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ABSTRACT
Responses to Transnational Non-governmental 
Terrorism in Kenya and the United States:
An Anthropological Analysis
by
Kennedy G. Ondieki
Dr. Gary B. Palmer, Examination Committee Chair 
Professor o f  Anthropology & Ethnic Studies 
University o f  Nevada, Las Vegas
Terrorism is an ancient hum an phenomenon. In contemporary societies, 
however, terrorist attacks affect every country in one form or another. Hardly can 
any continent, region, or community claim immunity from it. Its causes, 
characteristics, and controlling mechanisms are as diverse and complex as there are 
terrorist groups. The impacts o f terrorism, on other hand, are lethal and far-reaching 
as are government responses against it. This study began as an attempt to examine 
governmental and survivor responses and reactions in regard to the attacks o f the 
American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania on August 7, 1998. Then the horrific 
attacks against the U.S. W orld Trade Center and Pentagon occurred on September 11, 
2001. Because these attacks were planned, ordered, and financed by Osama bin 
Laden and his al-Qaeda infrastructure (a transnational non-governmental enterprise), 
the focus o f  this study shifted to examine (i) al-Qaeda's organizational structure, 
recruitment methods, tactics, and modus operandi (ii) how the governments o f Kenya 
and America responded to these attacks and the counter-measures they put in place to 
prevent future terrorist operations, and (iii) the reactions and coping mechanisms o f
I I I
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the U.S. embassy bomb survivors in Nairobi. The aim o f this study is to provide 
victim izer-victim perspectives and Kenyan-American viewpoints o f  terrorism.
Various paradigms were employed to examine the problem of terrorism. They 
included: (i) “clash o f civilizations”, (ii) “clash o f  globalization” , (iii) “root-causes 
theory”, (iv) M arxist theory, and (v) revitalization movement theory. This study 
relied heavily on library materials and sources such as recent articles, books, journals, 
the Internet, and media outlets for information. Supplementary data were acquired by 
conducting field interviews with the Nairobi bomb survivors and compared them with 
inform ation acquired from m edia sources o f  those affected by the September 11 
attacks. This study finds that contrary to the claims by government officials that al- 
Q aeda has been dismantled because its members have either been killed or arrested, 
the war on global terrorism is far from over because al-Qaeda’s senior leaders, Osama 
bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, are still at large. For this reason, if  for no other, it 
would be premature to write bin Laden’s and al-Zawahiri’s and their disciples’ last 
obituaries. Because the al-Qaeda network is now believed to have sleeper cells in 
more than eighty countries around the world which can be activated at any time to 
conduct terrorist operations and execute suicide-bombings, every country and society 
is vulnerable. The recent attacks in London, Egypt, and Jordan are stark reminders 
that terrorism is real and lethal and al-Q aeda’s operatives are still a threat. Therefore, 
governm ent officials need not only the political will and resolve to fight al-Q aeda’s 
ideology o f  hate and its galaxies o f violent groups, but also a multilateral strategy to 
engage the multidimensional character of violent Islamists. In addition, state 
authorities need to be prepared to respond to terrorist attacks when they do occur to
IV
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mitigate disruption o f life, security, and economies. State officials also need to assist 
terrorism victims and survivors to make it easier for them to cope with their plight.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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PREFACE
Terrorism is the cancer o f  the modem  world. No state is immune to it. It is a 
dynamic organism which attacks the healthy flesh o f the surrounding society. It 
has the essential hallmark o f malignant cancer: Unless treated, and treated 
drastically, its growth is inexorable, until it poisons and engulfs the society on 
which it feeds and drags it down to destruction.
—Paul Johnson, “The Cancer o f  Terrorism ,” Terrorism: How the West Can Win, 1986:31
In the recent transnational non-govemm ental terrorist attacks, particularly the mass
murders o f  the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam on August 7, 1998, the
choreographed attacks on the W orld Trade Center and the Pentagon in N ew  York City
and W ashington D C. on September 11, 2001, the attacks in Afghanistan, Iraq, Indonesia,
Israel, M orocco, Pakistan, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Spain, and Turkey, and m ost
recent attacks in London and Egypt, state officials, media consultants, policy analysts,
terrorist specialists, the victim s’ families and survivors, and the general public asked and
still ask: “W hy”? Mahajan (2002:13) noted that in the aftermath o f these calamitous
attacks question, “why do they [terrorists] hate us?” reverberated in the media, at public
and private institutions, and in the streets o f the countries that were affected by terrorism .
Specifically, in the days, months, and even years after the attacks, many people in the
countries that were victimized struggled with the questions why the terrorists targeted
them and w hether or not the attacks could have been prevented. None, however, have
struggled harder than the people, victims, and survivors o f New York City, W ashington
D C., Nairobi, and Dar as Salaam who were among the first to experience transnational
non-governmental terror atrocities. Scholars, government officials, media analysts,
policy analysts, and terrorism experts attempting to understand terrorism arc confronted
with the enormous task o f seeking meaningful, discernable, and appropriate explanations
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
critical to discerning this complex and intractable phenomenon. The explanations for 
terrorism are often controversial and elusive (Hamm 1997; Talbott and Chanda 2001; 
Hoge and Rose 2001 ; Alexander and A lexander 2002).
In the cases o f  the simultaneous U.S. embassies bombings in Nairobi and D ar es 
Salaam and the multiple attacks in New York City, Washington D C., and over the fields 
o f  Pennsylvania, scholars and journalists, am ong others, have conducted extensive 
research and interviews o f  the people who were either victims or witnesses to the 
tragedies. During and after the attacks, the public was inundated with an avalanche o f  
information from the media, Congressional and intelligence oversight com mittee reports, 
and academic articles and books on the subject o f  terrorism, scrambling in a concerted 
effort to provide insight as to what happened, how it happened, why it happened, and 
what should be done to ensure that it does not happen again (Jenkins 2001; The 9/11 
Commission Report 2004; Scheuer 2004; Hoge and Rose 2001; Booth and Dunne 2002).
Unfortunately, the truth is buried deeply within this mountain o f information. But as 
Shakespeare once wrote: “There is some soul o f goodness in things evil/W ould men 
observingly distill it out” (quoted in Hamm 1997, p. viii). The raison de 'etre for this 
study is to attempt to distill out the subject o f  terrorism, however complex and 
uncomfortable it may be. Until recently, many people and societies dismissed terrorism 
as something incapable o f  penetrating their lives. In societies where terrorists have been 
able to penetrate, the loss o f life, the destruction o f property, the disruption o f commerce, 
and the cost o f  fighting terrorism have been enormous. As for the actual victims and 
survivors, coping is painful and challenging ordeal (Hamm 1997; Alexander and 
Alexander 2002; The 9/11 Commission Report 2004; Strasser and Whitey 2004; Fink and
XI
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Mathias 2002; Akhahenda 2002).
Specifically, the basic fundamental problem facing the victims and survivors is how 
to reconcile what they experienced, lost, suffered, and witnessed with what they learned 
in the aftermath o f  the tragedies. That reconciliation, as many observers suggest, is how  
they will make sense o f  the vicious attacks that changed their lives with what happened 
on those dreadful “days o f infamy” (Hamm 1997; Alexander and Alexander 2002; 
W eimann and W inn 1994; Fink and M athais 2002). But as victims, survivors, and their 
families are making every effort to deal with their loss and suffering, thus moving on 
w ith their lives, some families o f  the victims and survivors o f terrorism are still having 
problem s dealing with the tragedy. Furthermore, the general public in the societies that 
were targeted by terrorism are still having problems grasping the rationale or justification 
behind such unprovoked attacks (Laqueur 2004; Alexander and Alexander 2002; The 
9/11 Commission Report 2004).
In reference to the attacks o f September 11, Talbott and Chanda (2001 :x) noted that 
these attacks probably killed more Americans than all terrorist calamities and incidents o f  
the previous three decades combined. They estimated that the atrocity was nearly thirty 
times greater than that o f the Oklahom a City bombing in 1995 and about double that o f 
Pearl Harbor in 1945. Referring to the Oklahoma City bombing, Mark S. Hamm (1997: 
viii) observed that no other crime in American history more clearly epitomized the 
Chinese proverb: “ Kill one, frighten ten thousand.” But as the terrorist death toll of 
September 11 demonstrated, one can perhaps advance the Chinese proverb even further 
by saying: Kill three thousand and frighten tens o f millions o f people across the globe. 
Moreover, David E. Apter (1997:1), quoting from an editorial in the New York Times
.XU
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stated: “In no previous age have people shown so great an aptitude and appetite for 
killing millions o f other people for reasons o f  race, religion or class.”
These sentiments are equally shared among many scholars and policy analysts who 
assert that the choreographed macabre attacks on America on Septem ber 11 and the many 
other terrorist attacks before and after September 11 were not only aimed at killing 
thousands people, but also were meant to inculcate fear and create a climate o f  insecurity 
among the general public in order to reach a wider audience beyond the actual intended 
targets (Combs 2003; Jenkins 2001; Laqueur 2001; Smith 2004; Bodansky 2000). 
Terrorists, therefore, want many people dead and many people watching. Terrorists 
thrive on having thousands o f  people killed and millions and perhaps billions o f  others 
following reports in the mass media.
Some scholars think that the terrorists’ motives are driven by tactical and strategic 
objectives. For example, Stephen Segaller (1987) noted that from a tactical standpoint, 
the aim o f the terrorist is to acquire publicity and recognition for his cause, be it real or 
imaginary. He further stated that, “For the terrorist with a cause to promote, the 
advertisers’ apocryphal saying holds true: all publicity is good, and bad publicity is better 
than none” (p. 11). Segaller maintained that without publicity, terrorism is analogous to 
“a weapon firing only blanks” (p. 11). From the strategic standpoint, he asserted that the 
terrorist’s objective is to achieve some type o f  long-term change i.e., to acquire political 
independence, liberation, or to impose one’s religious beliefs upon others (p.l 1).
For terrorists to achieve their short- and long-term objectives, m aximizing publicity or 
acquiring socio-political change, the media, primarily the television networks that 
provide coverage o f terrorist events play a role in making the terrorists' agendas known.
Xlll
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
For example, some scholars and observers have noted that there is a symbiotic
relationship between terrorism and the mass m edia (see for example. Combs 2003;
Hickey 1977; W eimann and Winn 1994). Journalist and reporter Ted Koppel, wrote:
The media, particularly television, and terrorists need one another, that they have 
what is fundamentally a symbiotic relationship. Without television, terrorism 
becom es rather like the philosopher’s hypothetical tree falling in the forest: no 
one hears it fall and therefore it has no reason for being. And television without 
terrorism , while not deprived o f  all interesting things in the world, is nonetheless 
deprived o f  one o f the most interesting (quoted in Weimann and W inn 1994:51).
Going by this statement, one can argue that whereas terrorists rely on television coverage 
to maximize exposure or reach out to a larger audience in order to realize their socio­
political objectives, television personalities and networks, on the other hand, rely on the 
choreographed and sensational episodes o f  terrorist events to maximize profits and 
achieve higher ratings.
Cindy Combs (2003:138) pointed out that terrorism is “propaganda by the deed” 
because it captures the attention o f m illions o f  people around the world. She also argued 
that in m odem  societies, the media has becom e a tool that both the terrorists and 
journalists em ploy to achieve their intended objectives. She particularly stated that 
“This confluence o f interest between the media— who are only too happy to provide 
sensational events— has raised questions about the possibility o f complicity o f  the media 
in today’s terrorism ” (p. 138). Other scholars have also noted that terrorism and 
television feed upon each other for some type o f significant socio-political or economic 
gains (Hickey 1977; Segaller 1987; Combs 2 0 0 3 ). This parasitic nexus between 
terrorism and television is what Weimman and Winn (1994) refer to as lerrorvision.
The nature and dynamics o f modem terrorism have affected and changed the way this 
ancient, yet com plex phenomenon, is examined. For example, historically the general
X1V
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consensus am ong terrorism experts such as Brian M. Jenkins (1985:4) was that “terrorists 
want a lot o f  people watching and a lot o f people listening, and not a lot o f  people 
dead ...I see terrorism  as violence for effect. Terrorists choreograph dramatic accidents to 
achieve m aximum publicity, and in that sense, terrorism is theater.” According to 
Weinberg and Eubank (2002) contemporary terrorists want both many people dead and 
millions more watching. Considering the number o f people who were killed on 
September 11 and the kind o f coverage and publicity the attacks received locally, 
nationally, and internationally, one can conclude that the perpetrators, for all intents and 
purposes, knowingly or unknowingly, succeed in accomplishing some o f their 
objectives— killing thousands o f people, forcing millions to watch, and threatening 
billions o f  peoples’ lives, security, and self-image around the world (Alexander and 
Latter 1990; Combs 2003). But as some scholars such as Simonsen and Spindlove
(2000), Henderson (2001), and Segallar (1987) contend, terrorist perpetrators could 
probably not have accomplished their goals without the complicity o f the mass media.
Furthermore, some scholars and observers including Laqueur (2001) and Henderson
(2001) noted that in the 1960s, many “traditional” terrorist groups emerged from the left- 
wing o f the political spectrum that mostly subscribed to the Marxian doctrine: the 
necessity to use violence as a method o f struggle for collective purposes (e.g., liberation 
and freedom) But in the 1980s to the present, scholars have reported a significant wave 
o f  change from the traditional terrorists to modem terrorists as well as a shift o f ideology 
from the most extreme left to the most extreme right (Hoffman 1999; Laqueur 2001; 
Laqueur 2004; Ruthven 2002). On the extreme right, one finds radical religious ideology 
as epitomized by the fanatical Islamic group, al-Qaeda.
XV
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Generally speaking, scholars contend that up until the end the twentieth century, both 
types o f terrorism, traditional and m odem  continued to play significant roles in 
international politics. The real problems and challenges that scholars, government 
officials, the intelligence community, and the law enforcement agencies face in the 
twenty-first century is that the patterns and the methods o f operation o f the new brand o f 
terrorists are less clear and unpredictable. For example. Combs (2003:2-3) asserted that 
the willingness to use weapons o f  mass destruction against civilians shows how lethal 
and dangerous the new wave o f  terrorists will become in the twenty-first century. M ost 
frightening o f  all, however, is the thought o f  not knowing what techniques and effects the 
next waves o f  terror might entail and bring.
But if  the truth can calm the fury and suffering, the loss of life and property, and the 
cost o f  fighting and controlling terrorism, it is imperative that we understand the cultural, 
economic, historical, political, religious, and sociological factors that contribute to 
terrorist attacks in the first place. More than anything, the explanation o f  why 
transnational non-state terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda commit heinous crimes against 
defenseless noncombatants deserves thorough analysis. To accomplish this goal, this 
study examines case studies o f two very different countries, Kenya and the United States, 
to discem  how they have responded.
To study the culture o f terrorism in general and to analyze the dynam ics o f 
transnational non-governmental terrorism in particular, there is always the first and 
obvious question, “ Where to begin?” (W hite 1982:1). Scholars and terrologists 
(terrorism specialists) wrestle with some o f the most complex and perplexing questions: 
Who is a terrorist? What is the definition o f terrorism? What are the motives o f
X V I
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terrorism? W hy do some individuals or groups choose terrorism to express their 
grievances? Why are some societies culturally more violent than others? W hat are the 
effects o f  terrorism ? What are its lessons? How can it be mitigated? What mechanisms 
are effective for fighting global terrorism ? Attempts to analyze terrorism, must, 
therefore, contend with the “whats” “whos”, “whys”, and “hows” , because these 
questions are significant components in the overall understanding o f the calculus o f 
terrorism. Because this study focuses on terrorist operations orchestrated and conducted 
by non-govemm ental organizations also referred to by Noam Chomsky (1986:vii) as 
“retail terrorism ”, I ask: (i) Can we define transnational terrorism as a cultural 
phenom enon? (ii) What is al-Qaeda’s organizational structure, recruitment methods, and 
modus o p érande  (iii) Why is terrorism becom ing increasingly a common weapon for 
fundam entalist groups promoting socio-economic, political, religious, or ideological 
agendas? (iv) “How does traditional anthropological analysis o f primitive law and 
customs help us to understand m odem  terrorism ?” (Leach 1977:6) (v) Do different 
societies or peoples react differently when faced with similar terrorist tragedies?
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION: TERRORISM DEFINITIONS,
THEORIES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
There was no pause, no pity, no interval o f relenting rest. ...In the universal fear 
and distrust that darkened the time, all the usual harmless ways o f life were 
changed.
—Charles Dickens, A Tale o f  Two Cities, [1859]
On the morning o f August 7, 1998, terrorist suicide-bombers drove trueks filled with 
explosives into the U.S. embassies in two East African cities— Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar 
es Salaam, Tanzania. They killed 253 people, among them twelve Americans and eleven 
Tanzanians. In Kenya they wounded 5, 000 more. Almost immediately, the attacks were 
linked to Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda terrorist network. The impact from these 
attacks was catastrophic in terms o f the loss o f lives, destruction o f property, and the 
disruption o f economic infrastructure. It was particularly damaging to the tourism 
industry, which is the major source o f foreign currency in the two African nations 
(Bodansky 2000; Alexander and Alexander 2002)
Many buildings near the embassy in Nairobi were seriously damaged. The Ufundi 
Cooperative House, a seven-story office building which held several offices, small 
businesses, and a secretarial college was leveled. The entire building was reduced to 
piles o f twisted metal and concrete, killing many people instantly and trapping many 
more in the wreckage. The twenty-one story Cooperative building, home to several 
governmental ministries and private businesses, also adjacent to the Ufundi building and 
the U.S embassy, was severely damaged. Other buildings were also affected, including
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Foreign Affairs, Law Courts, Parliament, Office o f the President, the Coffee Board, the 
Railway Station, Railway Headquarters, Electricity House, Post and Tele­
communications House, and Pioneer building. The impact o f the explosion was felt 
throughout the surrounding areas near the American embassy, where many people 
suffered injuries as windows shattered up to ten blocks away. Because the explosion 
took place at mid-morning, the streets around the U.S. embassy were particularly busy. 
The busiest streets included Moi Avenue and Haile Selassie Avenue where the U.S. 
embassy was located. Immediately after the East African attacks, many world leaders, 
African heads o f state, victims and survivors o f the blast, and the general public, both 
inside and outside the East African countries, condemned the attacks, reacted with 
outrage, and demanded retaliation (McGeary 1998:32-35). Among those world leaders 
who condemned the attacks against Americans and their allies in Africa was U.S. 
President W illiam Clinton who vowed to do whatever it took for however long necessary 
to capture the perpetrators and bring them to justice (Cooperman 1998:29). On October 
20, 1998, Clinton ordered military retaliation in the form of cruise missiles directed at bin 
Laden’s hideout and terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and at a pharmaceutical 
factory, alleged to be a chemical-weapons plant in Khartoum, Sudan {The 
9/11 Commission 2004; Miniter 2003).
Many people, especially those in America, thought that the retaliations in Afghanistan 
and the Sudan were too little, too late. For example, critics argued that President 
C linton’s decisions to authorize preemptive military attacks against Afghanistan and 
Sudan were in essence an attempt to “wag the dog” to divert attention from his personal
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
scandal with White House intern, Monica Lewinsky (Bergen 2002:123; Emerson 
2002:150-151).
The current U.S. President, George W. Bush, while running for the office o f the 
presidency in 2000, claimed that Clinton’s decision to drop surface-to-air missiles worth 
millions o f dollars on Afghanistan caves, only to hit a herd o f donkeys, was a waste o f 
United States resources and taxpayers’ monies. Bush was claiming that the Clinton 
administration and the intelligence agencies under his leadership squandered significant 
opportunities to prevent and thwart the attacks against the U.S embassies in East Africa 
and failed to capture bin Laden and his global terrorist network {The 9/11 Commission 
Report 2004; Clarke 2004; W oodward 2004; Miniter 2003).
But terrorist threats directed against Americans were according to the counter-terrorist 
Czar Richard A. Clarke, “important but not urgent” during the early months of the Bush 
administration (Clarke 2004; Strasser and Whitney 2002). In short, the attacks on the 
American embassies in the African cities made little apparent impact on the psyche of 
government officials in America. In addition, the lessons from the African attacks 
seemed to have been relegated to the dustbin o f history and became another footnote in 
the annals o f terrorism until the spectacular choreographed attacks against the United 
States when Americans suffered the largest loss o f life and destruction o f property on 
their own soil since the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941.
On September 11, 2001, nineteen men o f Middle Eastern and North African descent 
operating as al-Qaeda suicide-terrorists, wielding knives and box-cutters, hijacked four 
American commercial aircraft full o f fuel and passengers and crashed them into the twin 
towers o f the World Trade Center in New York City, the Pentagon in Washington D C.,
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and a third in a location, not the intended target, a field in Pennsylvania {The 9/11 
Commission Report 2004; Alexander and Alexander 2002; Talbott and Chanda 2001 ; 
Hoge and Rose 2001). The Pentagon incurred severe damage and twin towers o f the 
World Trade Center, the symbol o f U.S. financial power, collapsed.
The costs o f  these simultaneous and massive attacks were phenomenal. More than 
3,000 people perished. Thousands more were injured. Many office complexes adjacent 
to the twin towers collapsed, and many business enterprises were severely affected. 
Commercial airlines and many businesses were forced to file for bankruptcy or to 
downsize resulting in severe losses o f jobs (Alexander and Alexander 2002). In short, the 
economic impact was and still is being felt. The costs included rebuilding “Ground 
Zero” and the Pentagon, bailing businesses out o f bankruptcy, compensating victims, 
fighting the w ar against terrorism on two fronts (i.e., at home and abroad), and protecting 
Americans and their interests around the world. Other costs now include the rebuilding 
o f Afghanistan and Iraq after the demise o f the Taliban and Saddam Hussein regimes.
Immediately after the attacks o f September 11, bin Laden and al-Qaeda were 
pinpointed as the perpetrators. As America and the world condemned the atrocities and 
as Americans mourned the loss o f innocent life and the destruction o f property. President 
Bush vowed to hunt the culprits down and bring them to justice (Alexander and 
Alexander 2002). He publicly pledged to the American people that he would do 
everything necessary to protect them at home and abroad from the “evil scourge o f 
terrorism.” As a result. Bush put the world on alert by issuing what has now become the 
“Bush Doctrine” : “You are either with us, or you are with the terrorists.” He claimed,
“If you harbor terrorists, you are a terrorist; if you aid and abet terrorists, you are a
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terrorist, and you will be treated like one” (Talbott and Chanda 2001 :xv; Chomsky 
2002:16; W echsler 2001:129).
Moreover, President Bush added that in the war against global terrorism, he would not 
make distinctions between the terrorists who attacked America on September 11 and 
countries that harbor them. He not only vowed “to drain the swamps o f global terrorism” 
(Mahajan 2002; Herbst 2003) and cut the financial life-line o f the “evildoers” , but he also 
pledged to “starve terrorists’ funding, turn them against each other, rout them out o f their 
hiding places and bring them to justice.” In his State o f the Union speech. Bush pointed 
out that, “America will never seek a permission slip to defend the security o f our 
country” and “our grief has turned to anger, and anger to resolution,” (Dionne 2004:3; 
Simon 2001:6-7). President Bush further indicated that he would not hesitate to invade 
countries that harbor and provide sanctuaries, logistics, training, and financial assistance 
to terrorists. Among the countries he was referring to were those he dubbed the “axis of 
evil”— Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. In the same breath. Bush forewarned the world 
financial institutions and their related enterprises that, “ if you do business with terrorists, 
if  you support them or sponsor them, you will not do business with the United States of 
America” (W echsler 2001:129).
Six weeks after the attacks. Bush authorized surgical military strikes against the 
Taliban regime in Afghanistan. In March o f 2003, he ordered U.S.-led coalition forces to 
invade Iraq. Consequently, U.S.-led coalition forces toppled two o f the most brutal 
regimes in the world, the Taliban under the leadership o f Mullah Omar, thus severely 
disrupting al-Qaeda, and Iraq’s Saddam Hussein.
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Although President Bush takes credit for successfully disposing o f these two very 
brutal regimes, there are still many unanswered questions as to why he invaded Iraq when 
evidence showed that bin Laden and Saddam Hussein or al-Qaeda and Iraq were not 
linked in the September 11 terror attacks against America. Critics think that the evidence 
provided by the Bush administration that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons o f mass 
destruction (WMD) was misleading because to date such weapons have not been found. 
Other critics even go so far as to say that President Bush invaded Iraq to finish the job his 
father, Bush senior, failed to finish during the early I990’s G ulf War, to topple Saddam. 
(Unger 2004:247-254)
The accounts o f Richard A. Clarke, Against A ll Enemies: Inside Am erica's War on 
Terror (2004), and Bob W oodward, Plan o f  Attack (2004), suggested that President Bush 
failed to take the threat o f terrorism seriously in his early months in the White House 
because he was preoccupied with planning to invade Iraq. Clarke and Woodward 
remarked that unlike President Clinton, Bush gave the threat o f al-Qaeda lower priority 
prior to the September 11 attacks, and in the aftermath o f the attacks, diverted his 
attentions to Iraq. In other words, these authors argue that the president should have 
preemptively attacked bin Laden, not Saddam Hussein and that Bush should never have 
strayed into Iraq. This putative presidential fixation and diversion from the war on 
terrorism played a significant role in the formation o f Congressional committee and 
intelligence hearings and specifically the establishment o f the September 11 Inquiry into 
the events that led to the terrorist attacks against America.
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Before his testimony to the September 11 Commission, the counterterrorism expert
under both the Clinton and Bush administrations, Richard A. Clarke, began by
apologizing to the American people, particularly the victims and survivors o f the terrorist
attacks by stating the following:
To the loved ones o f the victims o f 9-11, to them who are here in this room, to 
those who are watching on television, your government failed you...Those 
entrusted with protecting you, failed you. And I failed you. We tried hard, but that 
doesn’t matter because we failed. And for that failure, I would ask, once all the 
facts are out, for your understanding and for your forgiveness (Clarke 2004).
According to the final report o f the National Commission on the Terrorist Attacks 
Upon the United States (also known as The 9/11 Commission: xv), an independent 
bipartisan panel directed “to investigate the facts and circumstances relating to the 
terrorist attacks o f September 11, 2001”, summarized its findings as follows: Both the 
Clinton and Bush administrations failed to take the threats o f international terrorism 
seriously; there were severe systemic flaws and institutional failures within and between 
federal government agencies; there were serious bureaucratic barriers and red-tape within 
federal agencies that contributed to their failure to share available information; there was 
a serious lack o f common sense and imagination among and within federal government 
officials that hindered their sense o f judgm ent and decision-making; the intelligence 
community missed superb opportunities to identify terrorists and prevent terror attacks; 
there were deep fundamental, dysfunctional practices within the intelligence agencies, in 
particular, the CIA and FBI, in the way they gathered, analyzed, and presented 
information to decision-makers; there was no operational, collaborative relationship 
between al-Qaeda and Iraq or between bin Laden and Saddam Hussein regarding the 
attacks on America; and the global intelligence agencies, the CIA, MI-6 and Mossad
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failed to provide adequate information on the whereabouts o f  Saddam Hussein’s weapons 
o f mass destruction {The 9/11 Commission Report 2004: xvii-xv; Strasser and Whitney 
2004:175-176).
The authors o f The 9/11 Commission, however, admitted that neither Presidents 
Clinton nor Bush were to blame for the attacks nor can any single individual or federal 
agency be blamed for the terror attacks on America. Additionally, the report indicated 
that the institutional failures were not only in place over many years and administrations, 
but also the blame has to be shared among and between government officials who 
generally failed to use their imagination and common sense to connect dots, follow leads, 
share information, and make adequate decisions to protect America and Americans from 
attack. In essence, U.S. government authorities and officials simply squandered 
significant opportunities to identify and thwart the attacks o f September 11 and other 
attacks prior to the September 11.
Although the techniques used to attack and assault the two African cities on August 7, 
1998, and the two American cities on September 11, 2001, were quite different— the use 
o f truck bombs in the former and the use o f commercial aircraft in the latter, the impact 
(loss o f life, destruction o f property, disruption o f commerce and economic infrastructure, 
the psychological fear and insecurity that these catastrophic attacks inculcated in the 
human psyche) was and still is in many ways more similar than they are different in 
Africa and America. The same can be said about the many other societies around the 
world that have now become victims o f terrorism.
At a time o f increasing modernization, globalization, and worldwide vulnerability, the 
study of disasters, particularly those wrought by mankind, violence has become an
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important focus for anthropological research— one where the sub-fields o f anthropology 
are now utilized and synthesized to address the multidimensionality o f the effects that 
these social disasters, especially those that terrorism brings to a society’s or a nation’s 
socio-political and economic structures (Hoffman and Oliver-Smith 2002).
Using data from the new wave o f terrorism (NWT) perpetrated by neo-terrorist 
organizations such as al-Qaeda, I intend to explore the causes and consequences of 
attacks against one African city, Nairobi, and one American city. New York City. Even 
though Dar es Salaam and Washington D C. were also affected during the attacks, the 
focus o f this study is on Nairobi and New York because the deaths, injuries, damage, and 
destruction were much more severe and extensive. Nonetheless, information on Dar es 
Salaam and W ashington will be used when necessary to bolster and support my 
discussion o f Nairobi and New York.
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Figure 1. U.S Embassy Bomb Site, Nairobi, Figure 2. The World Trade Center Bomb Site, New York 2001 
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Why a cross-cultural comparative study o f terrorism? Anthropologists Schmidt and 
Schroder (2001:6) stated that, “Violence is never so specific and culturally bounded that 
it cannot be compared. There is a long tradition in anthropology o f linking types o f 
collective violence to types o f societies and arranging them on an evolutionary scale.”
For example, one can study the methods that primitive and civilized societies employ to 
ivage wars. From a military standpoint, one can compare, for instance, the Zulus under 
Shaka to the refined fighting tactics and weaponry employed by modem nation-states 
(Tumey-High 1991-250-253). Whereas Shaka’s warriors used primitive short-stabbing 
spears, assegai, to enhance their victory in the battle against the white settlers in Southern 
Africa, contemporary societies and groups, such as the United States and al-Qaeda,
10
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employ nuclear weapons, surface-to-air missiles, smart bombs, car bombs, and suicide- 
bombers to fight their enemies.
Schmidt and Schroder (2001:6) further noted that from a functional level, violence can 
be studied comparatively because, “Violence is a basic form o f social action that occurs 
under concrete conditions, targets concrete victims, creates concrete settings and 
produces concrete results. All o f these dimensions are clearly accessible to comparative 
analysis.” In other words, terrorism can be studied and compared in relation to its causes, 
courses, and consequences. One can compare cultures o f violence and the cultural 
contexts o f violence.
The causes o f violence can be attributed to the conflicts wrought by competition over 
scarce natural material resources or social status and prestige. Other causes that 
contribute to clashes and confrontations are cultural, political, religious, and ideological. 
Part o f the human antagonistic relationship can be explained historically as the legacy of 
colonialism or imperialism, but as Schmidt and Schroder (2001:7) noted, “to persist to 
the present day, there must also be more recent incentives for perpetuating conflict.”
Such causes or triggering mechanisms can be oppression, neo-colonialism, globalization, 
or modernization. These causes are accessible to researchers.
Violent events are often highly visible. They usually take place in public arenas. 
Spectacular events are easier for scholars and researchers to document and reconstruct. 
Schmidt and Schroder (2001:7) stated that, “long-term confrontations explode in violent 
clashes that can be described and analysed as events, forms o f social action clearly 
marked off in space and time from everyday practice....” In short, because events such 
as terrorist operations occur in public places and affect the general populace, records of
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such events are not only stored in museum and library archives; they are also stored in 
people’s memories and psyches for many years and generations. This makes it easier for 
scholars to access them and reconstruct their occurrences and thus make suitable 
comparisons.
Violence causes not only the loss o f lives, property, and security, but also the loss o f
significant symbols— cultural, financial, and political. An example is the destruction o f a
country’s financial symbol as was the case with the twin towers o f the World Trade
Center in New York. Therefore, violence has emotional and intangible effects as well as
more obvious physical and tangible effects. Schmidt and Schroder (2001:8) stated:
Violence produces unique experiences that are culturally mediated and stored in a 
society’s collective memory. Their representation forms an important resource for 
the perception o f legitimation o f future violence. Yet it also produces tangible 
results ranging from dead bodies to the redistribution o f space, the relocation of 
people or the occupation o f new territory. These are empirical facts that can be 
discerned physically or reconstructed from historical record, but these facts also 
become malleable in cultural discourse. There exists no more important resource 
for an ideology o f violence than the representation o f past violence, o f former 
dead, former loss and former suffering.
As post-modernist approaches gain popularity in the study o f contemporary problems
such as terrorism and conflict, cross-cultural comparisons have lost favor. But
anthropologists Gingrich and Fox (2002:6-7) have offered justifications for continuing
comparative studies by stating that:
A nthropology’s uncertainty regarding comparative methodologies is undoubtedly 
related to the state o f the world at present. In fact, this final factor amounts to a 
significant theoretical dilemma. On the one hand, globalization in all its aspects—  
from transnational m edia flow  to mass m igrations— connects more and more 
human beings and makes them experience similar conditions. Individuals may 
respond to these new interconnections in varying ways: sometimes, converging on 
their cultural similarities; at other times, conserving or even emphasizing their 
cultural differences. These global connections and the heterogeneous local 
responses to them legitimate a renewed comparative agenda for anthropology and 
related fields. If  people all around the globe are increasingly reacting to
12
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comparable conditions, it becomes a more obvious challenge for scholars to 
compare how people react and what results culturally from their reactions.
Therefore, because globalization and technological innovations (cyberspace, 
communications, and transportation) play significant roles in transforming the world into 
one “big village” where different cultures and peoples can interact quickly and 
experience similar effects from contemporary problems such as terrorist operations, 
comparative studies are indicated. Because these are similar events, people have both 
similar and different reactions thus making comparison possible. A comparative study 
such as the one proposed in this project can provide insight for policy-makers as they 
attempt to search for possible preventive solutions to the problem o f terrorism for better 
ways to assist the victims o f  terrorism. Let us turn our attention to the definition o f the 
terrorism.
Defining Terrorism
“A concept that is boundless cannot be rationally defined.”
—Franz Neuman, Behemoth (1943:75)
Although terrorism is widely debated and researched, it is also one of the least 
understood subjects in the study o f contemporary societies. Terrorism eludes precise and 
compressive definitions (Jenkins 2001; Hoffman 1999; Laqueur 1977; Schmid 1988). 
Paul L. Bremer (1988:1-4) observed that even though terrorism has inspired large 
volum es of literature and produced scores o f self-styled experts, analysts, and consultants 
examining the phenomenon, there is still no general consensus on what terrorism entails. 
Terrorism is like pornography whereby everyone has a general impression o f  what it is 
without agreeing on its details. Others attribute the difficulty o f defining terrorism to the
13
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fact that it means different things to different people (Alexander and Alexander 2002, 
Azar 1988; Emerson 2001; Kupperman and Kamen 1989; Kushner 1998; Taheri 1987; 
White 1991; Schaffert 1992). Perhaps Donna Schlagheck (1988:1) stated it best when 
she wrote, “Terrorism is now one o f the paradoxes o f our times. Its threat is as pervasive 
as nuclear w ar.... Its consequences are widely publicized in excruciating details... .There 
is no agreement on how to define it.” According to Schmid (1988), the quest to define 
terrorism has produced more than one hundred definitions and yet none o f the proposed 
definitions have achieved universal acceptance. One reason for this can be found in the 
popular aphorism that one m an’s terrorist is another’s liberator (Taheri 1987).
Anthropologist Edward A. Hoebel (1967:18-19) warned us regarding the difficulty of 
absolute clarity, especially when dealing with concepts that encompass a broad range of 
things. Attempts to define concepts that are complex can be likened to “the quest for the 
Holy Grail” (p. 18). Hoebel also noted that, “those who have learned humility have given 
over the attempt to define concepts” (p. 18). This being the argument, however, he stated 
that concepts are not “incapable o f definition, for a definition is merely an expression of 
the acknowledged attributes o f a concept or phenomenon” (p. 19).
If concepts such as violence or terrorism were beyond definition, it would be because 
their attributes were unknown or they simply did not exist. If  the latter argument is true, 
then one is forced to ask whether the generations o f scholars, analysts, journalists, and 
terrologists (terrorism experts) have been living in a wonderful fool’s paradise (Hoebel 
1967:19). This study argues that this is not the case. Although providing an appropriate 
definition o f terrorism has proved to be a challenging task due to its complexity and 
although a universally acceptable definition o f terrorism is impossible— as one person’s
14
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terrorist will always be another’s liberator— it can be argued that terrorism is what 
terrorism does, difficult to define, but easy to detect when we see it.
An Operational Definition o f Terrorism
In this study, I use a definition o f terrorism that has a fairly broad universal consensus. 
It is based on three key criteria (Wilkson 1990). First, terrorism is an act intended to 
inculcate terror (Merari and Friedland 1985; Schmid 1988; Wilkson 1990). This is not to 
argue, however, that terrorism does not evoke other emotional reactions among different 
peoples and societies which may include anger, confusion, or despair, but rather that the 
goal o f terrorist acts is to undermine its sense o f security (Smith 2004). In other words, 
modem terrorists are not interested in the number o f people killed during an attack or the 
amount o f destruction inflicted on targets per se, but rather in the number o f people 
threatened and in the amount o f fear and terror generated worldwide.
Second, terrorism plays to the audience beyond its actual victims or targets (Bandura 
1990; Schmid 1988). For instance, Schmid (1988) discussed the difference between 
targets o f  terrorism (i.e., the victims)— who are chosen to symbolize a larger group, and 
the targets o f terror (i.e., the audience)— who identify with the victims and a larger group. 
Though sometimes instrumental (e.g., when victims are the actual persons that terrorists 
want to hurt or eliminate), terroristic violence is also symbolic in nature. Terrorist attacks 
are planned covertly and target non-combatants to maximize fear, paranoia, and anxiety 
among and between various peoples and societies. Terrorists engage in both physical and 
psychological warfare (Smith 2004:410; Booth and Dunne 2002).
15
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Third, terrorist organizations engage in terrorist acts to further their objectives 
(Schmid 1988; W ilkinson 1990). These objectives may be economic, political, social, 
religious, or ideological. Although objectives vary from group to group, what is 
important, however, is that creating fear through terror is an intentional act through which 
a group can achieve its goals and objectives rather than through unintentional 
consequences o f the act (Jenkins 1985). Bombing campaigns that nation-states conduct 
during wartime can create fear in non-combatants and civilians, these campaigns can only 
be considered terroristic when fear is being produced intentionally in order to enhance 
other objectives such as pressuring a regime in power to change its behavior and actions 
or toppling an unpopular regime (Smith 2004:410).
Given these considerations, I offer a succinct working definition o f terrorism as the 
deliberate, calculated, premeditated, and unlawful use o f  violence or the threat o f  
violence to create an atmosphere o ffea r  with the intention o f  coercing and intimidating 
state authorities fo r  the purposes o f  advancing economic, political, social, religious, or 
ideological agendas. In other words, terrorism is a form  o f  violent struggle in which 
violence is intentionally used against civilians to advance certain agendas. Individuals 
or groups who resort to the use o f  terror intend not only to communicate some type o f  
political message to the targeted audience but also hope to produce mass hysteria, 
paranoia, and insecurity fa r  beyond the immediate victims or physical targets to 
influence the behaviors o f  larger and broader audiences and to influence decision­
making processes o f  targeted countries and societies (Hoffman 1999; Kushner 1989; 
Schmid 1988; Alexander and Alexander 2002; Schaffert 1992).
16
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This definition is based on three premises; (1) the essence o f the action— usually a 
form o f political struggle— such as protests, strikes, or demonstration; (2) the goal 
underlying terrorism—-usually a political motive— to overthrow governments, change 
economic and social policies or disseminate an ideology; and (3) the target o f the 
damage— usually civilians— killing non-combatants to inculcated fear and insecurity. In 
this way, terrorism can be distinguished from other forms o f political violence. The 
proposed definition emphasizes that terrorism is not the consequence o f random attacks 
against civilians who happen to be at the wrong place at the wrong time, but rather it is a 
deliberate and intentional act aimed purposely at killing and maiming civilians.
Terrorists often take advantage o f the relative vulnerability o f civilian “soft 
underbelly” targets as well as the tremendous fear and impact their actions cause. State 
military actions also kill and maim civilians but such actions are not usually viewed as 
terrorism but are rather considered unintended consequences. For example, the U.S. 
decision to drop nuclear bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki during the Second World 
War, U.S.-coalition forces’ decision to drop smart bombs in Iraq during the first G ulf 
war, and U.S.-led forces’ decision to invade Iraq thereby killing thousands o f civilians 
may not be considered as terroristic. Therefore, the distinction between state and non­
state aetions resides in the intentionality o f the act. This study focuses on actions that are 
conducted by non-state entities such as al-Qaeda. But before embarking on the issues 
raised and before presenting a more elaborate theory, it is important to examine some 
theories o f terrorism. Although theories are ubiquitous and diverse, there are a few 
principle ones.
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The Principle Theories o f Terrorism 
Over the decades, scholars, policy analysts, and terrorist experts have spent a great 
deal o f time and energy debating and researching terrorism. Nevertheless, there is still no 
consensus on a theory o f this ancient and complex phenomenon. In fact, many scholars 
and theorists no longer strive to explain phenomena or human behaviors by means o f 
grand theoretical systems (i.e., “unitary theories”). This being the case, there has been a 
concerted effort made by scholars in proposing theories critical for examining the 
phenomenon o f terrorism. These are theories worthy examining. They include: (i) the 
“clash o f civilizations”, (ii) the “clash o f globalization”, (iii) the “root-causes” theory,
(iv) the Marxist theory, and (v) the religious revitalization theory. These theories are not 
mutually exclusive, nor are they right or wrong per se. The study o f terrorism is a 
complex enterprise that calls for diverse analyses and perspectives (Henderson 2001 ; 
Bender and Leone 1986; Booth and Dunne 2002; Hershberg and Moore 2002).
The “Clash o f Civilizations” Theory 
In his seminal work. The Clash o f  Civilizations and the Remaking o f  World Order, 
Samuel P. Huntington (1996:19-39) argued that in the post-Cold W ar world, the most 
significant distinctions among peoples and societies, both those in developed and 
developing countries, will not necessarily be economic, political, or ideological forces, 
but rather cultural factors. Specifically, he argued that future global conflicts and wars 
would occur between the ‘tectonic plates” o f  civilizations or along the fault-lines o f 
ancient cultural programming.
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For example, he maintained that whenever peoples or nations seek to find out who 
they really are, the bulk o f their answers lies in generational practices or cherished values 
and beliefs, ancestry, customs, tradition, history, institutions, language, and religion, 
among others. People identity with their own tribes, ethnic groups, religious 
communities, nation-states, and, at the broader level, civilizations (p.21).
Furthermore, Huntington asserted that people use politics not only to promote and 
advance their interests but also to define who they are. Oftentimes, he observed that, 
“people and nations know who they are only when they know who they are not and often 
only when they know whom they are against” (p.21). Among the future clashes predicted 
by Huntington is a conflict between a revitalized Islam and the West. For Huntington, 
“The dangerous clashes o f the future are likely to rise from the interaction o f Western 
arrogance, Islamic intolerance, and Sinic assertiveness” (pp.28-29).
Huntington identified civilizations in terms of world religions and philosophies, 
Confucianism, Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, Judeo-Christianity, and Slavic-Orthodox 
philosophies. He argued that since there are deep distinctions and differences in terms of 
the cultural values, practices, and teachings among these religions, most likely they are 
bound to clash (pp.28-29).
Dinesh D ’Souza (2002:14-15) argued that the W estern industrial nations in general 
and the United States in particular must take Huntington’s warnings seriously and cease 
assuming that “the rest o f the world will uncritically embrace the principles o f Judeo- 
Christian civilization.” He asserted that in this new world order, local politics are the 
politics o f ethnicity and global politics are the politics o f  civilizations. D ’Souza, like
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Huntington, noted that future rivalries between the core (developed countries) and the 
periphery (developing countries) could be based upon the clash o f civilizations (p. 15).
One implication o f Huntington’s theory is that in the new world, the most pervasive 
and dangerous confrontations will not be between social classes, the “haves” and the 
“have-nots” (i.e., first- and third-world countries), or other economically defined groups, 
but rather, between peoples and societies belonging to different cultural backgrounds and 
entities (pp. 19-39). The September 11 attacks on America’s symbolic landmarks, the 
World Trade Center and the Pentagon (sites o f U.S. economic and military power), 
appear to bear this out.
Huntington’s theory has come under severe criticism. For example, Edward Said 
(2001) critiqued the cultural essentialism underlying his concept o f  a “civilization” as 
something discretely marked o ff from its neighbors (Herbst 2003; Mamdani 2004). Said 
noted that Huntington is an ideologue who is looking for another cold war between the 
“W est” and “the Rest”, who makes his “civilizations” and “identities” into “sealed-off 
entities” purged o f the “myriad o f currents and counter-currents that animate human 
history” (quoted in Ruthven 2002:241). He concluded that such interactions have over 
the centuries made it possible for “history not only to contain wars o f religion and 
imperial conquest, but also to be one o f  exchange, cross-fertilization and sharing”(quoted 
in Ruthven 2002:241).
Other critics, specifically Peter Bergen (2001:227), argued that Huntington’s clash o f 
civilizations thesis was essentially a seductive theory that generally explained the events 
and the political discourse o f the post-Cold War era. Bergen maintained that “The test o f 
such a theory is its applicability to a wide number o f situations, and certainly Huntington
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can point to a wealth o f examples: a bloody war in the Sudan between the Islamist regime 
and Christian rebels; continued wars between the Russians and Chechens; the Muslim 
insurgency in the Philippines; the Arabs versus the Jews in Israel; and now, perhaps, the 
events o f September 11” (p.230).
Furthermore, Bergen contended that the myriad o f conflicts around the globe have run 
inconveniently the opposite o f the world according to Huntington. For example, the 
bloodiest political violence, genocide during the 1990s, was not between civilizations, but 
between tribal and ethnic groups. The point is exemplified by the Hutu-Tutsi massacres 
in Rwanda, Burundi, and the Congo and on-going tribal and religious wars in other 
hotspots around the world (pp.227-231).
Additionally, critics contend that Huntington’s theory fails to explain, for instance, the 
frequency o f  conflicts that are emerging from within the developing countries 
themselves. Therefore, contrary to Huntington’s prediction that future conflicts would be 
between the w orld’s major civilizations, it appears that future conflicts will be, to borrow 
Bergen’s phrase, between the “clash o f acquaintances” (p.231), i.e., wars fought between 
peoples and societies with similar historical, territorial, cultural, ideological, linguistic, or 
religious backgrounds.
Moreover, examples that seem at first glance to conform to the idea o f the clash o f 
civilizations become more complicated when one takes a hard and deeper look at 
contemporary world conflicts— the tribal wars in Rwanda, Burundi, Somalia, Ethiopia, 
Sudan, Nigeria, Egypt, Algeria, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Ivory Coast (Africa); ethnic 
rivalries in Bosnia, Kosovo, Serbia, Chechnya (Eastern Europe), politico-religious 
confrontations in Pakistan, Kashmir, India, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, and the Philippines (
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Southwest and Southeast Asia); political conflicts in Northern Ireland and the Basque 
region o f Spain (Western Europe); political rivalries in Palestine, Iraq, Turkey, (the 
Middle East), or the on-going religious strife and conflicts in many parts o f the Middle 
East, especially those between Islamic fundamentalisms, the Shiites against Sunnis, the 
Wahhabis against the rest o f the Islamic dogma, and the al-Qaeda brand o f Islam against 
the rest o f the Arab and Muslim world. One detects a pattern o f confrontations and 
animosities waged and directed at peoples and societies that share similar socio-cultural 
backgrounds, geopolitical landscapes, or religious faiths.
Walter Laqueur (2001 and 2004) also argued that it is impossible to explain the 
current and frequent violent atrocities using the “clash o f civilizations” theory because 
the bloodiest confrontations have occurred not only between Muslim groups or states 
against the West, but also within the Muslim world itself. He added that this trend holds 
true for both interstate conflicts (e.g., the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s and the Iraq invasion 
o f Kuwait in the 1990s) as well as intrastate conflicts (such as the terrorism o f Algerian 
Islamists against their fellow citizens (Laqueur 2001:77-79). The same thing also applies 
to the persecution o f the Kurds in Iraq during Saddam Hussein’s dictatorial era and the 
civil war in Afghanistan during the Taliban’s brutal era. Additionally, one must consider 
the many assassination attempts, successful and unsuccessful, against Arab and Muslim 
leaders (Laqueur 2001:71-82)
It may be a more accurate predictor o f post-Cold War rivalries, and particularly, the 
many modem animosities and conflicts that we are currently witnessing. Nationalism is 
another motive that cuts across the “clash o f civilizations.” It applies to the Muslims in 
Kosovo, the Kurds in Iraq and Turkey, the Basques in Spain, the Irish Republican Army
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in Ireland, and the Palestinians in the Middle East. On a smaller scale, we see the 
rivalries that Michael Ignatieff, borrowing from Sigmund Freud, called the “narcissism o f 
minor differences” (i.e., wars fought between culturally and ethnically similar tribes) as 
epitomized by the many conflicts witnessed in contemporary African, Middles Eastern, 
Asian, and European countries and regions (Ignatieff 2003; Bergen 2002; Rushdie 2002). 
It is important, however, to note that where there are clashes o f confrontation within each 
major civilization, it is only a few people or groups who are engaged in conflict, as were 
the cases with the ethnic cleansings in Rwanda and areas within the former Yugoslavia.
The “Clash o f Globalization” Theory 
The idea that a nexus o f the free-market economy with democracy will transform the 
developing world and sweep away racial or ethnic hatred and religious fervors associated 
with underdevelopment, oppression, and exploitation has come under a great deal of 
criticism (Chua 2003). Proponents o f triumphant globalization argue that over the years 
this process has succeeded in transforming the world into a global village, whereby walls 
have been tom  down and borders submerged due to the new technological revolutions in 
information and communications infrastructures (Hoffman 2002:1). To benefit from 
globalization, nations and their citizens must be willing to be transparent, accountable, 
and competitive. But a nation that chooses “to stay closed invariably faces decline and 
growing discontent among its subjects who are eager for material progress. But if it opens 
up, it must accept a reduced role that is mainly limited to social protection, physical 
protection against aggression or civil war, and maintaining o f national identity (Hoffman 
2002:2).
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The champions o f this “epic without heroes”, globalization, include Thomas Friedman 
(2004) who contrasted barriers with open vistas, obsolescence with modernity, and state 
control with free markets. He sees in globalization the light o f dawn, the “golden 
straight)acket” that will force a contentious public to understand that the logic of 
globalization is that o f peace (since war would interrupt globalization and therefore 
progress) and democracy (because new technologies increase individual autonomy and 
encourage initiative).
As much as globalization generates opportunities and hope and elevates conditions of 
living in many countries, it also creates a new host o f social desires, stresses, insecurities, 
and frustrations (Chua 2003). In this case, globalization fails to resemble the one that 
many observers including Thomas Friedman celebrate. Stanley Hoffman (2002:2-4) 
argued that globalization has three components, each with its own set o f problems. The 
first is economic globalization, which results from recent revolutions in technology, 
information, trade, foreign investment, and international business enterprises. The main 
actors, movers, and shakers are companies, investors, banks, and private service 
industries, as well as state and international organizations. Hoffman noted that this 
present form o f capitalism, ironically foreseen by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, poses 
a central dilemma between efficiency and fairness (p.2). The specialization and 
integration o f firms make it possible to increase aggregate wealth, but the logic o f pure 
capitalism does not favor social justice (p.2). In this case, therefore, economic 
globalization has become a formidable cause for inequality among and within nation­
states and the desire for global competitiveness limits the aptitude o f states and other 
actors to address this problem (p.2).
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The second component is cultural globalization, which stems from technological 
breakthroughs, and economic globalization, which together foster the flow o f cultural 
goods. Under this component, “the key choice is between uniformization (often called 
‘Americanization’) and diversity” (p.2). As Hoffman observed, the end result is both 
“disenchantment o f the world” (in Max W eber’s words) and a reaction against 
uniformity. The latter takes “form in a renaissance o f local cultures and languages as 
well as assault against Western culture, which is denounced as an arrogant bearer o f 
secular, revolutionary ideology and a mask o f United States hegem ony” (p.2).
The third component is political globalization, a product o f both the economic and 
cultural globalization. It is characterized by the United States’ political institutions and a 
vast array o f international and regional organizations or trans-govemmental networks 
(specializing in areas such as law enforcement, intelligence, immigration, or justice). It is 
also marked by private institutions that are neither governmental nor purely national, for 
example. Doctors without Borders or Amnesty International (p.3). Hoffman noted that 
these agencies lack democratic accountability and transparency and are weak in scope, 
power, and authority. Again, much uncertainty hangs over the fate o f U.S. hegemony, 
which faces significant resistance abroad and is affected by U.S. policy decisions, 
primarily between the temptations o f  domination and isolation (p.3).
Although the benefits o f globalization are undeniable, the global market economy is 
by and large an American creation, rooted in the period after W orld War II and based on 
American economic might. Therefore, deep and protracted economic crisis in the United 
States could trigger a devastating blow to globalization and global stability as the Great 
Depression did or as the attacks o f September 11 demonstrated (Hoffman 2002).
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Globalization promotes the inclusion/exclusion dichotomy because it benefits rich 
countries and harms poor countries which culminates in the clash o f globalization 
(Hoffman 2002; Chua 2003).
One can argue that there is a nexus between globalization and violence. This is 
because people who sense that they are excluded or harmed by globalization may turn to 
violence to vent their anger and frustration. Moreover, contrary to the assertion that 
globalization spreads peace, today it tends to foster conflict and resentment. For 
example, the lowering o f various barriers celebrated by Thomas Friedman, especially the 
global spread o f communications media, makes it possible for the most deprived or 
oppressed to compare their fate with that o f the wealthy nations (Chua 2003; Flint 2003). 
The dispossessed then may form alliances with others who share their common 
resentments, ethnic origins, or religious faith. Thus, insofar as globalization enriches 
some and uproots many, those who are both poor and uprooted may seek revenge in 
terrorism (Hoffman 2002; Flint 2003).
Therefore, terrorism is the poisoned fruit o f several forces. It can be the weapon o f 
the weak in a classic conflict among states or within a state, as in the Palestinian 
territories and Kashmir. But it can be seen as a product o f globalization. Transnational 
terrorism is made possible by the vast array o f communications tools available as is the 
case with Islamic terrorism, which is based not only on the support for the Palestinian 
struggle and opposed to an invasive American presence in the region, but also motivated 
by a resistance to “unjust” economic globalization and to a W estern culture deemed 
threatening to local religions and cultures.
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Contrary to the assertion that free markets and democracy are “magic bullets” that will 
cure underdevelopment, underemployment, poverty, and social malaise in developing 
countries, many o f those in third world countries currently consumed by ethnic hatred 
and tribal violence have attempted free market economies and democratic practices and 
yet have been unsuccessful in competing with the rest o f the world or in elevating their 
lot from the yoke o f poverty and misery (Flint 2003; Chua 2003; Hershberg and Moore 
2002).
Chua maintained that free markets are usually concentrated in the hands o f a few 
wealthy individuals or groups in both developed and developing nations. While the 
citizens o f the most developed western nations, especially the United States, are the sole 
beneficiaries o f the fruits o f the global economy, the beneficiaries, on the other hand, in 
the least developed countries are the few and well-connected elites. This is primarily 
because the wealth and scarce resources are disproportionately concentrated in the hands 
o f the few who are often ethnic minorities.
As Chua asserted, these “market-dominant minorities” , for example, the Chinese in 
Southeast Asia, Croatians in the former Yugoslavia, whites in Latin America and South 
Africa, Indians in East Africa, Lebanese in West Africa, and Jews in post-communist 
Russia, have become objects o f hatred and potential targets for political violence. At the 
same time, democracy (majority political participation) has empowered the wretehed o f 
the earth to unleash ethnic demagoguery, confiscate other peoples’ property, and 
participate in genocidal vengeance.
In sum, globalization is becoming the primary contributing factor to the rising tide of 
anti-W esternism and anti-Americanism. The virulent hatred and violent aggression
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against Americans and their values, beliefs, and practices that we currently witness may 
be driven by the effects o f globalization (Hershberg and Moore 2002). For example, 
linguist and social critic, Noam Chomsky (2003:209), noted that the “return o f 
barbarism” and terrorism in modem societies is motivated by globalization.
Officials in the U.S. National Intelligence Council (NIC) argued that, “globalization 
and its evolution will be rocky, marked by chronic financial volatility and a widening 
economic divide” (quoted in Chomsky 2003:209). This kind o f financial volatility most 
likely means slower growth, extending the pattern o f neo-liberal globalization (for those 
who follow the rules) while punishing or harming those that fail to do so, mostly the poor 
(Chomsky 2003).
The NIC maintains that as this form o f globalization continues, “deepening economic 
stagnation, political instability, and cultural alienation [will] foster ethnic, ideological and 
religious extremism, along with the violence that often accompanies it” (quoted in 
Chomsky 2003:209) much o f it directed against the United States. Under these 
conditions, the poor, weak, and desperate will most likely “lash out at the United States 
as the agents or symbol o f their suffering” (Chomsky 2003:29).
“The Root-Causes” Theory
For many decades, policy analysts, decision-makers, media pundits, and academic 
scholars viewed terrorism as a response to socio-economic injustices (Flint 2003; 
Chomsky 2003; Hershberg and Moore 2002). Historian and terrorism expert, Walter 
Laqueur (2001:71-72), observed that the proponents o f the “root-causes” theory tended to 
argue that if  the economic, political, and social injustices were to be solved, there would
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be fewer human conflicts and confrontations. He noted that proponents o f the “root 
causes” theory, therefore, suggested that the way to deal with terrorism is to address 
factors such as anger, frustrations, grievances, stresses, and resentments that lead to 
hatred and terrorism. Viewed from this perspective, Laqueur wrote that, “terrorists were 
fanatical believers driven to despair by intolerable conditions. They were poor or 
oppressed, or at least on the side o f the poor and oppressed, and their inspiration was 
deeply ideological” (p.72).
Although Laqueur acknowledged some truth in the assertions proposed by the root- 
causes theorists, he however thought that this was a left-wing ideology that was mostly 
applicable during the decolonization periods, during which those in developing areas 
employed violence to justify liberating themselves from imperial and colonial rule (p.72). 
He further noted that this left-wing ideology found and still finds fertile ground among 
organizations such as the Basque separatist movement (ETA), sections o f the Irish 
Republican Army (IRA), and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (FLO), which 
subscribe to M arxist-Leninist doctrines. Laqueur, however, noted that this “ ideological 
patina was merely a reflection o f the Zeitgeist, did not go very deep or last long, and 
hardly affected staunch nationalism at these m ovem ents’ cores” (p.72).
Furthermore, although there are new waves o f terrorism emerging from the extreme 
right o f the political spectrum, the left-wing terrorists did not totally disappear, but rather 
occupied a peripheral position. Laqueur, therefore, concluded that those “people who 
had sympathized with what they thought were the justified grievances behind terrorism 
found themselves in a quandary” (p.72). This is because the most heinous terrorist attack 
in American history prior to the catastrophic attacks o f September 11 was in Oklahoma
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City in 1995. The bombing o f the Federal Building in downtown Oklahoma City was not 
the work o f left-wing ideologues, but that o f homegrown right-wing terrorists (Talbott 
and Chanda 2001: Kushner 1998; Hamm 1999). Laqueur pointed out that Timothy 
McVeigh, the mastermind and perpetrator o f the Oklahoma City bombing, harbored deep 
grievances and a hatred o f the U.S. federal government and law enforcement authorities, 
but M cVeigh’s grievances were not what Americans in the left-wing o f the political 
spectrum would have supported, endorsed, or sympathized with.
According to Laqueur, M cVeigh’s “grievances were those found in “ 77ze Turner 
Diaries, o f an America taken over by foreigners and degenerates, o f the holy duty o f all 
patriots to cleanse the country in a river o f blood— in short, the worldview o f a virulent 
form o f fascism” (p.72). Laqueur noted that M cVeigh’s worldview and actions were not 
unique. “Similar descriptions could apply to the murderers o f Anwar Sadat, Yitzhak 
Rabin, and Mohandas Gandhi. Their assassins belonged to fanatical nationalist and right- 
wing undergrounds firmly convinced that they were doing their patriotic duty by 
liquidating traitors. These terrorists could hardly be said to be engaging in ‘revolutionary 
violence,’ nor could poverty, oppression, or free-floating rage help to explain the torching 
o f asylum seekers’ homes in Germany or the unspeakable atrocities perpetrated by 
Islamic terrorists in Algeria where they were fighting not colonial rulers but their own 
compatriots” (pp.72-73).
Other scholars also propose that the “root causes” for hatred and terrorism are hunger, 
poverty, illiteracy, marginalization, alienation, oppression, unemployment, and other 
miseries. For example, because it is generally believed that poverty provides a fertile 
breeding ground for terrorism, fighting poverty would seem an ideal strategy in helping
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make the world free o f terrorism. The argument then goes that solving these underlying 
socio-political and economic problems would end hatred, violence, and terrorism 
(Laqueur 2001 ; Chomsky 2003; Chua 2003; Atran 2004). The problem with these 
assertions, however, is that as logical as poverty-breeds-hatred and hatred-breeds- 
terrorism might be, poverty and socio-economic disparities do not necessarily drive 
people to sacrifice their own lives to kill others. Anthropologist Scott Atran (2004:67) 
stated that, “poverty and lack o f education per se are not the root-causes o f suicide 
terrorism.” For example, he noted that the September 11 planners, financiers, hijackers, 
and suicide bombers were not impoverished nor ignorant. Legal scholar Amy Chua 
(2003) observed that when poverty is combined with other factors such as honor, pride, 
dignity, and hopelessness, they can become lethal, the driving wedge against all types of 
evils.
Other critics o f the “root causes” theory, including Tergal Keane (2002) and Victor 
Hanson (2004) argued that if  terrorism is the response o f socio-economic and political 
injustices, why is it that the most oppressed and repressed people, particularly those in 
developing societies are reluctant to employ terrorism as an instrument o f struggle to 
express their frustrations and grievances? Put another way: Why is it that the w orld’s 
poorest nations, Haiti and Burkina Faso, among others, do not resort to the use of 
terrorism to express their anger, suffering, and injustices? Why is it that millions o f 
oppressed people throughout the developing world do not embark on suicide missions or 
campaigns to vent their ifustrations? Why is it that two o f the most politically oppressed 
nations on the globe, Afghanistan and Iraq during the regimes o f  the Taliban and Saddam 
Hussein, did not resort to terrorism to express their miseries? Hanson (2004) noted that
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individuals or groups rarely resort to violence solely based on their economic or political 
status. In other words, poverty and oppression are not the only reasons why individuals 
join and participate in terrorist operations nor are some members o f terrorist groups 
typically impoverished.
In reference to the terrorist attacks against America on September 11, Peter Bergen 
(2001:226-232) argued the attacks were not primarily the by-products o f poverty or 
socio-economic inequalities between the West and the developing countries. Because if 
that were the case, the September 11 hijackers should have been poor and destitute 
Africans or Afghans and not Egyptians, Saudis, or United Arab Emirate citizens who 
came from w ell-off families. Rohan Gunaratna (2002:26) also pointed out that Osama 
bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, the w orld’s most wanted renegades, “are the 
archetypes o f a new generation o f terrorists, many o f whom come from educated and 
well-to-do families, as did the 9/11 hijackers— a clear demonstration that the Islamist 
terrorists ideologies appeal equally to all classes and strata o f society.”
Peter Bergen (2002) argued that bin Laden and his terrorist network did not want to 
destroy U.S. symbols o f American culture such as the entertainment industry in 
Hollywood, the media establishment, or the “entertainment capital o f the world” . Las 
Vegas. But The 9/11 Commission Report (2004: xvi) contained the following 
conclusions about Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda terrorist infrastructure: “We 
learned about an enemy who is sophisticated, patient, disciplined, and lethal. The enemy 
rallies a broad support in the Arab and Muslim world by demanding redress o f political 
grievances, but its hostility toward us and our values is limitless. Its purpose is to rid the 
world o f religious and political pluralism, the plebiscite, and equal rights for women. It
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makes no distinction between military and civilian targets. Collateral damage is not in its 
lexicon.” In other words, bin Laden and members o f his groups are interested in 
universalizing their brand o f Islam, overthrowing Middle Eastern regimes, opposing 
secularism, and establishing true Islamic states in the Arab world even if it requires 
destroying America and its allies.
Marxist Theory
Some scholars argue that Marxist theory helps to explain political violence and
terrorism (Apter 1999; Trotsky 1974; Fanon 1967; Thackrah 1987). According to Marx,
“all history is a history o f class struggle” (quoted in Nelson 1982). Proponents o f the
Marxian approach assert that traditional and modem terrorist groups either find their
motivation in Marxist ideology or the anarchist and radical schools o f thought
(Alexander, Carlton and W ilkinson 1979; Fanon 1967; Marighella 1985; Trotsky 1974;
Arendt 1970; Sartre 2001; Gurr 1980; Laqueur 1999; Henderson 2001). Referring to
M arx’s dialectical materialism theory, Sahakian and Sahakian (1996:80) stated that:
All goods are material, and material goods are the sources o f power. He who 
controls capital controls also the culture o f the people— their morals, religion, 
education, public opinion, music, art, etc.; those who control mass media 
(newspapers, radio, television) can manipulate public opinion and politics; those 
who control music publishing houses and recording companies can manipulate the 
musical tastes o f the nation.
Marx noted that economic determinism (an argument that the course o f history is 
determined by economic factors) dictated who controls the mode o f production, a source 
o f class conflict and violence (Gurr 1980; Nelson 1982; Thackrah 1987; Henderson 
2001 ).
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But as Harry Henderson (2001:13) pointed out, “the wellsprings o f late 20^ century
terrorism are complex, deriving from the struggle against colonialism, the inspiration of
communist or socialist ideology, and the bonds o f nationalism, ethnicity, and religion.
Often these factors are mixed together in the same movement. The IRA, for example,
sometimes used M arxist rhetoric, yet represented an ethnic group that was defined in part
by religion.” The same can be said o f the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Basque
separatist movement (ETA) and Islamic fundamentalist movements such as al-Qaeda.
Specifically, Henderson (2001:14) argued that in the Western democracies, revolutionary,
political protests, and violent activities are not new phenomena. He stated:
The 1960s also saw a leftist movement, mostly on the part o f intellectuals and 
students, in both Western Europe and the United States. In France, the movement 
also spread to the working class, while in the United States, despite the efforts o f 
activists, it remained confined mainly to the student antiwar efforts, the civil 
rights movements, and black and brown-power m ovem ents.. ..Groups such as 
Germ any’s Red Army Faction, France’s Action Directe, and Italy’s Red Brigades 
based their ideologies on Marxism-Leninism, emphasizing action against the 
government and capitalists in urban population centers. From roughly 1970 to the 
mid-1980s, they carried on extensive bombing campaigns as well as shootings 
and kidnappings. In the United States, groups such as the Weathermen and the 
New World Liberation Front carried on similar activities, but on a smaller scale.
It has been suggested that from the mid-1980s through the 1990s, for example, the
focus o f terrorism and terrorist groups in western democratic countries seemed to move
from the left- to right-wing ideologues. Laqueur (1977:106-107) succinctly stated that:
Left-wing ideology was virtually all-pervasive in the 1970s, and this was reflected 
in the propaganda o f nationalist groups such as the IRA, the Basque separatist 
group ETA, and the Palestinian terrorists— for example in anti-imperialist slogans 
and calls for working-class solidarity, and so on...D uring thel980s, left-wing 
terrorism petered out, a trend that coincided with the collapse o f the Soviet bloc, 
though it was not caused by the collapse. Instead, the terrorist initiative in 
W estern countries such as the United States, and also Germany and Turkey, 
moved to the extreme right. Yesterday’s theories about the progressive character 
o f terrorism ceased to make sense and became, in fact, embarrassing. The burning 
o f a hostel housing foreign guest workers in Germany could hardly be described
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any longer as a liberating act. Neither could the bombing o f the World Trade 
Center in New York or the bombing o f a government building in Oklahoma City 
be interpreted as a prologue to a revolution that would help the masses. The old 
wisdom about one person’s terrorist being another person’s freedom fighter was 
no longer heard.
Henderson (2001) concluded that current and future political terrorism may come 
from both right- and left-wing ideologues responding to economic globalization and 
political hegemony. He wrote that, “The Left will be opposed to the control o f the 
world’s economic resources by international corporations and decries what it sees as the 
inability o f democratic governments to hold these economic behemoths accountable. The 
Right views globalism in the form o f the United Nations and other institutions as threats 
to the sovereignty o f countries, regions, and localities. Extremists on both sides have 
shown their willingness to use violence in order to be heard” (pp.l 14-115).
In short, the radicals on both sides o f the political spectrum have shown a willingness 
not only to employ terrorism to advance their agendas but also to inflict catastrophic 
havoc in the countries and societies targeted. Perhaps nowhere in the history of 
humankind has there been such a willingness among many individuals or groups to resort 
to the reign o f  terror against their real or imaginary enemies. Most o f  the modem 
terrorist organizations do not follow M arxist doctrines.
Terrorism and Religion
In contemporary societies, religion is increasingly becoming the primary source of 
political violence or terrorism. The “return o f religion” in modem globalizing societies 
has become one o f the most pressing issues o f our times. The events in Waco, Texas, the 
Oklahoma City bombing, the U.S. embassies bombings in East Africa, the USS Cole
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attacks, and the attacks on America on September 11 serve as powerful and painful 
reminders o f this “return” and its implications for the United States and its allies 
(Hoffman 1999; Ruthven 2002; Armstrong 2001; Hanson 2002). Other countries and 
societies, too, have seen the revitalization of religion as a socio-political force. It may 
help our understanding o f terrorism to view it as a form o f a religious revitalization 
movement (Wallace 1966).
Political anthropologist Ted C. Lewellen (1992:73) pointed out that, “Religion may 
substitute for direct political action in cases where natives have been rendered politically 
impotent by an alien power or where they do not understand the nature o f their situation.” 
In societies where citizens who express dissent and criticize the status quo are oppressed 
and repressed, religion usually becomes not only an avenue for dissent but also for 
political participation. When colonized peoples are oppressed by their colonizers, they 
may seek change through fundamentalist movements.
Anthony F.C. W allace (1966:30) defined a revitalization movement as “a conscious, 
organized effort on the part o f  some members o f society to create a more satisfying 
culture.” Revitalization movements are deliberate processes and rituals through which 
members o f a society create a more satisfying culture by employing multiple innovations, 
which usually include religious or supernatural means (Wallace 1985; Mooney I99I; 
Lewellen 1992). Wallace described the various stages o f  movements. These include: (i) 
the pre-movement phase in which a society is in a steady state (i.e., without significant 
stresses or pressures for radical change): (ii) a period o f increased individual stress where 
social anomie, vices, and disillusionment are rampant; and (iii) a period where some 
individuals realize the need for cultural change and seek the guidance o f a charismatic
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prophet or messiah for a more satisfying society or culture. When finally a larger number 
o f people or the whole population adopts the new doctrines and practices, a cultural 
transformation is affected making revitalization a reality (Wallace 1956; Lewellen 1992). 
Wallace (1966:30-39) pointed out that the first step is the formulation o f a code. An 
individual or group must construct a new utopian image o f cultural organization. 
Frequently, the new code is formulated during the course o f a hallucinatory revelation o f 
a mystical experience. The second step is the communication o f the new code to a group 
o f disciples and followers. The code is usually offered as the means o f spiritual salvation 
for the individual and o f the cultural salvation for the society. Finally, as the movement 
gains momentum, new institutions based on the code are organized with subsequent 
widespread acceptance. Lewellen (1992:75), however, noted that although most 
revitalization movements (e.g., millenarian, messianic, and cargo cult movements) pass 
through a number o f stages to affect cultural transformation, others do not. He concluded 
that, “Revitalization movements are basically attempts, often unsuccessful, to adapt to 
new conditions, and despite the religious trappings, they are basically political.” A case 
in point is the Islamic fundamentalist group, al-Qaeda. If  we view al-Qaeda as a 
revitalization movement, we can see it as an attempt to create a more satisfying culture.
Critique
The approaches reviewed above provide fundamental insights into the nature terrorist 
groups. Some o f  the approaches are much stronger in explaining how social movements 
actually operate. While it is true that most o f the terroristic conflicts that we are 
witnessing today are driven by ethnic and religious identities, not all social movements
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that are concerned with identity advocate violence. Identity does not explain why 
terrorism is employed by some social movements and not by others or why the extent and 
intensity o f its use varies among terrorist groups. This section, therefore, briefly critiques 
the strengths and weaknesses o f the proposed theories o f terrorism discussed above.
Political scientist Samuel P. H untington’s arguments and predictions about the “clash 
o f civilizations” were apparently vindicated with the terrorist attacks against the United 
Stated on September 11. His thesis was premised on the assertion that in the post-Cold 
W ar period, important conflicts will occur along cultural lines separating civilizations. In 
other words, future confrontations will be driven by cultural factors and not necessarily 
by economic, political, or ideological factors. He argued that in the new world order, 
people and nation-states will rely on cultural and religious identities to find out who they 
really are and what makes them different or unique. These cultural identities are usually 
drawn from common generational practices, values, traditions, and beliefs (e.g., customs, 
history, institutions, language, or religion). Huntington further observed that people 
usually identify with their own cultural affinities such as ethnic and tribal groupings, 
nation-states, religious faiths, and on a broader level, civilization.
It appears that the global conflicts and terrorism that we have been witnessing over the 
decades, especially those emerging from the Middle East and the Arab world against 
Western values and practices, have strongly been motivated by cultural and religious 
factors. Therefore, it is fair to argue that future confrontations between the core and 
periphery regions (i.e., the developed versus developing countries) will be driven by the 
clash o f civilizations. A case in point is the on-going clash between some extremists who 
subscribe to Islamic beliefs, values, and practices against those o f the West and America.
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Although Huntington’s theory helps us understand why there are violent clashes and 
confrontations between Islam and the West, his theory does not, however, explain why 
other civilizations that have been around for centuries (e.g., those o f Southwest and East 
Asia) have not engaged in violent confrontations with the West on a grander scale as has 
been the case with Islam. It seems to me that the clash o f civilizations’ weakness lies 
with the fact that it tends to explain the events and the political discourse that followed 
immediately after the Cold W ar era and the demise o f the Soviet Union and not the 
problems we are facing in m odem  societies.
For example, Huntington’s theory does not explain why there are clashes between 
peoples and societies that share the same civilization. Many o f the conflicts that we are 
currently witnessing around the world are not necessarily occurring among peoples of 
different civilizations as Huntington suggested, but rather between and within peoples of 
the same civilization— people who share common geo-political boundaries; share 
common cultural beliefs and values; speak the same languages; and prescribe to the same 
religious faiths as is evidenced by the ethno-religious conflicts in Rwanda, Bosnia, 
Chechnya, the Philippines, Iraq, Turkey, and Ireland. Thus, the clash o f  civilizations is 
limited in the sense that it fails to explain why, for example, Muslims and the Arab world 
and a number o f African nations constantly wage war against one another when in reality 
they share common cultural values, customs, practices, traditions, or religious faiths.
The “clash o f globalization” strengths lie in the assertion that global free market 
economies and democracies are necessary ingredients against poverty, despair, hatred, 
and violence. It is also true that globalization often generates economic opportunities and 
elevates the living conditions o f the poor, marginalized, and oppressed masses (Hoffman
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2002; Chua 2002; Friedman 2002). The downside o f globalization is that it oftentimes 
raises desires, stresses, and frustrations as peoples and societies from developing 
countries are in a position to compare their plight with those in affluent developed 
countries. As leaders in the developing societies struggle to meet globalization’s 
conditions in order to attract the global market economy and foreign investments, they 
usually alienate their citizens who lack the technological expertise and skills to compete 
and perform on a par with those in developed industrialist countries. Because 
globalization and the global market economy put greater pressure on developing 
countries to make “catastrophic” reforms such as structural adjustment, downsizing, 
modernizing, democratizing, and westernizing, the changes often affect peoples in these 
areas. For example, the structural adjustment and downsizing conditions force 
governments in poor countries to cut down on jobs and privatize state corporations 
resulting in an even higher rate o f unemployment.
The main point o f the “root-causes” theory is that poverty, destitution, despair, lack o f 
education, oppression, repression, underdevelopment, social injustice, and other 
examples o f  social malaise foster terrorism. While it is true that there is a nexus between 
poverty and terrorism, and while it is logical to argue that poverty may breed frustration, 
hatred, and terrorism, nonetheless, they do not necessarily lead to violence or terrorism.
If  this assertion were correct, then those people who come from poor, marginalized, 
oppressed, or repressed countries, especially those in developing areas (e.g., Afghanistan 
under the Taliban regime, Iraq under Saddam Hussein, Haiti, and many African 
countries) should be the greatest advocates and perpetrators o f terrorism. To the 
contrary, the planners, financiers, and perpetrators o f attacks on America on September
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11 were not individuals from poor, marginalized, or oppressed societies. Al-Qaeda’s 
leaders (bin Laden and al-Zawahiri) and the September 11 suicide-bombers (Mohammed 
Atta and his eighteen co-hijackers) came from well-to-do and well-educated families.
It is not entirely wrong to argue that addressing the world’s number one problem, 
poverty, a “disease” that promotes destitution and other miseries, is important to reducing 
terrorism. This is because extreme poverty often leads to hopelessness, frustration, 
despair, terrorism’s pools o f  support and recruitment (Atran 2004; Jenkins 2001; Zakaria 
2003; Talbott and Chanda 2001). Under these conditions, it is fair to argue that finding 
solutions to the root sources o f terrorism is critical to preventing future attacks.
The Marxist theory o f terrorism revolves around the analysis o f the capitalist mode o f 
production. M arx’s basic premises were that capitalism, like other earlier economic 
systems (e.g., feudalism and mercantilism) was based upon class exploitation and class 
struggle. He argued that because few bourgeoisies (capitalists) own the means o f 
production (monies, factories, machines, and other material instruments o f  production), 
exploitation, alienation, and oppression on the part o f the proletariat (the working class or 
the masses) were the ultimate consequences. Specifically, Marx noted that class 
exploitation will inevitably lead to class conflict as those alienated and exploited will 
naturally resist the apparatuses and machineries that exploit them. Going by M arx’s 
materialist interpretation, it is logical to argue that to rectify the course o f material history 
and to solve class struggle (exploitation, alienation, and oppression), revolutions, 
uprisings, or violence are necessary ingredients for restoring the social health o f the 
masses and for ensuring collective liberation on the part of the exploited and oppressed.
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But Marxist theory does not explain why many countries around the world, including 
the former Soviet Union and China are now embracing capitalism, given the monstrous 
picture that Marx painted o f capitalism. Additionally, Marxist theory does not explain 
why the masses around the world, the most exploited, alienated, and oppressed, are 
reluctant to employ violence to resist the forces and institutions o f capitalism that oppress 
them. Moreover, M arxist theory does not explain why many non-state terrorist groups 
such as al-Qaeda now more than ever rely heavily on the capitalist tools and values such 
as technology, communications, transportation, and the freedoms o f association, speech, 
media, and religion to resist the same capitalistic machineries that exploit and oppress 
them in the first place. It seems to me that Karl Marx underestimated the power of 
capitalism, and this may have played a part in weakening his theory.
Terrorism can be traced to some conditions o f conflict such as the clashes o f 
civilizations and globalization, the legacies o f colonialism and neo-colonialism, poverty 
and social injustices. Social movements often resort to the use o f terrorism as a means o f 
effecting change. Therefore, it is fair to say that terrorism is not only caused by structural 
factors, unequal access to resources and external imperatives (invasion and imperialism), 
but it is also brought about by the cultural factors o f ethnicity, religion, self-image, honor, 
pride, and traditional practices. Anthropologists Schmidt and Schroder (2001:4) stated, 
“Conflicts are mediated by a society’s cultural perception that gives specific meaning to 
the situation, evaluating it on the basis of the experience o f past conflicts, stored as 
objectified knowledge in a group’s social memory.” The same is true with terrorism. As 
the above critiques and reflections show, the study o f social movements that employ 
terrorism requires multiple theoretical approaches because terrorist movements are not
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monolithic entities. Terrorist movements usually continue to evolve motivationally and 
methodically in time and space. This study develops and employs a multi-faceted 
cultural approach.
A Working Theory and Hypothesis 
I propose a holistic definition and theory o f the culture o f terrorism as follows: 
Terrorism is a deliberate, calculated, premeditated, and unlawful use o f  violence or the 
threat o f  violence to inculcate and create an atmosphere o ffea r  with the intention o f  
coercing or intimidating state authorities fo r  the purposes o f  advancing some type o f  
economic, political, social, religious, or ideological objective. Individuals or groups who 
employ terror intend not only to undermine government ability to protect its citizens, but 
also intend to produce fe a r  and insecurity fa r  beyond its immediate victims or physical 
targets to influence the behavior o f  a larger and broader audience and to sway 
government officials ' decision-making processes. Terrorism is a socio-cultural response 
to the legacies o f  colonialism and neo-colonialism. These legacies may include political 
oppression and repression, economic exploitation, and social injustices. In certain 
places, on-going colonial conflicts are catalyzed by the clashes o f  civilizations and  
globalization whose differences are aggravated by ancient cultural animosities and  
traditional practices that evoke tribal and religious fervor. People who believe that these 
legacies contribute to their oppression, poverty, deprivation, and suffering may employ 
violence to express their grievances. In particular, individuals or groups who claim to be 
the champions o f  the oppressed and critics o f  social ills, thus considering themselves 
freedom  fighters, oftentimes resort to terrorism to enhance social change. Conflicts can
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also be motivated by virulent historical hatreds between developed and developing 
societies. For example, United States practices and policies regarding the Middle East 
and the G u lf regions provoke the sensibilities o f  Arabs and M uslims to employ 
choreographed terror attacks, not only to kill Americans and their allies, but also to 
inculcate fe a r  and instill insecurity in the American psyche and to undermine government 
authorities in order to influence policy-making processes. Catastrophic terrorist attacks, 
on the other hand, provoke government officials to use the rhetoric o f  the "evil-doers ", 
the "axis o f  evil ” and the " war on terror " to demonize not only their enemies and those 
who support them, but also to resuscitate patriotic slogans and divert the public's  
attention from  domestic problem s and agendas. Political actors also use the rhetoric o f  
the threat o f  terrorism to galvanize national and international support and cooperation 
fo r  the necessity o f  military intervention to combat terrorism. Government responses 
against terrorism oftentimes impose excessive counter-measures that can infringe upon 
peoples ’ liberties and freedom s. For example, in the United States and in many European 
nations, the introduction and passage o f  draconian anti-terrorism legislation under the 
guise o f  national security and the war on terror threaten democratic practices and values 
and suppress citizens ’ civil liberties and personal rights, such as the freedom s o f  
expression, association, protection from  arbitrary and capricious laws (i.e., detentions 
without trial, rights to legal counseling, and the suppression o f  due process procedures). 
When issues o f  security and liberties collide, they evoke emotional reactions, public fury, 
political dissent, and mistrust resulting in internal conflict and instability. Furthermore, 
rash responses to terrorism negatively affect not only the p eo p le ’s personal and national 
security and sense o f  community, but also undermine their democratic systems o f
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government. From an international viewpoint, the war on terror has not only forced  
world leaders to pass new legislation to combat terrorism, but also has provided an 
opportunity fo r  some leaders in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East to use the rhetoric o f  
war on terror to harass and intimidate political opponents, opposition groups, and 
human rights advocates and to criminalize political dissent and protests. For example, 
as the American government continues to pressure the international community and 
world leaders to enact more and tougher anti-terrorism measures, and as President Bush 
continues to threaten countries that fa il to cooperate and support the United States in the 
war on terror with the power o f  “ the s tick ’’ (i.e., the use o f  military fo rce  or the 
imposition o f  economic sanctions, such as terminating foreign aid and loans, restricting 
foreign trade and investment, freezing and confiscating financial assets, or embargoing  
weapons), the relative good relations that America enjoyed around the world prior to the 
events o f  September 11 continue to weaken. Moreover, the international support and  
cooperation that the United States received immediately after the attacks o f  September 11 
continue to wane.
Terrorism consists o f  a set o f  socio-cultural practices, ideologies, methods, 
techniques, and organizational structures that individuals and groups find useful to 
redress their grievances and advance their desired agendas. Terrorism can be a 
desperate response by weak and powerless groups (i.e., in regard to size and 
capabilities) challenging stronger and more powerful entities (i.e., in regard to states 
with established militaries). But it is not only a weapon o f  the weak and desperate, it is 
also an instrument o f  struggle that any person or movement can use to accomplish some 
type o f  economic, political, social, religious, or ideological objective.
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The definition and theory o f terrorism that I have just presented fit well together 
because individuals or groups that perform terrorist acts have developed a culture that has 
a history, a social organization, a militant religious ideology, a set o f religious rituals, and 
tactics that have enabled them to conduct violence to inculcate fear and insecurity in the 
public psyche, manipulate the media, and influence government authorities and policy­
making processes.
The theory proposed for this study enables us to ask the following anthropological 
questions: (i) Can we define terrorism as a cultural phenomenon? (ii) What are al- 
Q aeda’s organizational structure, recruitment techniques, and modus operandil (iii) Why 
is terror becoming increasingly a common weapon for radical groups promoting socio­
economic, political, religious, or ideological agendas? (iv) “How does traditional 
anthropological analysis o f primitive law and custom help us to understand modem 
terrorism?” (Leach 1977:6) (v) Do different societies respond differently when faced 
with similar terrorist tragedies?
My approach therefore builds upon classical and contemporary theories, such as 
theories o f political anthropology including world systems theory, Marxist theory, 
religious revitalization theory, the “clash o f civilizations” , and the “clash of 
globalization”.
Chapter two deals with the methodological approach and briefly discusses the 
rationale for choosing the qualitative-descriptive technique to collect and analyze data. I 
describe how I gathered data to examine the phenomenon o f terrorism and its impact on 
victims. I also highlighted obstacles that I encountered in the field and how I dealt with 
them to enable me to contact and interview U.S. embassy bomb survivors in Nairobi.
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Chapter three provides a detailed description o f al-Qaeda. Discussions focus on al- 
Q aeda’s origins, ideology, organizational structure, recruitment methods, military 
operations, and modus operandi. Discussions also deal with al-Qaeda before and after 
the attacks o f September 11. I also examine the strategic reasons for the attacks on the 
American embassy in Nairobi in 1998 and the World Trade Center in 2001.
Chapter four examines major issues that preoccupy social scholars and political actors 
regarding al-Qaeda and the war on terrorism. They include; whether all terrorist groups 
including al-Qaeda can be considered liberators or oppressors; whether al-Qaeda leaders 
and members are “evildoers” and states that support them the “axis o f evil” ; whether the 
choreographed attacks o f al-Qaeda are intended to minimize collateral damage and 
maximize fear and insecurity; whether the leaders and followers o f al-Qaeda resort to 
terrorism because they are impoverished, deprived, deranged, and cowardly; whether 
U.S. foreign policy contributed to the attacks o f September 11 ; and whether finding a 
solution to the Palestinian-Israeli problem would reduce Arab hatred towards America 
and its allies.
Chapter five focuses on the governmental responses to transnational terrorism. This 
chapter specifically examines how government authorities in America and Kenya 
responded to their respective attacks. The chapter begins with a discussion o f the m ulti­
dimensional counter-terrorism measures that the U.S. instituted to deal with the attacks of 
September 11 to combat international terrorism. They included; diplomatic, economic, 
legislative, political, military, and socio-cultural responses. Next, I examine the U.S. 
Patriot Act and its implications. Additionally, I discuss the responses o f the Kenyan 
government to the 1998 and 2002 bomb attacks. Finally, I discuss the general reaction o f
47
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
African governments to the attacks o f September 11 and the war on global terrorism.
Chapter six reviews the reactions o f the victims o f terrorism and discusses the issues 
and claims surrounding the compensation o f the victims. Specifically, the key question 
raised is: why the victims o f the September 11 attacks were compensated in large sums 
o f money while those o f the American embassies bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, with 
the exception o f the twelve Americans killed, were not? This chapter also provides some 
excerpts from the Nairobi bomb survivors comparing them with those from New York to 
identify key cultural reactions, claims, and coping mechanisms common among the 
victims o f terror. Since I did not conduct fieldwork in New York, I relied on library 
materials, magazine and newspaper clippings, the Internet, and other media outlets.
Chapter seven deals with the new trends o f international terrorism and argues that to 
prevail against global terrorism, government officials, policy-analysts, social scholars, 
and the general public must start thinking about terrorism in a new and different way (a 
shift o f paradigm) if  they intend to understand and combat terrorism. Despite the on­
going security improvements and counter-measures instituted by the United States and 
the world community, the threat o f terrorism still looms. The solutions to terrorism and 
terrorist operations will require the utmost in multi-lateral approaches and cooperation 
from the world community. Chapter eight provides a concluding summary o f terrorism.
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CHAPTER TWO
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHOD;
A QUALITATIVE ETHNOGRAPHY 
To understand the culture o f terrorism and how victims respond to catastrophes caused 
by terrorist operations, this study used a variety o f methods and sources: library, media, 
Internet materials, and my own field research in East Africa following the 1998 U.S. 
embassies bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. The primary sources o f information, 
however, were library and media resources. These sources included: the most recent 
articles from academic journals and periodicals; recent articles from magazines, 
newspapers, newsletters, and the Internet; recent published academic books and 
monographs; media reports from U.S. major television networks (i.e., CBS, NBC, CNN, 
and C-SPA N II); the U.S. Congressional Committee investigation hearings (i.e., the 
Senate Judiciary Committee inquiry and The 9/11 Commission Report)-, court 
proceedings and grand jury hearings; the Rand Corporation data bank on international 
terrorism; and other open sources and outlets.
Baker and Chapman in Man and Society in Disaster (1962) discussed the 
methodological problems and challenges that researchers often encounter when collecting 
data in the field. Ira H. Cisin and Walter Clark (1962:23) particularly argued that, 
“ Strictly, we cannot speak o f the methods o f disaster research; there are no special 
methods unique to this field. Its methods are the methods o f social research, the available 
techniques are those o f social research, the essential logic is that o f social research.” If 
this is the case, why then should studies o f  disasters such as violence or terrorism require 
“a special methodological consideration?” (p.23).
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Part o f the answer to this question, according to Robert A, Stallings (2002:23) lies in 
the impromptu nature o f disaster studies, especially those which attempt to study human 
behavior on the site o f a disaster immediately after a tragic occurrence. Anthropologist 
H. Russell Bernard (2002) and sociologist Lewis M. Killian (1956) noted that research 
planning takes time, and time is what the researcher has least o f in many disaster studies. 
Killian (2002: 49-50) argued that during and immediately after a tragedy, chaotic 
situations emerge that may cause scholars to fail to apply all the necessary research rules 
and methods.
Cisin and Clark (1962:23) noted that the carefully defined population that the 
researcher “would like to study is thoroughly disrupted; his sampling plans deteriorate to 
a nonrandom selection o f the persons or victims he can locate; his data collection 
procedures suffer from transportation and communication troubles.” In other words, it 
can be argued that when scholars o f catastrophic events such as those caused by terrorism 
encounter field problems or limitations, it may not necessarily be wrong to use eclectic 
methodologies or even make use o f improvised techniques to collect data. According to 
“Cisin and Clark (1962:23), “improvisation has replaced method, and the quality o f the 
results seems to depend more on the researcher’s ingenuity than upon his scientific 
skills.”
Other scholars have also suggested that qualitative research is especially appropriate 
for studies such as terrorism where it is difficult to contact terrorists themselves or where 
little empirical data exist. Political scientist Martha Crenshaw (1994), in particular, 
attributed the problem of studying terrorism to the fact that information is frequently 
inaccessible because researchers not only find it difficult to contact actual terrorists
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themselves, but also face unprecedented government red-tape from officials who are 
reluctant to release information for public consumption for fear o f jeopardizing national 
security.
Anthropologist Carole Nagengast (1994:112) also observed that besides bureaucratic 
red-tape and other challenges that researchers often face when collecting data in the field, 
“Anthropology has not been in the forefront of the study o f collective violence, terrorism, 
and especially violence in state societies, in part because its methods and theory depend 
on months or years in the field, until recently defined as a relatively small, self-contained 
community that did not include the state.” In other words, it takes time, money, and 
patience to conduct long-term studies to understand, for instance, how victimized 
individuals and communities deal with their plight, i.e., what it means to be a survivor o f 
a bomb/terror attack, what it feels like to lose loved ones, and what socio-cultural 
mechanisms victims apply to cope with their tragedies (Hoffman and Oliver-Smith 2002; 
Oliver-Smith and Hoffman 1999).
To understand how countries that are victimized by transnational terrorist operations 
respond, I chose one African city, Nairobi, and one American city. New York City, as 
case studies. The former suffered the bomb attack against the U.S. embassy in Nairobi 
on August 7, 1998, and the latter suffered with the terrorist attacks against the twin 
towers o f the World Trade Center in New York. Although both Dar es Salaam and 
Washington D C. were also attacked, I chose to focus my study on Nairobi and New 
York because the damage in these two cities was much more severe and extensive. These 
cases studies were selected purposely to understand how Kenyan and American survivors 
coped with their respective tragedies and how government authorities responded to
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transnational non-state terrorism. From these case studies, there emerges a picture of 
differing Kenyan and American responses to terrorist operations.
The reasons for conducting fieldwork in Nairobi, Kenya, include the following; I 
knew my way around Nairobi, and I personally knew at least two bomb victims; I knew 
where to locate potential survivors within the city (e.g., in both public and private offices 
and the Kenya School for the Blind); and I speak both English and Kiswahili fluently. 
Both are the official languages o f Kenya.
Kenya and the United States were selected for a cross-cultural comparative study for 
the following reasons: Kenyans were among the first casualties o f al-Qaeda’s network; 
the attack in Nairobi was certainly among the worst acts of terrorism o f the last years o f 
the twentieth century; the near simultaneous attacks o f August 7, 1998 against the 
American embassies in East Africa were seemingly a dress rehearsal for the attacks on 
the U.S. on September 11, 2001; both Kenyans and Americans were victimized by 
Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda network; both attacks were devastating to many in the 
two nations.
Initially, I wanted to compare how the Kenyan and Tanzanian governments responded 
to transnational terrorism and how the survivors coped, but then the September 11 
terrorist attacks in the United States happened. Because the attacks against the World 
Trade Center and the Pentagon were also the work o f bin Laden and al-Qaeda, I decided 
to compare and contrast the responses o f America and Kenya. Although al-Qaeda 
terrorists used different tactics to attack the two selected sites— the use o f a car bomb in 
Kenya and the use o f commercial aircraft in the United States— the impacts (i.e., loss o f 
lives, destruction o f property, pain, and suffering) were far-reaching in both countries.
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Their similarities and differences enable fruitful comparisons.
Although this study was initially intended to attempt to understand how both Kenyans 
and Tanzanians reacted to the bomb attacks, I spent more time in the field collecting 
information in Kenya because the damage and trauma in Nairobi were so much more 
extensive than in Dar es Salaam. For example, whereas twelve people were killed and 
less than one hundred injured in Dar es Salaam, two hundred and forty-seven people, 
including twelve Americans, were killed and over five thousand were injured in Nairobi. 
In other words, when one compares the death and destruction that emerged as a result of 
the bomb attacks in Kenya and Tanzania, the attacks in the former were much more 
severe.
Furthermore, when scholars speak or write about the attacks against the United States 
embassies in East Africa on August 7, 1998, Dar es Salaam is more often than not 
mentioned merely as a footnote. The main focus is always on Nairobi. In the same vein, 
when academicians, analysts, and terrorism experts talk about the attacks against the 
United States on September 11, the Pentagon in Washington D.C. is mentioned, but the 
main focus is on the World Trade Center in New York. Although I will supplement data 
using Dar es Salaam and W ashington D C., the focus in this study is Nairobi and New 
York.
After encountering difficulties in contacting bomb survivors in East Africa and 
considering practical factors o f time and financial resources, I decided to use a qualitative 
approach and an eclectic method for the part o f the study dealing with the aftermath of 
the attacks to understand what survivors think and how they cope.
Some scholars suggest that one o f  the primary purposes o f the qualitative approach is
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accomplished when researchers ask the very basic fundamental questions: What is going 
on here? What is up with this picture? What do you think about this problem? Or what 
should be done to mitigate this problem? (Spradley 1980; Denzin and Lincoln 1994; 
Lofland 1971). Such questions may be used in studies o f members o f religious extremist 
movements, criminals, gang members, terrorists, and victims o f terrorism. As Bernard 
(2002:203-219) noted, in each instance, it is the total context that creates what it means to 
be present, to be a participant, to be an observer, or to be a member. In other words, it is 
the participant’s experience in that context that the researcher seeks to capture and 
understand in a qualitative study.
The study o f terrorism necessarily involves one in disaster studies. Some scholars and 
analysts argue that because disaster studies are designed to understand the nature o f the 
disaster, its causes, consequences, and possible preventive mechanisms, the opening 
wedge must therefore include a set o f descriptive methods discussing in detail human 
behavior during and after the disaster (Riches 1986; Cisin and C larkl962; Oliver-Smith 
1996; Oliver-Smith and Hoffman 2002; Schmidt and Schroder 2001). Bernard 
(2002:206) particularly noted that descriptive research tends to rely on informal 
observational studies that attempt to answer the question, “Just exactly what happened?”
Oliver-Smith (1996:303-328) contended that because in any given disaster, a great 
many things happen, it is perhaps inevitable that descriptive studies characteristically 
reflect the selective perception o f the observer. For example, the media reporter sees one 
thing, the sociologist another, and the anthropologist still another. Under these 
conditions, descriptive studies play a significant role in introducing the researcher to 
unfamiliar territory; they prepare him or her for focused studies o f the subject; and they
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open his or her horizons to further study on the topic using formal and structured 
methods. Therefore, one o f the strengths o f descriptive studies is that they enable 
scholars to generate theories and hypotheses, the beginning o f explanations, and the 
understanding o f phenomena (Bernard 2002; Oliver-Smith and Hoffman 1999; Cisin and 
Clark 1962).
For example, scholars who use descriptive studies to examine disasters usually 
concentrate on the details o f the disaster itself and on the behavior o f people during and 
immediately after the disaster. The methods researchers use may range from the most 
informal and unstructured interviewing or observation to the most formal and structured 
interviewing or survey sampling. Bernard (2002:205-208) argued that unless the 
researcher him self has been involved in a disaster, descriptive studies depend largely 
upon re-collective interview techniques that are either structured or unstructured. He 
maintains that when describing the details o f a disaster and its effects on the community, 
descriptive studies tend to rely on interviews with knowledgeable informants selected for 
their position in the community.
Similarly, for details on the effects o f a disaster on individuals or small groups, 
descriptive studies tend to rely on interviews with individuals selected as a sample to 
represent the views o f  a larger population. The sample may include the victims and their 
families and the survivors o f a tragedy. The difficulty associated with these types of 
studies is that it is often problematic for the informants or survivors o f a disaster to be 
objective in recalling the actual events o f a disaster. This is because the survivors may 
still be dazed by the painful experience from the ordeal, or it may be painful to tell their 
story without reliving their experiences (Stallings 2002; Baker and Chapman 1962;
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Oliver-Smith and Hoffman 2002).
Scholars studying disasters struggle with ethical questions, particularly those dealing 
with question-format in order to conduct data in the field. One o f  the ethical questions 
researchers encounter is whether or not it is morally right to use formal and closed-ended 
questionnaires to gather information from victims. Anthropologist Oliver-Smith (1996) 
questioned the credibility and use o f closed-ended questionnaires to collect data because 
this format prevents victims o f a tragedy from expressing themselves openly and freely 
and hinders them from providing extensive stories regarding their experiences and their 
pain and suffering without feeling threatened. Equally significant, the format o f formal 
and closed-ended questionnaires does not usually help researchers to form rapport or win 
trust from respondents. Oliver-Smith (1996:19) stated that, “The ethical dimension o f 
research in crisis situations has been applied to whether questionnaires are appropriate 
instruments for research on people under stress, which has evoked criticism o f the 
reification o f victims and their experiences. More dialogic, open-ended methods are 
suggested as both ethically more appropriate and methodologically more effective.”
Other scholars also argue that unstructured interviewing is a significant probing 
technique for collecting data on sensitive issues such as conflict, aggression, and racial 
and religious groups as well as catastrophic events, because this technique allows 
researchers to pose general and open-ended questions to enable them to gather more and 
detailed data. Bernard (2002:204-205) also noted that, “There is nothing ‘informal’ about 
unstructured interviewing, and nothing deceptive, either. You sit down with another 
person and hold an interview. Period. Both o f you know what you’re doing, and there is 
no shared feeling that you’re just engaged in pleasant chitchat.” He maintained that
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before the interview can take place, the researcher introduces him /herself to the 
respondents, makes his intentions known, and indicates that he is conducting a study 
(pp.208-209). In other words, both parties, the researcher and the respondents, are aware 
o f the study and play their respective roles.
Bernard (2002:206) noted that researchers or ethnographers who use unstructured 
interviewing to guide them enter the field and gather general data to understand a society 
or a social context they otherwise had little knowledge of. According to these scholars, 
this technique guides ethnographers to develop and formulate semi-structured studies. It 
also prepares them in constructing the questions they should ask and whether or not it is 
necessary to design questionnaires in the native languages o f the groups they probe 
should they decide to conduct a highly structured formal study.
In essence, it is fair to conclude that when we want to know about live experiences o f 
our fellow human beings, what it is like to be victims o f a tragedy, how victims cope and 
deal with their plight, or how it feels to survive tragic events such as terrorism, 
unstructured interviewing is most effective (Bernard 2002). In sum, the advantages o f 
using unstructured rather than structured interviewing in human crises where people 
undergo extreme stress are that they enable victims to speak freely and comfortably and 
they allow researchers to build rapport and trust with the victims. For example, Fontana 
and Frey (1994:371) argued that unstructured interviewing allows the researcher to ask 
general questions for the purposes o f “breaking the ice” and gradually allows them to 
move on to more specific questions. Therefore, it is fair to say that when studying 
sensitive topics such as racial and ethnic prejudices, political and religious conflicts, and 
terrorism and terrorized individuals and groups, formal and structured interviewing may
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be inappropriate. Furthermore, Schmidt and Schroder (2001:6-9) and Gingrich and Fox 
(2002:6-7) noted that disasters and tragic events such as violence or terrorism are best 
studied using informal and unstructured techniques.
Some information for this study was acquired using ethnographic field research that 
employed informal and semi-structured interviewing o f bomb survivors in Nairobi, 
Kenya. The survivors were asked to share their experiences. The interviews are 
discussed in detail in chapter six. In Kenya, I contacted and interviewed twenty bomb 
survivors in Nairobi. I used personal contacts to locate and interview willing bomb 
survivors.
It was not my intention to speak to every person who survived the bomb attack or who 
escaped unhurt during the explosion. I decided to focus on only clearly identifiable 
victims. I therefore searched out those who were physically injured by the blast.
Because thousands o f Kenyans were affected by the tragedy, it would have been difficult 
if  not impossible to locate them all and request them to share their ordeal. The goal o f 
my interviews with the victims was to understand how they were coping with the trauma.
One o f the techniques that I used was the snowball sampling method— where one 
bomb survivor was located, interviewed, and then asked to name others who might be 
willing to be interviewed. I used snowball sampling because it was difficult to locate 
survivors in Nairobi (Bernard 2002:185-186). The majority had relocated to rural areas; 
others were dispersed throughout the city.
To interview the survivors in Nairobi, I used semi-structured interviewing and 
specifically what James P. Spradley (1980:77-80) referred to as “grand tour” and “mini­
tour” questions. In regard to grand tour questions, I asked, for example: “Can you tell
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me where you were when the bomb went off?” “Can you tell me what happened to you 
after the explosion?” “Can you tell me what kind of assistance you received to help you 
deal with your tragedy?” “Can you tell me what kind o f things you use to cope with your 
loss, pain, and suffering?” Similarly, as it concerns the mini-tour questions, 1 asked, for 
instance; “Can you describe specifically what you actually received or continue to receive 
from government and non-governmental organizations to assist in your recovery?” “Can 
you be specific where you went for medical treatment and what kind o f treatments you 
received?” “Can you talk more about why you think you were selected to travel abroad 
(i.e., to Germany) for further medical treatment and what your experiences were?” “If 
you did receive financial compensation for pain and suffering, how much did you 
receive?” “W hat criteria were used to provide compensation?” “Do you think what you 
received was enough?” (For more semi-structured questions asked in both English and 
Swahili, refer to Tables 1 and 2 in Appendix I). The questions asked are not idiomatic, 
i.e., word-for-word translation, but rather correspond closely but not perfectly.
In Nairobi, I was able to interview eleven bomb survivors at least twice on 
consecutive years in 2001 and 2002. Others were interviewed in the years o f 2000 and 
2002 (i.e., before and after the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 
2001). Eighteen o f the twenty bomb survivors who were interviewed preferred English; 
two preferred Kiswahili. The majority o f the survivors were government and parastatal 
‘government enterprises’ employees who were more comfortable talking in English than 
Kiswahili.
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Fieldwork Problems, Limitations, and Reflections 
Problems
Qualitative researchers conducting fieldwork face many problems in the field. These 
problems range from gaining entry into the field to locate respondents, winning 
respondents’ trust, building rapport, and ensuring the reliability o f the data acquired. I 
encountered all o f these problems during my fieldwork. However, the major problem 
that I faced was locating bomb survivors in Nairobi. Many had either moved or relocated 
to rural areas, or they could not be reached because I was unable to get their addresses 
and phone numbers. The lack o f addresses and telephone numbers made it extremely 
difficult to locate survivors to participate in my study. To overcome this problem, I 
decided to interview any survivor I could locate, including those I briefly came into 
contact with during the annual commemoration ceremonies at the bombsite.
In addition, I used the so-called “cold canvassing” technique to find bomb survivors to 
interview. Many public and private offices that were near the United States embassy 
were also damaged killing and injuring many people. I decided to walk from one 
government office to another in search o f survivors. At each office, I inquired from the 
reception staff whether they knew o f individuals injured by the attack. Although the 
buildings near the American embassy seemed ideal places to find survivors, it proved 
impossible to locate them because the employees who operated from those buildings or 
offices were either dispersed or relocated. For example, one of the buildings that was 
extensively damaged during the bomb attack was Cooperative House, a twenty-five story 
building that housed several government ministries and private companies. But because 
that building had been under repair since 1999, employees who worked there have since
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been operating from different locations within the city or share space with other 
governmental departments, making it difficult to find them.
Although I was able to locate some bomb survivors, I faced yet another problem—  
getting them to tell me their stories and share their experiences. I found out some 
survivors were still shaken and dazed from the tragedy while others were very reluctant 
to share their stories with a stranger for fear that their responses might be used against 
them. But after informing survivors that the purpose o f my study was academic, they 
agreed to talk to me, but only on condition that I first seek permission from their 
supervisors and not use a tape recorder during the interview. The reason for seeking 
permission from their supervisors was because my interviews took place during office 
hours.
In addition, I frequently stopped at kiosks and cafés where government employees 
including the bomb survivors went for coffee or lunch. When I was able to identify 
survivors in these places, I would talk with them briefly and request an interview for a 
later date. Seven people were located in this manner and eventually interviewed.
I also I visited the Kenya School for the Blind (KSB) because survivors told me that 
many o f those who were blinded by the bomb attacks attended rehabilitation classes 
there. At the Kenya School for the Blind, 1 would meet a blind person and ask him/her 
whether his/her injuries were caused by the embassy bombing attack. If the answer was 
in the affirmative, I then asked that person for an interview. At the Kenya School for the 
Blind, the survivors were willing to share their experiences with me because they were 
instructed to do so as part o f the healing process. Four people were interviewed at this 
location.
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Another problem that I faced was whether to conduct formal and structured 
interviewing or informal and semi-structured interviewing. Before leaving for my 
fieldwork in Nairobi, I wanted to collect data using formal and structured interviewing 
and personally administer closed-ended questionnaires. But on arrival in the field, 1 
realized that it was not only difficult to locate bomb survivors to participate in my study, 
but also about half o f the survivors were uncomfortable or reluctant to talk to me because 
they thought they were being interrogated by a government official and thus felt 
threatened. To make sure that the survivors were comfortable and felt unthreatened, I 
decided to ask them very general questions to get them to talk and then employed more 
probing techniques to elicit specific information. I needed to restructure my approach to 
collect data.
I interviewed a total o f twenty survivors in Nairobi. Seven at the Railways 
Headquarters, four at the Kenya School for the Blind, five at the bomb site during the 
anniversary ceremonies, and four at kiosks and restaurants. My interviews with the 
survivors generally lasted for 30 to 45 minutes. Five survivors were interviewed twice 
(i.e., before and after September 11, 2001). During the second interview, 1 was able to 
ask specific questions and clarify previous uncertainties and resolve misunderstandings.
In sum, to locate survivors I used snowball sampling and cold-canvassing tactics to 
locate survivors to interview. The buildings and offices that were near the American 
embassy were selected for cold canvassing because these buildings were severely 
damaged, killing and injuring many. I also attended three anniversary programs o f the 
attack and talked to some o f the survivors who were present during these commemorative 
events. Furthermore, I also stopped at restaurants and coffee shops located near the site
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o f the bombed-out U.S. embassy hoping to spot bomb survivors to talk to. To identify 
survivors, I paid attention to their physical features to detect bodily deformities. In other 
words, I looked for individuals who were blind, had missing limbs, or were badly scarred. 
After observing bodily deformities, I would politely ask the individual whether the 
injuries were bomb-related. If the answer was yes, I requested an interview.
Furthermore, I used personal contacts to locate survivors. Because my interviews 
took place during workday office hours, survivors were at times reluctant to talk to me 
because they did not want to jeopardize their jobs. But after seeking permission from 
their supervisors they were much more willing to talk to me. At least seven survivors did 
not want me to use a tape recorder during the interview, but they did not object to my 
taking notes.
Some survivors preferred being interviewed in the presence o f their fellow employees 
to show that they were not receiving money in exchange for interviews contrary to the 
complaints by a few workmates. These survivors also preferred having our conversations 
at their desks in order to stop the interview in case they wanted to attend to their job 
duties and responsibilities. These survivors also did not want to spend time away from 
their offices or desks giving interviews during working hours for fear that their actions 
may be seen as using their office hours to attend to personal matters. I was informed that 
there were rumors that the survivors were using office hours giving interviews or talking 
to reporters and rehabilitation staff, which caused their supervisors to warn them against 
giving interviews during working hours.
For example, in one office, I was denied permission to interview survivors because it 
was alleged they were spending too much time giving interviews and too little time
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performing their duties. Even though there was an element o f truth in the allegation, I 
sensed that jealousy was also a factor because the survivors were getting all the attention. 
As a case in point, when I presented a written note to one supervisor authorizing me to 
interview four bomb survivors at the Kenya Railways Corporation, this is what the 
supervisor said to those particular survivors: 'W ew e Kamba, kikuyu, lugha, na jaluo, 
mmoja wa watu wenu kutoka Am erikayuko hapa na anataka kuongea nanyinyi kuhusu 
m am boya bomu, m ajem haa yenu na mengineo.” Literal meaning, “You Kamba,
Kikuyu, Lugha, and Luo, one o f your people from America is here and he wants to talk to 
you about the bomb, your injuries, and other things.” I knew what the supervisor meant 
by “and other things”— money. I also knew that it was impolite for the supervisor to 
address employees using their tribal identities instead o f their real names. The polite way 
should have been, “You Mkamba, Mkikuyu, Mlugha, and Mjaluo, there is a person here 
who would like to talk to you about your experiences in the aftermath o f the bomb 
attack.”
When I inquired o f the survivors the reason for such derogatory remarks and 
resentment, I was told that some supervisors and workmates were complaining that the 
survivors were getting all the attention and were using the tragedy as an excuse to attend 
to personal matters. M oreover, survivors were receiving state and NGO assistance such 
as free computer training, school fees, medical treatment, drugs, and financial assistance.
I sensed that during my first contacts with survivors, some o f them actually wanted to 
tell me only what they thought I wanted to hear, probably because they were unsure about 
the purpose o f my research. However, after introducing m yself and at times using my 
personal contacts as a character reference to substantiate my identity as a doctoral student
64
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
affiliated with a university and conducting research for academic purposes, the survivors
were much more willing to speak to me. The more the survivors came to trust me, the
freer they became in sharing their ordeal with me. However, even though survivors were
calm and composed during our interviews, some would simply burst out in unprovoked
raged. For example, when I asked one survivor how she was coping with her suffering,
this is what she said;
I’m so angry and bitter about those coward terrorists who attacked us. If those 
terrorists wanted to kill Americans, why didn’t they go to W ashington D.C. to kill 
Americans there? Why did they [terrorists] come to Kenya looking to kill 
Americans here only to kill many o f our people and injure thousands o f us and 
destroy our lives? If  it were not for the American embassy, I will still be having 
my now missing eye and my life will still be norm al.. ..I don’t blame American 
people for what happened to me, but I blame their officials who don’t want to 
solve the terrorists’ grievances so that many innocent people like us do not have 
to be killed ....B ut America has been so generous to us by helping us with the 
medical assistance to deal with our injuries.
The major limitation o f the information collected in Nairobi is that the sample taken 
(i.e., the twenty bomb survivors that I interviewed) was not random. This is because, as 
indicated earlier, I interviewed only those bomb survivors I was able to locate and those 
who were willing to share their experiences with me. The non-random nature o f my 
sample would not have not be an issue if  one could assume that survivors who were 
interviewed and those who were not interviewed were homogenous in every regard (i.e., 
if their experiences, pain, suffering, and responses were the same). However, one cannot 
make such an assumption because research has shown that different people, including 
survivors, respond differently even when they are faced with similar tragic circumstances 
(Ochberg and Soskis 1982; Fields 1982; Fink and Mathias 2002). Nevertheless, much 
useful data can be obtained.
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Reflections
My fieldwork was less extensive compared to many others that have attempted to 
study human catastrophes. In part, this is because talking to bomb survivors who were 
blind or only had one eye or were burnt, disfigured, and disabled from the attack was 
very difficult. I concentrated on taking notes during the interviews, because I thought that 
staring at them would have offended them. Similarly, whenever survivors said that they 
were in a predicament because the government had terminated free medical assistance or 
failed to honor its promises of providing free school fees to their children, I did not know 
how to show my sympathy.
One o f the advantages o f qualitative study is the opportunity that it provides a 
researcher to reflect on his/her experiences and dilemmas as they occur in the field. 
Hammersley and Atkinson (1995:206) observed that, “a common ailment in fieldwork is 
where the researcher feels it is necessary to try to be everywhere at once and stay in the 
setting for as long as possible. As a result o f this, a great deal o f data is collected, but 
little time is left for reflection on the significance o f the data and the implications for 
further data collection.” My personal doubts revolved around questioning the reliability 
o f the information that I acquired. Because the information I collected involved 
ethnographic narratives that were meant to address the survivors’ responses to terrorist 
operations, I wondered how such information could be reliable when I interviewed 
survivors some years after the bomb attack had happened. How could the bomb 
survivors’ responses be verified when government officials declined to be interviewed to 
substantiate the survivors’ claims, concerns, and fears? How could a few minutes o f 
interviewing survivors be enough to tell us what it really means to be a bomb survivor?
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What could a few interviewed individuals tell us about the actual experiences o f the 
survivors or the mechanisms they actually use to cope with their pain and suffering? 
Participant observation in a long-term study o f a group o f survivors would have produced 
a more complete and possibly a different description of the survivors’ experiences and 
responses to terrorist operations. Nonetheless, the information that I acquired from the 
survivors was checked against documents and media materials. By using a variety o f 
sources, I was able to obtain additional accounts o f a range o f responses and discover 
some general themes in those responses.
Summary
To study bomb survivors in the aftermath o f a disaster is a difficult task. Patience, 
empathy, and a willingness to listen are critical to understanding how survivors cope with 
their loss, pain, and suffering. In researching human tragedies, the best way is to let the 
victims tell their stories with as little interruption as possible. However, by using probing 
techniques judiciously, a researcher can acquire answers to specific questions. Finally, 
being sympathetic to the conditions, concerns, and fears o f the survivors is key in 
building rapport, gaining trust, and collecting information.
Informal Interviewing using semi-structured Questionnaires 
In Nairobi, I personally administered semi-structured interviewing using open-ended 
questionnaires to gather information from survivors concerning the bomb attacks. 
Specifically, this study was conducted on the second and fourth annual commemorations 
o f the bomb attacks in Nairobi. Survivors were informed that the data obtained from this
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study will be used for academic purposes. Survivors were also told that their responses 
were important in helping us understand how they have been able to cope with the 
attacks, what they think should be done to better assist them deal with their plight, and 
what they think their government should do to ensure that such a tragedy does not happen 
again. In addition, survivors were informed that their participation was voluntary and 
their responses will remain anonymous by ensuring them that their names or identities 
will not be disclosed or made public in this research.
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CHAPTER THREE
AL-QAEDA’S ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE, 
R ECRU ITM EN T METHODS, AND M ODU S OPERANDI
The enemy must not know where I intend to give battle. For if he does not 
know where I intend to give battle, he must prepare in a great many p laces...If 
he prepares to the front, his rear will be weak, and if  to the rear, his front will 
be fragile. If  he prepares to the left, his right will be vulnerable and if to the 
right, there will be few on his left. And when he prepares everywhere, he will 
be weak everywhere.
—James Clavell, The Art o f  War by Sun Tzu 1981 [1910], p. 38.
This statement was written over many centuries ago by a Chinese war strategist about 
the art o f war and the advantages o f hit-and-run and surprise attacks, yet its relevance still 
applies to contemporary societies and times. If  it is correct as Alexander and Alexander 
(2002) and Clancy and Stiner (2002) contend, that modem terrorism is a form of 
unconventional and “asymmetrical warfare” waged in the shadows, then the most 
spectacular manifestations o f Sun Tzu’s warnings were realized on September 11, 2001.
In the calculated and choreographed attacks on the so-called “Black Tuesday” the 
most powerful country in the world with unmatched economic prosperity, military 
prowess, and intelligence capabilities was surprised by nineteen terrorists who mounted 
unexpected kamikaze assaults on American shores, killing three thousand people and 
injuring thousands more in the process (Alexander and Alexander 2002). Talbott and 
Chanda (2001) judged that the September 11 attacks were the single most lethal act 
directed against Americans in contemporary times.
Cooley (2000), Mamdani (2004), Jenkins (2001), Hanson (2000), Ruthven (2002) that 
terrorism has become a cultural and social weapon o f struggle that fundamentalists
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employ to promote their political, religious, and ideological agendas. In modem times, 
the most notorious organization that justifies the use o f violence to wield power and to 
intimidate its adversaries is the Islamic fundamentalist group, al-Qaeda ‘the base’.
Under these conditions. Bar (2004), Combs (2002), and Emerson (2002) wam that it is 
important that we understand who these terrorists are, how they operate, why they attack, 
how they rationalize their actions, and what they have been able to accomplish in the past 
decade if we hope to detect, dismantle, and prevent their plans o f executing future acts of 
terror. In chapter one, I indicated that terrorism consists of a set o f cultural practices, 
belief systems, organizational stmctures, operational technologies, and modus operandi. 
This chapter examines important issues regarding the rise of al-Qaeda and bin Laden, the 
declaration o f jih a d  ‘struggle’ against the United States and its allies, the world view and 
ideology o f its members, the organization’s leadership, military, and strategic stmctures 
and the little-known cultural component o f kinship within al-Qaeda. But first, let us tum 
our focus to the origins and historical records o f al-Qaeda.
The Origins o f Al-Qaeda
We— with G od’s help—  call on every Muslim who believes in God and wishes to 
be rewarded to comply with G od’s order to kill the Americans and plunder their 
money wherever and whenever they find it. We also call on the Muslim ulema 
[community], leaders, youths, and soldiers to launch the raid on Satan’s US troops 
and the devil’s supporters allying with them and to displace those who are behind 
them so that they may learn a lesson (quoted in Gunaratna 2002:1).
—Declaration o f war against “the infidels” by bin Laden, Febmary 23, 1998
The word al-Qaeda, Arabic for ‘the base’, is an Islamic fundamentalist movement that 
believes in jih a d  violent stmggle to fight and evict imperialists, cmsaders, and Zionists 
from the Middle East and other Muslim nations around the world. Al-Qaeda also
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believes in waging outright war against Kafir 'the infidels’ (unbelievers) who in their 
view are enemies o f Allah and Islam. To al-Qaeda’s mujahideens ‘holy warriors’, the 
infidels not only include the West in general and the United States in particular, but also 
Muslim and Arab regimes that cooperate with “the Great Satan” (the United States), 
abandon Islamic true faith, or fail to adhere to stringent Sharia, ‘Islamic laws’ {The 9/11 
Commission Report 2004; Hoffman 1999; Gunaratna 2002; Bar 2004; Stem 2003).
Mahmood M amdani (2004), a professor of government in the departments of 
Anthropology and International Affairs at Columbia University pointed out that al- 
Qaeda’s senior leaders and a majority o f their followers participated in jihad  against the 
Soviet invasion o f Afghanistan between the years o f 1979 to 1989. During this period, 
young Muslims and Arab volunteers from around the world flocked to Peshawar,
Pakistan, to train as mujahideen and to wage war against the Soviets in Afghanistan 
(Cooley 2000:120; The 9/11 Commission Report 2004:55-57). The Arab volunteers who 
participated in the decade-longyï/îaJ were viewed as freedom fighters struggling with 
their Muslim brothers, the Afghan National Resistance Movement, to evict the Soviet 
communist infidels in order to liberate Afghanistan (Cooley 2000:3-4; Mamdani 
2004:140; Herbst 2003:70).
Armed with sophisticated weapons, logistics, training, and financial support which 
were covertly and clandestinely provided by the United States, Great Britain, Saudi 
Arabia, Pakistan, China, Egypt, and several other countries, the so-called “Afghan Arabs” 
triumphed over the Soviets (Cooley 2000:3-6; Mamdani 2004:136). Among those who 
fought and volunteered their time, money, and services against the Soviets were Saudi 
Arabian millionaire and philanthropist, Osama bin Laden, and Egyptian religious scholar
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and physician, Ayman al-Zawahiri (Cooley 2000:120; Mamdani 2004:132; Gunaratna 
2002:20). Cooley (2000:4) and The 9/11 Commission Report (2004:55) noted that 
Osama bin Laden, in particular, generously financed the anti-Soviet jih a d  using his 
family’s wealth and donations acquired from M iddle Eastern governments and wealthy 
Arab G ulf merchant families. Furthermore, bin Laden relied heavily on his business 
skills and connections to collect money to finance his operations in Afghanistan 
(Benjamin and Simon 2002; Bergen 2002; 2004; Hoffman 2004; Gunaratna 2002).
Mamdani (2004:125) reported that prior to moving to Afghanistan in the early 1980s
to take up the Afghan struggle, “bin Laden was recruited, with U.S. approval at the
highest level, by Prince Turk al-Faisal, then the head o f Saudi intelligence” to spearhead
and lead “Afghan Arab” volunteers in the war against the Soviets. Cooley (2000:225)
also claimed that because o f his business credentials and close connections with the Saudi
royal family, bin Laden was put in charge o f transferring and supplying Saudi donations
to the Afghan cause. Cooley maintained that because o f his personal friendship with
Prince Turki al-Faisal, bin Laden was appointed to be the direct conduit between Saudi
Arabia and Pakistan on issues regarding the war in Afghanistan. Furthermore, bin
Laden’s construction companies were employed to build bridges, roads, training camps,
and medical facilities in Afghanistan. Specifically, Mamdani (2004:132-133) stated that:
In 1986, bin Laden worked as the major contractor to build a large CIA-funded 
project: the Khost tunnel complex deep under the mountains close to the Pakistani 
border. The Khost complex housed a major arms depot, a training facility, and a 
medical center for the mujahideen. It is the Khost complex that President Clinton 
decided in 1998 to bomb with Tomahawk cruise missiles. It is also in the Khost 
complex— the famed mountain caves— that the United States later fought al- 
Qaeda remnants in its own Afghan War.
Other analysts observed that prior to taking up the Afghanistan struggle, bin Laden
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and Prince Turki had much in common on matters o f Islamic religion. They both 
believed that Islam was in decline due to decadence, imperialism, and corruption. 
Therefore, when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, Prince Turki promptly directed bin 
Laden to travel to Pakistan to find out whether it was possible and doable to create an 
Arab volunteer battalion to fight the Soviets (Bergen 2001:55; Benjamin and Simon 
2002:99-100). Knowing this, it is safe to conclude that bin Laden began his jih a d  against 
the Soviet infidels with the blessings and approval o f both Saudi and American power 
structures, but when the Soviets were defeated, bin Laden turned his wrath against his 
sponsors, Saudi Arabia and the United States, which now were considered the corrupt 
and oppressive states needing to be brought down.
During his college years, bin Laden was a student o f Sheikh Abdullah Azzam (then an 
Islamic professor at King Abdul Aziz University in Jeddah) and as M amdani (2004:133) 
observed, “the first Afghan-Arab gatekeeper o f the jihad in the m id-eighties.” Bin Laden 
was inspired by the charisma and teachings o f Azzam, a Jordanian-Palestinian theologian 
who was influenced by Sayyid Q utb’s world-view and ideologies. Qutb was an Egyptian 
radical Islamist intellectual, a writer, religious scholar, and member o f the Muslim 
Brotherhood Movement. He was assassinated in 1966 for advocating violence in 
overthrowing President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s corrupt and oppressive regime {The 9/11 
Commission Report 2004:36; Mamdani 2004:56-61). Therefore, one can argue that 
before becoming a key player in the struggle against the Soviets, bin Laden was deeply 
affected and inspired by both Qutb and Azzam ’s religious scholarship and ideologies.
According to Gunaratna (2002:18), Azzam played a principal role in “formulating and 
articulating the jihad doctrines that mobilized Afghan and Arab volunteers to fight the
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Soviets.” To formulate his jihad doctrines, however, Azzam relied heavily on the 
thoughts o f Qutb who sanctioned the use of violence to crush A llah’s enemies and to aid 
in Islam ’s eventual triumph and rule throughout the world {The 9/11 Commission Report 
2004:51). According to Benjamin and Simon (2002) and Emerson (2002), Azzam 
became the architect and the mastermind behind the creation o f the global Islamic 
extremist movement that participated in the war against the Soviets. Although he later 
teamed up with bin Laden and other mujahideen members to fight the Soviets, Azzam 
“was personally responsible for reviving the concept o f a jih a d  among the Muslim 
masses” {The 9/11 Commission Report 2004:51).
Mamdani (2004:126-127) reported that Azzam traveled extensively throughout the 
world, including North America, under Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) protection and 
patronage to rally, recruit, and collect funds within the United States to support the anti­
communist crusade in Afghanistan. Furthermore, Azzam was among the principal 
inspirers and founders o f Hamas, the terrorist movement struggling to liberate Palestine 
from Israeli occupation by any means necessary. Gunaratna (2002:19) also suggested 
that Azzam was revered for his charisma, knowledge o f military strategy, and religious 
and academic scholarship, qualities that bin Laden admired and which influenced his 
thinking during and after the war in Afghanistan.
After the defeat and surrender o f the Soviets, Abdullah Azzam and bin Laden agreed 
that the organization that was created for war in Afghanistan should not be allowed to 
dissolve. Instead a new foundation should be created to serve as a potential general 
headquarters for future jihads against other infidels, imperialists, crusaders, and Zionists 
in the Middle East and in other countries around the world where Muslims faced
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oppression, persecution, humiliation, and injustice (Gunaratna 2002:21).
Emerson (2002:129-132) pointed out that even after the withdrawal o f the Soviets 
from Afghanistan, Azzam continued to rally Muslims worldwide, including within the 
United States, to rise and fight on behalf o f oppressed Muslims. In many o f his speeches, 
rallies, and sermons, he routinely reminded M uslims everywhere to fight jihads  with their 
tongue {daw ’awha) and with their money {jihad fi-m al). He repeatedly remarked that it 
is the duty o f every Muslim to fight A llah’s enemies with their lives and wealth.
In addition, Azzam called upon all Muslims to fight the Zionist infidels to ensure that 
Palestinians achieved their independence. Emerson (2002:130-132) reported that Azzam 
routinely encouraged kamikaze operations and self-sacrifice by arguing that martyrdom 
was an honorable deed because it promoted A llah’s cause and aided in Islam ’s triumph. 
He argued that martyrdom is a precious personal duty that every Muslim must embrace 
because it is the most effective means through which Muslims can fight well-established 
military establishments and state apparatuses, particularly those o f the infidel Americans 
and Israelis (Mamdani 2004; Stem 2003; Benjamin and Simon 2002; Sechuer 2004).
Azzam ’s protégé, bin Laden, embraced the directions and doctrines o f the jihad as 
they were interpreted and formulated by his mentor Azzam. Bin Laden insisted that 
violence must be employed to wage war and overthrow corrupt and oppressive Middle 
Eastern regimes (e.g., Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan) and to remove the U.S. presence 
from Saudi Arabia where Islam ’s holiest sites, Mecca and Medina, are located (Bodansky 
2000; Mamdani 2004; Gunaratna 2002). W hen Azzam disagreed with waging jihad 
against fellow M uslims within Arabic countries and disapproved using violence to target 
Muslim civilians, women, children, and the elderly, the two jihadists, bin Laden and
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Azzam, parted company. Soon after, Azzam and his two sons were killed in a car bomb 
on their way to a mosque in Peshawar, Pakistan. It is alleged, although not proven, that 
bin Laden ordered the assassination o f his estranged mentor, Azzam (Mamdani 2002:133; 
Gunaratna 2002:23).
In short, even prior to his death, Azzam vehemently resented the direction the jihad 
was taking under his protege’s leadership; however, by August 1998, al-Qaeda was in 
place under the leadership o f bin Laden (Alexander and Alexander 2002; Reeve 1999; 
Cooley 2000; Emerson 2003; The 9/11 Commission Report 2004; Benjamin and Simon 
2002). It is also presumed that even before becoming the senior leader o f al-Qaeda, bin 
Laden had privately and successfully funded and sponsored terrorist attacks against 
America and American interests both at home and abroad beginning with the 1993 
shooting o f two CIA employees by an al-Qaeda operative at the Central Intelligence 
Agency Headquarters in Langley, Virginia, the first bombing o f the World Trade Center 
in New York City in 1993, and the killing o f American troops in Mogadishu, Somalia in 
1993 (Reeve 1999; Alexander and Alexander 2002; The 9/11 Commission Report 2004). 
Gunaratna (2002:21) claimed that Azzam laid the groundwork for bin Laden’s rise to 
power and that the militant “Afghan Arabs” that Azzam “helped create eventually 
metamorphosed into bin Laden’s al-Qaeda, a network of terrorists wreaking havoc 
around the globe today.” Gunaratna also maintained that contrary to the popular 
perception that al-Qaeda was the sole creation o f bin Laden, “ it was Azzam who 
conceptualized A1 Qaeda, primarily to stabilize and harness the massive mujahidin 
organization his ideology had helped to create. Nonetheless, O sam a’s aim o f re-creating 
the Caliphate, or uniting the whole Muslim world into a single entity, appealed to the
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Arab mujahidin'" (pp .127-128). Thus, the jih a d  doctrines and ideologies that al-Qaeda 
currently embraces were initially formulated by its “founding father”, Azzam, in the mid- 
1980s and revolutionized by his protégé, bin Laden, beginning in the early 1990s.
Analysts frequently argue that it was by sheer luck that bin Laden was able to acquire 
such a large following after the end o f the Afghan-Soviet war. It happened because many 
o f the Afghan mujahideen were able to find a safe haven within the al-Qaeda network 
first in Sudan and later in Afghanistan. Mamdani (2004:127-130) pointed out that 
immediately after the withdrawal o f the Soviets from Afghanistan, at least three things 
happened: (i) some o f the “Afghan Arabs” who fought against the Soviets who returned 
to their respective countries and advocated the use o f violence to reform or overthrow 
oppressive regimes were arrested and imprisoned; (ii) those who completed their jail 
terms took political asylum in different countries or returned to Afghanistan to find 
sanctuary with bin Laden; and (iii) still others simply refused to return to their home 
countries for fear o f being persecuted and thus decided to stay in Afghanistan where they 
easily assimilated into Afghan culture and even married Afghan women.
Many Afghan veterans had little alternative but to join al-Qaeda either as freelancers 
or terrorists-for-hire. After joining al-Qaeda, these operatives began systematically 
targeting Arab and Middle Eastern regimes that were alleged to be corrupt and oppressive 
puppets o f the West. The targeted Arab regimes included: Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Libya, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. Other terrorists directed their jihad against 
“the Great Satan” and the “little Satan”, the United States and Israel respectively (Cooley 
2000; Bergen 2002; Stem 2003; Benjamin and Simon 2002).
Cooley (2000) and M amdani (2004) asserted that the United States played a principal
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role in creating and nurturing many al-Qaeda senior leaders and operatives. As Mamdani
(2004:132) judged “The best-known CIA-trained terrorist, was o f course, bin Laden.”
Arundhati Roy (2003:234) wrote that, “bin Laden has the distinction o f being created by
the CIA and wanted by the FBI.” Cooley and Mamdani further asserted that bin Laden
was not the only one created by the CIA; other leaders such as Abdullah Azzam, Sheikh
Omar Abdel Rahman (the blind Egyptian cleric), and other al-Qaeda members benefited
from CIA training on the art o f guerrilla war. Analysts claimed that:
All CIA inventions, all were on the FBI list o f the most wanted. The co­
conspirators in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing including two other 
veterans o f the Afghan jihad: Ramzi Ahmed Y ousef and Mahmud Abouhalima. 
The W orld Trade Center bomb exploded underground, leaving a crater two 
hundred feet wide and several stories deep. The bomb was made o f ammonium 
nitrate and fuel oil— according to Cooley, a formula ‘taught in CIA m anuals’ 
(Mamdani 2004:234-235).
Other scholars also argued that those who joined al-Qaeda received extensive training 
in military and guerilla tactics, logistics, and weaponry through the CIA in conjunction 
with assistance from United States’ allies, which included Britain, Saudi Arabia, and 
Pakistan. The training, tactics, logistics, and intelligence capabilities that the United 
States and its allies passed on to the “Afghan Arabs” played a significant role in the 
defeat and surrender o f the Soviets. These are the same tactics, skills, and weapons that 
the Afghan veterans (now al-Qaeda) are employing to wreak havoc on their former 
sponsors and employers, the United States and Saudi Arabia (Cooley 2000; Gunaratna 
2002; Mamdani 2004; Scheuer 2004).
Analysts claimed that the CIA provided training to the “Afghan Arabs” in many 
military skills: espionage, assassination, explosives making, detonation o f bombs, firing 
Stinger missiles, conducting surveillance, gathering information using covert methods.
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and scaling potential targets. The CIA also covertly shipped some high-level Afghanis 
and foreign mujahideen recruits into the United States to be trained in advanced military 
strategies and special operations tactics at American military camps and complexes 
(Mamdani 2004:136-137; Cooley 2000; Scheuer 2004).
Cooley (2000:88-90) noted that these intelligence and military training complexes 
included: the CIA’s shooting range at High Rock Gun Club in Naugatuk, Connecticut; 
Fort Bragg, North Carolina; C IA ’s Camp Perry (alias “Camp Smokey” or “The Farm”) in 
Williamsburg, Virginia; a CIA-used Army Special Forces site, Harvey Point, North 
Carolina; Fort A. P. Hill, Virginia; and Camp Pickett, Virginia. Other mujahideen 
received advanced training in the deserts o f  Sandy Valley, Nevada, a few miles away 
from the “entertainment capital o f the world” . Las Vegas,
It has been suggested that the real mistake was not so much the C IA ’s decision to 
covertly support the Afghan mujahideen with weapons, tactics, logistics, and finances to 
evict the Soviets from Afghanistan, but rather according to Mamdani (2004:138), “the 
privatization o f information about how to produce and spread violence and the formation 
o f private militias capable o f  creating terror.” The CIA training camps and military 
complexes in the United States were secretly used to train and teach Afghan fighters the 
art of war by passing on top intelligence and military secrets. The U.S. trainers were both 
retired and active-duty Green Beret officers, many o f them former Vietnam veterans. 
These special forces members took draconian secrecy oaths and then embarked on the 
clandestine training o f Afghan mujahideen. In the process they passed along the top 
secrets of U.S. intelligence and military information to foreigners. Mamdani (2004:138) 
argued that all the CIA training in the U.S. camps involved infiltration tactics, extracting
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information from prisoners, and other skills. Cooley (1999:87-88) specifically reported 
that the skills that the U.S. trainers passed to the Afghan mujahideen included the “use o f 
sophisticated fuses, timers, and explosives; automatic weapons with armor-piercing 
ammunition, remote-control devices for triggering mines and bom bs....” Mamdani 
(2004:138) also pointed out that, “There were also local Afghan skills such as throat 
cutting and disemboweling— that the CIA incorporated in its training.” Clearly, many o f 
the members o f al-Qaeda are alumni o f the Central Intelligence Agency. Referring to the 
role that the United States played in creating al-Qaeda and the attacks o f September 11, 
one Algerian sociologist remarked that, “Your government participated in creating a 
m onster.. ..Now it has turned against you and the world: 16,000 Arabs were trained in 
Afghanistan, made into a veritable killing machine” (quoted in Mamdani 2004:140).
In short, al-Qaeda was conceived and bom in Afghanistan in 1989. It was nurtured by 
the finances, training, and logistics it received from the United States, Saudi Arabia,
Great Britain, and Pakistan in 1979 to 1989. It came o f age in the terrorist training camps 
o f Afghanistan and Sudan in 1991 to 1996. It underwent its rite de passage with the 
successful simultaneous attacks o f the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 
1998. It entered maturity with the multiple simultaneous attacks against the United 
States’ symbolic landmarks, the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, in 2001. These 
attacks and numerous others which included the bombings o f the Madrid and London 
commuter trains and buses in 2002 and 2005 respectively were alleged to be 
masterminded and funded by al-Qaeda’s senior leaders, bin Laden and al-Zawahiri. The 
fugitives are considered public enemy number one and are believed to be hiding within 
the rugged mountains of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. The “crowning glory” o f al-
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Q aeda’s campaign against the United States and its allies was on September 11 when 
nineteen al-Qaeda operatives, using only box cutters and knives, hijacked four American 
commercial airliners and crashed them into buildings killing thousands.
Al-Qaeda is an umbrella organization that consisted o f many and varied Islamic 
groups, conglomerates, and individuals who subscribe to the ideology o f jih a d  and 
violence. These individuals came from different economic classes and social strata.
They were united by extreme ideology and hatred for America and what its stood for. 
These individuals believed that triumph over the imperialists, crusaders, and Zionists can 
be accomplished not through negotiations and concessions, but through the “barrel o f the 
gun.” Figure 3 is a diagram of the Islamic global terrorist groups that pledged allegiance 
to bin Laden and joined al-Qaeda.
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To summarize, al-Qaeda is a multinational terrorist organization which has operatives 
and cells in more than sixty countries around the world. It is today loosely organized, 
subscribes to conservative Islamic practices, and advocates the use o f extreme violence to 
promote its agenda. It is made up o f several Islamic terrorist groups whose primary 
objective is to wage jihad against its enemies, the imperialists, crusaders, and Zionists.
Its affiliates come from different Islamic fundamentalist organizations such as the 
Egyptian Islamic Jihad, The Armed Islamic Group, Abu Sayyaf, and Jamaah Islamiyya, 
among others. Its members and disciples come from diverse socio-economic 
backgrounds and strata and are comprised o f different nationalities and age-groups.
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In addition, al-Qaeda’s senior leaders were once former Afghan mujahideen who were 
then sponsored by the United States and her allies, Great Britain, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, 
Israel, Egypt, among others. These sponsors and financiers were responsible for creating, 
recruiting, training, funding, and arming the “Afghan Arabs” , an international network o f 
Islamic militants who fought and evicted the Soviets from Afghanistan. Many Afghani 
veterans received advanced training in special operations and guerrilla warfare tactics in 
United States Central Intelligence Agency training camps and military complexes.
Therefore, it is fair to say that although the decade-long jihad in Afghanistan and the 
defeat and final withdrawal o f the Soviets from Afghanistan played an essential role in 
the rise o f al-Qaeda and the formulation o f its objective o f waging jihad on behalf o f all 
oppressed M uslims around the world, it was the CIA which was mainly responsible for 
creating al-Qaeda and its leader, Osama bin Laden. This is because o f the following: (i) 
al-Qaeda’s terrorism training manual is almost a duplicate o f that o f the CIA; (ii) al- 
Q aeda’s intelligence-gathering techniques, military skills, weapons use, and guerilla 
tactics were learned from the CIA; and (iii) al-Qaeda’s terrorist training camps in Khost, 
Afghanistan, were built by bin Laden in consultation with and under the supervision o f 
the CIA. Hence, when President Clinton ordered military strikes against al-Qaeda in 
Afghanistan in retaliation for the American embassies bombings in Kenya and Tanzania 
on October 1998, the CIA knew exactly where those caves and camps were located.
Apparently, the CIA was indirectly responsible for the subsequent attacks perpetrated 
by al-Qaeda. Although the CIA trained the Muslim mercenaries in the 1980s, after 
defeating the Soviets, the United States and its allies abandoned the Afghan veterans. 
After joining al-Qaeda as terrorists for hire, these Muslim mercenaries turned their wrath
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against their former benefactor and employer, the United States. The next section 
discusses al-Qaeda’s history o f terror since its creation to the present.
A l-Q aeda’s History o f Terror and Terror as a Cultural Phenomenon
As indicated above, the history o f al-Qaeda, the “new kind o f  terrorism”, can be traced 
from the Afghan-Soviet war o f the 1980s. During this decade-long battle, the Afghan 
veterans were hardened by war against the Soviets and were later energized against 
America due to its presence in Saudi Arabia, wherein lie the most sacred sites o f Islam. 
Although al-Qaeda does not belong to any particular country, flies no particular flag, nor 
wears any particular uniform, this loosely-organized terror network has managed to 
infiltrate many countries and inflict mass causalities in many places around the world.
The preeminent practitioner o f al-Qaeda’s tactics is its founder, Osama bin Laden, who 
personally masterminds and finances acts o f terror to promote his political and 
ideological agenda. In the space o f a decade, bin Laden has also managed to draw the 
United States and her close allies into a declaration o f global war. This section discusses 
al-Qaeda’s history o f terror. Contrary to the assertion o f many that al-Qaeda targets only 
the core-industrialized and powerful nations, such as the United States, in fact it has also 
targeted peripheral and marginalized countries, such as Kenya, Tanzania, Indonesia, 
Algeria, or Morocco.
Alexander and Alexander (20002) claimed that the successes o f al-Q aeda’s history of 
terror since it was first created in the late 1980s to the present shows that this group has 
some o f the most dedicated cadres and followers the world has ever seen. Furthermore, 
al-Qaeda has great planning skills, sophisticated intelligence-gathering know-how, and
84
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
dynamic strategies o f attack necessary to engage and inflict harm on its enemies. These 
planning and execution skills were put into use on September 11.
The spectacular attacks forced millions o f people in America and around the world to 
watch with “shock and awe” as the airplanes crashed into the World Trade Center twin 
towers causing their ultimate collapse. Millions o f people around the world watched the 
news in disbelief. Others thought that what they were witnessing on that very day was a 
surreal re-enactment o f a fictitious story line in one o f Tom Clancy’s books or scenes 
from the film, Armageddon.
The human costs o f these massive attacks became tragically clear during that 
apocalyptic day. Over three thousand people from more than sixty countries were killed 
while thousands more were injured. The W orld Trade Center, the beacon o f American- 
led capitalism collapsed, whilst the Pentagon, the embodiment o f American military 
superiority, incurred severe damage. The impact from these attacks was felt throughout 
all spheres o f society and especially in the economic and business sectors o f the United 
States and around the world (Alexander and Alexander 2002; The 9/11 Commission 
2004)
To be capable o f inflicting such unprecedented harm against lives and property, al- 
Qaeda operatives had attempted several mock attacks to sharpen their tools. For 
example, al-Qaeda’s successful attacks against the American embassies in Kenya and 
Tanzania in 1998 demonstrated that this organization was a force to be reckoned with. 
Moreover, the attacks in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam also demonstrated that al-Qaeda 
operatives could not be dismissed as dilettantes but as dedicated militants who were
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willing to sacrifice their own lives and those o f innocent civilians to promote their 
agenda. Bergen (2002) noted that the African attacks against U.S. facilities were a dress 
rehearsal for the attacks o f September 11.
As early as 1992, al-Qaeda declared war against U.S. military troops and civilians 
stationed in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and the Horn o f  Africa. Since that time, al-Qaeda’s 
major operations against Americans and their interests abroad have included the killing o f 
nineteen American soldiers on a mission in Somalia when their helicopters were shot 
down on October 4, 1993, the killing o f five Americans and two Indians when a car bomb 
exploded in the American-operated Saudi National Guard training center in Riyadh,
Saudi Arabia, on November 13, 1995, the killing o f nineteen military personnel when a 
car bomb exploded at Khobar Towers, an American Air Force housing complex in 
Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, on June 25, 1996, the killing o f 253 people, among them twelve 
Americans, and the injuring o f 5,000 others in the bomb attacks on the U.S. embassies in 
Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, on August 7, 1998; and the killing of 
seventeen sailors in a suicide bombing against the USS Cole in Aden Harbor, Yemen, on 
October 12, 2000 (Alexander and Alexander 2002; Emerson 2002; Gunaratna 2002).
Other attacks by al-Qaeda and bin Laden’s network against the U.S. included the 
killing o f six people and hundreds more injured when a truck full o f explosives detonated 
in a garage at the World Trade Center in New York City on February 23, 1993, the 
killing o f two CIA employees when a Pakistani terrorist with ties to al-Qaeda opened fire 
outside the CIA Headquarters in Virginia, on June 25, 1993, and the killing of three 
thousand civilians on September 11, 2001 (Alexander and Swetnam 2001; Emerson 
2002; Gunaratna 2002; Williams 2002; The 9/11 Commission Report 2004). Table 1
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provides a selective chronology o f al-Qaeda’s record o f attacks directed against the U.S 
and its allies.
To summarize, Table 1 shows that since its creation, al-Qaeda has been responsible in 
waging jihad against “the infidels” and their allies on almost a yearly basis. A l-Qaeda’s 
attacks have been felt almost everywhere around the globe. Today, few countries and 
societies can claim immunity from al-Qaeda’s terrorism. As the selective chronology 
indicates, as early as the 1990s, al-Qaeda had systematically started using terrorism 
campaigns to promote its agenda. By September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda’s attacks were on a 
grand scale. In addition to the fact that the September 11 catastrophic attacks caused 
unprecedented damage, it was also an event o f “crowning glory” to al-Qaeda as bin 
Laden and his network had finally and successfully globalized violence and terrorism 
(Atran 2004; Hoffman 2004; Cooley 2000).
As a consequence o f the globalization o f terrorism, many people around the world 
have lost their lives, property has been destroyed on a grand scale, and personal security 
is highly threatened. A l-Qaeda’s influence is felt from Algiers to Casablanca, Cairo, 
Nairobi, Mombasa, Dar es- Salaam, Riyadh, Islamabad, Kabul, Bali, Manila, New York, 
Washington, Madrid, London, and many cities in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Since the creation o f al-Qaeda, terrorism has been brought home to a great many 
people the world over. In the contemporary world, fewer countries can now claim 
immunity from the effects o f terrorism. Gone are the days when people thought that the 
problem of terrorism was in other peoples’ backyards, i.e., in far away places. According 
to Cooley (2000:259), “By the start o f the new millennium, all that had changed.
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TA BLE 1
SELECTIVE CHRONOLOGY OF AL-QAEDA’S ATTACKS, 1993-2005
2/26/1993 United States: Seven people were killed and more than 1,000 injured in 
truck bomb explosion at World Trade Center, New York.
10/4/1993 Somalia: Nineteen American soldiers with Special Operations Forces
were killed and seventy-eight were wounded when two U.S. helicopters 
were attacked in M ogadishu by Somali militiamen loyal to Mohammed 
Farrah Aideed. The attack was linked to al-Qaeda.
11/13/1995 Saudi Arabia: Five Americans were killed and dozens more injured
when a car bomb exploded on a temporary U.S. training facility in 
Riyadh.
6/25/1996 Saudi Arabia: Nineteen American troops were killed and dozens more
injured when a truck exploded outside a U.S. Air Force housing 
complex at Khobar Towers in Dhahran.
8/7/1998 Kenya and Tanzania: 254 people were killed among them twelve
Americans and eleven Tanzanians, and 5,000 Kenyans were injured from 
truck explosions in near simultaneous U.S. embassies bombings in Nairobi 
and Dar es Salaam.
8/20/1998 Afghanistan and Sudan: U.S. cruise missiles were launched to strike five
training camps belonging to bin Laden’s network in Afghanistan and 
at a pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum suspected o f manufacturing a 
precursor for chemical weapons. These attacks were ordered in 
retaliation for the bombings o f the U.S. embassies in Kenya and 
Tanzania.
10/12/2000 Yemen: N ineteen U.S. Marines were killed and dozens more injured at
a port in Aden Harbor when the U.S.S. Cole (an American 
destroyer) was attacked by suicide-terrorists with links to al-Qaeda
9/11/2001 United States: Three thousand people from more than sixty countries
around the world were killed and thousands more injured in multiple 
terror attacks against A merica’s World Trade Center, New York, the 
Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia, and at a field in Pennsylvania.
10/7/2001 Afghanistan: US-led coalition forces began military air strikes against
Afghanistan’s Taliban regime and their guests, the al-Qaeda terrorist 
group. These military air strikes were a retaliatory response against the 
terrorists who attacked New York and Washington, D.C., on Sept. 11.
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T able 1, (continued)
10/10/02 Indonesia: More than 200 people, mostly Australian, were killed and
many more wounded in simultaneous car bombs at a tourist resort hotel in 
Bali. The Jemaah Islamiyah group with links to al-Qaeda claimed 
responsibility.
11/28/02 Kenya: Fifteen people were killed, among them three Israelis, in a car
bombat a hotel in Mombasa. At the same time the car bomb exploded, 
several men fired two surface-to-air missiles that missed an Israeli charter 
aircraft taking off from a nearby airport.
5/12/03 Saudi Arabia: Fifty people were killed, 12 o f whom were American
citizens, and hundreds wounded in truck bombs aimed at three residential 
complexes for foreign workers in Riyadh.
5/16/03 Morocco: Forty people were killed when dozens o f suicide-bombers
attacked five targets in Casablanca. One hundred were wounded. The 
targets included a Spanish restaurant, a Jewish community center, a Jewish 
cemetery, a hotel, and the Belgian Consulate. M orocco’s terrorist 
network, affiliated with al-Qaeda, claimed responsibility.
5/8/03 Indonesia: A car bomb exploded outside the Marriot Hotel in Jakarta,
killing 10 people and injuring 150. Jemaah Islamiyya was blamed.
8/19/03 Iraq: A truck bomb exploded outside the United Nations Headquarters in
Baghdad’s Canal Hotel killing 23 people and injuring 100. Among them 
UN Special Representative Sergio Viera De Mello. An al-Qaeda branch 
known as the Brigades o f the Martyr Abu Hafz al-Masri was blamed.
11/15/03 Turkey: Two suicide truck bombs exploded outside the Neve Shalom and
Beth synagogues in Istanbul, killing 25 people and injuring at least 300 
more. The Brigades o f the Martyr Abu Hafz al-Masri with links to al- 
Qaeda claimed responsibility.
11/20/03 Turkey: Two suicide truck bombs exploded at the British HSBC Bank and
the British Consulate General in Istanbul, killing 27 people and wounding 
at least 450 more. Al-Qaeda operatives were blamed.
12/31/03 Iraq: Hundreds o f U.S. coalition forces, foreign workers, and civilians
were killed or injured after the fall o f Saddam Hussein. The culprits 
were believed to be Iraqi insurgents and militants with links to al-Qaeda.
2/28/04 Iraq: Hundreds o f people were killed and thousands more injured in a
series o f terror-coordinated attacks targeting US coalition forces.
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T able 1, (continued)
United Nations staff, Red Cross workers, and other non-state 
aid groups assisting in the reconstruction o f Iraq post-Saddam.
Other people killed as a result o f these series o f suicide-bomb 
attacks included innocent Iraqis, police personnel, and Shiite Muslims.
3/11/04 Spain: At least 191 people were killed and 1,800 injured in Madrid when 
terrorists attacked a commuter train using cell phones to set off 
explosives. The Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group linked with al- 
Qaeda was blamed.
7/7/205 London: More than 50 people were killed and hundreds others injured
when commuter trains and a bus were attacked. British natives linked 
with Pakistani radicals and al-Qaeda were blamed.
7/23/05 Egypt: More than a hundred people were killed and others injured when a
a resort and a shopping mall were attacked. Two groups with links to 
al-Qaeda claimed responsibility.
Source: Paul Williams, A l Qaeda: Brotherhood o f  Terror (New York: A Pearson 
Education Company, 2002), pp. xii-xix; Rohan Gunaratna Inside A l Qaeda: Global 
Network o f  Terror (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002); Steven Emerson, 
American Jihad: The Terrorists Living Am ong US (New York: The Free Press, 2002), 
p p .139-140; Rohan Gunaratna, “The Post-M adrid Face o f  Al Qaeda,” The Washington 
Quarterly (Summer 2004); The 9/11 Commission Report (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 2004); Yonah Alexander and Michael S. Swetnam, Usama bin Laden's al- 
Qaida: Profile o f  a Terrorist Network (New York: Transnational Publishers, 2001); 
Cindy C. Combs Terrorist in the Twenty-First Century (Upper Saddle River, NJ: 2003); 
Craig W hitlock “Terrorist Eperts say al-Qaida might have directed the attacks from afar” 
in Las Vegas Review Journal, July 24, 2004; Megan K. Stack, “Egypt, Britain Reeling” 
in Las Vegas Review Journal, July 24, 2005.
Violence in nearby and familiar places had become almost a daily diet, served up by 
television, radio and the rest o f popular media in the W est.” In other words, the problem 
o f terrorism and terrorist operations have become commonplace as they affect all 
societies, rich and powerful and poor and less powerful countries. M any people have 
wondered: Why do al-Qaeda and bin Laden target and kill civilians including those in 
the Arab world and those from the poor and marginalized countries? Part o f the answer
90
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
to this question can be found in al-Qaeda’s belief systems.
Ideology
Al-Qaeda, an international movement and a protracted stepchild o f the “Afghan 
Arabs”, thrives on the ideology o f hatred and violence. The 9/11 Commission Report 
(2004) claimed that al-Qaeda has cells, freelancers, and sleeper-agents in almost sixty 
countries around the world. These countries run the gamut from Afghanistan to Bosnia, 
Chechnya, Ethiopia, France, Germany, Great Britain, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Palestine, 
Pakistan, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, the United States, and 
Yemen. Gunatrana (2002) and The 9/11 Commission Report (2004) pointed out that a 
majority o f the members o f al-Qaeda are young men from the Middle East, North Africa, 
and other Arab countries. They subscribe to an ideology that embraces an extreme 
interpretation o f the Koran that encourages the use o f violence against the enemies of 
Islam. They regard martyrdom and suicide-operations as part and parcel o f being good 
Muslim believers aiding A llah’s cause.
Al-Qaeda’s Islamic fundamentalists consider the West in general and the United 
States in particular as “the Great Satan”, which in their view deserves to be annihilated. 
They also believe that the only way to destroy Allah’s enemies is through clandestine and 
violent jihad. Almost all o f al-Qaeda’s followers, especially the suicide-bombers, receive 
funding and extensive training and indoctrination from bin Laden and his close 
associates. The reward for participating in suicide operations is martyrdom and a place in 
paradise where countless virgins await (Taheri 1987; Buia et al. 2001; Biema 2001; Stem 
2003; Tariq 2002).
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Today, al-Qaeda members consider themselves as mujahideen whose mission is to 
fight on behalf o f  all oppressed Muslims worldwide and defend their fellow believers 
(Gunaratna 2004:84). According to Bruce Hoffman, “For the religious terrorist, violence 
is first and foremost a sacramental act or divine duty executed in direct response to some 
theological demand or imperative. Terrorism thus assumes a transcendental dimension, 
and its perpetrators are consequently unconstrained by the political, moral, or practical 
constraints that may affect other terrorists” (quoted in Strasser and Whitney 2004:425).
Al-Qaeda’s other objective is to destroy the West and principally America, the alleged
source o f all the Middle East and the Arab w orld’s problems, oppression, poverty,
humiliation, and injustice (Atran 2004; Chua 2003; Benjamin and Simon 2003; Ruthven
2002). To wage jihad against the United States and kill thousands o f civilians as
epitomized by the attacks o f September 11, al-Qaeda’s operatives made use o f Am erica’s
own technology, political freedoms, and religious tolerance to inflict mass causalities.
Reporter Jane Corbin (2002: xvii) wrote that:
Al-Qaeda, fundamentally a product o f the Arab world, could flourish in a free and 
forgiving climate, unlike that o f many Middle Eastern countries, where harsh 
regimes stick to the only form o f rule not recognized and respected by militant 
Islamic organizations. Bin Laden and his group turned instead to the softer 
underbelly o f the west; to democracies with respect for human rights, more open 
immigration policies, and laws that restricted intelligence and law enforcement 
agencies. Bureaucratic turf wars, complacency, military timidity and political 
weakness, not to mention political correctness, contributed to our inability to deal 
with these extremists, until it was too late to save the lives o f thousands.
The authors o f The 9/11 Commission Report (2004) summarized al-Qaeda’s world­
view by arguing that after the defeat and withdrawal o f the Soviets from Afghanistan in 
1989, the mujahideen warriors coalesced into al-Qaeda and declared war on America, 
Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. As early as 1992, bin Laden called upon Muslims to
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target America because it was the enemy o f Allah. The 9/11 Commission Report 
(2004:48) noted that in 1996, he issued a self-styled fatw a  ‘religious decree’ calling upon 
all Muslims to revolt against the U.S. occupation in Saudi Arabia, where the most sacred 
sites o f Islam, Mecca and Medina, are found.
Besides calling upon all M uslims to drive American soldiers out o f Saudi Arabia by 
every means necessary, bin Laden celebrated the suicide bombings o f American military 
facilities in Saudi Arabia and praised the 1983 suicide attacks in Beirut that killed 241 
U.S. Marines. The 9/11 Commission (2004:48) pointed out that bin Laden also praised 
the 1993 o f killing o f the nineteen American Marines in Somalia after which the U.S.
“left the area carrying disappointment, humiliation, and defeat and your dead with you.”
The 9/11 Commission reported that in February 1998, the Saudi Arabian renegade bin 
Laden together his right-hand man, Ayman al-Zawahiri, an Egyptian fugitive, officially 
declared war on America by issuing a jo in t fa tw a  ‘religious edict’ in the name o f the 
World Islamic Front directing all Muslims to kill unbelievers anywhere on earth as the 
“individual duty to every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it was possible to 
do it” (quoted in The 9/11 Commission Report 2004:47).
The fatwa also promulgated that those Muslims willing to kill Americans and their 
allies must not discriminate between military and civilian targets, as both were fair game. 
Bin Laden routinely encouraged his followers to became fedayeen  ‘s e lf  sacrifleers’ and 
engage in jihad (The 9/11 Commission Report 2004:55). Furthermore, bin Laden 
routinely reminded his members to use the tactics o f martyrdom and self-immolation 
because “the walls o f oppression and humiliation cannot be cannot be demolished except 
in a rain of bullets” (quoted in The 9/11 Commission Report 2004:50-51).
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It is important to bear in mind that al-Qaeda’s belief systems and images differ very 
little from other violent Islamic radical organizations. Combs (2003:42-44) identified six 
general beliefs that play a significant role in the overall thinking o f terrorist 
organizations, including those of al-Qaeda. These beliefs include: the image o f the 
enemy; the terrorist images o f themselves; the nature o f the conflict; the image o f the 
victims; the theme o f millenarianism and martyrdom.
First, the image o f the enemy is the most significant and dominant theme among all 
terrorists. To successfully wage war against the enemy, terrorists must first and foremost 
dehumanize the enemy and view the citizens o f the enemy in a monolithic fashion, either 
as capitalists, communists, imperialists, or oppressors. Depicting the enemy in these 
terms allows terrorists to argue that it is not the people whom they wage jihad against, but 
rather the dehumanized monolith.
Terrorists do not put a human face on their enemies. Combs (2003:42) wrote that, “As 
long as the enemy does not have a face, a wife, or child, a home, grieving parents or 
friends, the destruction o f that enemy is a simple matter that requires little justification 
beyond the enemy status.” For example, bin Laden’s repeated calls for jihad against 
American civilians and troops as every M uslim’s duty is a case in point. Moreover, bin 
Laden and his followers claim that if  and when innocent bystanders, women, and children 
are killed in their attacks, it is fate that puts victims at the targeted sites.
Terrorists typically regard themselves as heroes belonging to an elite class. For 
example, terrorists from the left-wing view themselves as belonging to an heroic and elite 
class and see society as the oppressor and thus take it upon themselves to lead, enlighten, 
and liberate the oppressed and victimized masses. Conversely, terrorists from right-wing
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religious fundamentalists assume the image o f being chosen by God or Allah to lead in 
the struggle against decadence, injustice, and oppression. Right-wing terrorists, 
specifically those in al-Qaeda, believe that to die while fighting the enemy that oppresses 
Muslims and threatens the Islamic faith is a sacred and noble thing (Combs 2003:43).
Terrorists from both the left and the right believe normal standards o f behavior, 
conventional laws and morality do not apply to them. Condemning terrorism as immoral, 
inhumane, or cowardly makes little sense to those who embrace violence and suicide- 
bombing. They regard those who condemn their actions and behavior as inferior and 
immoral. They believe that W esterners lack the moral authority to condemn their 
actions. For al-Qaedans, their struggle is sanctioned and blessed by Allah, the only one 
to whom they answer (Combs 2003:43).
Terrorists have clearly drawn special beliefs regarding the nature o f conflict. For al- 
Qaedans, the world is divided between Islam and “the infidel” , believers and unbelievers, 
God and Satan, good and evil. Theirs is a moral struggle in which Islam and good must 
triumph at all costs. Therefore, in their struggle to universalize Islam, terrorists rarely 
consider the killing o f people and bystanders as criminal, but rather as part o f their 
obligation to rid the world o f “the infidels” , evil, and jahiliyya  ‘ignorance’ (Shay 2004; 
Scheuer 2004; Bergen 2002; The 9/11 Commission Report 2004).
The image o f the victims o f terrorism is a belief component equally significant in 
understanding the ideology o f terrorist organizations. Combs (2003:44) argued that, “If 
the victims are fairly easily identifiable with the enemy, then as representatives o f the 
hostile forces, they are despised and their destruction easily justified, even if  such victims 
have committed no clear offense against the terrorist or his group.” For instance, when
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three thousand civilians were killed on September 11, in addition to the many others in 
previous terrorist attacks, al-Qaeda dismissed the victims as unimportant by-products o f 
the struggle against “the infidels” . The same dismissal applies to those who have most 
recently fallen victim to al-Qaeda’s terrorist operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. For 
example, al-Qaeda’s senior operative, Abu M usub al-Zarqawi, is blamed for planning and 
executing serial terror attacks, abductions, and beheadings o f foreign workers in Iraq 
(Garwood 2005).
Responding to the question o f why his organization targets and kills even Muslim 
believers, bin Laden said that when fighting A llah’s enemy, it is inevitable to shed blood 
o f fellow Muslims. He also maintained that the Koran authorizes the destruction of 
those, including Muslims, who refuse to fight for the sake o f Allah (Combs 2003; 
Bodansky 2000). For bin Laden, the victims o f terrorism should blame fate for their 
deaths and injuries and not their actual behavior, i.e., being at the wrong place at the 
wrong time. Following this line o f  thinking those passengers who boarded the four 
American commercial airliners on September 11 were simply victims o f fate. Those who 
were killed in the W orld Trade Center and at the Pentagon were part o f the enemy o f al- 
Qaeda against which war had been declared.
A fifth belief component is the central theme o f millenarianism, which plays a 
significant role in the total calculus o f terrorism. Some terrorists take part in violent 
operations for personal reasons such as redemption. The perpetrators o f September 11 
are an example. Terrorists are certain o f absolute righteousness and inevitable success o f 
their causes. Terrorists argue that if  their actions bring the millennium closer, then any 
type o f attack, regardless o f its outcome, cannot be seen as a failure (Combs 2003).
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A final important element in al-Qaeda’s belief system is the premium placed upon 
martyrdom. Self-sacrifice is considered a noble and desirable thing among Islam ’s true 
believers. For instance, in their periodic pronouncements o ffa tw a  and in repeated 
speeches, bin Laden and al-Zawahiri instructed their followers to embrace martyrdom in 
order to fight “the infidels” . Bin Laden and al-Zahawiri’s moment o f glory came to 
fruition on September 11 when nineteen Muslims responded to bin Laden and al- 
Zawahiri’s calls and volunteered to sacrifice their lives in the process o f attacking and 
humiliating the w orld’s “Great Satan”, the United States.
Analysts suggest that extensive religious indoctrination plays a significant role in 
suicide-terrorism. For example, while it is true that some al-Qaedans volunteered and 
requested that bin Laden include them in suicide missions. Others were kept in the dark 
regarding the planning and execution of approved targets (Sageman 2004; Corera 2002).
In sum, the underlying maxim o f al-Qaeda and bin Laden is to wage jihad against 
A llah’s enemies and to ensure their continual true Islamic practices and rules triumph 
throughout the world. The enemies o f Allah and Islam include both Muslim and non- 
Muslim societies that fail to live by the principles o f the Koran. As Bergen (2002:48) 
stated: “This is the ideological underpinning o f bin Laden’s followers, who target not 
only the West but also such rich Muslim regimes as Saudi Arabia, which they regard as 
apostates.”
Promotional Structure 
There is a variety o f  ways through which al-Qaeda’s senior leaders appoint and 
promote members and followers into positions o f power. One o f the mechanisms that bin
97
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Laden employed was meritocracy— the promotion o f individuals into leadership positions 
based on their skills and qualifications in military areas— recruitment, training, tactics, 
and weapons procurement and use. Others were promoted because o f their experiences 
and academic scholarship in such areas as computers, communications, explosive- 
making, and prior participation in terrorist attacks (Gunaratna 2002; Sageman 2004).
Still others were awarded rank and duties because o f being charismatic, persuasive, 
multilingual, well-traveled, and even introverted (Schweitzer and Shay 2003). These 
qualifications were also the same ones that al-Qaeda’s top echelons considered in 
assigning certain individuals to certain suicide-bombing operations. For example, the 
selection o f the September 11 suicide-pilots, Mohammed Atta and his co-hijackers, was 
determined by their qualifications, experience, devotion to Islam, and ideology o f jihad 
(Gunaratna 2002; Sageman 2004; Schweitzer and Shay 2003).
Some analysts pointed out that Mohammed Atta automatically became a martyr 
because he demonstrated that he was able to lead the September 11 plot and see it 
through to its final execution. It was reported that Atta was selected to be the primary 
leader and coordinator by three senior officials within al-Qaeda: bin Laden {Emir- 
General), Mohammed A tef (the military commander), and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed 
(the media adviser) (Gunaratna 2002; Sageman 2004; Shay 2004; Schweitzer and Shay 
2003y
Apart from considering an individual’s resume or broad experience, bin Laden also 
took into consideration his senior leaders’ requests and recommendations. For example, 
Gunaratna (2002) claimed that at the recommendation o f al-Zawahiri, two o f Egyptian 
Islamic Jihad and al-Zawahiri’s loyalists were promoted to military leadership positions
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within al-Qaeda. Bin Laden personally appointed into key positions some o f his closest 
friends and fellow jihadists  (the Afghan veterans who fought with him against the 
Soviets) (Gunaratna 2002; Sageman 2004; Bodansky 2000). Other members and 
followers, especially those from different nationalities and Islamic denominations, were 
awarded positions o f power or appointed to lead the various committees within al-Qaeda 
only after agreeing to formally pledge allegiance by taking an oath {baya) o f total and 
absolute loyalty to bin Laden (Sagaman 2004; The 9/11 Commission Report 2004).
Bin Laden appointed officials to the Shura Majlis ‘advisory or consultation board’ 
after ascertaining that the potential advisers occupied significant leading positions within 
their own organizations prior to signing contracts to merge with al-Qaeda. For example, 
bin Laden made Ayman al-Zawahiri his right-hand man and second in command because 
al-Zawahiri was not only the head of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, but also took an oath o f 
loyalty to bin Laden upon joining al-Qaeda. Moreover, bin Laden respected and revered 
al-Zawahiri’s religious and academic scholarship— both as a theologian and a physician. 
Bin Laden usually addresses al-Zawahiri as “Doctor” (Gunaratna 2002; Bergen 2001).
Favors and gift-giving played a significant role in awarding rank and leadership 
positions within al-Qaeda. For example, because Dr. al-Zawahiri was and still is the 
personal physician and religious and ideological mentor o f bin Laden, the latter returned 
favors by promoting al-Zawahiri as his second in command. The exchange o f favors was 
a common practice within al-Qaeda (Sageman 2004; Gunaratna 2002).
It has been argued that because both bin Laden and al-Zawahiri are wanted renegades, 
they rely upon each other for their survival and that o f their organization. The same can 
be said about the Taliban officials and al-Qaeda remnants who may be relying upon each
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other to evade being captured or killed by U.S.-coalition forces. Bin Laden played a 
pivotal role in assisting the former regime o f the Taliban ‘religious students’ to come to 
power. Particularly, he provided assistance to the Taliban leader Mullah Omar in terms 
o f money, logistics, and fighters to wage war against the Afghanistan Northern Alliance. 
The Northern Alliance was led by one o f the most revered guerrilla commanders, Ahmed 
Shah Massoud. Because o f his assistance, the Taliban regime reciprocated by providing 
sanctuary to al-Qaeda and personal protection to bin Laden, even refusing to hand him 
over to American authorities to face trial for masterminding attacks against American 
citizens and interests {The 9/11 Commission Report 2004:65-66; Bodansky 2000:307).
After the w ithdrawal o f the Soviets from Afghanistan, ethnic wars and confrontations 
erupted within Afghanistan and between Afghani populations. Mamdani (2004) claimed 
that the major confrontations revolved around regional (north vs. south), linguistic (Farsi 
vs. Pashtun), ethnic (Pashtun vs. non-Pashtun), and doctrinal (Sunni vs. Shi’a) 
differences. M amdani maintained that on arrival in Afghanistan from Sudan, bin Laden 
decided to consolidate his army with that o f the Taliban to fight the Northern Alliance. 
Within a few months o f the merger, Taliban and al-Qaeda forces were camping, training, 
and operating together as a single entity enabling them to control 90 percent of 
Afghanistan’s territory, thus enabling the Taliban regime to come to power.
Mamdani claimed that other countries that played a significant role in the triumph o f 
the Taliban regim e were Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, both o f whom provided funding, 
training, logistics, and weapons. After coming to power, the Taliban leader Mullah Omar 
returned the favor by instituting in Afghanistan the tough Wahhabi law usually practiced 
only within Saudi Arabia. The Taliban leader Omar provided bin Laden with sanctuary.
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security, weapons, equipment, training camps, and facilities (Gunaratna 2002:40-41). 
Furthermore, bin Laden was permitted to use Afghan state-owned Ariana Airlines to 
transport members, recruits, couriers, and supplies from overseas, because he not only 
assisted the Taliban to come to power, but also financially helped the Taliban regime 
build roads, hospitals, and madrassas ‘Islamic schools’ to train future mujahideen {The 
9/11 Commission Report 2004:65-66). The Taliban also allowed bin Laden to recruit 
madrassa graduates into al-Qaeda. Therefore, the relationship between the Taliban and 
al-Qaeda was reciprocal (Gunaratna 2002:41; Bodansky 2000; Sageman 2004).
Kinship and Marriage Relationships
According to Gunaratna (2002:96-98), another way of appointing al-Qaedans into 
positions o f power was through family ties. Bin Laden and his most senior members 
appointed followers based on family backgrounds. For instance, some o f the members in 
al-Qaeda’s inner circle were believed to be senior leaders’ sons, brothers, in-laws, and 
relatives. Bodansky (2000) pointed out that one o f bin Laden’s sons, M ohammed Ahmed 
bin Laden, is a member o f the consultative council. The same was true o f al-Zaw ahiri’s 
younger brother, Mohammed Rabie al-Zawahiri, who was a member o f the advisory 
committee within the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and later within al-Qaeda (Williams 2002; 
Jacquard 2002). The same principle applied to al-Zawahiri’s loyalists. Immediately after 
merging with bin Laden, all o f al-Zaw ahiri’s most trusted members were promoted into 
senior positions within al-Qaeda (Gunaratna 2002; The 9/11 Commission Report 2004).
Promotions were also made based on marriage or marital ties. Arranged marriages 
were and still are preferred among M uslim fundamentalists. Members o f al-Qaeda
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practiced daughter-exchange. For example, it has been reported that the former Taliban 
leader Mullah Omar married one o f bin Laden’s daughters while bin Laden married one 
o f Omar’s daughters. The younger daughter o f bin Laden is married to a son o f Mullah 
Omar. The daughter o f Mohammed Atef, (the former top military commander within al- 
Qaeda) is married to one o f bin Laden’s sons (Miniter 2003; Sageman 2004; Jacquard 
2002; Bodansky 2000; Clarke 2004).
Perhaps the reason why the Taliban leader M ullah Omar refused to hand over bin 
Laden at the request and warning o f the two U.S. Presidents, Clinton and George W. 
Bush, was because Omar and bin Laden are in-laws. M initer (2003:177) pointed out that 
because Mullah Omar and bin Laden were family, “Asking the Taliban to remove bin 
Laden was mission impossible.” Scheuer (2004) noted that because Mullah Omar 
considered bin Laden as a brother, he was not willing to hand him over to the U.S. 
authorities to stand trial. For example, Clarke (2004) argued that in 1997, President 
Clinton offered the Taliban regime a deal indicating that if  Mullah Omar gave up bin 
Laden, Afghanistan would once again be recognized internationally and the United States 
would send millions o f dollars in foreign aid to Afghanistan in exchange. The Taliban 
refused. In 2001, Bush repeatedly warned Mullah Omar that if  he failed to surrender bin 
Laden, the Taliban regime would face U.S. preemptive attack. The Taliban and Mullah 
Omar chose the latter. They were attacked and removed from power (Miniter 2003; 
Clarke 2004; W oodward 2004).
Finally, kinship ties play a significant role in promoting members to the high-ranking 
echelons. Bin Laden and his deputies reward their followers based not only friendship 
and intermarriage, but also kinship relationships. For example, Sageman (2004:112-113)
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pointed out that, “Marriages were also the ideal way o f forging permanent alliances 
between mujahedin families.” Other members were also awarded favors, duties, and 
responsibilities within al-Qaeda based upon other pseudo-kinship bonds, i.e., they were 
Afghan veterans, jihad brethren, and most-wanted terrorist renegades. Prison comrades, 
cell leaders, and relatives o f suicide bombers w ere also provided with favors. In short, al- 
Qaeda functioned based on family ties and kinship bonds. This was because as a socio­
cultural organization, al-Qaeda operated as if  it were an Islamic fraternity or brotherhood, 
where family and marriage ties, loyalty, and friendship played critical roles in 
recruitment, membership, promotion to leadership positions, and allocation o f operational 
missions to individuals, thus forging permanent alliances within the group.
In reference to al-Qaeda’s socio-cultural and kinship networking, Gunaratna (2002:96) 
reported that:
Although its modus operandi is cellular, familial relationships play a key role. As 
a cultural and social network, al Qaeda members recruit from among their own 
nationalities, families, and friends. After the training is completed, the very best 
o f new recruits are integrated among, and assigned to work within one o f  these 
families. For example, Osama bin Laden referred to the head o f the 9/11 operation 
as ‘Muhammed [Atta] from the Egyptian fam ily’. Within the organization itself, 
the notion o f brotherhood ingrained in Islam helps Al Qaeda cohere. Osama is 
regarded as the elder brother and no one disputes his leadership o f  this wider 
‘Islamic fam ily’ o f the modem era.
In other words, al-Qaeda basically operated as if  it were a good-old-boy network, where
leaders and followers interacted as if  they were from one big Islamic family. Gunaratna
(2002) pointed out that al-Qaeda was originally an offshoot o f  the Muslim Brotherhood
because it embraced the political and religious agendas o f the latter. But unlike the
Egyptian M uslim Brotherhood, al-Qaeda never compromised its original objectives,
converting the rhetoric o f the Muslim Brotherhood into concrete action. The Muslim
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Brotherhood’s failure to fulfill its objectives may have made some militant individuals 
receptive to al-Qaeda’s religious doctrines. For example, although the Muslim 
Brotherhood spoke o f martyrdom, it was al-Qaeda that actually practiced it on grand- 
scale around the world (Gunaratna 2002).
Nevertheless, al-Qaeda relied heavily upon the Muslim Brotherhood in terms o f 
structure, leadership, and experience. Al-Qaeda was also organized along a broad-based 
family clan where its multinational members and followers were designated as 
“brothers” , a term also commonly used by religious Muslims when referring to each other 
in the streets and mosques (Gunaratna 2002; Benjamin and Simon 2002; Stem 2003). 
Therefore, al-Qaeda’s North African “family” (i.e., Algerians, Egyptians, Libyans, 
Moroccans, and Tunisians) was responsible for attacks in Europe and North America, its 
Southeast Asian “family” (i.e., Filipinos, Indonesians, Malaysians, and Singaporeans) 
was responsible for attacks in the Far East; and its Central Asian “family” (i.e., Chechens, 
Uzbeks, and Tajiks) was responsible for attacks in the region from Turkey across Muslim 
Central Asia into Xingjian in China (Gunaratna 2002).
To summarize, the study o f family and kinship ties is important to understanding 
socio-political systems in most societies, perhaps all, westem and non-westem. Kinship 
is not only significant among non-industrialized societies such as those in Africa, (e.g., 
the Nuer in the Sudan), but also among industrialized societies such as those in Europe. 
The British royal family provides just one example. In other words, kinship systems are 
universal facets o f political organization in both developed and developing countries.
They influence how societies and peoples organize their socio-political stmctures (Fortes 
and Evans-Pritchard 1962; Evans-Pritchard 1967).
104
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Organizational Structure 
Al-Qaeda’s command and control structure enabled it to wield both direct and indirect 
control over other Islamic movements such as the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Hamas, 
Hezbollah, the Palestinian Liberation Front, Armed Islamic Group (GIA), Abu Sayyaf, 
and Jemaah Islamiyya). Al-Qaeda’s senior leaders therefore influenced how devout 
Islamic terrorist groups and cells conducted jihad (Gunaratna 2002).
It would appear that “the war on terror” o f the administration o f George W. Bush has 
significantly disrupted al-Qaeda by denying them sanctuary, arresting or killing its 
members, and forcing its senior leaders, bin Laden and al-Zawahiri, to go underground. 
However, al-Qaeda uses chameleon-like strategies in order to survive. Today al-Qaeda 
relies heavily on its global network of associates, affiliates, and operatives to conduct 
overt and covert terrorist operations (Whitaker 2002; Gunaratna 2002; Hoffman 2004).
Furthermore, as a multinational and multidimensional organization, al-Qaeda can now 
engage its enemies on many fronts simultaneously. Although al-Qaeda has lost its 
terrorist training camps, its permanent headquarters in Afghanistan and Sudan, and its 
founding fathers, it has managed to compensate for this loss by building a global network 
o f organizations that effectively and independently carry out terrorist operations in 
furtherance o f al-Qaeda’s agendas (Hoffman 2004; Gunaratna 2002). The network is 
shown in Figure 4.
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To understand the organizational structure o f al-Qaeda before the war in 
Afghanistan (Operation Anaconda and U.S. coalition military strikes in Afghanistan in
2002) and to understand al-Q aeda’s network in the post-Taliban era, it is important to 
discuss its changes from centralized to decentralized organization. I will make the case 
that prior to the September 11 attacks against the United States, al-Qaeda was centralized, 
but now it operates as a fragmented and acephalous or polycephalous organization.
Centralization
Analysts and government officials have frequently suggested that before September 
11, the presence o f terrorist training camps in Sudan and Afghanistan were proof that al-
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Qaeda was a well-organized but highly secretive terrorist network. It was organized in a 
way that allowed its members to rendezvous in Sudan and later in Afghanistan to attend 
madrassas ‘religious schools’ and be provided with the necessary training, logistics, 
weaponry, intelligence, and funding (Scheuer 2004; Sageman 2004).
Other factors in support o f the proposition that prior to September 11 al-Qaeda was a 
well-organized and centralized network include the following: Bin Laden’s executive 
circle, the Shura Majlis ‘consultative council’ included a dozen loyalists, aides, and 
representatives who were experienced in mounting jihad; headquarters were established 
in Khartoum, Sudan, and Khost, Afghanistan; there were training camps where al- 
Q aeda’s followers from around the world flocked to train as mujahideen in guerrilla 
warfare and paramilitary tactics; in mosques and madrassas, young Muslims were 
encouraged to enlist as holy warriors and martyrs; there were senior leaders, the Emir- 
general bin Laden and his loyal lieutenant, al-Zawahiri; there was a military hierarchy 
with a well-established chain o f command; bin Laden approved plans, targets, operations, 
and even the timing o f the attacks (Scheuer 2004; Gunaratna 2002; Cherkasky and 
Prud’homme 2003; Cooley 2000; W hittaker 2002; The 9/11 Commission 2004; Williams 
2002; Hoffman 2004).
The evidence cited above suggests that al-Qaeda was centrally organized before the 
attacks against the United States on September 11. Further, both specialization and 
division o f labor were employed. Elaborate military methods were employed to recruit, 
train, equip, and manage terrorist campaigns as shown in Figure 5. Hoffman (2004:552) 
stated that:
A ‘corporate succession’ plan o f sort has seemed to function even during a time 
when A1 Qaeda has been relentlessly tracked, harassed, and weakened. A1 Qaeda
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thus appears to retain at least some depth in managerial personnel as evidenced by 
its abilities to produce successor echelons from the mid-level operational 
commanders who have been killed or captured. It also still retains some form o f a 
centralized command and control structure responsible for gathering intelligence, 
planning, and perhaps even overseeing more spectacular attacks against what are 
deemed the movement’s most important, high-value targets in the United States.
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After September 11, 2001, the well-organized and smooth-running structures o f al- 
Qaeda were disrupted by the war against international terrorism. Subsequently, al- 
Q aeda’s organizational structures disappeared. Instead, al-Qaeda was fragmented into 
loosely-organized associates, affiliates, and cells distributed throughout the world. As 
U.S-coalition forces launched Operation Anaconda against the Taliban regime and al- 
Qaeda, the senior officials o f the latter were forced to operate from underground (Atran 
2004; Hoffman 2004; Gunaratna 2004; Sageman 2004). According to Whittaker 
(2002; 104), today al-Qaeda is no longer “a hierarchical structure but a loose, rambling
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one, a ‘spaghetti’ type o f organization. W hatever its nature, there is no doubt about its 
effectiveness.” Other analysts claim that the war on terror has forced al-Qaeda to 
fragment into even more loosely-organized and decentralized cells that plan and execute 
attacks against soft targets such as hotels, nightclubs, synagogues, residential complexes, 
shopping malls, commuter trains and buses, and tourist sites where civilians congregate 
(Atran 2004; Hoffman 2004; Gunaratan 2004; Sageman 2004). Figure 6 shows the 
transformational nature o f al-Qaeda from a centralized to decentralized group.
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As the hunt for bin Laden and al-Zawahiri continues, many al-Qaeda alumni around 
the world have formed new cells or activated their jihad comrades (sleeper agents or
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freelancers) to operate covertly. Gunaratna (2002:92) stated that, “Since 9/11, however, 
many Islamist groups, parties and regimes have been cautious about identifying 
themselves too closely and openly with A1 Qaeda for fear o f bringing down the wrath o f 
America on their heads. However they support its aims and objectives and A1 Qaeda 
continues to maintain links with many o f them.”
Many other Islamist groups in Western Europe, particularly in Britain and France, 
now identify with al-Qaeda. In France, for example, the terrorist group, Tablighi Jamaat 
‘Society for the Propagation o f Islam ’ recruits and trains young Muslim men and sends 
them to Iraq to fight and conduct suicide operations against the U.S.-coalition forces 
(Sageman 2004; Scheuer 2004. The Iraq jihad, Al-Tawhid, headed by Abu Musab al- 
Zarqawi, the Jordanian-born terrorist and most wanted man in Iraq, recently pledged 
allegiance to bin Laden and joined al-Q aeda’s global jihad.
The methods employed by these loosely-organized al-Qaeda affiliates differ from 
those o f bin Laden and al-Qaeda. Peters (2002) and Sageman (2004) pointed out that 
while some terrorists commit acts o f terror for personal reasons— notoriety and 
publicity— others kidnap foreigners for extortion purposes, as is the case in the 
Philippines and Indonesia. The Abu Sayyaf Group, Jemaah Islamiyya, and the Moro 
Islamic Liberation Front are examples. Others abduct and behead civilian foreign 
workers in Iraq to derail the reconstruction process. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s al-Tawhid 
is a good example. This group also uses abducted individuals as bargaining chips.
These tactics are contrary to the practices and doctrine of al-Qaeda, which shuns 
diplomacy and negotiations and adheres strictly to the famous dictum of one o f the 
founding fathers, Abdullah Azzam: “Jihad and rifle alone; no negotiations, no
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conferences, no dialogues” (quoted in Sageman 2004:3). Decentralization is not the same 
as disorganization and disruption o f al-Qaeda and its ideology, but rather it is a military 
tactic that assists al-Qaeda to evade detection and capture.
Al-Qaeda’s global network was o f critical importance while it was based in Khartoum,
Sudan, from 1991-1996. During this period, bin Laden enjoyed state sponsorship o f Dr.
Hassan al-Turabi who provided him and his group with safe havens and training camps.
It was reported that as al-Qaeda’s ambitions, resources, recruits, and support increased, it
developed a decentralized and regional structure to carry out attacks (Jacquard 2002;
Schweitzer and Shay 2003; The 9/11 Commission 2004). Gunaratna (2002:95) stated:
the Sudanese, Turkish, and briefly, Spanish nodes ran clandestine military 
operations and activities in Europe and North America. Except for those 
operatives assigned to the London bureau (the Advice and Reformation 
Committee), which had a global remit for propaganda and coordination, the 
worldwide nodes have no structure and hierarchy. Assignments were carried 
out by individuals designated for the operation who were simply referred to as 
the ‘person responsible’.
Some scholars and analysts pointed out that the regional nodes and operatives 
affiliated with al-Qaeda lacked fixed headquarters or abodes (Sageman 2004; Gunaratna 
2002; Atran 2004). Gunaratna (2002:96) claimed that after al-Qaeda relocated to 
Afghanistan from Sudan in 1996, its European and North American offices and bureaus 
moved to Turkey and Yemen respectively. But after the 1998 arrest o f Mamdouh 
Mahmud Salim, one o f al-Qaeda’s most important figures in Europe, the Turkish bureau 
moved again, this time to Spain. With the increased threat facing al-Qaeda post- 
September 11, the regional bureau and nodal responsibilities shifted to cells and sleeper 
agents and subsequently to senior members in Western Europe who traveled extensively 
back and forth to Afghanistan to consult with al-Qaeda’s senior leaders.
I l l
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Al-Qaeda affiliates in Southeast Asia, Central Asia, and the Horn o f Africa were also 
decentralizing and dispersing. Rather than weakening the organizational structure o f al- 
Qaeda, constant reshuffling and displacement seemed to provide fresh opportunities. As 
Gunaratna (2004:96) wrote, “al-Qaeda is structured in such a way that it can react very 
quickly to changing events on the ground. Mobility, flexibility, and fluidity will be the 
guiding principles o f its post-Taliban structure.”
To conclude, opinions remain divided over whether or not al-Qaeda is a centralized or 
decentralized network. W hat is not disputed, however, is that before September 11, al- 
Qaeda exhibited central and formal organizational structures whereby the group had 
physical headquarters and specific terrorist training camps. Available videos have shown 
bin Laden boasting on the Arabic television channel, al-Jazeera, indicating that he was 
the mastermind o f  the attacks against the U.S. embassies in East Africa in 1998, the USS 
Cole attack in 2000, and the U.S. attack in 2001.
Al-Qaeda has become an acephalous (headless) organization which relies heavily on 
its alliances (Evans Pritchard 1967; Leach 1969). Nevertheless, al-Qaeda is far from 
being dismantled. A l-Q aeda’s displacement from its bases in Afghanistan and the 
absence o f its founding father(s) have played to its advantage in some respects. It has 
regrouped worldwide. Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri have been lionized by militant 
Muslims as the saviors o f Islam. According Gunaratna (2002:96), al-Qaeda is a 
pragmatic group with clear objectives and agendas, “but one that is capable o f 
chameleon-like maneuvering” and one that can function in different circumstances and 
environments even without direct control by its founding fathers and leaders.
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Leadership Structure 
Prior to the September 11 attacks, al-Qaeda demonstrated the existence o f a well- 
organized, well-established chain o f command and an effective leadership apparatus 
comprised o f  several loyal principals and personalities who were responsible for its 
smooth running. W ithin al-Qaeda, different individuals performed various duties and 
obligations. For example, there were individuals who approved target sites; those who 
issued Islamic religious instructions; those who provided theological interpretations of 
the Koran; those who oversaw financial and business transactions; those who recruited 
new members and provided training and logistics services; those who dealt with media 
and publicity; and those who carried out the actual operations— the suicide-bombers 
(Williams 2002; Gunaratna 2002; Sageman 2004; The 9/11 Commission Report 2004).
Executive Wing
The leadership o f al-Qaeda had three wings that oversaw various operations within the 
organization. The first was the “executive” wing, comprised o f the Ew/r-General and 
made up o f  financiers and religious scholars whose duty was to approve and fund terrorist 
operations and to issue fa tw as  ‘religious edicts’. It was also referred to as the politico- 
religious bureau because its duties were primarily to command and control. Bin Laden 
and al-Zawahiri belonged to this wing or bureau. Al-Zawahiri was revered within the 
group because o f his erudition, his profession as a physician, and his renowned career as 
head o f the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (Gunaratna 2002; Williams 2002; Mamadani 2004; 
Schweitzer and Shay 2003; Scheuer 2004; Sageman 2004).
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Legislative Wing
The second was the “legislative” wing, the shura majlis ‘consultative council’, made 
up o f the most experienced and loyal lieutenants o f bin Laden. Members were required 
to take an oath o f allegiance and loyalty to bin Laden. Among the first to jo in  were 
Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abu Ayoub al-Iraqi, and Dr Fadhil el-M asry. Bin Laden personally 
appointed prominent personalities, trusted loyalists, and close Afghan veteran comrades 
to positions o f leadership (Gunaratna 2002; Corbin 2002; Williams 2003).
Schweitzer and Shay (2003) noted that if and when the Shura Majlis members were 
arrested or killed, other close members were appointed to replace them. Moreover, it was 
believed that bin Laden exercised his leadership position as the Ew/r-General o f al-Qaeda 
by reshuffling his advisers whenever he saw fit in order to test their trust, faith, and 
loyalty to him and al-Qaeda.
Gunaratna (2002) stated that although al-Qaeda functioned as a political movement 
that was driven by an interpretive religious ideology, it usually operated on the basis o f  a 
cultural network that recruited known jihad veterans, Afghan alumni, family friends, 
former war commanders, trusted persons, and fugitives, and yet there were no formal 
procedures and guidelines for recruitments, appointments, or promotions. Even though 
al-Qaeda senior leaders considered merit, ability, skills, expertise, and performance to 
confer promotions to selected members to positions o f leadership, nonetheless, 
appointments and promotions were generally determined based on kinship, family ties, 
marriage ties, friendship, and nationality (Williams 2002; Schweitzer and Shay 2003; The 
9/11 Commission Report 2004; Gunaratna 2002; Cooley 2000; M amdani 2004).
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Operational Wing
The third and perhaps the most complex was the operational wing which consisted o f 
four committees— military, finance, education, and media. W hile committee leaders or 
representatives must be qualified in their areas o f expertise, some were personally hand- 
picked by bin Laden or at the request o f his closest loyalists. Committee leaders reported 
directly to the senior echelon of al-Qaeda {The 9/11 Commission Report 2004;
Sageman 2004; Gunaratna 2002). W hittaker (2002) reported that committee leaders took 
oaths o f allegiance to bin Laden and pledged loyalty to the doctrines and goals o f jihad.
M ilitary Committee
The military committee is important because, as The 9/11 Commission Report (2004) 
indicated, to become a military leader, a qualified and nominated person swore a formal 
pledge o f allegiance and took an oath o f loyalty bayat to bin Laden. Gunaratna (2002) 
and Sageman (2004) pointed out that some committee leaders, including those on the 
military committee, served on more than one committee and were rotated between 
committees to ensure stability and continuity.
The military committee was responsible for recruiting and training recruits and for 
procuring and transporting weapons. All recruits were taught and trained how to acquire 
and use weapons (e.g., small arms, artillery, demolition devices, anti-aircraft missiles). 
They were also taught guerrilla tactics. Others received advanced training in the areas o f 
explosives, computers, communications, intelligence-gathering techniques, and how to 
plan and execute attacks (Williams 2002; Gunaratna 2002; The 9/11 Commission Report 
2004; Mamdani 2004).
115
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
In short, the military committee consists o f top military strategists, lieutenants, and 
special operations commandos (suicide-bombers). The 9/11 Commission Report (2004) 
and Robinson (2001) reported that among officials in this wing were: Mohammed Atef, 
Abu Zubaydha, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, Mohammed Atta and 
eighteen o f his co-hijackers, the perpetrators o f the September 11.
Finance Committee
Members o f the finance and business committee oversaw and managed al-Qaeda’s 
finances including investments, income, and expenses, (Williams 2002; McAllister 
2004). Al-Qaeda had many sources o f income. These ran the gamut from international 
banking systems and traditional Islamic banking systems to contributions (zakat) 
acquired from mosques and charitable donations from organizations such as Mercy 
International R elief Agency and Muslim-based welfare initiatives. Other fund-raising 
techniques included drug-trafficking, money-laundering, and most interestingly, tribute 
money known as baksheesh ‘bribes’ demanded from G ulf and Middle Eastern regimes to 
keep al-Qaeda from establishing cells within their borders and to guarantee that al-Qaeda 
did not attack them. Other assets were accumulated from bin Laden’s personal fortune 
and shrewd investments in construction firms and agricultural enterprises (honey, sesame, 
and com), tanneries, and the import-export o f gems and diamonds acquired during his 
stay in Sudan from 1991 to 1996 (McAllister 2004; The 9/11 Commission Report 2004), 
Al-Qaeda’s financial resources acquired through both legal and illegal means were 
moved to their destinations o f storage through a network referred to as hawala— an 
underground banking system. Hawala  in Arabic means ‘change’ and in Hindi it means
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“in trust’. It is an informal traditional and trust-based system for transferring funds 
internationally and regionally with little documentation and law enforcement supervision 
and regulations (W echsler 2001; M cAllister 2004; The 9/11 Commission Report 2004).
Transferring money through an informal system is a common practice in the Muslim
and Arab world, especially in the Middle East and South Asia. Hawaladars affiliated
with al-Qaeda made use o f this informal method o f moving large amounts o f  money in
order to evade detection and capture. The advantage o f this cash transfer is that it leaves
little or no paper trail, involves no government regulations, and does not require the
actual physical movement o f  banknotes across borders. W echsler (20021:135) reported
that: “Moving money through the hawala system requires only a phone call, fax, or e-
mail from one hawaladar to another. A client gives cash to an agent in, say, Pakistan, and
asks that it be delivered to someone else in New York. The Pakistani hawaladar then
calls a colleague in New York, who disburses the proper amount to the intended
recipient. No actual wire transfer or contacts with formal banks are involved. The
advantages o f this system to terrorists are obvious.”
For example, M cAllister (2004:305) stated that;
The effectiveness o f this financial network can be seen in the way it was able to 
protect A1 Qaeda assets in the face o f invasion. As coalition forces closed in on 
Afghanistan large sums o f U.S. dollars were moved across the border to Karachi 
where they were transferred using the hawali system to the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE). In the UAE it was largely converted to gold bullion and globally 
dispersed. M oney was also transferred into investments such as diamonds in 
Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic o f Congo, and tanzanite in Tanzania, 
preserving assets while generating profits. This complex network o f financial 
interactions has helped A1 Qaeda maintain an operational budget while in the 
underground and to a degree has augmented the successes o f  the U.S. 
counterattack.
The authors o f The 9/11 Commission Report (2004) judged that because hawaladars
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use couriers or third parties to move large sums o f cash, diamonds, and gold, efforts made 
by the intelligence community and law enforcement agencies to track and freeze assets 
and finances o f al-Qaeda and its affiliates are difficult and problematic. It was suggested 
that al-Qaeda kept its financial investments on and moves them through at least four 
continents. Also al-Qaeda held stocks in many multinational corporations and 
institutions. Besides collecting money through corrupt charities and practices, al-Qaeda 
hides its fortunes in many third-world countries, especially those in Middle Eastern and 
South Asian countries that lack external government oversight regulations and effective 
internal supervision, thus making it difficult to shake bin Laden’s money-trees and freeze 
al-Qaeda’s assets.
In short, al-Q aeda’s financial infrastructure was as complex as the organization itself.
It has been likened to a sort o f malevolent Ford Foundation where potential terrorists 
applied for funds to finance their terrorist attacks against the infidels, crusaders and 
Zionists. After thorough and careful consideration, some applicants received funding 
while others w ere turned down. Others were told to use illegal means and credit card 
theft or fraud to finance their attacks (Gunaratna 2002; Reeve 1999; Benjamin and Simon
2003). Other analysts viewed al-Qaeda as a multinational corporation that has many 
branches around the world that perform complex financial transactions and provide 
services to millions o f its clients (Gunaratna 2002; M cAllister 2004; W echsler 2001).
Education Committee
The education committee trained all recruits in the teachings o f the Koran and the 
principles o f jihad. Large sums o f money collected through both legal and illegal
18
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practices including drug-trafficking, money-laundering, and charitable donations from 
Saudi Arabia and the G ulf regimes were used to finance al-Qaeda’s educational pursuits. 
Most of the money was used to build mosques around the world to train Muslims in the 
ways and practices o f Wahhabism  (an extremely rigid, puritanical, and conservative 
brand o f Islam). Other funds were used to build madrassas ‘religious schools’ in 
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and other Central and South Asian countries for religious 
indoctrination purposes (Benjamin and Simon 2003; M amdani 2004; Sageman 2004).
The majority o f al-Qaeda’s members and followers were recruited or drafted from 
these religious schools. During the war with the Soviets in the 1980s, many of the 
“Afghan Arabs” (especially those leading terrorist cells and conducting terrorist 
operations today) graduated from these madrassas. It has been reported that Saudi 
Arabia has been the largest financier o f the many mosques and madrassas found around 
the world today (Benjamin and Simon 2003; Ruthven 2002; Cooley 2002; Mamdani 
2004; Gunaratna 2004; Bergen 2002).
M edia Committee
The media committee oversaw public relations and was designed to obtain support 
from Islamic believers. It published the in-house newspaper, the Nashrat al-Akhbar. It 
also printed and circulated al-Qaeda’s literature and made the lectures, writing, and 
instructive information o f its leaders available to the general public inside and outside the 
Arab and Muslim regions. The media committee specifically arranged and made bin 
Laden’s and al-Zawahiri’s speeches, fatwas, declarations, and videos available on web 
sites, in Arab newspapers, and on television stations such as al-Jazeera for public 
consumption. It also performed propaganda and indoctrination services (William 2002;
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The 9/11 Commission Report 2004; Hoffman 2004; Benjamin and Simon 2003). Figure 7 
shows al-Qeada’s the organizational structure and functions o f the various committees.
Figure 7. Al-Qaeda'.s Organization Structure 
Prior to September 11, 2001
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Another way o f describing al-Qaeda’s military and operational structure is by 
comparing it with other Islamic terrorist organizations such as Abu Nidal, Hamas, 
Hezbollah, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (FLO), the Irish Republican Army 
(IRA), or the Tupamaros (W hite 2001; Kupperman and Kamen 1989). The operational 
structure can be depicted as a pyramid. The entire organization was run by four key 
groups: (a) a small cohort o f first-tier elites (the Emir-General and his deputies), (b) a 
small group o f  loyal lieutenants, the second-tier elites known as Shura Majlis ‘advisers’, 
(c) a military unit, the third-tier consisting o f qualified war strategists, field marshals, 
recruiters, instructors, and w ar managers), and (d) finally, enlisted foot-soldiers and
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special operations forces, and suicide-bombers as shown in Figure 8.
Figure 8. A1-Qaeda's Military Command and Control 
Structure Prior to September 1 !. 2001
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In other words, bin Laden and al-Zawahiri command the organization from their 
hideout in the caves on the Afghanistan/Pakistan border. The consultative council was 
comprised o f  the most experienced loyalists and trusted members o f the organization who 
had to be consulted before conducting attacks. The military wing oversaw duties and 
issues that pertained to recruitment, training, procurement, and the use o f weapons. The 
enlisted soldiers and sleeper-agents performed surveillance, gathered intelligence, 
scouted potential targets, and conducted suicide-missions.
Al-Qaeda cells can now be found in more than sixty countries around the world (i.e., 
Africa, the M iddle East, Southeast and Southwest Asia, Central and Western Europe, and
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North America). Before any major terrorist attacks were conducted, they had to be 
approved and blessed by the senior leadership o f al-Qaeda, bin Laden and al-Zawahiri, 
and cleared by the advisory council, some of whom headed different committees within 
the organization. Although committee reports were considered, it was bin Laden and his 
closest loyalists and aids who usually selected the targets, suicide-bombers, and the day 
and time o f the attack. Senior leaders consulted with military commanders and field 
marshals and sought out logistics and information before making final decisions to carry 
out an attack. Command and control ran strictly from the top-ranked leaders to the 
lowest enlisted cell members, the suicide-bombers themselves {The 9/11 Commission 
Report 2004; Sageman 2004; White 2001; Hoffman 2004; M cAllister 2004).
Having terrorist cells in many countries around the world worked in al-Q aeda’s favor 
because it made it difficult for law enforcement authorities to infiltrate its cells. 
Additionally, because al-Qaeda’s cells have little or no contact with each other, even 
within countries, it was extremely difficult for the intelligence community to identify and 
prevent these cells from planning attacks. Furthermore, because al-Q aeda’s special 
mission forces (i.e., the foot-soldiers and suicide-bombers) were usually left in the dark 
until the eleventh hour, when they were officially activated, it was difficult for 
intelligence authorities to stop a terrorist act before it materialized {The 9/11 Commission 
Report 2004; Gunaratna 2002; Jenkins 2001; Atran 2004). Cooley (1999:40) reported 
that because al-Qaeda’s terrorist cells were self-contained and functioned as if  they were 
a bunch o f grapes, this enabled them to conduct attacks because if  “one were plucked, as 
from a grapevine, its disappearance, would not affect the others.” In other words, the 
removal o f one or a few cells as a result o f being arrested or killed did not affect others
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from conducting attacks (Gunaratna 2002; The 9/11 Commission 2004; Scheuer 2004).
Additionally, because the initial planning, the selecting o f targets, the timing, and the 
actual attackers were known only to a few top al-Qaeda senior leaders and loyal officials, 
the organization’s top-secret targeted site(s) remained a secret even to other inner circle 
members until the attacks took place and the senior officials had claimed responsibility. 
After the attacks had materialized, the planners and perpetrators were known or revealed. 
For example, according to the 9/11 Commission Report (2004), plans to attack the United 
States using commercial aircraft as guided missiles were initiated by Khalid Sheikh 
Mohammed (KSM), but the selection o f the targets to be attacked and those who would 
actually carry out those attacks were selected by bin Laden and M ohammed Atef. The 
9/11 Commission that, “No one else was involved in the initial selection o f the
targets.” The 9/11 Commission also reported that bin Laden, assisted by A tef and Sheikh 
Mohammed chose the September 11 pilots and hijackers.
The manner in which al-Qaeda conducted its operations was so secretive that even the 
organization’s suicide-bombers themselves remained uninformed and unaware as to what 
their mission would entail or when and where their mission was to take place until the 
eleventh hour. Stem (2003:249) reported that, “Because of A1 Qaeda’s strict policy o f 
sharing information only on a need-to know-basis, sleepers— who serve as a kind of 
reserve army in the targeted country— are unlikely to know precisely for what they have 
been recruited until immediately before an attack.” A case in point is the September 11 
attacks. The planning and timing o f the attacks were only known by a few senior leaders, 
but not the suicide-bombers who were informed about the attacks at the eleventh hour. 
After the successful attacks o f September 11, bin Laden made the following statement:
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The brothers who conducted the operation, all they knew was that they had a 
martyrdom operation and we asked each o f them to go to America, but they didn’t 
know anything about the operation, not even one letter. But they were trained and 
we did not reveal the operation to them until they were there and just before they 
boarded the planes (quoted in Scheuer 2004:136).
A l-Qaeda’s suicide-bombers who perpetrated the attacks on September 11 were 
recruited and assembled from different terrorist cells, nationalities, sects o f Islam, geo­
political landscapes, age-groups, and socio-economic statuses to take part in the attacks. 
Some hijackers were personally selected by bin Laden according to recommendations, 
while others requested bin Laden to allow them participate in the suicide missions 
(Mamdani 2004; Gunaratan 2002; Williams 2002; Schweitzer and Shay 2003; The 9/11 
Commission Report 2004; McAllister 2004; Sageman 2004).
Figure 9 shows four o f the pilots who took part in the multiple simultaneous attacks 
against the U.S. on September 11, 2001. Three o f the four pilots who steered American 
airliners and crashed them into America’s W orld Trade Center and the Pentagon were 
from the German group, the “Hamburg Cell” . Even though members o f this cell were 
anti-American and anti-Semitic, they spoke English, German, and Arabic fluently and 
were familiar with Western societies and lifestyles. Bin Laden, with the assistance, o f 
Mohammed A tef and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed chose Mohammed Atta (the founder o f 
the Hamburg cell) to be the leader o f the attack. Regarding the rest o f other hijackers, 
Strasser and W hitney (2004:379) reported that Mohammed A tef “ ‘chose the hijackers 
from young Arab men who had no previous terrorist activities.’ After bin Laden had 
approved the selection, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed ‘trained them and instructed them on 
acquiring pilot training’ and ‘supervised the ‘final touches’ o f the 11 September 
operation’”. Figure 9 below helps us to understand the complexity and dynamic nature of
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al-Qaeda. The four pilots and their co-hijackers came from different countries and socio­
economic backgrounds, subscribed to different Islamic sects, and spoke different Arab 
dialects, yet they were drawn together by the ideology o f hatred. They were also 
disenchanted by the W est and the United States and therefore were willing to sacrifice 
their own lives to destroy their enemies (Gunaratna 2002; Strasser and W hitney 2004).
H ani H anjour 
(Saudi A rab ia, 29)
M oham m ed A tta  
(E gyptian , age 33)
M arw an al-Shehhi 
(U A E , age 23)
Z iad Jarah  
(L ebanon , age 26)
F igure 9. Four Suicide Pilots Who Attacked America on September 11, 2001
Modus Operandi
Since the 1990s to the present, al-Q aeda’s ability to conduct attacks against its 
adversaries has been enhanced by different and often innovative techniques that it 
employs. For example, terrorist operations carried out before September 11 suggested 
some o f the following tactical characteristics: (1) long-range planning— the 1998 
bombings against the two American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania took five years to 
plan. The attacks against the U.S.S. Cole in 2000 took several years; (2) simultaneous 
operations— the 1998 attacks against the two U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es
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Salaam demonstrated that al-Qaeda was capable o f conducting simultaneous attacks, 
suggesting sophistication in the overall planning o f its operations. This was largely 
because al-Qaeda had enough skilled sleeper-agents, operators, logisticians, and planners 
to conduct simultaneous attacks; (3) operational security— al-Qaeda’s terrorist training 
manual resembled that o f the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that stressed that all 
operations be kept secret and information be disseminated on a need-to-know-basis. 
Communications security, traveling documents, and other necessary information and 
techniques were strongly stressed to minimize exposure and evade detection and arrest to 
ensure that planned operations were not disrupted; (4) imagination and improvisation—  
al-Qaeda’s operatives were usually conservative in their techniques as they relied on 
simple weapons such as small arms, explosives, and individually-made bombs to attack 
selected targets. The bombing o f the U.S.S Cole in Yemen and the attacks o f September 
11 were examples. In the former they used small dingy boats full o f explosives to attack 
the U.S.S. Cole while in the latter the hijackers used box-cutters and knives to hijack four 
U.S. commercial aircraft and crash them into buildings; (5) patience and innovation— al- 
Qaeda’s sleeper-agents and cell members were instructed not only to be patient but also 
to travel and live quietly in societies and countries selected as targets and to wait until 
they were activated or called upon to carry out operations. Others were instructed to 
finance their own terrorist operations through credit card theft and fraud like Ahmed 
Ressam, the mastermind o f the thwarted millennium attack against Los Angeles 
International Airport; (6) flexible command structure— “Bin Laden’s network uses at 
least four different operational styles: a top-down approach employing highly-skilled 
radicals; training amateurs like Richard Reid, the so-called ‘shoe bom ber’ to conduct
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simple, but lethal attacks; helping local groups with their own plans as with the Jordanian 
plotters during the millennium; and fostering like-minded insurgencies. Tactics that can 
stop one type o f attack do not necessarily work against others” (Strasser and Whitney 
429-430) (Bodansky 2000; Benjamin and Simon 2003; Bergen 2002; Scheuer 2004;
Stem 2003; Sageman 2004; M cAllister 20004; Hoffman 2004; Gunaratna 2004; Atran 
2004; The 9/11 Commission Report 2004; Williams 2002).
New terrorist cells emerge while others continue join bin Laden as was the case with 
the recent merger o f Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s Tawhid group into al-Qaeda. New groups 
bring new tactics. Some o f these tactics are unfamiliar to the w orld’s intelligence 
community and law enforcement agencies. For example, Jordanian-bom terrorist, al- 
Zarqawi, has used new tactics to fight U.S.-led forces in Iraq. It was alleged that he is 
responsible for the bombings, killings, abductions, and beheadings o f many foreign 
civilian workers who were in Iraq to assist in the reconstruction efforts. It was also 
alleged that Al-Zarqawi was responsible for the withdrawal o f  United Nations staff and 
Spanish, Philippine, and Ecuadorian forces from the Iraq. Several other countries were 
also been forced to withdraw or stop sending troops and civilian workers into Iraq for 
fear of being abducted and beheaded. A l-Zarqawi’s group even abducted and beheaded a 
female aid worker and used her as leverage to force their demands— the withdrawal of 
U.S-coalition forces from Iraq.
Looking at the methods that terrorists employed to attack America and the East 
African U.S. embassies, one detects a common pattern in the planning and execution o f 
these attacks. For example, just as the perpetrators o f the September 11 attacks entered
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the U.S. with fake passports and identification cards, enrolled in colleges and flight 
schools, conducted reconnaissance on the potential targets, and then attacked, the 
perpetrators o f  the August 7, 1998, U.S. embassies bombings in Nairobi and Dar es 
Salaam, on the other hand, entered Kenya and Tanzania with fake passports, started 
businesses, identified potential targets as the two U.S. embassies, and then attacked. In 
both incidents, the perpetrators kept a low profile and blended into societies that they 
targeted while they waited for orders from al-Q aeda’s leaders to execute the attacks.
The new tactics are working. Some countries around the world are becoming 
reluctant to send their troops and citizens to Iraq to assist in the reconstruction efforts. 
Elsewhere, terrorist organizations are also using female suicide bombers for political 
objectives. In Russia, women were reported to be the principal perpetrators o f terrorist 
attacks. For example, women from Chechnya successfully brought down two Russian 
commercial airliners killing all 90 passengers. M oreover, terrorists from Chechnya, 
among them several women, took school children hostage in Baslan. More than 350 
children, teachers, and parents were killed. Hundreds more were injured. In both o f 
these incidents, the perpetrators were using explosive devices. In short, the participation 
o f women in terrorist activities is increasing because they are considered to be the least 
likely individuals to engage in terrorism.
In the airliner incidents, women terrorists hid explosives under their belts. In the 
second incident, the terrorists slipped explosives into the school sports complex days 
before taking the school children hostage. Other countries where women have sacrificed 
their lives as martyrs include Palestine and Sri Lanka. With the global war on terror, 
terrorist groups, including al-Qaeda, now encourage women to participate in suicide
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bombings to advance their desired agendas.
To discern why religious terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda employ violence to 
promote their agenda and to understand why terrorist leaders encourage their followers to 
participate in suicide missions to wreak havoc on America and her allies, it is important 
to turn our focus to the discussion o f the motivations to attack Nairobi and New York.
Strategic Decisions in Attacks on Nairobi and the W orld Trade Center 
The U.S. Embassy in Nairobi 
Al-Qaeda’s most ambitious African operations were the simultaneous coordinated 
attacks against the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam on August 7, 1998. The 
Nairobi attacks had been planned since 1994 when al-Qaeda first established its presence 
in Mombasa and Nairobi {The 9/11 Commission 2004; Bodansky 2000; Cherkasky 2003). 
In Nairobi, al-Qaeda’s senior members, Abu Zubadya, Mohammed al-Bashiri and 
Mohamed Atef, spearheaded the operation, and with the help o f Ali M ohammed surveyed 
the American embassy in Nairobi as a possible target, collected intelligence information, 
took pictures, diagrams, and made reconnaissance sketches. The pictures and sketches 
were then shown to bin Laden and his closest top leaders at his Khartoum headquarters. 
Bin Laden then applied his knowledge o f civil engineering to identify the most effective 
path o f entry for the explosive-laden trucks into the embassy compound (Benjamin and 
Simon 2003; The 9/11 Commission Report 2004; Bodansky 2000; Cherkasky 2003).
But why Nairobi and Dar es Salaam? Why the U.S. embassy in Nairobi, in particular? 
Some analysts argued that the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were targeted 
because they were so vulnerable. Security was lacking. Other analysts claimed that
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compared to the United States embassies in the Middle East, Asia, and Europe, African 
embassies were the least likely to be targeted by bin Laden. Fewer people expected the 
American embassies to be attacked in Africa (Jenkins 2001, Hoffman 2003; Shay 2004).
According to bin Laden’s communiqués o f August 11, 1998, the factors mentioned 
above were exactly why Nairobi and Dar es Salaam were selected as targets. There are 
other factors as well. Regarding the attacks in Kenya, bin Laden provided the following 
reasons: First, the Kenyan government had allowed United States military personnel to 
use of its airfields and ports for the purpose o f attacking a Muslim country, Somalia, 
during the Operation Hope Mission in 1994 (Benjamin and Simon 2003). Appearing on 
the al-Jazeera television network, bin Laden stated that the U.S. embassy in Nairobi was 
targeted because as Shay (2002:26) reported, “the brutal [U.S.] invasion o f Somalia 
kicked o ff from there.” Second, the U.S. embassy in Kenya was attacked, bin Laden 
declared, because “ it was considered to be the biggest intelligence-gathering center in 
East Africa. With the help o f God, the hit against it was very strong against Americans. 
This is so the Americans can taste something of what we Muslims have tasted” (p.26).
Third, in regard to attacks against the Hotel Paradise in Mombasa, it was hit because it 
was owned by Islam ’s enemy Jews and because more Israeli-owned businesses, hotels, 
resorts, and other Zionist centers were located in Kenya than anywhere else in the Horn 
o f Africa. Form er CIA official, Michael Scheuer (2004:95), pointed out that after the 
Mombasa attacks, al-Qaeda’s Al-Ansar newspaper reported that, “the message here is to 
pursue the Zionist targets all over the world.”
Fourth, bin Laden and al-Qaeda claimed that Nairobi was attacked because the 
government o f Kenya collaborated with Israeli intelligence in the rescue o f Israelis taken
130
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
hostage in Entebbe, Uganda, in 1977 (Netanyahu 1995). For example, after the attacks in 
Nairobi and Mombasa, former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu claimed that Kenya 
will always be a prime target o f terrorist events because bin Laden and al-Qaeda hate the 
warm relationship between Kenya and Israel. He also noted that the cooperation and 
business ventures that the two countries enjoy are envied.
Fifth, bin Laden and his supporters claimed that it was from Kenya that America 
supported the war o f separation in the southern Sudan led by the fighters o f  John Garang. 
Furthermore, Sudanese officials, particularly. Hassan al-Tarabi claimed that over the 
years, the Kenyan government played a significant role in destabilizing and threatening 
the Sudanese state (Jacquard 2003).
Sixth, Shay (2004) noted that the U.S. embassy in Nairobi was attacked because it was 
seen as an easy target. Its location at the intersection o f two busy avenues made it 
extremely vulnerable. Shay further maintained that local security personnel in Kenya 
were incapable o f identifying and arresting al-Qaeda cell members who were already in 
the country as early as 1993 planning the attacks. From a strategic point o f view,
K enya’s geographical location made it easier for terrorists to travel to and from Kenya 
without detection.
Al-Qaeda’s desire for revenge against Kenya was due to its cooperation with the 
United States and Israel, the strategic location o f Kenya and its major cities, the porous 
borders of Kenya in its northern areas, the stateless countries that are K enya’s neighbors 
in the north, and the relative political stability that Kenyans enjoy compared to other 
countries in the Horn o f Africa (Barkan 2004; Lyman and Morrison 2004).
Ih e  9/11 Commission Report (2004) pointed out that the withdrawal o f the U.S. troops
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from Somalia in 1994 inspired some Arab and Muslim militants to plan further attacks 
against the United States because they believed that once the American public started 
seeing their young men and women coming home in body bags, they would pressure their 
government to withdraw. The 9/11 Commission report (2004:48) noted bin Laden not 
only celebrated the suicide attacks against the U.S. personnel and facilities in Saudi 
Arabia but also praised the attacks against American troops in Beirut, Yemen, and 
Somalia. Regarding to the withdrawal o f the U.S. from Somalia, bin Laden noted that 
America “left the area carrying disappointment, humiliation, defeat, and your dead with 
you.” At a news eonference in Afghanistan in 1998, bin Laden also cited the example of 
the withdrawal o f the Soviet Union from Afghanistan and the withdrawal o f the United 
States from Lebanon as proof that a ragged group o f dedicated Muslim militants could 
overcome two world superpowers (Benjamin and Simon 2002; The 9/11 Commission 
Report 2004).
In conclusion, Osama bin Laden and his war strategist, al-Zawahiri, have routinely 
boasted on television and reminded their al-Qaeda members that their dedication and 
willingness to sacrifice their lives for Islam ’s and A llah’s cause have made it possible to 
attack the United States, the most powerful nation in the world. Bin Laden and al- 
Zawahiri cited the catastrophic attacks o f September 11 and argued that if  nineteen 
dedicated martyrs armed with the teachings o f the Koran and primitive knives and box- 
cutters could plan and execute such daring and meticulous attacks against the United 
States using Am erica’s own commercial airliners as guided missiles to topple the World 
Trade Center and severely damage the Pentagon, hundreds o f dedicated al-Qaedans with 
the support o f God would bring Armageddon to American shores.
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The U.S. W orld Trade Center
Immediately after the September 11 attacks against the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon, analysts, scholars, journalists, and leaders claimed that bin Laden and his al-
Qaeda operatives targeted the U.S. because they hated and envied Americans values
freedoms, liberties, wealth, and power (Hoge and Rose 2001; Talbot and Chanda 2001;
Mahajan 2002). As much as these assertions were correct, some analysts, however,
pointed out that bin Laden and al-Qaeda were less interested in American ways o f life,
democracy, and liberties than in the way America conducted its policies (Bergen 2002;
Mahajan 2002; Scheuer 2004). In addition to hatred, other reasons and strategic
considerations were provided as to why bin Laden and his al-Qaeda network attacked the
United States. The 9/11 Commission Report (2004:51) summarized these factors and
stated that bin Laden and al-Qaeda targeted the United States because:
America had attacked Islam; America is responsible for all conflicts involving 
Muslims. Thus Americans are blamed when Israelis fight with Palestinians, when 
Russians fight with Chechens, when Indians fight with Kashmiri Muslims, and 
when the Philippine government fights ethnic Muslims in its southern islands. 
America is also held responsible for the government o f Muslim countries, derided 
by al Qaeda as ‘your agents.’ Bin Laden has stated flatly, ‘Our fight against these 
governments is not separate from our fight against you’. These charges found a 
ready audience among millions o f Arab and Muslims angry at the United States 
because issues ranging from Iraq to Palestine to Am erica’s support for their 
countries’ repressive rulers.
Other analysts claimed that bin Laden and al-Qaeda’s grievances with the U.S. may
have started in reaction and response to specific American policies in the Arab and
Muslim worlds, particularly in the Middle East, but his grievances gained momentum and
became deeply entrenched, covering many other areas in the world where American
policies and actions directly or indirectly affected peoples and societies (Chomsky 2003;
Bodansky 2002; Hershberg and Moore 2002; Booth and Dunne 2002).
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Scheuer (2004) noted that bin Laden’s ideas and perceptions about American policies 
and actions in the Arab and Muslim regions were commonly shared by millions in both 
radical and moderate Islamic countries although many Muslims do not publicly support 
bin Laden’s militant and violent responses to U.S. policies. British journalist Robert Fisk 
stated that, “Arabs may deplore this [bin Laden’s] violence, but few will not feel some 
pull o f emotions. ...Am id Israel’s brutality toward Palestinians and A m erica’s threat 
toward Iraq, at least one Arab is prepared to hit back” (quoted in Scheuer 2004:xviii).
Scheuer (2004) maintained that bin Laden and his al-Qaeda militants and supporters
commonly perceived their actions and undertakings as acts o f war, not terrorism because
their actions are part and parcel o f a defensive jihad  ‘struggle’ sanctioned by Allah and
contained in the Koran and praised by the hadith ‘sayings’ o f the Prophet Mohammed.
These attacks are meant to advance bin Laden’s clear, focused, limited, and 
widely popular foreign policy goals: the end o f the U.S. aid to Israel and the 
ultimate elimination o f that state; the removal o f U.S. and W estern forces from 
the Arabian Peninsula; the removal o f U.S. and Western military forces from Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and other Muslim lands; the end o f U.S. support for the oppression 
o f M uslims by Russia, China, and India; the end o f U.S. protection for repressive, 
apostate Muslim regimes in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Egypt, Jordan, et cetera; and 
the conservation o f the Muslim w orld’s energy resources and their sale at higher 
prices. To secure these goals, bin Laden will make stronger attacks in the United 
States— complemented elsewhere by attacks by al-Qaeda and other Islamist 
groups allied with or unconnected to it— to try to destroy A m erica’s resolve to 
maintain the policies that maintain Israel, apostate Muslim rulers, infidel garrisons 
in the Prophet’s birthplace, and low oil prices for U.S. consumers. Bin Laden is 
out to drastically alter U.S. and W estern policies toward the Islamic world, not 
necessarily to destroy America, much less its freedoms and liberties. He is a 
practical warrior, not an apocalyptic terrorist in search o f Armageddon. Should 
U.S. policies not change, the war between America and the Islamists will go on 
for the foreseeable future (Scheuer 2004: xviii-xix).
From the above quote, we can discern that bin Laden and al-Qaeda attacked the U.S. 
on September 11 for the following strategic decisions: (1) bin Laden called upon his 
operatives and other Muslim militants to use terror tactics to wage war against Americans
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in order to evict them from the Arab and Muslim world; (2) bin Laden targeted the 
beacon o f American economic superiority, the W orld Trade Center, because he wanted 
not only to cause unprecedented destruction and disruption o f the American economy, 
but also to show his followers that America was only but a “paper tiger”; (3) bin Laden 
hoped that the attacks would force the U.S. to respond drastically either by withdrawing 
from the Middle East or by stopping to support oppressive Arab regimes, making it 
possible for bin Laden to overthrow them; (4) bin Laden hoped that the attack o f 
September 11 would force the U.S. to stop supporting the Israelis over the Palestinians or 
force the U.S. to invade an Arab or Muslim country to validate his assertions that the U.S. 
bullies Arab and Muslim countries for their oil resources; (5) bin Laden hoped that the 
invasion would fuel and inflame further hatred and anti-US sentiment among the Arab 
and Muslim peoples and thus increase his pool o f supporters; (6) bin Laden hoped that 
the invasion o f Arab and Muslim countries would bring to fruition his wish for a clash o f 
civilizations between the W est and Islam; and (7) bin Laden hoped to alter the West and 
U.S. foreign policy towards the Arab and Muslim world to make it possible to create 
Caliphate states (Alexander and Alexander 2002; Bergen 2002; Gunaratna 2002; Scheuer 
2004; The 9/11 Commission Report 2004; Strasser and W hitney 2004; Stem 2003; 
Ruthven 2002; Booth and Dunne 2002; Hershberg and Moore 2002).
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CHAPTER FOUR
ISSUES THAT PREOCCUPY SOCIAL SCHOLARS 
AND POLITICAL ACTORS
“It is better to debate a question without settling it 
than to settle a question without debating it.”
—Joseph Joubert [1754-1824]
The problem o f terrorism has for decades been examined by social scholars, terrorist 
experts, policy analysts, and political actors who often use yesterday’s theories and 
explanations to understand actions committed by contemporary terrorist groups. But 
since the attacks o f September 11, a number o f new questions and issues regarding al- 
Qaeda have been raised. This chapter considers some o f those issues in light o f the 
theory that I proposed for this study. The issues that preoccupy social scholars and 
political actors regarding al-Qaeda and the war on terrorism include the following: First, 
are all terrorist groups including al-Qaeda liberators or oppressors? Second, are terrorists 
“evildoers” and are states that support them part o f an “axis o f evil”? Third, are al- 
Q aeda’s attacks intended to minimize collateral damage while maximizing fear and 
insecurity among the general public? Fourth, are members and followers o f al-Qaeda 
impoverished, deprived, deranged, and irrational cowards? Fifth, did U.S. foreign policy 
contribute to the attacks o f September 11 ? Sixth, would solving the Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict reduce M uslim rage and hatred against America and her allies? (Herbst 2003; 
Friedman 2002; Rushdie 2002; Laqueur 2004; Jenkins 2001; Gunaratna 2004; Bremer 
1988; The 9/11 Commission Report 2004; Bergen 2002; Talbott and Chanda 2001; 
Chomsky 2003; White 2002; Bodansky 2000; Mamdani 2004).
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Liberators or terrorists?
In my theory on terrorism, I pointed out that terrorism is a set o f socio-cultural 
resources and practices which individuals or groups use to promote their desired agendas. 
These cultural practices include ideologically based rhetoric through which both terrorists 
and their opponents hide in a semantic camouflage, portraying themselves in positive 
ways to seek alliance and alignment with supporters, while depicting their opponents in 
negative and demonic ways to discourage people from aligning with their enemies. In 
particular, the rhetoric implicit in labels o f terrorism has become a focus among scholars 
and policymakers. One such rhetorical question or issue is whether terrorist groups 
should be characterized as freedom fighters or oppressors. 1 must point out, however, 
that this characterization o f groups can be misleading because it is not only a false 
dichotomy but also a question o f perspective. This is because it is possible to be a 
liberator and an oppressor at the same time, just as it is possible to liberate one person by 
oppressing another. In this section, I examine the general issue and then consider how 
the labels are deployed in the ideological struggle between terrorists and state officials.
The General Issue
Over the years, the phrase “one m an’s terrorist is another m an’s freedom fighter” has 
been evoked by many individuals or movements throughout the world to justify the use 
o f violence or terrorism to express legitimate grievances and to achieve certain objectives 
(Hoffman 1999; Taheri 1988; Laqueur 2001; Bender and Leone 1986; Chomsky 2003; 
Herbst 2003). Numerous scholars and politicians have argued that individuals or groups 
who participate in political struggle for the purposes o f bringing about socio-economic
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and political change (i.e., to end internal and external political oppression and 
colonialism, social alienation and injustices, or economic exploitation and inequalities) 
for the collective good are freedom fighters (Henderson 2001; Chomsky 2002; Fanon 
1967; Sartre 2001; M arighella 1985; Hoffman 1999).
Historically, individuals or groups with legitimate political agendas and grievances 
have used terrorism to free themselves from colonial rule and to liberate themselves and 
their countries from external occupation or internal oppression. For example, Hoffman 
(1999), Henderson (2001), Sartre (2001), and Fanon (1967) pointed out that there have 
been many examples where national liberation individuals or movements have employed 
terrorism as an instrument to bring about political change, i.e., to end external or internal 
colonialism. According to Frantz Fanon (1967:75), “The colonized man liberates him self 
in and through violence.” In this view, violence is considered as a powerful tool through 
which those who are oppressed achieve their political independence and thus ensure 
human dignity. Cases in point include Kenya under Jomo Kenyatta and the Mau Mau 
uprising. South Africa under Nelson M andela and the African National Congress, and the 
Algerian war o f  liberation (Meredith 2005; Mandela 1994; Kenyatta 1968; Macey 2000).
Violence and terrorism continue to be employed as instruments o f change in many 
parts o f the world including Europe with the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Basque 
separatist group Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA), and the Chechen rebels in the former 
Soviet Union; in the Middle East with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 
Hamas, and Hezbollah; and in Asia with the Kashmiri rebels and the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front in the Philippines (Hoffman 1999; Henderson 2001; Herbst 2003). The 
leaders and members o f these movements consider themselves as liberators and not
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terrorists. Furthermore, the countries and societies that these political movements 
represent are regarded as liberators and are generally held in high regard by their citizens. 
Sinn Fein o f the Irish Republican Army and Yasser Arafat o f the Palestine Liberation 
Organization are examples (Hoffman 1999; Henderson 2001).
Although the phrase freedom fighter applied to groups that were involved in post- 
World War II anti-colonial movements in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin 
America, today some individuals known for struggling to free themselves and their 
societies from oppressive rule regard themselves as liberators and not oppressors (Herbst 
2003). For example, addressing the United Nations General Assembly in 1974, Yasser 
Arafat o f the Palestinian Liberation Organization claimed that, “the difference between 
the revolutionary and the terrorist lies in the reason for which each fights. For whoever 
stands by a just cause and fights for the freedom and liberation o f  his land from the 
invaders, the settler and the colonialist, cannot possibly be called terrorist” (quoted in 
Hoffman 1999:26).
Furthermore, the term freedom fighter has been applied to groups or societies seeking 
support from the West, particularly the United States, for political causes. Policy analyst 
Noam Chomsky (2003) claimed that the United States has a long tradition o f supporting 
brutal regimes struggling against communism. Anthropologist Philip Herbst (2003) 
noted that the United States and South Africa supported Angolan rebel, Jonas Savimbi, 
the leader o f UNITA, in a twenty-seven year war with the communist government o f 
Angola. Before his death in 2002, Savimbi was praised and hailed as a freedom fighter 
by United States President Ronald Reagan. Similarly, President Reagan praised the 
“Afghani Arabs” who participated in the war against the Soviets as freedom fighters
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President Reagan stated that, “The freedom fighters o f Afghanistan would tell us as well 
that the threat o f aggression has not receded from the world” (Herbst 2003:70).
With United States support o f the war with the Soviets in the 1980s, Afghanistan 
became a rallying point for Muslim and Arab extremist freedom fighters including 
Osama bin Laden who traveled to Afghanistan to fight the communist “ infidels’, the 
Soviet Union. But after the defeat and surrender o f the Soviets, al-Qaeda decided to 
wage jihad against other enemies including the capitalist “infidels”, the United States 
(Cooley 2000; M amdani 2004). Today, with the on-going war on terrorism, the United 
States and its allies no longer view bin Laden and al-Qaeda as liberators, but as terrorists.
Some scholars tend to deny the label “freedom fighters” to those who use method o f 
terror. According to historian and specialist in terrorism, Walter Laqueur (1977), not all 
those who are engaged in anti-imperialist struggles or the wars o f liberation can be 
considered freedom fighters. He pointed out that individuals or groups who approve or 
use indiscriminate terrorism against non-combatant civilians, women, and children can no 
longer be seen as liberators but rather as terrorists. Michael W alzer (2002) also noted 
that those who kill defenseless civilians in dancing halls, resorts and hotels, shopping 
malls, buses and trains systems, or other public places and then call themselves liberators 
only fool the fooled. Other scholars also argue that the bombing o f government buildings 
in Oklahoma City in 1995, the attacks o f  the U.S. embassies in East Africa in 1998, the 
attack on the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen in 2000, the attacks on the W orld Trade Center and 
the Pentagon in 2001, and the many other terrorist acts that al-Qaeda has been implicated 
in cannot be considered or depicted as liberating acts nor could they be interpreted as 
precursors to uprisings that would collectively liberate the masses (Henderson 2001 ;
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Friedman 2002; Herbst 2003; Booth and Dunne 2002; Talbott and Chanda 2001; Hoge 
and Rose 2001). Laqueur (2001) noted that the argument one m an’s terrorist is another 
m an’s liberator no longer applies to some terrorist individuals including bin Laden and 
his al-Qaeda protégés.
Salman Rushdie (2002) similarly argued that those who attacked America on 
September 11 using illegitimate means to pursue legitimate causes cannot be considered 
freedom fighters, because their main objective was not political or social change but total 
annihilation o f their enemies. U.S. General Wesley Clark also argued that while the 
traditional anarchists and terrorists from previous centuries pursued legitimate political 
agendas, contemporary Islamic terrorists, including al-Qaeda, are not motivated by 
legitimate grievances, but only by hatred and revenge against the W est and America 
(Atran 2004). Rushdie (2002) added that al-Qaeda terrorists wrap themselves in the 
world o f grievances that are shared by the masses to hide their essential narcissism. 
Rushdie (2002:338) concluded that the September 11 plotters and attackers were not 
interested in advancing social and political change because “W hatever the killers were 
trying to achieve, it seems improbable that building a better world was part o f it.” Berger 
and Stuphen (2001) also claimed that al-Qaeda militants are not interested in social 
justice and equality. They stated, “Nor is bin Laden’s cause social equity; he is not some 
distorted reflection o f the ‘anti-globalization’ movement, although despair, inequity, and 
corruption provide him camouflage” (p. 124).
Whether or not some individuals or groups are considered liberators or terrorists 
depends on a variety o f factors: the context in which these phrases are evoked; the 
observer or w itness’ point o f view; the type o f violence condoned in a particular time
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period; and the historical fluctuation o f the use and meaning o f these terms (Laqueur 
2004; Riches 1986; Apter 1997). Hoffman (1999:31) also noted that the general 
consensus among scholars is that terrorism and terrorists are pejorative words that contain 
“negative connotations that generally applied to one’s enemies or opponents, or those 
with whom one disagrees and would otherwise prefer to ignore.” Jenkins (1980:10) 
added that what is referred to as terrorism usually “depends on one’s point o f view. Use 
o f the term implies a moral judgm ent; and if one party can successfully attach the label 
terrorist to its opponent, then it has indirectly persuaded others to adopt its moral 
viewpoint.”
Hoffman (1999:31) maintained that the decision to label some individuals or groups as 
“terrorists” is a subjective endeavor because it is dependent upon the observer’s 
perspective, i.e., whether the observer sympathizes with or opposes the individuals, 
groups, or causes concerned. For example, if one identifies with the victim(s) o f 
violence, the act is usually labeled terrorism, but if one identifies with the perpetrator(s), 
the violent act is often regarded with sympathy or seen not to constitute terrorism. 
Laqueur (2004:1 -2) claimed that what may be true for terrorist groups in one country at a 
certain time and space may not necessarily be true with regard to terrorists in other 
countries, periods, or continents.
Benzion Netanyahu (1986) argued that terrorists usually have ulterior motives besides 
those that deal with liberation and freedom. He maintained that terrorists cannot be 
reasoned with and won over through peaceful negotiations and agreements. He noted 
that failure to make clear distinctions o f what constitutes terrorists and liberators may 
make tackling or fighting terrorist threats difficult. Netanyahu (1986:25) concluded that:
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...w e must bear in mind that we are dealing with a crafty, potent enemy who 
operates not only with physical but also with psychological weapons, with 
persuasive arguments and captivating slogans. Thus, to delude the people o f the 
free world, the terrorist appears to be the bearer o f their ideals, as the champion o f 
the oppressed, as the critic o f social ills, and, more specifically, as a fighter of 
freedom. The last claim, especially, is a sure catch which springs the trap for the 
credulous. Since freedom fighters have also used violence in their struggles, and 
since freedom is so dear to free men, many in the democracies are almost 
automatically filled with sympathy for the terrorists and their causes.
However, according to the reasoning put forth by Laqueur, Hoffman, and Jenkins, we
can conclude that today’s terrorists may be tom orrow ’s liberators or even statesmen. In
other words, it is not uncommon today to call some individuals or groups terrorists and
perhaps tomorrow praise them as liberators. Apparently, both terrorists and state officials
use the phrases as useful tools to demonize the actions o f their enemies to acquire
alliances. In other words, both sides use the terms for rhetorical purposes to express
their points o f  view. Furthermore, even some scholars and policymakers may argue that
the distinction between terrorists and liberators is usually blurred, we are reminded o f
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Stewart Potter who when asked to define pornography
responded by saying, “I know it when I see it.” The same can be said o f terrorists and
liberators; W e all think we know them when we see them,
The Issue o f Rhetoric Applied to Al-Qaeda 
For many people in the western industrialized countries and some in Arab and Muslim 
societies, the attacks o f September 11 and other attacks that bin Laden and al-Qaeda 
plotted and executed may not be considered as liberating acts nor could the macabre 
killing o f defenseless civilians be described as actions o f  freedom fighters (Herbst 2003; 
Friedman 2002). According to op-ed columnist, John Bums (2002), Osama bin Laden’s
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brand o f Islam and the concept o f jihad continue to receive criticism even from Islamic 
scholars who argue that the killing o f thousands o f non-combatant civilians as occurred 
on September 11 was a heinous crime in Islam. Moreover, those who find justifications 
in the Koran to approve mass murder in the cause o f Islam are perverting the meaning of 
jihad. Critics not only think that bin Laden is an adventurer with a flawed conception and 
interpretation o f Islam, but also rebuke those in the Arab and Muslim worlds who 
compare bin Laden to Saladin (Herbst 2003; Tariq 2002; Ruthven 2002).
However, in some Arab and Muslim countries such as Palestine and Pakistan, millions 
o f people see bin Laden and his followers as freedom fighters because o f their dedication 
and bravery in waging war against the imperialists and Crusaders to defend o f Islam and 
protect oppressed Muslims (Scheuer 2004:104-105; Gunaratna 2004; Bergen 2002; Stem 
2003; Benjamin and Simon 2003). Other scholars point out that in many Arab and 
Muslim worlds, bin Laden is widely revered as a military commander and religious 
fighter in the war against the enemies o f  Islam. Others support him because he alone and 
his al-Qaeda militant Islamists dared to wage jihad against America and change the 
course o f history. Bin Laden is also revered because he wages war against the Middle 
East regimes that he considers oppressive and corrupt (Bodansky 2002; Tariq 2002; 
Ruthven 2002; Scheuer 2004; Herbst 2003).
In sum, the concepts o f terrorism  and terrorist are that, they are difficult to define and 
they defy simple and precise definition because they mean different things to different 
people. These concepts are tools in the rhetorical struggle between terrorists and counter­
terrorists. Their usage depends upon ones’ position in this struggle. Joseph Sobran 
cautioned that, “We must beware o f defining terrorism ideologically. W hether one is a
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terrorist has little to do with what side one is fighting on, only with the methods used. In 
fact, it’s perfectly possible to be a terrorist and a freedom fighter at the same time— for 
the simple reason that it is possible to use bad methods for good purposes” (Quoted in 
Kemp 1986:135).
“Evildoers” and the “axis o f evil”?
My theory indicates that individuals or groups who perceive themselves as either 
powerless, oppressed, and marginalized may employ extreme means o f violence to create 
a sense o f being powerful by attacking much more powerful adversaries. It also creates 
an image to observers that the powerful are not immune from terrorist attack. Terrorists’ 
spectacular attacks may be designed to create and exploit fear by killing, intimidating, 
and frightening the masses in order to influence government policies. It is important to 
point out that “evil” is not a term that is often used by social scholars because the word is 
emotionally freighted. The term is loaded, subjective, and misleading. However, the 
word “evil” is usually employed by various writers, policy analysts, political leaders, and 
media personalities to label enemies, downplay and disparage the causes o f their enemies, 
legitimize and justify attacks against their enemies, and to delegitimize terrorist actions 
and enterprises. In my theory, rhetoric is an important element in responses to terrorist 
acts. In particular, rhetoric is a prominent feature in the debate about terrorism and that 
debate is one o f the social responses to it.
Herbst (2003:58) pointed out that, the term “evil” ’ has its uses both within terrorist 
groups and among those who oppose them. On both sides, the evil found in others’ 
actions releases those who fight it from responsibility for the violence o f their own
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actions.” He maintained that suffering and death o f those portrayed as “evildoers” or 
“monsters” exonerate political leaders and government authorities fighting “evil” from 
being sympathetic to the enemy. He concluded that portraying the enemy as “evil” 
distracts the parties concerned from examining the factors behind the actions o f “evil” 
(pp.30-32)
For example, Islamic militants, including those in al-Qaeda, view the United States as 
the “Great Satan” whose destructive forces threaten Islam. Terrorist jihadists may view 
themselves as reluctant warriors who are forced to wage war against “the infidels” and 
the “evil” forces o f imperialism, exploitation, and oppression (Herbst 2003:92-93). 
Similarly, the rhetoric o f evil was mentioned numerous times after the destruction o f the 
World Trade Center and Pentagon on September 11 when President George W. Bush 
labeled those who attacked the United States as “evildoers” and vowed to fight and rid 
the world o f the “evildoers” (Hocking 2004; Herbst 2003; Stem 2003).
Terrorism is an emotional subject loaded with stereotypes and moral judgments. 
Scholars, political actors, and observers often label terrorists either as monsters or 
evildoers. Legal expert, Jenny Hocking (2004:2), noted that beyond the horror that 
terrorism causes, its meaning still remains subjective as the language and rhetoric o f 
terrorism has become commonplace and its usage has been reduced to a simplistic 
cartoon-like dichotomy o f good versus bad and noble versus evil. She stated that the 
concept o f terrorism “is ambiguous, its meaning is culturally and politically determined 
and changes over time, allowing one-time ‘terrorists’ such as Nelson Mandela, Xanana 
Gusmao, and M enachem Begin, to shift into positions o f legitimate power” (p. 2).
Today, it is fashionable for American officials to refer to al-Qaeda as “evil persons”
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and countries that sponsor terrorism as “rogue states.” For example, in the aftermath o f 
the September 11 attacks, the President referred to bin Laden and al-Qaeda operatives as 
“evildoers” . Shortly thereafter in his State o f the Union speech, the President labeled 
states that sponsor terrorism, Iran, North Korea, and pre-war Iraq as the “axis o f evil” 
(quoted in Reynolds 2001:95). The President’s phrase was repeated by many other 
officials and analysts at public speeches and political discourses throughout the United 
States (Herbst 2003; W oodward 2004:86-87).
Some scholars and policymakers such as Rushdie (2002), Friedman (2002), Hoge and 
Rose (2001), Talbott and Chanda (2001) and the authors o f The 9/11 Commission Report 
(2004) noted that the actions o f those who attacked America were incomprehensible and 
“evil” because there were no justifiable reasons why nineteen young men o f  Muslim 
descent hijacked four American commercial aircraft, crashing them into buildings and 
killing thousands o f civilians from more than sixty-two countries around the world 
including Arab and Muslim states. According to these writers, the actions o f September 
11 were those o f weak and evil-minded individuals.
Anthropologist Edmund Leach (1977) and Chomsky (1988) claimed that when policy 
practitioners and public officials label terrorists as barbaric and weak, they fail to 
acknowledge that actions o f  weak groups may have the same destructive and disruptive 
outcomes as those o f powerful entities. Chomsky (2003:189) pointed out that, “It is this 
common practice that allows for the conventional thesis that terror is a weapon o f the 
weak. That is true, by definition, if  terror is restricted to their terrorism. If  the doctrinal 
requirement is lifted, however, we find that, like most weapons, terror is prim arily a 
weapon o f the powerful.” Leach (1977:26) also noted that when terrorist groups use the
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techniques o f guerilla warfare o f surprise attack and hit-and-run operations, they are 
viewed as evil, barbaric, and weak, but when a state’s military apparatus uses similar 
tactics, their actions are regarded as skillful, ingenious, and noble.
The use o f such phrases as “evildoers” and the “axis o f evil” in reference to bin Laden 
and Saddam Hussein had other significant political implications. They were used to rally 
national and international support, cooperation, and collaboration in the fight against 
international terrorism and the invasions o f  Afghanistan and Iraq. By demonizing 
terrorists as “evil-doers”. President Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair o f Great Britain 
made their case in the world court o f opinion (Hershberg and M oore 2002; Booth and 
Dunne 2002; Herbst 2003; Chomsky 2003).
There was heated debate whether the U.S. president and other world leaders were 
justified in using the “evildoers” and “axis-of-evil” phrases in their speeches to make a 
case for military intervention. But scholars, analysts, and policymakers including Talbott 
and Chanda (2001), Friedman (2002), Clarke (2004), W oodward (2004), Stem (2003) 
and the authors o f  The 9/11 Commission Report (2004) claimed that no matter how 
compelling the perpetrators’ grievances were, the act o f killing thousands o f civilians 
during the attacks o f September 11 was unjustifiable and thus should be viewed as evil.
Are the choreographed attacks o f al-Qaeda intended to minimize 
collateral damage while maximizing fear and insecurity?
In my theory on terrorism, I indicated that violence is a technique that individuals or 
groups employ to promote their causes. The question that some scholars have tried to 
examine is whether or not terrorists’ actions are intended to minimize death and
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maximize fear or whether they do not care as their only goal is to cause mayhem (Jenkins 
1985; Hoffman 1999). According to scholars such as Taheri (1987) and Wilkinson 
(1977), from the 1960s through the 1980s, the underlying intentions o f terrorist groups 
influenced the level o f violence the group would allow. I f  the purpose o f terrorists was to 
seek publicity and maximize media coverage to appeal to a wider audience in order to 
promote their agenda, the level o f violence used towards that objective was likely to be 
controlled. This was because the use o f extreme violence could result in bad publicity, 
which would alienate the supporters and sympathizers that the terrorists were targeting.
In this case, mass murder was the last act that terrorists were likely to commit (Stem 
1999). Jenkins concluded that because “terrorism is a theater” which is manufactured to 
attract the media and its wide audience, “terrorists want a lot o f people watching, not a lot 
o f people dead (quoted in Stem 1999:76).
Conversely, if  terrorists are motivated by hatred and revenge, the level o f  violence 
they are willing to commit is much higher since their intention is to kill as many people 
as possible. At the same time, they still gain the advantage o f forcing millions or perhaps 
billions o f people around the globe to watch and listen (Bergen 2001). The authors o f 
The 9/11 Commission Report (2004) claimed that bin Laden’s and al-Qaeda’s main 
purpose was to kill as many people as possible because in several o f his fa tw as  ‘religious 
decrees’, bin Laden called for the killing o f Americans and their allies anywhere in the 
world where it may be possible to do so. Therefore, hatred and revenge were not only the 
driving reasons for the al-Qaeda attacks on September 11, but also maximizing fear and 
confusion and dismption o f the economy were motivating factors. For these reasons, one 
can argue that al-Qaeda militants wanted a lot o f people dead and billions o f  people
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watching, listening, and reading about their activities in the media and communications 
outlets such as television, radio, print, and the Internet.
Assertions that terrorists attempt to control violence or employ it only when it is 
particularly necessary to attract media coverage to promote their cause can be misleading, 
because today’s terrorists sometimes no longer seek publicity for fear o f being targeted 
by state forces (Henderson 2001 ; Laqueur 2004; Herbst 2003). Such reasoning was 
applicable to traditional terrorist movements such as the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO) and the Irish Republican Army (IRA) who were selective about their 
targets and attempted to control the use o f extreme violence to reduce killing o f innocent 
bystanders and civilians to ensure that they did not alienate their supporters. But 
according to Ruthven (2002), Friedman (2002), Gunaratna (2004), Armstrong (2000), 
and Juergensmeyer (2002), modem Islamic terrorists including bin Laden and his al- 
Qaeda militants thrive on killing thousands with millions and perhaps billions o f people 
watching and listening via media outlets. This is why al-Qaeda usually targets civilians 
at govemment buildings, embassies, airlines, train and bus systems, hotels and resorts, 
residential and business complexes, and other “soft targets” where civilians congregate.
In summary, al-Q aeda’s deliberate methods of attack against America and its allies are 
intended to kill as many people as possible and to magnify fear, insecurity, and anxiety in 
the general public. Furthermore, al-Qaeda’s choreographed acts are intended to send a 
frightening message to world leaders and their citizens that al-Qaeda is capable o f 
attacking its enemies anywhere on the globe and no one including Americans can claim 
immunity. The question that social scholars and political actors wrestle with is whether 
al-Qaeda’s leaders and followers resort to terrorism because they are impoverished.
150
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
deprived, deranged, and cowardly.
Are al-Qaeda leaders and members impoverished, 
deprived, and deranged cowards?
In my theory, I pointed out that terrorism can be a response to the legacies o f 
colonialism and neo-colonialism. Among these legacies are poverty, deprivation, 
exploitation, and socio-economic inequality and injustice. Some theorists contend that 
individuals who generally join terrorist groups and participate in suicide-terrorism usually 
come from poor, deprived, and dysfunctional backgrounds (Post et al. 2002; Bender and 
Leone 1986; Henderson 2001; W ievirorka 1993; Hoge and Rose 2001). In other words, 
academicians think post-colonial resentments and globalization drive groups to terrorism. 
In this section, I examine this proposition and discuss the implications o f my findings for 
my theory.
The issue o f  deprivation and derangement are usually considered in tandem when 
debating the motivations for resentment, hatred, and terrorism. Some people assume that 
those who are deprived and poor are also most likely to be deranged and violent (Herbst 
2003; Silke 2004). This assertion is somewhat misleading because to be poor and 
deprived does not necessarily lead to derangement and terrorism. These are different 
issues and problems.
Anthropologist Scott Atran (2004:73) observed that depicting some groups as poor 
and violent injects a sense o f hopelessness in any attempt to address the so-called “root 
causes” o f violence or terrorism. Some groups will always be desperate and deranged 
enough to conduct and execute suicide-terrorism. As reasonable and logical the assertion
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that poverty breeds frustration and frustration breeds terrorism may sound, studies show 
that terrorist leaders and suicide terrorists and their supporters are not usually poor or 
deprived (Atran 2004:75).
Furthermore, the evidence acquired from those al-Qaedans who have been arrested 
and interviewed in U.S. prisons, including those at the Guantanamo detention center, 
show that terrorists are neither deranged nor irrational cowards. To the contrary, most 
terrorists, including those who attacked the U.S. on September 11, were from stable 
families and were generally well-educated and rational (Mandelbaum 2001; Zakaria 
2004; Silke 2004; Bodansky 2000; Flanson 2002; Gunaratna 2002; Bergen 2002; 
Hershberg and Moore 2002).
When social scholars and political actors apply reasoning o f deprivation to terrorism, 
they argue that if  poverty, hopelessness, and other factors that generate despair were to be 
solved, terrorism will cease to exist. Following this logic, U.S. President George W. 
Bush, while addressing a United Nations conference on poor countries in Monterrey, 
Mexico, said that " . . . [w]e fight against poverty because hope is an answer to terror” 
(Quoted in Atran 2004:75).
The assertion that poverty, deprivation, despair, and hopelessness forced individuals 
and groups to employ terrorism to express their grievances lost its applicability simply 
because al-Qaeda members, including the perpetrators o f the September 11 attacks, did 
not come from impoverished, deprived, and desperate backgrounds nor did they come 
from deranged and dysfunctional families. They were, according to Hershberg and 
Moore (2002:4), “the sons o f  relative privilege, well educated and widely traveled.”
Cases in point are provided by al-Qaeda’s senior leaders, Osama bin Laden and
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Ayman al-Zawahari, and the September 11 hijacker, Mohammed Atta. Bin Laden was 
bom into a family worth billions o f dollars, one o f the wealthiest families in Saudi Arabia 
and the M iddle East. He was highly educated and skilled in the world o f business 
(Gunaratna 2002; Zakaria 2003; D ’Souza 2002; The 9/11 Commission Report 2004; 
Mandelbaum 2001). Al-Zawahiri comes from a long line of highly prominent families in 
Egyptian society. His grandfather was the C hief Imam o f Al Zhar, the most important 
center o f mainstream Islam in the Arab and Muslim world. His uncle was the first 
Secretary General o f the Arab League. His father was a distinguished professor at Cairo 
University. Al-Zawahiri junior him self was a prominent surgeon in Cairo and is 
currently believed to be the personal physician to Osama bin Laden (Zakaria 2003:136).
Mohammed Atta, the ringleader o f September 11 and the pilot o f the first plane to hit 
the World Trade Center, came from a modem and moderate Egyptian family. His father 
was one o f the most powerful lawyers in Cairo. He had two sisters with doctoral degrees, 
one a professor o f zoology and the other a medical doctor (Cloud 2001 ; Zakaria 2004). 
Atta him self graduated from Cairo University with a degree in architectural engineering. 
He also enrolled at the Technical University o f Hamburg, Germany, and graduated with a 
master’s degree in urban planning. M ost o f his accomplices in the hijacking were also 
well educated. Furthermore, within al-Qaeda, even lower-level recmits are mostly from 
the middle class and have college degrees (Gunaratna 2002; Bergen 2002; The 9/11 
Commission Report 2004; Miniter 2003; Stem 1999).
Atran (2004) further argued that evidence from some al-Qaeda operatives who have 
been arrested and interrogated by American intelligence and law enforcement agencies at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and other U.S. prisons indicated that those who are Saudi
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Arabian citizens, particularly those in leadership positions, are not only well educated 
with bachelor’s or m aster’s degrees, but also come from highly privileged families.
Atran also noted that evidence from Jemaah Islamiyya (JI), an Islamic fundamentalist 
group in Singapore and Indonesia with links to bin Laden and al-Qaeda, shows that most 
o f the members are not uneducated, impoverished, destitute, or disenfranchised, but hold 
normal and respectable jobs just as many o f their counterparts in other militant Islamic 
groups (pp. 75-76).
Atran concluded that with the exception o f being mostly young and unmarried,
Islamic militants and suicide-terrorists are fundamentally different from members of 
violent racist organizations such as the white supremacists in the United States because 
suicide-terrorists do not exhibit socially dysfunctional attributes such as being fatherless, 
friendless, jobless, mindless, and suicidal (p.76).
Furthermore, the assertion that terrorists sacrifice their own lives because o f socio­
economic factors such as poverty, hopelessness, despair, and alienation can be misleading 
because such assertions fail all sorts o f common-sense tests. Zakaria (2004:136) claimed 
that, “the Al Qaeda terrorist network is not made up o f the poor and dispossessed” nor 
does despair and hopelessness (i.e., not having something to live for) drive extremists and 
al-Qaeda operatives to attack rich and affluent westerners and Americans.
Bergen (2002:224-227) argued that if  the assertions were correct that the attacks o f 
September 11 were a direct result o f socioeconomic inequalities that exist between 
western developed countries and non-western developing nations including some in the 
Middle East, then the perpetrators and the hijackers should have come from the most 
economically marginalized and poor countries in the Arab and Muslim regions such as
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Afghanistan or those in sub-Saharan Africa rather than from Egyptian and Saudi middle- 
class backgrounds.
If human suffering, poverty, hopelessness, despair, marginalization, and other 
intolerable conditions were the “root causes” o f violence and terrorism, then terrorist 
recruits should be coming come from some o f the most impoverished areas such as are 
found in sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America and not from the Middle 
East, North Africa, Europe, or North America which are rich in natural resources and oil 
and are economically and technologically prosperous (Bergen 2002; Atran 2004; Zakaria 
2004; D ’Souza 2002; Brem er 1988; Booth and Dunne 2002).
In sum, the general assumed view that suicide-terrorists are poorly educated, come
from deprived socioeconomic backgrounds, and are brainwashed by terrorist leaders are
all unsupportable on the evidence. This explanation may have applied to traditional
terrorists o f the 1970s and 1980s, but modem terrorist groups including those in al-Qaeda
hardly fit this profile. M andelbaum (2001:264) claimed that.
Since Osama bin Laden comes from one o f the wealthiest families in the world, 
and M ohammed Atta, the alleged mastermind o f the airplane hijackings, was the 
son o f  an Egyptian lawyer, the attacks o f September 11 cannot have been the 
result exclusively o f anger induced by material deprivation. And even if 
widespread poverty in the Middle East did help to create the terrorist networks 
that have targeted the West, the United States is not going to eradicate it.
The claim that poverty and deprivation lead to violence seems to lose some o f its 
credibility is because most leaders and members within al-Qaeda come from the 
prosperous and educated classes. In other words, al-Qaedans are sons o f relative 
privilege and education, yet are willing to die for their faith and ideology. Leo (2001:47) 
observed that terrorism is not necessarily about post-colonial resentments.
Colonialism is two or three generations past. The rich nations have spent so
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heavily on the underdeveloped world that who-did-what-to-whom many decades 
ago cannot explain what is happening. No, this is a global cultural war, pitting a 
pan-Islamic movement o f fundamentalist extremists against the modem world and 
its primary cultural engine, America, ‘the Great Satan.’ But that does not mean we 
are in a battle against Islam. The vast majority o f  Muslims want no part o f 
terrorism, and many Muslim states are as nervous about extremism as we are. The 
problem is a religious subculture that cannot cope with openness, change, rules, 
democracy, secularism, and tolerance— and that wishes to destroy those who can.
Although M andelbaum, Berger and Stuphen, and Leo seemed not to subscribe to the 
assertions that poverty, deprivation, and post-colonial resentments were the direct causes 
for terrorism and the attacks o f September 11 per se, they acknowledged the claims 
brought forth by many scholars that the legacies o f colonialism may be indirectly related 
to terrorism. This is because groups o f people who generally believe that the legacies o f 
colonialism contribute to their oppression and suffering may employ violence to bring 
about social change. In the same vein, individuals who claim to be the champions o f the 
oppressed may resort to terrorist acts to change the status quo. In this case, my findings 
that terrorism can be a stepchild o f  protracted conflicts o f oppression, deprivation, 
underdevelopment, and injustices support my theory.
Did U.S. foreign policy contribute to the attacks of September 11, 2001?
My theory pointed out that one o f the reasons why the United States is unpopular, 
hated, targeted, and attacked by terrorists is generally because o f its foreign policies. 
Critics o f U.S. foreign policy cite its profitable projects o f globalization; its blind support 
o f Israel over the Palestinian cause; its support o f tyrants and unpopular regimes in the 
Middle East, especially Egypt and Saudi Arabia; the continued presence o f U.S. troops in 
Saudi Arabia; and its current preemptive invasion and war in the Muslim states o f
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Afghanistan and Iraq (Chomsky 20003; Mamdani 2004; Rubio 2002; Booth and Dunne 
2003; Scheuer 2004; Mahajan 2002; Hershberg and Moore 2003; Smith 2002). In other 
words, U.S. foreign policies provoke widespread hatred and hostilities in the Arab and 
Muslim countries.
Herbst (2003) and Smith (2002) pointed out that immediately after the attacks of 
September 11, there were fundamental differences o f opinion as to why bin Laden and al- 
Qaeda attacked the United States. Some people within the United States and many from 
around the world blamed American foreign policy as the contributing factor for the 
attacks. Scholars who “blamed America first” for the attacks were Chomsky (2003), 
Scheuer (2004), and Mamdani (2004) and Mahajan (2002). They pointed to the U.S. 
intentions for hegemony in the Middle East; its disregard o f Muslim grievances; its 
economic sanctions against Iraq; its blind support for Israel’s repressive policies against 
Palestinians; and its support o f some o f the most unpopular, oppressive, repressive, and 
corrupt regimes in the Middle East, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, to ensure profits for 
American companies. In their view, the combination o f these factors provokes Arab and 
Muslim rage and al-Q aeda’s attacks against U.S. interests at home and abroad.
Another critic o f  American foreign policy, novelist Susan Sontag, stated that the 
September 11 attack was a “dose o f reality” for the United States. In her view, the attack 
was provoked by the U.S. direct and indirect engagement in “acts o f  terrorism” such as 
the military bombings i.e., no fly zone incidents o f Iraq prior to September 11 (cited in 
Herbst 2003:27). Sontag’s criticisms were directed at the U.S. government. Religious 
leaders who supported the “war on terrorism” and the invasions o f Afghanistan and Iraq 
directed their criticisms towards secular Americans and their lifestyles. For example.
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Reverend Jerry Falwell, speaking as a guest on Pat Robertson’s television show, “The 
700 Club”, stated:
I really believe that the pagans and the abortionists and the feminists and the gays 
and the lesbians who are actively trying to make that an alternative lifestyle, the 
ACLU, People for the American Way— all o f them w ho’ve tried to secularize 
America, I point the finger in their face and say ‘You helped this happen’. . ..God 
will not be mocked (quoted in Herbst 2003:27).
For months after the attacks o f September 11, those people who blamed the United 
States and questioned the President’s policies and counterterrorism strategies were 
considered disloyal, unpatriotic, and apologists for terrorism.
Rushdie (2002) pointed out that blaming America foreign policies and its citizens’ 
lifestyles for the attack o f September 11 was fundamentally flawed because as much as 
U.S. policies and practices inflames anti-American sentiments in the Arab and Muslim 
countries and around the world, the killing o f three thousands civilians could not be 
justified. Friedman (2002) claimed that as the nation was mourning the loss o f lives and 
the destruction o f the W orld Trade Center, those who blamed the U.S. foreign policies 
and suggested that “America had it coming” and deserved to be attacked were wrong and 
unpatriotic.
Herbst (2003), however, argued that most critics who were labeled unpatriotic for 
“blaming America first” were just as shocked and outraged by the attacks as the others. 
Furthermore, those who criticized government policies and actions may not necessarily 
be hateful towards America and Americans or support the macabre actions o f al-Qaeda 
terrorists, but rather were practicing the traditions and values that make America great, 
exercising the freedom o f expression and dissent (see also Koh 2001; Hershberg and 
Moore 2002; Booth and Dunne 2002). To conclude, because American foreign policy
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continues to inflame Arab and Muslim sensibilities, those who blame the U.S. policies 
and practices for the attacks are not only accused for being disloyal, unpatriotic but also 
hostile to the United States interests. The September 11 attacks have the effect o f 
strengthening the hand and resolve o f those who make policies including those designed 
to confront terrorism.
Would solving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict end Muslim hatred against the U.S.?
My theory pointed out that the legacy o f imperialism, oppression, and especially the 
current conflict between the Arabs and Israelis could be traced to the historical hatred and 
practices that incite the Palestinians and Israelis to resort to violence. Finding a solution 
to the Israeli-Palestinian problem that will allow two peoples to exist side-by-side as 
neighbors and sovereign states will be critical in mitigating Arab and Muslim rage and 
end the cycle o f hatred and violence against the Israelis and Americans and vice versa.
For example, Richard A. Clarke (2004:224) stated that, “If we could achieve a Middle 
East peace much o f  the popular support for al-Qaeda and much o f the hatred for America 
would evaporate.”
Charles Hill (2001:92) observed that, “Those who think that the U.S. can defuse 
Islamic fundamentalist rage and end the terrorism by imposing a peaceful agreement are 
out o f touch with the cruel reality o f the Middle East. To press now for such a peace is to 
invite further terror.” In other words, he argued that pressing for peace process without 
solving the underlying causes o f animosity and conflict between the Palestinians and the 
Israelis is to contribute for more hatred and confrontation. Hill concluded that only after 
Islamic terrorism is eradicated can an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement be achieved 
and only after the American war on terrorism is won can peace in the Middle East
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become possible. Berger and Sutphen (2001:124) also stated that:
Unquestionably, the cycle o f violence in the Middle East over the past year, 
which from the Arab perspective is driven by Israel’s occupation and its 
American-supplied power (without regard to Palestinian provocation), has 
provided resonance for bin Laden in the region. Moreover, American is a magnet 
for a range o f frustrations— some driven from our power and some from our 
policies. But it is important to lay flatly to rest the notion that September 11 
somehow is payback for America support for Israel or failure for American 
Middle East policy.”
The argument has been made in many other intractable conflicts around the globe, 
including those motivated by religious fundamentalists. Bergen (2002), Ruthven (2002), 
Scheuer (2004) asserted that political actors and public officials who think that capturing 
bin Laden “dead or alive” (to borrow President Bush’s phrase) will end terrorism fail to 
take into consideration that if  bin Laden is killed, he will be regarded a martyr by many in 
Arab and Muslim countries and if  he is captured alive, he will be viewed as a religious 
fighter for the service o f  Islam and Allah. They claimed that if  bin Laden is captured or 
killed, there are many bin Ladens in the Arab and Muslim world who would be willing to 
take his position.
According to Michael Ignatieff (2003), solving the Israeli-Palestinian confrontation is 
critical to eradicating decades o f animosities between the Jews and Arabs. He noted that 
the United States must ensure that peace prevails between the two competing entities. He 
also argued that to enforce peace, the U.S. must ensure that the Palestinians have a state 
o f their own and are assisted in rebuilding their shattered infrastructure and economy to 
ensure growth and development. Ignatieff concluded that to leave “the Palestinians to 
face Israeli tanks and helicopter gunships is a virtual guarantee o f unending Islamic wrath 
against the United States (quoted in Chomsky 2003:212).
Chomsky (2003:212) also observed that by supplying Israelis with U.S.-made
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gunships, tanks, military equipment, and the financial largesse to maintain them infuriates 
the Palestinians and Arabs who harbor hatred against Americans and Israelis. Chomsky 
maintained that public officials interested in controlling terrorism must heed the advice 
offered by some top Israeli military intelligence and security personnel, including the 
assertions made by Israeli counter-terrorist experts. Ami Ayalon, who claimed that 
‘“ those who want victory’ against terror without addressing underlying grievances ‘want 
an unending w ar’— much as President Bush proclaimed” (quoted Chomsky 2003:213). 
Similar remarks were made by former head o f Israeli military intelligence, Uri Sagie 
who pointed out that the Israelis will not be safe with their neighbors nor get anywhere as 
long as they adopt the slogan: “We will teach you what is good for you [by our superior 
force]. We must see things from the perspective o f the other side....Those who hope for 
mutual survival with the Arabs must accept a minimum of respect for Arab society” 
(quoted in Chomsky 2003:213).
To conclude, without a viable Palestinian state that will ensure its peoples’ right to 
self-rule, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will continue. This is because as long as the 
Palestinians believe that they are politically oppressed and their aspirations for a free 
state are unrealized, the historical conflicts and violence directed toward the United 
States and its ally Israel is unlikely to recede. Additionally, as long as there is a lack o f a 
solution to the Palestinian-Israeli confrontation, Arab and Muslim militants and 
terrorists, including bin Laden and al-Qaeda, will continue to capitalize on the Palestinian 
plight as leverage to justify their hatred and violence against the United States and Israel.
But as Berger and Stuphen (2001:124) cautioned, “ .. .one must separate bin Laden’s 
agenda from the distinct but relevant identification o f the sources o f sympathy for him
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and resentment in the Arab and Muslim worlds. Indeed, bin Laden had been no champion 
o f the Palestinian cause, although conflict in the Middle East has allowed him to more 
easily coalesce a wide range o f terrorist groups under the A1 Qaed umbrella.” In other 
words, although the Palestinian-Israeli problem provokes the sensibilities o f the Arab and 
Muslim worlds including bin Laden and al-Qaeda, their claims that they wage jihad 
against America and Israel primarily because o f the Palestinian plight is camouflaged in 
political propaganda and rhetoric. The true objectives o f terrorist groups including those 
within al-Qaeda “ ...a re  often stated in veiled terms or implication, and sometimes they 
are not stated at all” (Laqueur 2004:2).
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CHAPTER FIVE
GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO TERRORIST ATTACKS:
THE CASES OF THE UNITED STATES AND KENYA
To the loved ones o f the victims o f 9-11, to them who are here in this room, to 
those who are watching on television, your government failed you....Those 
entrusted with protecting you failed you. And I failed you. We tried hard, but that 
doesn’t matter because we failed. And for that failure, I would ask, once all the 
facts are out, for your understanding and for your forgiveness.
—Richard A. Clarke, former Counter-terrorism Czar, 2004
In my theory on terrorism, I pointed out that terrorist catastrophic events provoke 
government officials to use rhetoric or public relations statements to galvanize public 
support for political, legislative, and military responses. The theory o f terrorism includes 
considerations o f  the reactions and responses to terrorist attacks by officials, societies, 
and victims. For example, government may respond by imposing excessive counter 
measures and new legislation that can infringe upon citizens’ freedoms as demonstrated 
by the U.S. Patriot Act. This chapter focuses on the governmental responses to the 
attacks against the W orld Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, and the 
bombings o f the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania on August 7, 1998. The chapter 
begins with a discussion on the U.S. response to the attacks and the creation o f the 
Homeland Security Department. The discussion ranges over diplomatic, economic, legal, 
political, military, and socio-cultural responses. Finally, I examine the U.S. Patriot Act 
and its im plications. I then exam ine the K enyan responses to the bom b attacks in Nairobi 
and Mombasa. I also discuss U.S.-Kenya relations (patron-client tensions) regarding the 
war on terror. Finally, I discuss the African reactions, concerns, and worries regarding 
the September 11 attacks and the war on terrorism.
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A m erica’s Response to the Attacks o f September 11, 2001
According to Alexander and Alexander (2002), the attacks o f September 11 had a 
profound impact on the United States. Since that date, the U.S. government has proposed 
and passed several counter-terrorism measures to fight global terrorism and deny terrorist 
organizations the capability to recruit, train, and execute terrorist operations. The goal is 
to make the world peaceful and safe for democracy (Alexander and Alexander 2002).
Immediately after the September 11 attacks. President Bush delivered a speech to 
Congress in which he condemned the attacks against the World Trade Center and the 
Pentagon. At the same time, he gave the Taliban regime o f Afghanistan and its leaders 
an ultimatum: to hand over Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda operatives; to close down 
all terrorist training camps; to allow the U.S. forces access to all existing terrorist 
locations to ensure that they were no longer in operation; and to release all “unjustly 
imprisoned” foreign nationals, including several Americans, or face military retaliation 
and invasion (Alexander and Alexander 2002; Alexander and Prior 2001 ; Strasser and 
Whitney 2004).
In many o f his speeches. President Bush also indicated that the United States will 
consider any country that provides safe haven or support to terrorists as hostile to the 
peoples and interests o f the United States. He also announced the creation o f the 
Department o f Homeland Security headed by former Governor Tom Ridge to coordinate 
the efforts o f governmental agencies at the federal, state, and local levels to prevent 
terrorism (Alexander and Alexander 2002; Nye Jr. 2001; The 9/11 Commission Report 
2004; Flynn 2001; Clarke 2004).
Security actions instituted after September 11 included the creation o f the Department
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o f Homeland Security; the passage o f the USA PATRIOT ACT (Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism Act o f 2001); and the passage o f several counter-terrorism measures. .
The Department o f Homeland Security
On October 8, 2001, President Bush created the Department o f Homeland Security 
and appointed a former Governor o f Pennsylvania, Tom Ridge, to head the newly created 
cabinet-level post. Alexander and Alexander (2002:169) pointed out that the Department 
o f Homeland Security’s mission was and still is “to develop and coordinate the 
implementation o f a comprehensive national strategy to secure America from terrorist 
threats and attacks.” Homeland Security also works with the executive branch on issues 
related to detection, preparation for, prevention, protection against, response to, and 
recovery from terrorist attacks within United Sates shores (Alexander and Alexander 
2002; Clarke 2004; Strasser and Whitney 2004; Koh 2001).
On October 29, 2001, President Bush issued two Homeland Security presidential 
directives: (i) Organization and Operation o f the Homeland Security Council (HSC) and 
(ii) Combating Terrorism through Immigration Policies. The first directive emphasized 
that securing the American public from terrorist threats and attacks was a national 
security function that required extensive coordination across a broad spectrum of federal, 
state, and local agencies to reduce the potential for terrorist attacks and to mitigate 
damage should such an attack occur (Alexander and Prior 2001). The Homeland Security 
Council’s role is to ensure coordination o f all homeland- and security-related activities 
among executive government departments and agencies to develop and implement all
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homeland security policies (Alexander and Prior 2001).
The HSC consists o f top principal committee officials from different cabinet-level, 
intelligence, and law enforcement agencies, which include: Secretaries o f Treasury, 
Defense, Transportation, and Homeland Security; the Directors o f the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA), Federal Bureau o f Investigation (FBI), and the Federal 
Emergency M anagement Agency (FEMA); the Attorney General, the Director o f the 
Office o f M anagement and Budget, the Assistant to the President C hief o f Staff, and the 
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The latter attends all meetings o f 
the Homeland Security Council Principals Committee (HSC/PC) (Alexander and 
Alexander 2002; Alexander and Prior 2001; Nye Jr., 2001).
In short, the Department o f Homeland Security oversees all inter-agency coordination 
o f homeland security policies and implementations and ensures timely responses to 
decisions made by the president. Other functions o f Homeland Security include: 
detection, surveillance, preparedness, planning, training, prevention, law enforcement 
investigations, transportation security, airports, ports of entry and border control, and 
responses to domestic threats (Alexander and Alexander 2002; Alexander and Prior 2001; 
Bracken 2001).
Regarding the Homeland Security presidential directive o f Combating Terrorism 
through Immigration Policies, the Bush administration indicated that the United States 
will continue to welcome immigrants and visitors, but it will aggressively prevent illegal 
immigrants who engage in or support terrorist activities from entering the U.S. and will 
detain, prosecute, and deport any such aliens who are already in the United States 
(Alexander and Alexander 2002; Alexander and Prior 2001). Under these guidelines, the
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Attorney General created a Foreign Terrorist Task Force to ensure that federal agencies 
coordinate programs that accomplish some o f the following: deny entry into the United 
States o f aliens associated with, suspected o f being engaged in, or supporting terrorist 
activities; and locate, detain, prosecute, and deport such aliens already present in the 
United States. The Task Force draws upon the staffs o f the Department o f  State, 
Immigration and Naturalization Service, U.S. Secret Service, Customs Service, various 
intelligence and military agencies, and other federal officials (Alexander and Alexander 
2002; Alexander and Prior 2001).
The Attorney General, the Secretary of Treasury, and the Director o f the CIA develop 
and implement multi-year plans to enhance the investigative and intelligence analysis 
capabilities o f the INS and Customs Service. The reason for developing these plans was 
to assist government officials to better identify, locate, detain, prosecute, and deport 
immigrants associated with, suspected o f being engaged in, or supporting terrorist 
activities within the U.S. (Alexander and Alexander 2002; Alexander and Prior 2001).
The Bush administration passed measures to stop abuses o f student visas and prohibit 
certain foreign students from receiving education and training in sensitive areas, 
including areas o f study with direct application to the development and use o f weapons o f 
mass destruction. Additionally, the administration prohibits the training o f foreigners in 
military skills that could be used to harm Americans (Alexander and Alexander 2002; 
Alexander and Prior 2001).
The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), in consultation with the 
Department o f Education, periodically conducts reviews o f all institutions certified to 
receive foreign students and exchange visitor program students. These reviews include
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checks for compliance with record-keeping and reporting requirements. Those 
institutions that fail to comply with INS requirements may lose the privilege o f enrolling 
foreign students (Alexander and Alexander 2002; Alexander and Prior 2001).
The Secretaries o f State and Treasury and the Attorney General routinely initiate 
negotiations with Canada and Mexico to ensure maximum compliance with immigration, 
customs, and visa policies. The aim for such negotiations is to provide the involved 
countries with the highest possible level o f assurance that only individuals seeking entry 
for legitimate purposes enter these countries. At the same time, however, border 
restrictions that hamper legitimate transnational commerce are minimized (Alexander and 
Alexander 2002; Alexander and Prior 2001).
The Director o f the Office o f Sciences and Technology Policy, the Attorney General, 
and the Director o f the CIA make recommendations about the use o f  advanced 
technology to help enforce U.S. immigration laws and programs, facilitate the rapid 
identification o f aliens who are suspected o f engaging in or supporting terrorist activities, 
deny them access to the U.S., and recommend ways in which existing government 
databases can best be utilized to maximize the ability o f government officials to detect, 
identify, locate, and apprehend suspected terrorists in the United States (Alexander and 
Alexander 2002; Alexander and Prior 2001).
The Justice Department also restructured the INS into two separate sections; (i) that 
which focuses on immigration services (i.e., processing visa and other immigration 
documents) and (ii) that which addresses immigration enforcement issues (i.e., 
safeguarding border control and investigating immigration violations). Additionally, the 
Justice Department pointed out that visa applicants from selected Arab and Muslim
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countries must undergo strict criminal background checks (Alexander and Alexander 
2002). The INS reforms stem, in part, from findings and revelations that without 
undergoing interviews, fifteen o f the nineteen attackers o f September 11 received quick 
visas from the U.S. embassy in Saudi Arabia (Alexander and Alexander 2002).
Additionally, these changes were made because the Justice Department investigation 
report indicated that the INS failed to adequately monitor foreign visitors in the United 
States. The report further pointed out that about 40 percent o f the five million illegal 
immigrants living in the United States in 2000 overstayed their visas. In October 2001, 
the Justice Department requested the State Department to add 46 groups onto the list o f 
terrorist organizations that should not be permitted to enter the United States (Alexander 
and Alexander 2002; Alexander and Prior 2001).
Another anti-terrorism measure dealt with the banking system regarding the funding 
o f  terrorist operations through money-laundering, illegal financial transactions, and the 
movement o f large sums o f cash across U.S. territories. The Office o f Management and 
Budget works closely with the Attorney General, Secretaries o f State and Treasury, and 
other federal officials to review illegal financial and banking transactions, money- 
laundering, and drug-trafficking crimes used by terrorists to finance terrorist operations 
and shut them down (Alexander and Alexander 2002; Alexander and Prior 2001).
Other American responses against terrorism run the gamut from diplomatic options to 
economic responses, legislative and law enforcement measures, political rhetoric, 
improved intelligence, military intervention, and socio-cultural responses.
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The Diplomatic Response 
Immediately after the attacks o f September 11, the attackers were identified and 
responsibility was quickly traced to Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda network 
operating from the safe haven o f Afghanistan. Alarmed and angry, President Bush 
condemned the attacks and promised the American people and the world that he will act 
swiftly and decisively to bring the perpetrators to justice. Before ordering military 
retaliation, the President employed diplomatic options and persuaded the Taliban regime 
to surrender bin Laden and his senior al-Qaeda lieutenants to stand trial for planning, 
masterminding, and financing the attacks (Scheuer 2004; Alexander and Alexander 2002; 
The 9/11 Commission Report 2004; Clarke 2004).
Additionally, the President and Secretary o f  State Colin Powell assured the Taliban 
leader, Muhammad Mullah Omar, that if  he cooperated with the United States and shut 
down all terrorist training camps, allowed U.S. intelligence and forces to inspect all 
terrorist locations to ensure that they were no longer in operation, and released all foreign 
nationals, including American citizens unjustly imprisoned in Afghanistan, America and 
its European allies would provide economic assistance to Afghanistan and would lift all 
sanctions placed against the country (Alexander and Alexander 2002; Clarke 2004; 
Bodansky 2000; The 9/11 Commission Report 2004).
Diplomacy failed. The Taliban leaders refused to surrender their “guest” , bin Laden. 
When they failed to meet the U.S. requests and ultimatums, the consequence was military 
intervention. But before ordering military retaliation. President Bush appealed to world 
leaders to support military intervention to capture bin Laden and dismantle the al-Qaeda 
terrorist infrastructure in Afghanistan. He also indicated that if the world community
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failed to support multilateral action, the United States would take unilateral action to 
defend its citizens and interests (Woodward 2004; Clarke 2004).
Because there was such an overwhelming condemnation o f the attacks o f September 
11 from western leaders and citizens, the North Atlantic Trade Organization (NATO), for 
example, repealed Article 5 o f its founding treaty and stated that “an attack on America to 
be an attack on the alliance as a whole, and enables America to call on its allies for 
military support” {The Economist 9/22/2001:13). With the NATO countries and many o f 
their allies supporting the use o f force, the Bush administration campaign o f military 
action against Afghanistan became reality.
On October 7, 2001, U .S.-led coalition forces invaded Afghanistan, killed or captured 
al-Qaeda operatives, and overthrew the Taliban. Although the coalition declared victory 
for toppling the Taliban and dismantling the al-Qaeda network, some Taliban and al- 
Qaeda senior leaders such as Mullah Omar, Osama bin Laden, and Ayman al-Zawahiri 
remain at large (Silke 2003; Scheuer 2004; Booth and Dunne 2002; Hershberg and 
Moore 2002).
Before the coalition could finish the job  o f finding Mullah Omar, bin Laden, al- 
Zawahiri, and other remnants o f the Taliban and al-Qaeda, the Bush administration 
turned its attention to Iraq and Saddam Hussein who they alleged collaborated with bin 
Laden and al-Qaeda in the attacks o f September 11. The President again employed 
diplomacy and gave the Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein, an ultimatum: to allow United 
Nations inspectors into all sites o f nuclear plants and weapons o f mass destruction 
(WMD); to comply with all o f the United N ations’ Articles o f Agreement regarding the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and anti-nuclear proliferation; and cease
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delay and deception tactics or face U.S. military invasion (Clarke 2004; Woodward 2004; 
Scheuer 2004; The 9/11 Commission Report 2004).
When Saddam Hussein refused to comply with the United States and United N ations’ 
requirements and terms o f engagement and agreements, U.S.-led coalition forces invaded 
Iraq in the spring o f  2003 and toppled Saddam Hussein’s regime. In short, after briefly 
attempting diplomatic negotiations with the Taliban and Iraqi regimes, the U.S. and its 
closest ally. Great Britain, resorted to the use o f military force to overthrow them.
The Economic Response
After the September 11 attacks. President Bush warned countries around the world 
that if  they provided safe haven or support to terrorist individuals and groups, they would 
be treated as hostile to the United States (Fineman and Brant 2001 ; W echsler 2001 ; 
Kaplan and W hitelaw 2001). He also indicated that any country that conducted business 
with terrorists would not do business with the United States (Fineman and Brant 2001). 
Furthermore, in several o f his speeches, the president noted that countries that refused to 
cooperate with America in the war on terrorism stood to jeopardize diplomatic relations 
with the U.S. and risked reduction o f U.S. economic and military assistance (Fineman 
and Brant 2001).
The Bush administration argued that fighting global terrorism required going after the 
terrorists’ financing which would include the shutting down o f all financial pathways and 
capabilities that enable terrorists to raise funds for their operations (Alexander and 
Alexander 2002). Bush therefore ordered that al-Qaeda be put out o f business by having 
its financial life-lines dismantled and assets confiscated (Cohen 2001).
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Alexander and Alexander (2002) summarized the Bush adm inistration’s economic
tactics. On September 24, 2001, President Bush issued the Executive Order on Terrorist
Financing (EOTF) to block property and prohibit transactions with any person(s) who
commits, threatens to commit, or supports terrorism. Before issuing this order. Bush
stated, “Because o f the pervasiveness and expansiveness o f the financial foundation o f
foreign terrorists, financial sanctions may be appropriate for those foreign persons that
support or otherwise associate with these foreign terrorists”(quoted in Alexander and
Alexander 2002:179). Shortly after the issuance o f this Order, the former Secretary o f
the Department o f Treasury, Paul O ’Neil, warned countries and financial institutions
around world that the new powers o f EOTF allowed his department, in collaboration with
other federal departments and agencies, to go after countries and financial institutions
that failed to cooperate to fight terrorism. Secretary O ’Neil stated:
We have the President’s explicit directive to block the U.S. assets o f any domestic 
or foreign financial institution that refuses to cooperate with us in blocking assets 
o f terrorist organizations. This order is a notice to financial institutions around the 
world, if  you have any involvement in the financing o f the al Qaida organization, 
you have two choices: cooperate in this fight, or we will freeze your U.S. assets; 
we will punish you for providing the resources that make these evil acts possible 
(quoted in Alexander and Alexander 2002:179).
In addition, the New Executive Order listed and designated several individuals, 
groups, and charities including Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abu Zubaydah, 
al-Qaeda, Abu Sayyaf Group, Armed Islamic Group (GIA), and Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya 
(AIAI) (Alexander and Alexander 2002:179). Many who were listed have had their 
financial assets confiscated. Furthermore, all o f the organizations listed as terrorists are 
from Arab and M uslim countries even though they may have operated from foreign 
countries including the United States.
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The United States Department o f the Treasury worked with other agencies to identify 
individuals, groups, or charity organizations suspected o f committing crimes to raise 
funds for terrorists. These crimes include illegal movement o f money within the U.S. and 
abroad and the sale o f illegal drugs to finance terrorism (William 2002; M cAllister 2004). 
President Bush and Congress passed the Anti-Terrorism and Money Laundering Task 
Force legislation to combat illegal banking transactions, to crack down on alternative 
banking transactions such as hawala ‘informal money transfers’, to control the movement 
o f bulk cash over U.S. borders, and to punish those who commit crimes such as drug- 
trafficking, kidnapping, and hostage-taking to finance terrorism {The 9/11 Commission 
Report 2004; M cAllister 2004; Alexander and Alexander 2002; W echsler 2001).
The establishment o f the Anti-Terrorist Financing Task Force not only allows United 
States authorities to work with other countries around the world to identify bank accounts 
o f those who are associated with al-Qaeda, but also allows American government 
authorities to take the lead in identifying, disrupting, and dismantling the financial 
operations o f persons, groups, charities, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
associated to bin Laden, al-Qaeda, and other terrorist groups linked to terrorism 
(Alexander and Alexander 2002; W echsler 2001; The 9/11 Commission Report 2004).
The Legislative Response 
Post September 11, the United States passed several pieces o f legislation significant in 
combating terrorism within the United States and abroad. This legislation  includes the 
following: (i) the Anti-Terrorism Bill which allows capital punishment for terrorists 
found guilt o f planning or executing atrocities against American citizens and interests at 
home and abroad; (ii) the U.S. Patriot Act which empowers the intelligence community
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and law enforcement agencies to detect, identify, disrupt, prevent, and punish terrorist 
individuals and groups; (iii) other legislative changes and reforms revolving around the 
United States’ major institutions and agencies such as the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS), education, transportation, aviation, airports, border control, and banking 
systems. M ost important was the restructuring o f the intelligence community, chiefly 
involving the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Federal Bureau o f Investigation 
(FBI), to better share intelligence information on federal, state, and local levels to ensure 
domestic security and to be better prepared (The 9/11 Commission Report 2004; 
Cherkasky and Prud’homme 2003; Strasser and W hitney 2004).
The Political Rhetoric Response
After September 11, President Bush warned the community o f nations that if  they did 
not cooperate or support the war against terrorism, they would be considered hostile to 
the United States. The Bush Doctrine became: “You are either with us or with the 
terrorists”; “If  you provide safe havens or support terrorists you are a terrorist” , and “If 
you do business with terrorists you cannot do business with the United States” (quoted 
Fineman and Brant 2001:24; W echsler 2001:129). Shortly thereafter. President Bush 
labeled bin Laden and his al-Qaeda operatives “the evil-doers” . Defense Secretary 
Donald Rumsfeld also pointed out that the campaign against the “war on terror” and bin 
Laden and his al-Qaeda militia would combine a variety of initiatives, including military 
force to “drain the swamp they live in” (quoted in Herbst 2003:161).
According to Philip Herbst (2003), the use o f rhetorical devices and language 
combined with negative and demonizing metaphors to refer to Islamic extremism and al-
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Qaeda helped tap patriotic fervor. Muslim radicals used similar metaphors against the 
West in general and the United Stated in particular (Herbst 2003). For example, Egyptian 
theologian, Sayyid Qutb, the champion o f the Muslim jihad movement, suggested that the 
devout Muslim should spend his time on earth “purifying the filthy marsh o f this world 
(quoted in Herbst 2003:161). The use o f the metaphors the “swamp” and “marsh” seem 
to have the same connotation both in Arabic and English because these are places where 
enemies and predators hide. Jonathan Raban (2002:31) noted that Qutb urged true 
Muslim believers to participate in jihad to clean the “rubbish heap o f the W est” . In 
recent years, Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri have routinely called upon 
Muslims to kill “the infidels”, in particular Americans (the Great Satan) and Israelis (the 
little Satan), for the sake o f Islam.
The use o f rhetorical devices such as “evil-doers” , “axis o f evil”, “holy war” , or the 
“war on terror” help the parties concerned define their enemies and arouse interest and 
support for their cause. Stem (2003), Mamdani (2004), and Herbst (2003) pointed out 
that by grounding the cause on morality, the rhetoric also make it easier to kill those 
defined and depicted as the enemy, including civilian non-combatants. According to 
Janette K. M uir (1995:186), the war metaphor “perpetuates images o f hate and provides a 
powerful identifying means o f mobilizing extreme words and actions.” According to 
Herbst (2003:184), “Serving to tap the enemy as evil, the war rhetoric typically conveys 
the impression that the war must be fought to the bitter end (and at any cost): after all, 
there is no compromising with the evil.”
In his State o f the Union address to Congress, President Bush designated Iraq, Iran, 
and North Korea as “the axis o f evil.” This was a rhetorical move that set up the
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controversy that followed. Some argued that although it was not proven that Iraq, Iran, 
and North Korea were directly linked with bin Laden or collaborated with al-Qaeda in the 
attacks o f September 11, these nations’ abilities and capabilities to produce weapons o f 
mass destruction (WMD) were reason enough to alarm the Bush-Blair administrations 
and justified their campaign for the invasion o f Iraq and the removal o f Saddam (Herbst 
2003; Clarke 2004; W oodward 2004; Scheuer 2004).
They argued that Saddam Hussein had purchased nuclear warheads from Niger,
Africa, and was moving weapons o f mass destruction to secret locations and that bin 
Laden was experimenting with bio-chemical weapons acquired from Iraq and would not 
hesitate to use these weapons against America and other Western countries. Others 
argued that this was the last straw that broke the cam el’s back in the Bush-BIair war 
campaign to secure approval from many countries with the exception o f France,
Germany, Russia, and the United Nations to invade Iraq (Woodward 2004; Clarke 2004). 
It has now become evident from the conclusions o f  several Congressional inquiries. 
Judicial Investigation Reports, the 9/11 Commission Report, and Intelligence 
Investigation Reports that, in fact, there were no links between Osama bin Laden and 
Saddam Hussein in the attacks o f September 11 nor did Saddam Hussein possess 
weapons o f mass destruction {The 9/11 Commission Report 2004; Clarke 2004; 
Woodward 2004; Strasser and Whitney 2004). The invasion o f Iraq was based on flawed 
and misleading intelligence.
The Military Response
Before the September 11 attacks against the W orld Trade Center and the Pentagon,
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two American embassies were attacked, one in Nairobi, Kenya, and the other in Dar es 
Salaam, Tanzania, on August 7, 1998. In response to the attacks in East Africa, President 
William Clinton ordered retaliatory military strikes against bin Laden’s and al-Qaeda’s 
training bases and infrastructure in Afghanistan and a pharmaceutical factory in 
Khartoum, Sudan. The U.S. charged that the Sudan factory was producing a critical 
nerve gas component that could be used by terrorists against civilians (Bodansky 2000; 
Combs 2003; Miniter 2003; Clarke 2004; Benjamin and Simon 2003; Cherkasky and 
Prud’homme 2002; Duffy 2001; Hirsch and Barry 2001).
The retaliation had two implications: (1) American officials for the first time 
acknowledged a preemptive military strike against a terrorist group, and (2) strikes were 
precursors to new legislation and far-reaching policy changes (Emerson 2002; Bergen 
2003; The 9/11 Commission Report 2004; The Economist 2001; Thomas and Hosenball 
2001).
In 2003, five years after the 1998 blasts in Tanzania and Kenya that killed more than 
250 people and injured five thousand, al-Qaeda struck again at an Israeli-owned hotel 
near Mombasa, Kenya, and simultaneously fired surface-to-air missiles at an Israeli 
commercial aircraft taking o ff from the Mombasa airport. Fifteen people were killed and 
hundreds injured. The United States government condemned the attacks and promised to 
work with the governments o f Kenya and Tanzania to fight transnational terrorism. 
President Bush designated the greater Horn o f Africa, a region that includes Djibouti, 
Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, and Tanzania, as a front-line region in 
his global war against terrorism and continues to work with African leaders to disrupt and 
dismantle al-Qaeda within the region (Lyman and Morrison 2004; Barkan 2004).
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The Socio-cultural Response 
Responses to the attacks against the Pentagon and the World Trade Center include 
grieving for the loss o f those symbolic sites and the victims and support for rebuilding at 
Ground Zero (Cloud 2001). For days and months after the attacks, thousands o f people 
from around the world gathered at Ground Zero to mourn and express their anger 
(Fineman and Brant 2001). Millions o f Americans donated money and blood and rallied 
behind President Bush and Congress to provide assistance in the rescue, relief, recovery, 
and rehabilitation missions and efforts (Fineman 2001; Fineman and Brant 2001). The 
U.S. government also provided assistance to victims and survivors’ families. Assistance 
included financial benefits and compensation, medical insurance, school fees, 
rehabilitation costs, workers compensation benefits, and job training and placement. The 
government also provided financial assistance to airlines and for the rebuilding o f the 
Pentagon and the W orld Trade Center (Alexander and Alexander 2002; The 9/11 
Commission Report 2004; Alexander and Prior 2001).
The U.S. government created the Victims Compensation Fund that disbursed billions 
o f dollars to the victims and survivors o f September 11. Billions o f dollars were also 
collected from several non-governmental organizations (NGOs), workers unions, private 
funds, and charities to benefit direct and indirect victims o f September 11. Among the 
major NGOs that spearheaded the fund-raising efforts were; the American Red Cross
th
Disaster Relief Fund, the United Auto Workers Union, the September 11 Relief Fund, 
the Police and Fire W idow ’s and Children’s Fund, the Twin Towers Fund, the New York 
Times 9/11 Neediest, the Salvation Army, the Families o f Freedom, the New York City 
Fighters 9-11 Disaster Fund, the New York State World Trade Center Relief Fund, the
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Robin Hood Relief Fund, World Vision, and Concerts o f Prayer (Alexander and 
Alexander 2002:138-141; The 9/11 Commission Report 2004). The victims’ families 
who agreed not to file lawsuits against government institutions including airlines, airport 
authorities, airport security companies, and the landlords and management companies o f 
the World Trade Center were compensated in the billions of dollars from these funds. 
Remuneration for the victims o f September 11 ranged from $1.5 to $6 million. Ninety- 
five percent o f the victims and survivors o f September 11 accepted financial reward, but 
five percent o f the victim s’ families decided to seek damages through court procedures.
According to sociologist Janet Abu-Lughod (2001) and anthropologist Philip Herbst 
(2003), social solidarity was notably demonstrated by expressing sentiments o f patriotism 
and nationalism. In the wake o f the September 11 attacks, many honors were accorded to 
the firemen and policemen who had perished while rescuing others; there was an 
avalanche o f iconic symbols such as the displays o f American flags on public and private 
places such as buildings, automobiles, and homes; there were many ceremonies and 
burial rituals shown on television that honored fallen heroes; there was singing o f God 
Bless America, America the Beautiful, and chanting o f “USA! USA!” at many social 
events and gatherings. According to Herbst (2003), these symbolic behaviors and actions 
expressed strong sentiments which ranged from American bravery to national pride and 
support for military retaliation against the perpetrators. He also maintained that the 
displays o f American patriotism were not only natural responses to the attacks o f 
September 11, but also patriotic symbols and slogans used to sway Americans to rally 
behind President Bush’s agenda for the war on terrorism.
Furthermore, millions o f people attended churches and houses o f worship to
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remember those who were killed and injured; millions donated or helped raise funds to 
help the victims, and the federal government created a Compensation Fund Commission 
to fairly disburse billions o f dollars to the victims and survivors o f the attacks regardless 
o f their country o f citizenship, immigration status, race, ethnicity, gender, or religious 
affiliation (Alexander and Alexander 2002).
All these socio-cultural, human, and government responses discussed here were 
intended to restore social solidarity and galvanize American unity on issues pertaining to 
the global war on terrorism and support Presidential, Congressional, and intelligence 
legislation put in place to ensure the safety o f the United States. One o f the anti-terrorism 
laws that President Bush and many Congressmen hoped would galvanize national 
solidarity in the war on terror included the passage o f the U.S. Patriot Act.
The USA PATRIOT ACT
In response to the terrorist attacks o f September 11, the United States Congress 
passed, and President Bush signed into law, the USA PATRIOT Act (Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism Act). The purpose o f the Act was to empower the intelligence 
community and law enforcement agencies to detect, prevent, and punish suspected 
terrorists (Alexander and Prior 2001; The 9/11 Commission Report 2004; Strasser and 
Whitney 2004). The act gives “federal officials greater authority to track and intercept 
communications, both for law enforcement and foreign intelligence gathering purposes” 
(Lacayo 2001:68). The Patriot Act introduced “a plethora o f legislative changes which 
significantly increased the surveillance and investigative powers o f law enforcement
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agencies in the United State” (Lacayo 2001:69). The act also created new crimes, new 
penalties, and new procedural efficiencies for use against domestic and international 
terrorists {The Economist 8/22/2001).
Although initially the new act received criticism from both sides o f the political 
spectrum, the majority o f Congressmen in the House o f Representatives and Senate 
promptly voted in favor o f it and President Bush signed it into law. Before signing. 
President Bush stated that, “the bill will help law enforcement to identify, to dismantle, to 
disrupt and to punish terrorists before they strike” (Lacayo 2001:69).
The Patriot Act increased intelligence and law-enforcement powers in four areas: One 
is wiretappings— the act authorizes the intelligence community to conduct national 
surveillance and eavesdrop on all phones o f suspected terrorists and seize all voice 
messages with a search warrant rather than a court order. Before the passage o f this 
provision, wiretapping required separate court orders for each phone number in each 
jurisdiction (Lacayo 2001:69).
Two is computers— the act authorizes intelligence agencies to subpoena addresses and 
times o f e-mail messages sent by suspects and to intercept wire, oral, and electronic 
communications and computer trespassers on all matters related to terrorism (Lacayo 
2001:69).
Three is detention— the act empowers government officials to detain immigrants or 
foreigners certified as terrorist suspects or held to pose a threat to national security.
Under this provision, suspected terrorists could be incarcerated for an indefinitely long 
period o f time without trial and with only minimal judicial oversight. Prior to the passage 
o f this provision, mandatory detention o f suspected terrorists was discouraged and the
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duration o f time the suspects were supposed to be detained was limited to two days 
(Lacayo: 2001:69).
Four is money— the act empowers federal officials to order U.S. banks to cooperate 
for the purposes o f preventing terrorism and money laundering. It requires that banks 
make greater efforts to stop corruption and offenses related to terrorism. It requires 
banks to make full disclosure o f larger transactions on overseas accounts, and it prohibits 
banks from doing business with offshore “shell banks” (Lacayo: 2001:69).
These anti-terrorism laws range from surveillance to powers to arrest and detain, to 
financial disclosure and racial profiling. They invite greater federal involvement in 
people’s lives, thus raising fundamental concerns o f the loss o f constitutionally protected 
civil liberties. They provide intelligence agencies access to a broad array o f  information 
from school records, medical records, financial transactions, and Internet and electronic 
communications. Simultaneously, the standard o f evidence required for obtaining court 
orders for any o f the above activities has been greatly weakened. Now, all that 
intelligence and law enforcement agencies need to claim is that the information is 
“relevant” or “significant” to an investigation (Lacayo 2001:69; Elliot 2001:29; Clarke 
2004; Booth and Dunne 2002; Hershberg and Moore 2002).
Another aspect that raises concern among the public is the power under the new act to 
expand the definition o f “domestic terrorism” to include all those who harbor terrorists, 
deal drugs, and support terrorist organizations financially and logistically (Walsh 2001; 
Thomas 2001; Elliot 2001; The Economist 8/22/2001). The phrase is broadly defined to 
include other types o f activities, such as the use o f weapons and other dangerous devices 
to cause damage to property for political purposes {The Economist 8/22/001). Moreover,
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the new act dramatically extends the deprivation o f basic rights o f immigrants in tandem 
with the 1996 “Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act” passed in response to the 
Oklahoma City bombing, which initially did not involve immigrants (Begley 2001:60). 
Now, under the act, the use o f  secret evidence against immigrants may be used to deport 
them or to detain them indefinitely. To detain suspected foreign immigrants indefinitely, 
it requires only the Attorney General’s certification that there are “reasonable grounds to 
believe” the non-citizen endangers national security (Elliot 2001; Biema 2001; Saporito 
2001 ; Clarke 2004; Newman and Mazzetti 2001). There have been cases where 
suspected terrorists have been held incommunicado without even their families being 
notified o f their whereabouts while they were denied access to their lawyers (Begley 
2001:60; Saporito 2001:38-39). Many o f those in custody have minor immigration 
infractions. The majority o f those detained for immigration violations are mostly 
Americans o f M iddle Eastern and Southeast Asian origin with ties to Islamic religious 
groups (Herbst 2003; Biema 2001:72-74; Saporito 2001:38-39; Hirsh and Barry 2001).
Critics o f the act contend that it was introduced with great haste and passed with little 
debate from Congress. Its provisions go too far and it lacks a system o f checks and 
balances that traditionally safeguard civil liberties and freedoms protected under the 
Constitution (Lacayo 2001:66-69; Bieman 2001:72-74; The Economist 8/22/2001). 
Critics also claimed that the expanded powers granted by the act to the intelligence 
agencies to intercept information transmitted over the Internet lacks clear safeguards 
against abuse. They encourage the violation o f individual rights and civil liberties 
(Lacayo 2001:67; The Economist 8/22/2001). Critics, thus, conclude that since the act is 
so broad and lacks significant checks and balances, its constitutionality is questionable
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(Lacayo 2001; Biema 2001; Saporito 2001).
According to Herbst (2003:137), the Patriot Act disregards civil liberties and freedoms 
in the detaining o f  foreigners and non-citizens because the Attorney G eneral’s 
certification o f “reasonable grounds to believe” the person is a threat to the national 
security. He maintained that the act allows the Attorney General to harass and intimidate 
American citizens who criticize the government on the war on terrorism and increases the 
ability o f the government to conduct secret searches o f medical, educational, and 
financial records w ithout informing the parties concerned.
The attacks created a new level o f  fear in the public, which makes it more difficult to 
argue for civil liberties. In other words, the events o f September 11 unveiled a new level 
o f threat and raised the scale o f public outrage and tension between domestic security and 
civil liberties. The loss o f  lives, the use o f suicide-bombers, the lack o f warnings, and the 
conversion o f aircraft into flying missiles— all served as red flags signaling a need to 
reexamine old procedures and causing Americans to question some established liberties 
including the freedom to carry knives at airports or the freedom to stash money in foreign 
banks (Begley 2001; Clarke 2004; The Economist 10/13/2001).
Some analysts and observers noted that the security lapses in the United States had 
less to do with liberty than inefficiency. They argued that security was found wanting, 
partly because it had to deal with what once seemed an unimaginable threat and partly 
because, on the evidence available, it basically failed (Betts 2001; Nye Jr. 2001; Elliot 
2001; W echsler 2001; Hart 2001). Specifically, the lavishly-funded intelligence services 
(the CIA and FBI) failed to take note o f the fact that dozens o f suspected al-Qaeda 
operatives had entered the United States, were enrolled in aviation schools, were taking
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flying lessons, and had conducted reconnaissance at U.S. airports. In fact, much o f the 
failure to detect and prevent September 11 can be attributed to the lack o f human 
intelligence, the failure to share available information within and among law enforcement 
agencies, and the failure to follow leads and connect the dots {The 9/11 Commission 
Report 2004; Clarke 2004; Strasser and W hitney 2004). Therefore, the argument that the 
restrictive procedures and laws against wiretapping and other surveillance techniques 
hampered the intelligence agency did not sit well with many in Congress and the general 
public (Betts 2001).
In the aftermath o f September 11, the most commonly asked questions were: How 
could such atrocities happen on American soil when the U.S. has some o f the most 
sophisticated intelligence apparatuses in the world? Could the attacks o f September 11 
have been prevented? As political actors, policymakers, media personalities, social 
scholars, and terrorism experts wrestled with these questions, the answers unfortunately 
were and still are hard to comprehend. However, that did not stop some people from the 
“culture o f blame” and pointing fingers at the intelligence community and the law 
enforcement agencies for failing to prevent the attacks (Betts 2001; Terece 2001; Lacayo 
2001; Clarke 2004; M initer 2003).
Although some Americans commonly acknowledge that the events o f September 11 
were inevitable even with capable intelligence services, some people, including those in 
Congress, argued that there were big problems with the U.S. security agencies and so the 
Patriot Act was passed to correct some o f the problems. One o f the allegations against 
the intelligence community was that they failed to share available information with other 
law enforcement officials. Bureaucratic red tape and government-imposed walls and
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restrictions were singled out as some o f the impediments that prevented the intelligence 
community from doing their jobs (Clarke 2004; Woodward 2004; M initer 2003; Strasser 
and Whitney 2004). For example, The 9/11 Commission Report and the Congressional 
Investigation Report on the attacks o f September 11 judged that if  the intelligence 
community and other law enforcement agencies, particularly the Federal Bureau o f 
Investigation (FBI), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) had thoroughly done their jobs (i.e., shared information, 
followed leads, and connected the dots), the attacks o f September 11 may have been 
prevented {The 9/11 Commission Report 2004; Strasser and W hitney 2004).
To rectify this problem, the new anti-terrorism bill was passed and signed into law to 
provide enhanced powers to government investigative authorities to m onitor and detain 
suspected terrorists from planning another attack. Attorney General Ashcroft stated that 
the new act was the single-most effective strategy for preempting another terrorist attack 
on American soil (Elliot 2001). He reasoned that the act enables the intelligence 
community and law enforcement officials greater powers to go after those suspected o f 
planning further attacks {The 9/11 Commission Report 2004; Strasser and Whitney 2004). 
In his report to Congress on the progress and successes o f  the intelligence community in 
detecting and preventing further attacks against Americans at home and abroad, Ashcroft 
stated that law enforcement agencies have made tremendous and positive strides in 
thwarting terrorism and arresting suspected terrorists since the new act came into effect 
{The 9/11 Commission Report 2004; Strasser and W hitney 2004).
The critics (e.g., civil libertarians, the American Civil Liberties Union, Greenpeace 
and other environmental movements), on the other hand, contended that Congressional
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promptness and unanimity in the passage o f the new bill within 45 days after September 
11 raises some serious concerns as to its constitutionality. First, the act was introduced 
with great haste and passed with little debate i.e., without House, Senate, or conference 
reports (Lacayo 2001). Second, the act was introduced and passed when America was in 
shock and grieving the loss o f more than 3000 innocent people and when A m erica’s 
cherished symbols o f the economic and military might, the World Trade Center and the 
Pentagon, were attacked and destroyed (Lacayo 2001; Elliot 2001).
If the Patriot Act had not been introduced when Americans were emotionally 
vulnerable, many o f those in Congress, who under normal circumstances might have 
voted against the act, had no choice but to go along to demonstrate their patriotism and 
determination to fight terrorism. A few who voted against the act were viewed as being 
unpatriotic and standing in the way o f President Bush’s bold ultimatum: “You are either 
with us or you are with the terrorists” (quoted in Herbst 2003:136-137).
Furthermore, critics maintained that the Justice Department and other law enforcement 
agencies already had all the powers needed to do their job. Thus passing new legislation 
conferring such broad powers was equivalent to giving the intelligence community a 
blank check. Empowering government officials with such broad powers invited not only 
its misuse but also its likelihood to be used against Americans thus violating their 
constitutional rights and liberties (Elliot 2001; Biema 2001; Saporito 2001). For 
example, critics asserted that the enhanced “roving wiretaps” in tandem with the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) o f 1978 authorized the FBI to conduct national 
surveillance (i.e., to monitor any land-line phones, cell phones, and e-mails) on both 
foreigners and American citizens suspected o f terrorism activities plus those providing
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support to terrorist organizations (Elliot 2001; Fineman and Brant 2001; Cohen 2001).
Civil libertarians worry that foreigners suspected o f aiding organizations now 
designated as terrorist organizations (e.g., the anti-abortion movement, the Animal 
Liberation Front, and the Earth Liberation Front) can be detained incommunicado or 
deported without due process (Lacayo 2001 ; Elliot 2001 ; Biema 2001). Additionally, 
opponents o f the act think that the power to detain without trial and with only minimal 
judicial oversight would, in practice, make detention indefinite, something that many in 
Congress also fear would increase government’s powers o f surveillance in areas beyond 
terrorism (Lacayo 2001 ; Biema 2001 ; Elliot 2001). For example. Congressional 
representatives from both the Democrat and Republican parties including M axine Waters 
(CA), John Conyers (MN), Bob Barr (GA), Henry Hyde (SD), and Russ Feingold (WS) 
argued that changing American lifestyles or compromising their constitutional freedoms 
in the fight against terrorism would send a wrong message to terrorists who attacked 
America— that they had won (Lacayo 2001). Senator Russ Feingold, the only 
congressperson who voted against the Patriot Act, stated that, “It is crucial that civil 
liberties in this country be preserved. O therw ise.. .terrorists will win this battle without 
firing another shot” (Lacayo 2001:69).
According to American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) President, Nadine Strossen, 
“All these provisions together will amount to a breath-taking expansion o f federal 
powers” that can be used against American citizens (Lacayo 2001:69). David Cole, a 
lawyer at Georgetown University Law Center claimed that, “These new powers violate 
core principles o f  due process and associational freedoms” (Lacayo 2001:69). Cole 
maintained that the new provisions grant the FBI widespread powers to infiltrate and
189
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
monitor political, religious, and charitable groups and organizations in America without 
clear and probable cause. He believed that the majority o f the Americans have been led 
to believe that the new bill is also designed in such a way as to empower government 
officials to go after militant tax evaders and to use homeland security and national 
interest as guises to curtail freedoms and rights o f Americans granted to them under the 
Constitution (Lacayo 2001)
Among the least controversial o f the enhanced powers are those that make it easier for 
the Justice Department and the FBI to follow the money link by probing money- 
laundering activities (Cohen 2001; Lacayo 2001). Additionally, government power to 
order U.S. banks to cooperate so as deter money laundering, to disclose large 
transactions, and to prohibit banks from doing business with foreign “shell banks” for the 
purposes o f preventing terrorism on American soil, was o f less concern to civil 
libertarians. In addition, the powers to tighten immigration laws, to require that 
Homeland Security personnel participate in all entry-and-exit points at airports, seaports, 
and borders in America, and to require that the INS make changes to more stringently 
monitor foreign nationals and students entering and living in the United States, were not 
highly contested (Hart 2001).
Civil libertarians were most troubled by roving wiretaps, mandatory detentions, 
suspension o f  habeas corpus on certain suspected criminals, delays in executing warrants 
against search and seizure, delays in informing suspects o f their charges, and detention o f 
suspected terrorists incommunicado. Under the Patriot Act, habeas corpus has no statute 
o f limitation and therefore suspected terrorists can be held in a prison, penitentiary, or 
detention center for a long period o f time without actually being charged. This is in clear
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violation o f the right o f due process. Even with the suspension o f habeas corpus, a judge 
may order government officials to present detained suspects to appear in court to stand 
trial (Begley 2001).
Historically, suspension o f the writ o f habeas corpus has been used to violate 
Americans’ constitutional liberties and due process rights. For example, during the 
Second World War, a Presidential Executive Order authorized the arrest and internment 
o f Japanese-Americans in detention camps indefinitely simply because they were 
suspected o f being on the side o f Japan (Malkin 2004). The same argument has been 
advanced to the effect that the detention of the Afghani Taliban and al-Qaeda members 
held incommunicado at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, without being charged with any crime, 
violates their rights o f due process (Malkin 2004; Begley 2001).
However, the U.S. Attorney General is empowered to detain suspected terrorists 
incommunicado if he can make a convincing case that the release o f the suspects may 
interfere with an on-going investigation or present an immediate danger to national 
security. The powers under the new act in and o f themselves empower the Justice 
Department to detain suspected terrorists for up to eight years without bringing charges 
against them. At the moment, the suspension o f the writ o f habeas corpus seems to apply 
only to foreign nationals suspected o f terrorism and not American citizens (Malkin 2004; 
Begley 2001).
In conclusion, the U.S. Patriot Act was introduced and passed in great haste and is 
broad and extremely empowering. But to suggest that the act allows the suspension of 
the writ o i habeas corpus against certain suspected terrorists foreshadows the beginning 
o f a police state is to forget that traditionally what makes America great is that political
191
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
dissent and criticism against government powers and actions are also protected under the 
Constitution. Again, dissenters have the right to criticize the government’s war on 
terrorism and to ensure that the new Patriot Act does not run amok. But in all American 
wars, there is a natural tension between security and liberty. The trick is to achieve both 
without sacrificing one or the other (Begley 2001; Pound 2001; Newman an Mazzetti 
2001; Cohen 2001; Lacayo 2001; Biema 2001; Fineman and Brant 2001; Elliot 2001; 
Thomas 2001).
In addition, when a country is invaded, as was in the case on September 11, attempts 
to empower state agencies with overreaching powers to detect, prevent, and punish 
suspected perpetrators are not uncommon. And, where there is a concerted effort among 
the federal, state, and local law enforcement officials to ensure that America stays safe 
and free o f terrorism, it is not uncommon to find a clash between security and liberties. 
The state agencies under the new U.S. Patriot Act will likely find problems as to where 
exactly to draw the line between those protected rights and prohibited conduct (Begley 
2001; Malkin 2004; Elliot 2001; Hirsh and Barry 2001; M cGeary 2001).
The attacks o f September 11 enhanced the powers o f government to “sneak and peak” 
upon both American and non-American citizens for the purposes o f the national and 
homeland security. But as Franklin Delano Roosevelt once said, “ ...w e have nothing to 
fear but fear itse lf’ (quoted in Soukhanov and Swainson 2000:801). To some people, it is 
o f consolation to know that many o f the provisions in the Patriot Act were granted with a 
sunset clause, which allows Congress to review whether they have been abused and to 
decide whether they are worthy o f being reinstated in case the threat o f terrorism wanes. 
Many o f the provisions in the Patriot Act will not be in effect after December 31, 2005.
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The question now is; Will Americans compromise their constitutionally- protected 
liberties to be safe from terrorism or will they require that as the government makes every 
effort to ensure homeland security, officials remain transparent and accountable in their 
exercise o f power? As long as it is certain that the government’s enhanced powers will 
be exercised responsibly rather than with impunity, as long as these new powers are 
exercised in non-discriminatory ways, and as long as these powers are subjected to 
Congressional review and legal controls, the American public will most likely live with 
them for the sake o f their own personal interest— security.
The Response o f the Kenyan Government to the Attacks o f 1998 and 2002 
On August 7, 1998, trucks full o f explosives simultaneously detonated outside the 
American embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya, killing 240 people, 
including twelve Tanzanians and twelve Americans and injuring five thousand civilians. 
An outraged Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi strongly condemned the attacks and 
promised to cooperate with American officials and authorities to apprehend and bring the 
perpetrators to justice {The Daily Nation  August 9, 1998)
Furthermore, Kenyan authorities promised to strengthen security within the country to 
prevent another terrorist attack from happening. However, on November 28, 2002, al- 
Qaeda-backed terrorists struck again at an Israeli-owned hotel near M ombasa and 
attempted with shoulder-held surface-to-air missile to bring down an Israeli commercial 
airliner taking off from Mombasa airport. Fifteen Kenyans and three Israelis were killed. 
More than one hundred were injured. The attackers were Kenyan Muslims with ties to 
al-Qaeda {The Daily Nation, November 29, 2003).
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Why has Kenya become a terrorist target? It is located in the greater Horn o f Africa, 
a region comprising the countries o f Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, 
Tanzania and Kenya. Some analysts ask: Is Kenya a helpless victim or a haven for 
terrorism? Kenya enjoys relative political stability and economic growth, but it is 
surrounded by some o f the worst-ravaged and failed states in the region, in particular, 
Somalia, Sudan, and Ethiopia (Khadiagala 2004).
In May 2003, the Kenyan government revealed that a key member o f the al-Qaeda 
network was plotting an attack on western targets. It was an admission because it 
confirmed al-Qaeda’s presence in the country. Although the 1998 bombing o f the U.S. 
embassy in Nairobi had demonstrated the presence o f terrorists, the government took a 
long time to publicly acknowledge the local nature o f the threat. Ever since a radical 
Palestinian group was implicated in the bombing o f the Norfolk Hotel in Nairobi in 1981, 
Kenya had been considered a soft target by international terrorism experts (Barkan 2004; 
Lyman and Morrison 2004).
Evidence unveiled during the trial in New York o f four men linked to the bombing of 
the U.S. embassies in East Africa in 1998 revealed a terror network that had flourished in 
Kenya by taking advantage o f lax immigration and security laws. The leaders and 
members o f the Kenyan cell were from the U.S., Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan, the Comoros 
Islands, Saudi Arabia, Palestine, and Somalia. They had assimilated into local cultures 
along the Indian Ocean. Some m arried local Muslim women to deflect attention from 
their operations. These individuals recruited Kenyans from the Coast Province where 
Kenya’s largest Arab and Muslim populations reside. Due to endemic corruption in the 
immigration system, foreign residents o f the Kenyan cell obtained citizenship and set up
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small businesses and Muslim non-govemmental organizations (Khadiagala 2004; Barkan 
2004; Lyman and M orrison 2004; Bodansky 2000; Stem 2003).
In addition to assimilating and blending in with the rest o f the population in Kenya, 
the al-Qaeda network depended on decentralization and flexibility. Bodansky (2000) 
claimed that after the death o f Ali al-Rashidi (alias Abu-Ubaydah al-Banshiri), the 
Kenyan-based regional senior commander, bin Laden and al-Zawahari started activating 
other leaders in Nairobi to plan and execute terrorist attacks against U.S. facilities. 
According to Bodansky (2000:234-235), one of those activated operation commanders 
“was Wadi el-Hage, an Arab-American who had served as bin Laden’s personal secretary 
in Khartoum since the mid-1980s. Although fiercely devoted to the cause, he also proved 
unstable because he attracted attention to himself. In August 1997, a joint force o f 
Kenyan security services and the FBI raided el-Hages’ home in Kenya and in effect 
‘burned’ him as an operative.” As a result, bin Laden relieved him o f duties in Nairobi, 
and he returned to the United States where he was arrested and interrogated by the FBI, 
but released. El-Hage was replaced by Subhi Abdul Aziz alias Muhammed A tef 
Mustafa, an Egyptian and veteran o f the “Arab Afghans.” After the embassy attack, Aziz 
and other key leaders o f the Kenyan cell vanished (Bodansky 2000; Khadiagala 2004).
Gilbert Khadiagala (2004) asserted that working with the U.S. FBI and Interpol, the 
Kenyan government made efforts to destroy the al-Qaeda cell by apprehending several 
suspects in Nairobi and Mombasa. In July 2001, in Nairobi, police arrested eight Yemeni 
and thirteen Somali nationals suspected o f having ties to al-Qaeda. In November 2001, 
police arrested more than twenty individuals suspected o f having links to al-Qaeda in 
Lamu. Despite these arrests, several key leaders o f  the 1998 bombing attacks, including
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two M ombasa-based terrorists, remain at large.
On November 28, 2002, al-Qaeda operatives conducted a simultaneous attack against 
a Kenyan tourist resort, the Paradise Hotel in Mombasa, and an Israeli airliner taking off 
from a nearby airport. The coordinated attacks confirmed al-Qaeda’s local support and 
illustrated their ability to evade Kenyan security and law enforcement apparatus while 
transporting weapons and arms such as the surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) used in the 
attack (Khadiagala 2004).
Today, government officials believe that there is an indigenous terrorist movement in 
Kenya that works with foreign nationals linked with al-Qaeda to attack Western 
establishments w ithin the country. For example, after the arrest o f the Yemenis, who 
were suspected o f associating with al-Qaeda in Somalia in March 2003, K enya’s foreign 
minister acknowledged the involvement o f Kenyan nationals in the 1998 and 2002 bomb 
attacks. The first phase o f arrests focused on foreigners, particularly Yemeni, Pakistani, 
and Somali, while the second phase o f the arrests were on local individuals with links to 
al-Qaeda (Khadiagala 2004).
There were also inconclusive reports o f links between the Kenyan cell o f al-Qaeda and 
the largest radical Islamist group in Somalia, Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya (AIAI), stemming 
from the apparent mobility o f some o f the key leaders between Kenya and Somalia, 
A IAI’s base. With more that two thousand members, AIAI is the most powerful 
extremist group in the Horn o f Africa. It was reported it used to be funded by al-Qaeda 
{The 9/11 Commission Report 2004; Dagne 2002; Emerson 2002). Other reports have 
identified the Dabaab refugee camp on the Somalia-Kenya border as a training ground for 
Islamic radicals through the Muslim charity, al-Haramain that had established religious
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schools and social programs. But after the 1998 attacks, the Kenyan government revoked 
the registration o f Muslim non-govemmental organizations and charities, including al- 
Haramain, because o f their links to terror and al-Qaeda (Dagne 2002; Menkhaus 2004).
The Legal Response
Some analysts argued that the slow government response to terrorist threats since the 
1998 bombing grew from denial based on the perception o f Kenya as a victim rather than 
a source o f terrorism. This denial was also tied to the inability to acknowledge the wider 
context that led to the growth o f  terrorism: the erosion o f government, notably weak law 
enforcement and gate-keeping institutions such as ports o f entry and border control, and 
rampant corruption in state-level institutions (Lyman and Morrison 2004; Barkan 2004; 
Khadiagal 2004). Others noted that the Kenyan government has always been afraid o f 
alienating K enya’s minority group, Arabs and Muslims, who often complain o f being 
marginalized and harassed by state authorities. However, there was a marked attitude 
after many Arab and Muslim protestors in Mombasa and Nairobi embarrassed the Moi 
regime by marching in the streets in support o f al-Qaeda’s attack against the United 
States (Khadiagala 2004; Lyman and Morrison 2004).
The new government o f Mwai Kibaki moved to establish mechanisms to meet the 
growing threat. In February 2003, the government created an Anti-Terrorist Police Unit 
(ATPU) composed o f officers trained in anti-terrorism techniques. At the same time. 
Parliamentarians authorized negotiations between the executive and legislative branches 
o f government to pass legislation to empower intelligence and law enforcement agencies 
to detect, identify, and punish suspected terrorists. In June 2003, the Foreign Minister 
called on Parliament to pass the Anti-Terrorism Bill (Khadiagala 2004; Lyman and
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Morrison 2004; Barkan 2004).
Other counter-terrorism measures included the passage o f the Task Force on Anti- 
Money Laundering and Combating the Financing o f Terrorism, which consists o f 
officials and representatives from the ministries o f Finance, Trade, Commerce, and 
Foreign Affairs, the Central Bank, the police, the Criminal Investigation Department 
(CID), and the National Security Intelligence Service. This team seeks to review existing 
legislation and recommend a national policy on combating the financing o f terrorism 
(Khadiagala 2004).
These measures and strategies were a more proactive policy on terrorism, but their 
long-term viability hinges on fundamental reform in the security services, immigration 
system, border control, and port authorities. Fighting endemic corruption in these 
agencies and institutions has only begun as government officials acknowledge the need 
for urgent institutional reform (Ondieki 1997; Barkan 2004). There have also been 
suggestions to boost the capacity o f the Kenya Navy to patrol the Indian Ocean coastline. 
After the 2003 terrorist attacks on civilian targets in Saudi Arabia and Morocco, Kenyan 
officials stationed two army battalions on the Kenya-Somalia border to fight terrorism 
(Khadiagala 2004).
U.S. Policy towards Kenya
Security cooperation has long been an important aspect o f Kenya-America relations, 
underscored by airbase, port access, and over-flight agreements since the Cold War. 
Despite political disagreements between the U.S. and the Moi government over the issues 
o f human rights, corruption, and poor governance, the security component o f the 
relationship has endured (Khadiagala 2004). U.S.-Kenya relations under the leadership
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o f Kenyan President Mwai Kibaki have been relatively good as the U.S. has promised to 
increase funding, training, and intelligence sharing to strengthen security in Kenya and in 
the Horn o f Africa. Since the U.S. embassy bombing in Nairobi in 1998, the United 
States has spent more than $3.1 million on anti-terrorism assistance, including training o f 
more than five hundred Kenyan security personnel in the United States. These programs 
have been complemented by other initiatives such as the U.S. donation o f $1 million in 
airport security equipment under the “Safe Skies for Africa” program to improve airport 
and aviation security (Khadiagala 2004; Barkan 2004).
Kenya is an important partner with the U.S. in the war on global terrorism. In 2002, 
the U.S. created the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn o f Africa (CJF-HOA) consisting o f 
more than 1,800 American military personnel supported by U.S. Central Command.
Based in Djibouti, CJTF-HOA’s primary mission is to identify, preempt, and thwart 
terrorist threats emerging from Yemen, Somalia, and Kenya. The program also receives 
assistance from a multi-national naval force that patrols the Indian Ocean. The program 
includes the U.S. training o f regional militaries and personnel in counter-terrorism 
strategies. Lyman and Morrison (2004:78) reported that as “part o f the multinational 
campaign, a special anti-terrorism squad composed o f the German Naval Air Wing, is 
currently based in Mombasa to monitor ships plying the G ulf o f Aden and the Somali 
coast.”
Because the Horn o f Africa has now become an important region in the war against 
international terrorism, in June o f 2003, President Bush announced a $100 million 
package o f counter-terrorism strategies to be spent in the Horn o f Africa to combat 
terrorism (Lyman and Morrison 2004; Barkan 2004). While half o f these funds will
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support border and coastal security programs within the region, $10 million will be used 
to support the Kenyan Anti-terror Police Unit, and $14 million will used to support 
Muslim education. President Bush ordered the U.S. Department o f Defense to administer 
and control how such funds are utilized. Kenya is trying to secure a third o f the funds to 
fight the threat o f terrorism within its borders (Lyman and M orrison 2004; Barkan 2004).
Tensions between Patron and Client: A Dysfunctional 
Response to the Target Governments 
According to Joel D. Barkan (2004), Kenya is an important partner o f the United 
Stated in the fight against international terrorism. But since the bombing o f the U.S. 
embassy in Nairobi, the U.S. has not honored some o f its promises to the government of 
Kenya and has been slow to provide financial and training assistance to prevent terrorism 
from emerging within the region. The Kenyan government is dissatisfied because the 
U.S. travel advisories warning Americans not to travel to Kenya have remained in effect 
since 2003. Barkan (2004:97) wrote that, “The threat o f renewed terrorism has 
devastated K enya’s tourist industry. Once K enya’s second-largest source o f foreign 
exchange, tourism has now dropped to third place. Hotels both in Nairobi and on the 
coast are at their lowest occupancy levels in years.”
The government o f Kibaki is aware that if  it does not join the war on terrorism, U.S. 
development aid to Kenya will be reduced, hurting a struggling economy further. Kenya 
is doing everything it can to combat the threat o f terrorism with its limited resources, 
logistics, finances, and training. The Kenyan government has created a special counter­
terrorism unit and intensified its search for al-Qaeda affiliates (Barkan 2004:97-98).
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With the assistance o f the FBI, Kenyan intelligence and law enforcement authorities 
have raided known al-Qaeda cells along coastal areas. Thus far, the U.S. has spent more 
than $6 million in anti-terrorism assistance to Kenya including $4 million for training o f 
more than 500 security personnel in the U.S. and $2 million to boost security at Nairobi 
and Mombasa international airports (Barkan 2004:98).
However, Kenyan leaders and parliamentarians complain that the United States seems 
not to appreciate the efforts Kenya is making on the war on terrorism given its struggling 
economy. Other leaders resent being criticized by the U.S. ambassador and his senior 
staff for not doing more to fight terrorism when in reality it is the U.S. that is not 
providing enough resources to combat terrorism in Kenya (Barkan 2004).
In addition, Kenyan leaders complain that the U.S. is using a tough approach to force 
them to pass new legislation including the Suppression o f Terrorism Act (STA), which 
many equate to the U.S. Patriot Act (USAPA) (Barkan 2004:99). Other Parliamentarians 
and officials complain that the Bush administration is “playing hardball” by using the so- 
called power o f the “stick” rather than the “carrot” to secure K enya’s support on other 
issues o f interest to the United States. For example, the U.S. has threatened to cut off 
military aid ($3 million per year) if  Kenya ratifies the treaty o f the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) without exempting American servicemen under Article 98. This is viewed 
as an infringement on Kenyan sovereignty (Barkan 2004:99).
Barkan warned that a softer approach is required from the Bush administration if
Washington is to maintain its historically warm relations with Kenya. According to
Barkan (2004:100):
This means the United States should renew military aid to Kenya without 
conditions, as is permitted under the presidential waiver provision in the
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American Service M embers’ Protection Act o f 2002 (which otherwise bans 
military support for countries that have joined the ICC). The administration 
should deliver the aid package it has promised for the war on terrorism, rather 
than getting sidetracked on forcing the equivalent o f the U.S. Patriot Act through 
K enya’s National Assembly. The administration should also consider increasing 
U.S. development aid, contingent on K ibaki’s governm ent’s making tough 
decisions to restore economic growth.
Therefore, we can argue that terrorist attacks usually increase tensions between patron
and client states as U.S.-Kenya relations demonstrate. The rhetoric o f the war on terror
and President Bush’s warning to treat countries who refuse to cooperate with the U.S. in
global terrorism as hostile forces her allies (or client states) to respond with tougher
counter-measures that alienate and discomfort its citizens and supporters.
Government Responses: Comparisons o f America and Kenya 
Based on the discussions provided above, we can briefly compare how American and 
Kenyan governments responded to their respective tragedies. Immediately after the 
catastrophic attacks o f August 7, 1998, and September 11, 2001, government officials 
from the two countries severely condemned the attacks and indicated that those who 
planned and executed them were cowardly and evil. Political leaders vowed to do 
everything within their power to bring the perpetrators to justice. In regard to the U.S. 
embassy attacks in Nairobi, Kenya, President Daniel arap Moi said: “Those who were 
responsible for these senseless attacks were cowards. We cannot condone their evil acts. 
We will find them and bring them to justice” {Daily Nation August 8, 1998). American 
President W illiam Clinton also condemned those who were responsible for the senseless 
attacks that killed innocent people in the twin embassies bombings in Nairobi and Dar es 
Salaam. He called the attackers cowards and vowed to bring them to justice (Clarke
202
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2004). In a speech to the American public, President Clinton said; “We will use all the 
means at our disposal to bring those responsible to justice, no matter what or how long it 
takes” (Mcgeary 1998:34). Bin Laden and al-Qaeda were blamed for the attacks.
In October o f  1998, President Clinton authorized military attacks against two 
countries, Afghanistan and Sudan, in retaliation to the twin bombings o f  the U.S. 
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Four perpetrators were also arrested, tried, and 
imprisoned for life for participating in the attacks. President Clinton also promised the 
Kenyan and Tanzanian governments that the U.S. will not only work with them to fight 
international terrorism but will also assist them financially to rebuild damaged buildings 
and businesses. He also promised to assist the victim s’ families and survivors with 
medical costs and other social services to help them cope with their tragedy. Even 
though Clinton ordered retaliation against bin Laden’s camps in Afghanistan, vowed to 
track down the embassies bombers, and promised to fight international terrorism, his 
efforts and actions were considered inadequate because they were designed to “wag the 
dog”, that is, to divert attention from his personal political scandals. After his leaving 
office, bin Laden was still at large and his network was still attacking American interests 
including the attack on the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen in 2000 (Miniter 2003; Clarke 2004).
Substantial government actions against global terrorism came with the catastrophic 
attacks o f September 11. Immediately after the attacks against the W orld Trade Center 
and the Pentagon, American leaders strongly condemned them and vowed to hunt the 
perpetrators down and bring them to justice. In his statements. President George W. 
Bush vowed: “We will hunt them dow n.. .they will pay”; “W e’re at w ar”; and “The 
people who knocked these buildings down will hear from us all soon” (Thomas and
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Hosenball 2001: 29).
Bush labeled Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda operatives as “evil-doers” and 
countries that supported them as the “axis o f evil” (quoted in Herbst 2003). Bush also 
called the battle against international terrorism “a monumental struggle o f good vs. evil” 
and reminded the American people that he will strike back at the time o f his choosing to 
smoke terrorists out o f their caves and drain their swamps. In his speeches, he was 
resilient and vowed: “M ake no m istake.. .we will win” (W alczak et al., 2001:36). He 
also promised to rebuild Ground Zero and assist the victim s’ families with monetary 
compensation. He reminded the international community that in the war on terror, “you 
are either with us or you are with the terrorists.” In other words, those countries that 
failed to cooperate and support the United States in the war on terror would be considered 
hostile to the United States. Bush’s statements and rhetoric were followed by actual 
military invasions o f Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2002 and the removal o f the 
Taliban and Saddam Hussein regimes. Bush also created a Federal Compensation Fund 
to disperse millions o f dollars to the families o f the victims o f September 11 and 
allocated more millions to rebuild Ground Zero.
In both countries, tough legal actions and counter-measures were instituted to enable 
the intelligence community and law enforcement agencies to fight terrorism. Apart from 
the many security measures that were instituted at airports, ports o f  entry, symbolic 
landmarks, embassies, and other places o f importance, the United States and Kenya also 
created the US Patriot Act and the Suppression o f Terrorism Act respectively to enable 
their intelligence agencies to combat international terrorism. The two countries are also 
working together in the w ar on global terrorism.
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However, public response to legal actions, particularly those that concern the US 
Patriot Act and the Suppression o f Terrorism Act in the United States and Kenya have 
been criticized because they have played a role in polarizing citizens and ethnic 
groupings. In both countries, the legal actions are now viewed as being draconian 
because they target minority groups— Arabs and M uslims under the aegis o f national 
security. The threat to national security in both countries is now used as justification to 
arrest and jail both foreigners and citizens with lesser regard for due process procedures. 
For example, in the United States Arabs and Muslims dubbed enemy combatants and a 
threat to national security are being held in jails and prisons incommunicado. In Kenya, 
the Muslims in the Coast province complain o f harassment, mistreatment, and unlawful 
police raids and arrests in the name o f the war on terrorism.
Because o f government officials’ abuse o f legal action, some people or groups in 
America and Kenya are now reluctant to support government actions such as preemptive 
military strikes against terrorists and terrorist-sponsoring states (Barkan 2004; Lyman and 
Morrison 2004; Scheuer 2004). Additionally, countries and world leaders who supported 
America in the wake o f the September 11 attacks are now reluctant to support the war on 
terror and the invasion o f Muslim states. Most African nations and their leaders are no 
exception.
African Reactions to the Attacks o f September 11 
African reactions to the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center in New 
York and the Pentagon in W ashington D C. were overwhelmingly supportive o f the 
United States (Dagne 2002). In the days and months after the attacks, many African
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leaders and officials offered support in the war on terrorism. African heads o f states 
including Daniel arap Moi o f Kenya, Benjamin M kaba o f Tanzania, Yoweri Museveni o f 
Uganda, Thabo Mbeki o f South Africa, and Olusegun Obasanjo o f Nigeria joined other 
world leaders in denouncing the attacks against the United States and expressed their 
willingness and readiness to cooperate in fighting international terrorism. Even the 
Sudanese government under President Omar Bashir, whose country provided sanctuary to 
bin Laden between the years o f  1991-1996, condemned the attacks and indicated that his 
country will cooperate with the U.S. in the war on terror (Dagne 2002; Roessler 2004;
The Economist 9/22/ 2001).
In sum, many African heads o f state and several member states o f the Organization of 
African Unity (OAU) not only officially and collectively condemned the events o f 
September 11, but also pledged to work with the United States and the United Nations in 
the fight against terrorism. The African Unity members adopted the United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 1373, inter alia, that obliges all U.N. member states to make 
every effort to apprehend those who finance terrorist activities; to criminalize and punish 
their nationals who provide safe havens to terrorist groups; to freeze terrorists’ assets; and 
to participate in bilateral, regional, and multinational actions to prevent terrorism.
Not all African responses were supportive. Celebrations among Muslim militants 
were reported in some African countries including Nigeria, Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, and 
Somalia. In Somalia, for example, thousands o f people took to the streets o f Mogadishu 
and burned American and Israeli flags in support o f Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda. 
Although Som alia’s transitional national government condemned the attacks on America, 
Somali officials did little to prevent the demonstrations. With the exception o f these few
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cases, the general public in Africa, like the rest o f the world, denounced the attacks. It is 
estimated that 25 people from 13 different African countries died in the World Trade 
Center on September 11 (Dagne 2002:1-2).
Clearly, African countries have cooperated with the United States in its anti-terrorism 
efforts. According to press reports, the governments o f Djibouti and Kenya offered their 
sea and airport facilities for use by American forces. The United States has a military 
access agreement with Kenya. The U.S. has over the years used sea and airports in 
Djibouti for refueling o f its ships and for other purposes. With the urging o f former U.S. 
Secretary o f State Colin Powell, the Sudanese government agreed to give American 
officials unrestricted access to files of suspected terrorists and indicated that they would 
hand over suspects to American authorities. The South African government also was 
presented with a list o f names o f persons with possible links to the attacks in New York 
and Washington D C. and immediately signed an extradition treaty with the United 
States. U.S. officials also presented other African countries with lists o f names and 
charities suspected o f terrorism and asked for cooperation in handing them over to the 
U.S. and shutting down charities suspected o f supporting terrorist operations (Barkan 
2004; Lyman and Morrison 2004; Dagne 2002).
Africa and the United States have mutual interests in suppressing terrorism. The 
proximity o f some African countries to the Persian G ulf region is crucial to U.S. forces. 
For example, Eritrea has ports at Masawa and Assab on the Red Sea. In the past several 
years, Djibouti has emerged as an important refueling station for U.S. military planes. 
But a more immediate role for African countries and officials is fighting terrorism and 
terrorist cells and groups in Africa itself, because Africa is emerging as a safe haven for
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several terrorist groups from the Middle East and North Africa (Schermerhom 2004).
Steven Emerson (2002) argued that Sudan has been the host o f many radical Islamic 
groups that have been responsible for some o f the worst terrorist atrocities around the 
world. He maintained that the Sudan-based groups included al-Qaeda, Abu Nidal,
Gama’at al Islamiyya, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Hamas, Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic 
Jihad, and many other Islamic militants groups from the Middle East and Africa (see also 
Schermorhom 2004; Byers 2002).
Moreover, some o f the most disruptive attacks since the 1990s were conceived in 
Sudan and tested against African civilians as was demonstrated by the twin bombings o f 
the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania on August 7, 1998. There is also evidence 
suggesting that terrorist groups from the Middle East have established a presence in the 
African countries o f Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania (including Zanzibar), and South 
Africa, while terrorists are involved in illegal diamond and gemstone business 
transactions in Central and W est Africa (Bodansky 2000; Emerson 2002; Lyman and 
Morrison 2004).
Furthermore, as U.S-coalition forces continue to supposedly “drain the swamps’’ o f al- 
Qaeda infrastructure in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other parts of the world, it is highly likely 
that Somalia could become the next sanctuary for al-Qaeda remnants, simply because 
Somalia’s population is 100 percent Muslim, as shown in Table 3 below. Moreover, 
Somalia lacks viable government institutions and any semblance o f political stability. In 
Somalia, anti-American sentiments loom large (Lyman and Morrison 2004; Barkan 2004; 
Dagne 2002).
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Muslim Populations in Selected African Countries, 2003
Total
population
%
Muslim
Muslim
population
Burkina Faso 13,228,4m SO 6,614,230
Central African Republic 15 552.531
Chad f s j s s m 51 4.719.281
Comoros 632,948 98 620589
Congo. Democratic Republic of the 56.625.039 10 5.662504
Confço, Republic of the 2 59.085
Côte d’Ivoire "16,% ^l7, 40 6.784596
Djibouti 94
'■V
429.702
Egypt 94 -70235,669
Eritrea 50 2̂ 181,127
Ethiopia 66.557553 50 ‘ 33̂ 278/777
Kenya 31.639.091 10 3563,909
Liberia '."T35174176--. 20 m 4 3 5
Libya -AW5X#y4:.:'-: 97 5.334.102
Nigeria i m p i m 50 66,940.852
Senegal iùrSëjCiT 94 , , 9.945,489
Sierra Leone '-'5 ,7325#-: 60 3/439,609
Somalia j8^25;iw 100 8.025,190
South Africa 42.768,678 2 855.374
Sudan 38.114.160 70 26679.912
Tanzania 35,922.454 35 12.572.859
Uganda 25,632.794 16 4.101.247
s o u R C i :  C IA  W orldFacthaok, u p d a te d  A u g u s t 2003; E ritre a n  figures fro m  th e  E n tb a s s y o f  K ritrca.
The Bush Administration has indicated satisfaction with the level o f support it has and 
continues to receive from African countries. In late October 2001, President Bush told 
more than 30 African ministers who were attending the annual Africa Growth and 
Opportunity Act Economic Forum (AGOA) that, “America w on’t forget the many 
messages o f sympathy and solidarity sent by African heads o f state” (Dagne 2002:3).
President Bush also acknowledged Organization o f African Unity (OAU) political 
support for the anti-terrorism campaign. American officials asserted that Africa, with its
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large Muslim population, can play a pivotal role in solidifying support in Muslim 
countries such as Nigeria (Dagne 2002). Additionally, African states and peoples have 
been assured that the war on terrorism is not a war o f civilizations between the West and 
Islam. U.S. former National Security Advisor and current Secretary o f State, 
Condoleezza Rice, urged “African nations, particularly those with large Muslim 
populations, to speak out at every opportunity to make clear that this is not war o f 
civilizations, that this is a war o f civilization against those who would be uncivilized in 
their approach to us” (quoted in Dagne 2002:3).
Figure 10 . A Map of Africa
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In conclusion, terrorist attacks in a field o f mixed-ethnicities and mixed-religions 
polarize the countries in the region. Some support the attackers while others support the 
victimized countries. Some countries, such as Kenya, become more polarized internally.
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The same polarization has been reported in other countries across the Africa, where more 
than 380 million M uslims live {The Economist 9/22/2001).
African Officials’ Worries and Concerns
African officials are worried that U.S. military retaliation against Muslim 
fundamentalists has caused their supporters to target African countries. Today, the 
rhetoric o f the war on terror, which now means the war on M uslim groups and countries, 
has already stoked violent clashes between Islamic movements and others within African 
countries. For example, American military strikes against Afghanistan and Sudan in 
1998 were followed in parts o f east and southern Africa by violent activities by Islamic 
groups. In South Africa, Islamic militants called People Against Guns and Drugs 
(PAGAD) were implicated in a series o f bombings in Cape Town. In response, a mob 
looted shops and smashed up an Islamic center in a Somali community near Port 
Elizabeth, South Africa. In Uganda, an Islamic militant group was accused of 
orchestrating bombing attacks in Kampala {The Economist 9/22/2001:4 1-42). In Kenya, 
local Muslims were indicted for executing attacks against a resort hotel in Mombasa. In 
Nigeria, Muslim militants from the north have been implicated for orchestrating attacks 
against Christians in the south. Many civilians were killed and maimed in these 
incidents. African leaders are worried that retaliation against M uslim radicals will fuel 
even more violence (Lyman and Morrison 2004; Khadiagala 2004).
African officials and ambassadors are concerned that despite the strong support 
African governments have provided to the anti-terrorism campaign, they are not seen as 
valued coalition partners in the fight against terrorism. It has been reported that the Bush
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administration, like previous administrations, did not extend invitations to African heads 
o f state to visit Washington for discussions on the crisis, as has been the case with many 
European and other world leaders (Lyman and M orrison 2004; Barkan 2004; Dagne 
2002). Among the heads o f state officially received by the Bush administration since 
September 11 were Presidents Olusegun Obasanjo o f Nigeria, Daniel arap Moi and Mwai 
Kibaki o f Kenya, Benjamin Mkaba o f  Tanzania, Yoweri Museveni o f  Uganda, and 
Thambo Mkeki o f South Africa. The Bush administration dismissed this concern saying 
that what is important is the level o f collaboration and cooperation on the ground and not 
visits to W ashington D.C. and the White House. But some African ambassadors in 
Washington D.C. worry that sub-Saharan Africa may become a lower priority and that 
American financial support may be reduced because o f the new focus on the war on 
terrorism, particularly with the costly military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq 
(Dagne 2002, Lyman and M orrison 2004; Barkan 2004).
African officials assert that the United States has an obligation to assist them 
financially because they have suffered economically due to terrorist attacks. For 
example, government officials from Kenya and Tanzania told a Congressional hearing 
that their tourism sector, their largest foreign currency earner, has not been able to 
recover since the attacks. South African officials indicated that their airline industry has 
experienced flight cancellations and reductions in flights (Lyman and Morrison 2004; 
Dagne 2002).
Therefore, African leaders argue that they need U.S. economic assistance and military 
logistics and training to fight international terrorism in their respective countries. They 
would like to build an African security capacity able to detect and prevent terrorist acts.
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but this would require extensive training and technological expertise. African states also 
would like U.S. support in stopping money-laundering practices by extremist and terrorist 
groups in their countries (Alexander and Alexander 2002; Lyman and M orrison 2004; 
Dagne 2002).
Cooperation in sharing o f intelligence is another area where African leaders and 
governments would like to see improvement. Although American security agencies were 
appreciative o f the support and cooperation they received from Kenyan and Tanzanian 
authorities after the U.S. embassies bombings, African leaders contend that they lack the 
resources needed to provide such support routinely (Dagne 2002; Khadiagala 2004).
Immediately after the attacks o f September 11, some African countries were still 
concerned that they might become the next target for U.S. military action after 
Afghanistan and Iraq. Sudanese officials are reportedly concerned that the U.S. may 
target their country despite their recent cooperation (Dagne 2002). While U.S. officials 
have said they will fight terrorism whenever it is found, they have not given any 
indication that Sudan could be a target.
The U.S. has adamantly refused to lift sanctions against Sudan due to its ties with 
terrorism. President Bush told Congressional members that “because the actions and 
policies of the government o f Sudan continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat 
to the national security and foreign policy o f the United States, the national emergency 
declared on November 3, 1997, and the measures adopted on that date to deal with that 
emergency must continue in effect beyond November 3, 2001” (quoted in Dagne 
2002 : 10).
Somalis are also concerned that their country could become a target because o f the
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activities o f Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya and its alleged relationship with al-Qaeda. President 
Bush added Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya to the list of organizations that support terrorism and 
ordered the freezing o f its assets in accordance with Executive Order 13224 (Dagne 
2002). The freezing o f their financial assets has had a serious impact on Somalia’s 
fragile economy because al-Barakaat Group o f Companies employed many Somalis 
(Menkhaus 2004).
Moreover, some African officials contend that the coalition against the war on 
international terrorism should be spearheaded by the United Nations instead o f the United 
States. According to African officials, a truly international coalition led and coordinated 
by the United Nations is more acceptable to Africans as opposed to a coalition consisting 
o f largely W estern industrial powers and countries (Dagne 2002). Some African 
ambassadors were also concerned about pressures from the general public in their 
respective countries regarding the fate and status o f African citizens detained in the 
United States. These ambassadors claim that they have been unable to contact their 
citizens in U.S. detention centers or have been unable to leam their identities or 
nationalities. According to African officials, citizens from several African countries, 
including Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Somalia, and South Africa are being detained in U.S. 
detention centers and prisons (Dagne 2002).
According to African officials, cooperation between the United States and Africa on 
the war on terror should include arresting and extraditing members o f African terrorist 
cells and extremist groups active in Europe and America. Others claim that they have 
been unable to get the cooperation o f Western authorities in extraditing individuals 
engaged in terrorism. Some African officials claim that terrorist groups raise funds and
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train terrorists in the West with little hindrance from Western governments (Dagne 2002). 
For instance, an Algerian ambassador told a congressional audience that his country lost 
an estimated 20,000 people to terrorism, but received little support from Western 
governments. While some o f these concerns are being expressed by a handful o f African 
officials in London, Paris, and Washington D.C., many Africans think that the U.S. must 
address the problem of terrorism in a more comprehensive way. African officials, and in 
particular those from countries with large Muslim populations, see the need for a fair and 
quick solution o f the Palestine problem (Lyman and Morrison 2004).
Some Western and African observers are also concerned that the anti-terrorism 
rhetoric and campaign is significantly changing U.S.-Africa relations. For example, 
democracy and human rights advocates claim that African states with poor human rights 
records have been embraced by W ashington and the Bush administration because they 
have indicated their willingness to cooperate in the war on terrorism (Dagne 2002; 
M enkhaus 2004; lyob 2004; The Economist 9/22/2001).
Others expressed concerns that issues dealing with conflict resolution and 
development in Africa have been marginalized or neglected by policymakers in 
Washington. The Bush administration indicated that while the fight against terrorism is 
its foremost priority, other issues, such as trade, the fight against HIV/AIDS, and conflict 
management and resolution remain important (Dagne 2002; Lyman and Morrison 2004). 
For instance, in November 2001, Assistant Secretary o f State for Africa, W alter H. 
Kansteiner, told a gathering o f African ministers that the Bush administration has five 
policy priorities in Africa; (a) expanding trade and investment; (b) good governance and 
democracy; (c) the environment; (d) conflict resolution; and (e) combating disease and
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the HIV/AIDS pandemic (Dagne 2002; Lyman and Morrison 2004).
Some human rights activists and other observers are concerned that African 
governments are capitalizing on the war against terrorism by labeling legitimate 
opposition parties as terrorists in order to silence political rivals and suppress dissent.
For example, in Zimbabwe, President Robert Mugabe accused members o f the opposition 
party o f being terrorists. Since the attacks o f September 11 against the United States, the 
Mugabe administration has used existing laws and new legislation to harass and 
intimidate members o f the opposition party and independent journalists (lyob 2004).
In Kenya, some members o f the Arab and Muslim community in the Coast Province 
have not only complained o f  being harassed by government security forces and law 
enforcement officials, but have also complained o f physical assault and looting o f their 
property. In Kenya, the war on terrorism has become a major domestic political issue 
because it has complicated the relationship between the Arab minority and other 
Kenyans. The governm ent’s search for terrorists has focused on the Coast Province, 
where most Kenyan Muslims live. According to Barkan (2004:98), “Coastal people now 
feel singled out and increasingly view themselves as victims. Aggressive interrogations 
o f  suspected terrorists by the Kenyan police have exacerbated their sense o f grievance at 
the very time such feelings should be reduced.”
In Somalia, the M ogadishu-based transitional national government is a target o f 
attacks by other political groups who argue that the transitional national government 
supports terrorism (M enkhaus 2004). In Eritrea, the rhetoric o f the war against terrorism 
is also being applied to harass and eliminate all political dissent and to justify systematic 
suppression o f  all pro-democratic opposition (lyob 2004).
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Although many African governments have enacted new counter-measures, some 
political leaders are using the war on terrorism for ulterior motives— to silence opposition 
parties, eliminate political rivals, and suppress pro-democracy movements.
Some analysts and observers have argued that because o f A frica’s porous boundaries, 
lack o f proper security apparatus, and limited resources and expertise to fight terrorism, 
the U.S. and its European allies must significantly expand their intelligence presence in 
Africa (Lyman and Morrison 2004; Barkan 2004). Analysts also maintain that because 
America is the primary target o f terrorism, the U.S. should assist fragile African 
governments to build security apparatus and intelligence capabilities to detect and thwart 
terrorist operations against American interests (Dagne 2002; Lyman and Morrison 2004).
Others noted that while it is desirable to secure and win the support o f all African 
countries, only a handful will be capable of and suitable for joining an effective 
partnership with the United States in the fight against terrorism (Lyman and Morrison 
2004; Barkan; Dagne 2002; Khadiagala 2004; lyob 2004; M enkhaus 2004). Experts 
further noted that the Bush administration should identify relevant African actors and 
establish a special security relationship with these governments. For example, some 
analysts think that in dealing with the terrorist threat from Somalia and Sudan, Kenya and 
Ethiopia could provide significant support (Dagne 2002; Shinn 2004;Lyman and 
Morrison 2004; Barkan 2004).
Other observers, however, fear that close U.S. support for some African states and 
governments could be interpreted as a reduction in pressure for economic reforms and 
democratization. From these observers’ viewpoint, encouraging good governance, 
transparency, accountability, and respect for human rights, together with poverty
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alleviation and social development are significant elements in building stronger U.S.- 
Africa relations and a terrorist-free Africa (Lyman and Morrison 2004; Barkan 2004; 
Dagne 2002; Khadiagala 2004; lyob 2004; Menkhaus 2004).
Even though African nations may be considered by some political actors and policy­
makers as lesser partners with the United States and Europe in the war on terrorism, it is 
important to note that today’s terrorists including those who orchestrated catastrophic 
attacks against America on September 11, 2001, Madrid on March 11, 2004, and Britain 
on July 7, 2005 came from African countries such as Algeria, Egypt, Eritrea, Libya, 
Morocco, Tunisia, Sudan, Somalia, and Tanzania. Moreover, al-Qaeda was conceived 
and nurtured in Africa. Under these circumstances, the United States and its allies should 
work with African nations as viable, reliable, and important partners on the war on terror 
and cooperate with them on security matters. Therefore, the U.S.-African relations on the 
war on terror should include; the sharing o f intelligence, training o f security personnel, 
cooperation in counter-terrorism programs, and finding solutions to A frica’s fundamental 
problems— economic distress, ethno-religious conflicts, fragile governance, weak 
democracy, abuse o f human rights, poverty, and rampant corruption— that create fertile 
climate and environment in which terrorism and terrorists thrive.
218
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER SIX
THE VICTIMS OF TERRORISM: REACTIONS, CLAIMS, AND
COPING M ECHANISMS OF THE SURVIVORS OF AMERICAN
EMBASSY BOMBING IN NAIROBI AND THE 9/11 ATTACKS
“America has the money to composante u s . . ..If they will not give us 
compensation, we have to ask why: Is it because we are Kenyans?”
(Nairobi bomb survivor, 2002)
At 10:00 a.m. on August 7, 1998, suicide-terrorists drove trucks filled with explosives 
into the American embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, killing 250 
people, among them twelve Americans and twelve Tanzanians. Five thousand were 
injured. Kenyans were especially devastated because at least 224 civilians were killed.
In Kenya, the area surrounding the U.S. embassy was, and still is, usually busy in terms 
o f human traffic and commercial activities. In addition, the American embassy was 
located at N airobi’s busiest intersection. Moi Avenue and Haile Selassie Avenue. These 
avenues lead to and from K enya’s most significant governmental and non-governmental 
organs, enterprises, and corporations which include: the government ministries; the 
Railway Corporation Headquarters and train terminus; the Kenya Bus Services and mini­
buses terminus; Kenya Post and Telecommunications; Central Bank o f Kenya; the 
Treasury House, Kenya Polytechnic College; Kenya Press and Publications; the Coffee 
Board o f Kenya; Kenya Planters o f Coffee Union, Kenya Cinema; and the Ambassador 
and Hilton hotels.
At the time o f the attacks, the U.S. Ambassador to Kenya, Prudence Bushnell, was 
having a meeting with the Kenyan M inister o f Commerce, Joseph Kamotho, on the top
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floor o f the Cooperative House, a building that was severely damaged during the attacks 
killing people and injuring many others. Bushnell and Kamotho were injured.
As a result o f the attacks, many buildings near and around the U.S. embassy were 
either completely destroyed or severely damaged. For example, the Ufundi House, a 
seven-story office and secretarial college building, was completely destroyed burying 
with it many civilians including college students waiting to take their final examinations. 
The Cooperative Bank House, a twenty-one story building, home to government and non­
governmental agencies, was severely damaged. Civilians therein were killed and injured.
More than sixty buildings within the vicinity o f the U.S. embassy suffered severe 
damage. They included: the Railway Headquarters, the Electricity House, Kenya Post 
and Telecommunications, and the Pioneer Building. The impact o f the explosion was felt 
throughout the surrounding area o f the American embassy and beyond. M ost o f the 
injuries resulted from shattered windows and flying objects. However, the buildings that 
took the heaviest hits were the Ufimdi and Cooperative Houses. The former was 
completely reduced to piles o f twisted metal and concrete, killing civilians instantly and 
trapping many more in the wreckage. Outside the American Embassy, many people, 
including students, were lining up for visas. Many o f them were also killed or injured.
At the intersection o f Moi and Haile Selassie Avenues, buses and vehicles were 
completely destroyed as shown in the Figure 11. Commuters and passengers were 
burned beyond recognition. In short, after the attack, downtown Nairobi looked like a 
war zone. Kenyans and Nairobians who had considered themselves secure and far 
removed from terrorist threats and attacks realized that terrorism knows no boundaries.
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Those who survived the attacks incurred severe injuries such as the loss o f limbs, 
hearing, and sight, plus injuries to the head and spinal cord. Because so many were 
injured, the Kenyan hospitals were full, medical personnel and staffs were overwhelmed, 
and medical services and equipment were scarce.
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The U nited States, Great Britain, Israel, Germany, and South Africa sent rescue and 
recovery teams, medical personnel and staff, and medical equipment and drugs and 
donated money to help in the rescue and recovery and to assist victims and survivors. 
Several other countries from around the world also sent donations.
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The Kenyan government allocated funds and used the financial donations it received 
from well-wishers around the world to set up the Njojo Commission to provide assistance 
to the victim s’ families and survivors. The money from the fund was used to provide 
medical treatment, drugs, traveling expenses to foreign countries for further medical 
treatment, rehabilitation services, school fees, training in new skills, and compensation 
(Johanna 1998). The United States donated at least $42 million through the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) to assist in emergency rescue and 
recovery missions, provide treatment to the injured, pay school fees for the children o f 
victims, and repair and rebuild damaged buildings and businesses (Costello, 
https;//web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/docuinent.)
To understand subsequent events, it is important to know that the governments o f the 
United States and Kenya promised the victim s’ families and survivors that they would 
receive free medical and financial assistance to meet their medical needs, drug payments, 
rehabilitation services, school fees, and learning o f new skills (Linnee, https://web.lexis- 
nexis.com/universe/document.) The survivors and the victim s’ families were also 
promised direct individual compensation for their pain and suffering.
Unfortunately the majority o f survivors received very little. Survivors claimed that 
the free medical and educational assistance and social programs that they were promised 
were reduced or terminated. In June o f 2 0 0 0 ,1 traveled to Nairobi to find survivors to 
speak to and record their stories in order to understand their reactions to the attacks, their 
claims and concerns, and their coping mechanisms after the attack. Here is the story o f 
what transpired between the Nairobi bomb survivors and me from the notes taken during 
my fieldwork. This story focuses on five key themes: (i) how survivors remember the
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attacks o f August 7, 1998, (ii) who were the targets, (iii) the promises that were made, but 
inadequately delivered, (iv) the survivors’ reactions on hearing that the September 11 
victims were well compensated for their loss, pain, and suffering, and (v) the coping 
mechanisms that survivors used to deal with their tragedy.
Nairobi Bomb Survivors Remember
Although the survivors did not understand why they were attacked, they vividly
remembered the day o f the attack as if  it were the very day I interviewed them. When I
asked them how they remembered the attacks of August 7, 1998 the day that changed
their lives forever, the following is what four Nairobi bomb survivors said. All had
undergone reconstructive surgeries.
That day, I was at work. At around 10:00 a.m., I heard something that sounded 
like a tire burst. So, I proceeded to the window to see what was happening. As I 
was standing at the window looking out at the U.S. em bassy.. .1 saw many people 
running away. I thought that whatever the bang was, it might have been big to 
cause Kenyans to run. M inutes later, I heard another very loud bang. After that, I 
thought we were invaded because the noise from the bang sounded like those o f 
guns and bombs. I thought we were at war. A few seconds later, I was full o f 
blood and bleeding as I lay down in my office. I was in great pain. From that time 
on, I did not remember what happened or where I w as.. .When I woke up hours 
later, I found m yself at Kenyatta National Hospital. I was in deep pain and I was 
crying. I thought that I was going to die. I begged the nurses who were running up 
and down the hospital to tell me what had happened to me. ‘Why I am here?’ I 
cried. ‘Why is blood coming from my eyes, ears, and head?’ I asked crying. I 
begged for painkillers, but nobody would attend to me. I was told to calm down 
and stay quiet and try to sleep as I had been severely wounded (Nairobi Bomb 
Survivor “A”, June, 2000).
It was around 10:30 a.m. I was at my place o f work at the Kenya Railways 
Corporation, on the second floor, room 205, in the Personnel Section working.
We heard something that sounded like a tire burst or guns. So some o f  us rushed 
to the window to find out what was happening. A few minutes later, there was fire 
and smoke coming into our office. There were also flying glasses coming towards 
our office. I was hit with a flying glass on the face. I fell down. I was bleeding 
very badly from my head and eyes. Later on, I was taken by a Samaritan to
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Kenyatta National Hospital. Many hours later, I was operated on my eye. Days 
later, I was flown to Germany and received more eye operations.. . .In the months 
o f  November and December o f 1999,1 flew to Germany again for another 
operation....They operated on my eye and gave me an artificial eye (Nairobi 
Bomb Survivor “B” , June 2000).
From these testimonies, it is clear that they remembered where they were and what 
had happened to them. For example, they pointed out that when they heard something 
that sounded like a tire burst or an explosion coming from the direction o f the U.S. 
embassy, they promptly rushed to the windows in their places o f work to see what was 
happening. A few seconds later, they heard another very loud bang. The impact from the 
explosion not only sent shock waves throughout the city, but also killed and injured 
thousands o f civilians. The overwhelming majority o f the survivors received injuries 
from flying objects, debris, and broken windows. Many were blinded. The survivors 
pointed out that they clearly remembered being hit, bleeding, crying, and pleading for 
help as they lay on the ground helpless and blind. They also remembered being in great 
and excruciating pain and thought that they were going to die. They reported that at the 
hospitals, they begged doctors and nurses to attend to their wounds and ease their pain.
Additional revealing accounts o f memories presented by other survivors show that
they remembered and wanted to discuss not only the day o f the attack, but also their
injuries, pain, and medical treatment.
I was here working on the second floor and at about 10:15 a.m. I heard a loud 
noise. I went to the window to check out what was happening because the noise 
was so loud that it shook the whole building. Just as I reached the window to look 
out towards Haile Sailassie Avenue and Moi Avenue, I heard another very loud 
noise and saw the window glasses flying into our office. I was hit on the face and 
fell down under the table. I did not remember what happened to me except that I 
was hurting in my eye, head, and ear... .The people were telling me that I had 
been hurt very badly with what was they thought was a bomb. I could not see or 
hear well since 1 had been injured so badly. There was a lot o f blood coming from 
my eye and I was crying for help. Some people rushed me to Kenyatta National
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H ospital.. ..I did not get medical treatment immediately. But hours later, I was 
taken to the operation theater where my left eye was operated o n .. .Sometime last 
year in 1999 ,1 flew to Germany for a second eye operation. I received an artificial 
eye (Nairobi Bomb Survivor “C”, June 2000).
I was here on the first floor in the Payroll Section working. At about 10:00 a.m., I 
was standing near the file cabinets and then all o f a sudden, I heard something that 
sounded like gunshots. I thought that it might have been a gas tank that blew off. 
But then I saw smoke and fire. I then proceeded further to the window to see 
where the shots or smoke were coming from. I remember the whole building was 
shaking, and the next thing 1 knew, I was down after being hit by flying window 
glasses. I did not know what was happening and why I was hit or why I was 
bleeding. I heard many people running out o f the office building, but I could not 
find my way out because I could not see. Blood was coming out o f my eyes, head, 
and face. Sometime later, my brother called my office, but I did not answer as I 
could not see or find the phone. But one o f my co-workers did answer the phone 
and told my brother that I had been seriously injured from what many believed to 
be a bomb attack. So, my brother rushed into my office, got hold o f me, washed 
blood from my eyes and face and carried me into a matatu (minibus) and took me 
to Kenyatta National Hospital. After I arrived at the hospital, I did not receive 
treatment as there were many more bomb casualties with even more severe 
complications who were in need o f urgent medical care including surgeries. The 
doctors, however, gave me painkillers and non-infection medication while they 
attended to those with much more serious injuries. I was told to wait to be 
operated on because the theaters were full o f people who were undergoing 
operations. Later that day, I was transferred to Nairobi Hospital, where I was 
operated on. Both o f my eyes were operated on and the retinas were reattached. 
M onths later, I was flown to W est Germany under the USAID grant for further 
treatment (Nairobi Bomb Survivor “D”, June 2000).
The survivors reported that they were advised by therapists, counselors, or 
psychiatrists to jo in  a survivor group and to attend weekly meetings to share their 
experiences, stories, and ordeals with other survivors. While attending survivor groups, 
they met others with even more severe injuries and experiences. They also said that 
sharing their stories with other survivors and listening to others narrate their ordeals 
helped them to deal with their own tragedies and gave them a sense of comfort and 
belonging. The next testimony is a case in point.
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I joined a survivors’ group and attend the meeting at least once a week. 
Because when you are with people who were injured and who survived the attack, 
it makes you feel that you are not the only one whose life was affected. Attending 
the group meeting, I find survivors from different tribes, occupations, genders, or 
age-groups whose stories and injuries are even more severe than mine. Usually, 
we sit around, talk, cry, and console each other. It makes me feel good because at 
least you know that there are some people who in fact understand what I ’m going 
through. You see, sometimes people who were not injured or lost one o f their 
family members do not understand what we are going through. Some people think 
that we should get over it and move on with our lives. Others think that we are 
using our injuries to milk government assistance or compensations. But that is not 
the case. I and others like me did not ask to be injured in that bomb attack. I 
would give a million dollars to get my sight back. But that is not going to happen. 
So the way I cope is to accept the situation and work with what I got— being 
blind, but being alive (Nairobi Bomb survivor “K” August 2002).
To summarize, the survivors remember very vividly where they were and how they 
got injured on the morning o f August 7, 1998. They were working in buildings 
surrounding the American embassy, but were drawn to their windows to inquire as to 
what was happening at the American embassy. Moments later, their lives changed 
forever as they were hit by flying objects and broken glass. Even though they did not 
remember who assisted them to Kenyatta National Hospital and other clinics around the 
city, they indicated that work-mates, good Samaritans, and strangers drove them to 
hospitals. At the hospitals, they did not receive medical attention right away because the 
doctors and nurses were overwhelmed. They remembered crying and begging for 
painkillers and treatment. When they finally received treatment, they were highly 
appreciative o f the medical treatment they received in Kenya and Germany. They also 
pointed out that besides the immediate medical treatment they received, Kenyan and 
American government officials promised them long-term free medical and educational 
assistance and other social services. But those promises were inadequately delivered or 
were prematurely terminated.
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Who Were the Targets?
The bombing o f  the U.S. embassy in downtown Nairobi on August 7, 1998, is now 
considered as “the day o f infamy” among many Kenyans. Although some people argued 
that the attack was directed at American citizens and interests, Kenyan citizens and 
interests were also severely impacted (Bodansky 2000; Clarke 2004; The 9/11 
Commission Report 2004). More than two hundred Kenyans were killed, five thousand 
were injured, and numerous business enterprises were destroyed. Some news reports 
asserted that al-Q aeda’s attacks killed and injured many Muslims in Nairobi, but that 
seems unlikely, because on Fridays most Muslims are in mosques attending morning 
prayers (Costello https://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document ,Kamsteiner 
https://Iexis-nexis.com/universe/document.). Moreover, perusing through hundreds of 
names o f  the plaintiffs who joined in a class action compensation suit against the United 
States in the case o f Macharia, et ai., v. United States of America, one finds very few 
Muslim names. Among the 219 names inscribed on the black granite wall at the Nairobi 
memorial site, one finds few traditional Muslim names. It is important to note that 
traditional Muslim names are a reliable indicator o f  religion because non-Muslims who 
convert usually take Muslims names. It is almost unheard o f for M uslims in Kenya to 
convert to Christianity.
Contrary to the assertions o f some people that al-Qaeda intended to kill only American 
citizens and non-M uslims during the attacks, my interviews with some o f the Nairobi 
bomb survivors suggest that they saw the attacks differently. Four extracts from my 
interviews with the survivors demonstrate that the terrorists did not care who died in the 
attacks. Both American and Kenyan citizens were targets.
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If it is true as people say that this bad Arab man they call Osama bin Laden and 
his al-Qaeda wanted only to kill Americans, why didn’t they go to Washington 
D.C. to kill the Americans there? Why did they come in our country to find the 
Americans knowing very well that if they attacked the American embassy here, it 
would be Kenyans who would be killed and injured? (Nairobi Bomb Survivor, 
“B” June 2000).
If  Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda terrorists didn’t want to kill us and other 
Kenyan civilians, they would have at least picked a different target or location 
which is less congested. Instead, al-Qaeda chose to attack the American embassy 
in an area known to be congested with both human traffic and motorcars (Nairobi 
Bomb Survivor “C” August 2002).
It is clear that at least these survivors believe that Kenyans were also targets. Other
survivors also reported that:
Al-Qaeda chose to invade and attack us and our country on a Friday morning 
because they knew that there would be thousands of Kenyans in and around the 
U.S. embassy. Again, al-Qaeda terrorists knew that the majority o f the Muslim 
believers would be attending services in the mosques in and around the city 
(Nairobi Bomb Survivor “A”, June 2000).
When you visit the Nairobi bomb memorial site and read the names o f all those 
who died from the blast, you can see that there are very few names o f people of 
Arab and Muslim descent who were among those who died as a result o f the 
attack. This goes to show you that bin Laden and al-Qaeda carefully planned the 
timing o f the attacks to minimize killing people o f Muslim faith (Nairobi Bomb 
Survivors, August 2002).
These statements did not mean that Kenyan Arabs and Muslims were spared. To the 
contrary, some M uslims were killed or injured. These survivors wanted to set the record 
straight. They complained that immediately after the attack, news reporters, journalists, 
media pundits, and even political leaders from around the world were saying that al- 
Qaeda’s attacks killed many people o f Kenyan Arab descent. Evidence suggests, 
however, these reports w ere incorrect because the overwhelming majority o f those who 
were killed and injured by the blast were non-Arabic. The remarks o f the two survivors 
above do not indicate that they harbor hatred for Kenyan Muslims for the attacks, but
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hearing and seeing some Kenyan Muslims take to the streets o f Mombasa to celebrate bin 
Laden’s and al-Qaeda’s attacks against the American embassy in Nairobi, which resulted 
in the death o f  more than two hundred Kenyans and injured five thousand others, was 
troubling and utterly incomprehensible to these survivors. Determining whether Kenyans 
were the targets o f terrorism is crucial to understanding their reactions and frustrations 
regarding the unsatisfactory government assistance that survivors received.
Undelivered Promises
The embassies bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam not only received world-wide 
condemnation, but also caused U.S. officials to order military retaliation against Osama 
bin Laden and the al-Qaeda infrastructure in both Afghanistan and Sudan {The 9/11 
Commission Report 2004; Miniter 2003). Some critics, however, thought that the U.S. 
military response was inadequate and did little to prevent al-Qaeda from planning the 
catastrophic attacks o f September 11, 2001 (Bergen 2002; Emerson 2002; Mifflin 2001; 
Miniter 2003). Others argued that President C linton’s decision to authorize military 
retaliation against Afghanistan and Sudan was intended to deflect attention from his 
personal sexual and political scandals (Clarke 2004; Bergen 2002; The 9/11 Commission 
Report 2004).
In the days and months after the embassy attacks in Kenya and Tanzania, Clinton 
promised the African victims that the United States would do everything within its power 
to bring the perpetrators to justice, however how long it may take (McGeary 1998). The 
governments o f  America and Kenya promised the victims and survivors that they would 
do everything possible to assist them in dealing with their losses and injuries. Some o f
229
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
the promises made included free medical treatment, drugs, counseling, rehabilitation, 
school fees, job training, and direct individual compensation (Branccaccio, 
https://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document.)
Although the U.S. government gave $42 million in terms o f humanitarian aid, the 
funds were not enough because they also covered other things such as relief, rescue, 
recovery, and rehabilitation missions (https://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document.) 
Additionally, even though some o f the money that the U.S. gave helped Kenya establish 
the Njojo Commission to disburse funds to victims and survivors, those who received 
monetary compensation were fewer because priority was given to those with severe 
injuries (Branccaccio, https://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document.) Nonetheless, 
many victim s’ families and survivors received medical assistance and/or financial 
compensation which ranged from about $500 for light injuries to about $2,000 for severe 
injuries to about $11,000 for the loss o f life (http://news.bbc.co.uk./l//hi/world/africa.) 
This was small compensation given that thousands o f survivors today cannot work or are 
jobless (https://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document.)
According to the Kenyan Daily Nation (May 23, 2002) newspaper, the survivors have
continued to petition the U.S. government for further assistance. The termination o f
medical, educational, and poverty programs being provided by USAID has left them
feeling desperate and helpless. The Daily Nation reported that:
Representatives o f 100 women beneficiaries o f the USAID project said most of 
the survivors sustained permanent and crippling injuries that put them on life-long 
support drugs, while others lost their jobs... More than 250 Kenyans and a dozen 
Americans died in the blast and another 5,000 were injured. The US House o f 
Representatives has ruled out compensation for African victim s.. ..The women, 
who have formed the Bomb Blast Women Survivors Self-Help Group, asked the 
USAID to extend the program for another four years to enable the beneficiaries to 
arrange to for alternative medical schemes, and to educate their children to at least
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college level (Kelly 2002).
The same worries and fears were also expressed by the survivors that I interviewed.
For example, when I asked them what kind o f things or services they were promised by
government officials and whether or not those promises were adequately delivered, these
were some o f  their remarks:
We were wronged, unjustly attacked, and left to bear the burden o f sins we did 
not commit (Nairobi Bomb Survivor “E”, August 2002).
Every time we attend this anniversary, we hear the same story that the 
governments o f Kenya and America will do more to help us [survivors] in terms 
o f medical and financial assistance. We are frustrated because these promises are 
never delivered (Nairobi Bomb Survivor “F”, August 2002).
It is clear that the survivors felt that the promises that government officials made to 
them in the days and months after the attack were inadequately delivered. They pointed 
out that they were not only wronged and their lives violated, but also their injuries and 
suffering were quickly forgotten and they were left to finance their own medical costs 
and needs. They also indicated that they were angry that every time they attended the 
Nairobi bomb attack anniversaries and requested more medical and educational 
assistance and monetary compensation, they received the same dose o f  false hopes and 
undelivered promises.
The following is a story o f a single mother o f two children. Not only was she severely 
injured and forced to retire from her job, but the small compensation she received as 
remuneration from her employer went to finance her medical costs and needs. She said 
that without employment or government assistance, she does not know how she will raise 
her children.
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She also noted that upon learning that American officials decided to provide
compensation to twelve o f its citizens who died in the embassy attack, but refused to
compensate her made her angry. She pointed out the U.S. government denied her
compensation and others who were affected by the attack because o f discrimination.
My chest was crushed.. .1 was forced to retire because I could not work anymore.
I received $4,000 from the bank as compensation. I used the money to cover for 
medical costs. That money is gone now. I still require medications and monthly 
medical check-ups, but I can’t afford the costs. I have two children in school. Sick 
and without a job, I don’t know how I will pay for their fees and raise them. We 
were promised financial compensation, but we have not received anything yet.
We were told that the families o f twelve Americans who died in the Nairobi bomb 
blast were awarded one million dollars each. W e sued the U.S. government for 
damages, but Americans refused to compensate us. We know that America has 
the money to compensate us. If  they will not give us compensation, we have to 
ask why. Is it because we are Kenyans? (Nairobi Bomb Survivor “G”, August 
2002).
This statement is supported by another survivor who upon learning that the 
governments o f America and Kenya planned to terminate free medical and drug 
assistance wondered how he would pay for this cost o f his treatment without government 
assistance:
.. .now our government has said that the money which the United States gave 
through humanitarian aid to assist us is finished. We were told that all free 
medical treatments and other social services have been terminated. Now we are 
supposed to pay for our own medical costs. W orse still, many o f us [survivors] 
did not have insurance coverage and cannot afford to pay for our medical costs 
(Nairobi Bomb survivor “I” August 2002).
In summary, the Nairobi bomb survivors are not only angry that government officials 
reneged on their promises to provide them with long-term medical assistance and free 
medicines, but also were bitter that all medical assistance and services were being 
terminated without the provision o f an alternative medical plan. They also indicated that 
medication and periodical medical check-ups are so expensive, they were unable to pay
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since most o f them did not have insurance. Furthermore, when they learned that all o f the 
victims o f  the September 11 attacks were compensated in millions o f dollars for their loss 
and suffering while Kenyans were denied such payments, they were bitter and decided to 
use legal action to acquire damages. But when their class action suit and claims for 
damages were dismissed in the U.S. courts, they were further angered because they felt 
that they were being treated by the U.S. government with indifference simply because 
they were African and Kenyan. In other words, the Nairobi victims and survivors felt 
that their lives were less important compared to those o f September 11 and that Kenyan 
death, loss, and suffering were in vain.
Resentment over Denial o f Monetary Compensation 
The September 11 attacks killed three thousand civilians from more than sixty 
countries around the world. Shortly after the attacks, the U.S. government established the 
September 11 Victims Compensation Fund to distribute monetary compensation to the 
survivors and the victim s’ families (Alexander and Alexander 2002). The United States’ 
decision to compensate both American citizens and foreign nationals for their loss, pain, 
and suffering set a new precedent in American legislation. But the decision to pay the 
victims o f September 11 millions o f dollars while denying other victims compensation 
continues to generate heated debate (Kelly 2002; Musa 2002; https://web.lexis- 
nexis.com./universe/document.I
Cases in point are the victims o f the U.S. embassies bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. 
For example, whereas the U.S. government compensated the twelve Americans who died 
in the embassy attack in Nairobi, family members o f the more than two hundred Kenyans
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who died and five thousand who were injured were denied individual compensation 
because according to the U.S. Congress, they were not American citizens (Walsh, 
https://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document.') Moreover, when more than five 
thousand Kenyans who were injured in the U.S. embassy attack brought a class action 
suit against the U.S. government requesting financial damages, claiming that the U.S. 
government “negligently failed to secure the Embassy and to warn o f a potential 
terrorism attack”(Macharia et al., v. United States), their suit and claims were 
dismissed in both the U.S. District Court o f Columbia and the U.S. Court o f Appeals. 
These courts stated that the plaintiffs “failed to demonstrate sufficiently why the U.S. 
government should be held liable for the deaths and injuries in the terrorist attacks” 
(Macharia et al. v. United States).
The Kenyan bomb survivors’ perception o f compensation is the same as those o f other 
victims and survivors o f al-Qaeda actions. The moral perception among the victims and 
survivors whether they are from Africa or America is that government allocated funds 
and money collected through charities were supposed to be used for their medical 
expenses and to meet counseling and rehabilitation needs as well as other basic services 
during the recovery phases (Swetnam 2003; Akhahenda 2002; Hernandez, 
https://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document.')
The victims and survivors who suffer terrorist assaults expect to be fairly 
compensated without being discriminated against based on their race, color, or religion 
(Linnee, https://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document.'). For example, the American 
government’s decision to compensate all victims o f the September 11 attacks regardless 
o f their race, ethnicity, status, or religion set a new precedent upon which other victims o f
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terrorism base their legal arguments. The survivors indicated that because the U.S. 
government made direct monetary compensation to twelve American citizens who died in 
the Nairobi blast, they also expected to be compensated, although not as much as one 
million dollars each (Kelly 2002).
When I asked the Nairobi bomb survivors what their thoughts were regarding the issue
of monetary compensation and how they felt when they learned that twelve American
citizens who were killed in the U.S. embassy attack in Nairobi as well as the 3,000
American and foreign victims o f the September 11 attacks were highly compensated,
these were some o f their grievances and remarks:
It showed us that America has the money to compensate terrorist victims and 
survivors, but does not want to compensate those who were killed and injured in 
their embassy attacks here in K enya....Because the American government 
compensated twelve o f its citizens who were killed and several others who were 
injured from the bomb attack.. .The twelve Americans who were killed received 
at least $1 million each .. .while some o f us received nothing. Again the American 
government awarded the September 11 victims and survivors, both U.S. citizens 
and non-citizens, with millions o f dollars while the rest o f us [Kenyans] have not. 
Worse still, we have tried the legal procedure to acquire money or damages for 
our losses, pain, and suffering, but the U.S. courts keep dismissing our claims. We 
think that the American government has refused to compensate us Kenyan bomb 
victims and survivors because o f racial discrimination. If the U.S. government 
compensated all those who were killed or injured on September 11, we are also 
entitled to compensation because terrorist victims or survivors in New York are 
just as human as those in Nairobi (Nairobi Bomb Survivor “E” August 2002).
The above remark was also confirmed by another survivor’s testimony who believed 
that it was only fair and morally right that the United States government provide the 
survivors with some type o f direct individual payments so that they can pay for their 
long-term medical care and needs. The survivor also pointed out that it was not only 
inhumane that African victims were treated indifferently as their lives, losses, and 
sufferings were considered by the American government as less important, but also it was
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unfair that American officials have refused to release or make available bin Laden’s and
al-Qaeda’s seized funds and assets to benefit the survivors o f terrorism.
It is not fair. I t’s really hurting. Like for me, my life really changed. I think that 
they should compensate us so that w e...w e can organize ourselves and be able to 
live a good life. America should give us money because it gave other terrorist 
victims and survivors who were killed and injured in New York and Washington 
D.C. We are all human beings. A terrorist attack affects all o f us the same way no 
matter which country one comes from. If  the American government doesn’t want 
to pay from their own pocket, it should at least make available O sam a’s and al- 
Q aeda’s seized assets and funds to be used to compensate us. Because Osama and 
his al-Qaeda group were the ones who attacked us, their financial assets, which 
the American government seized, should be used to compensate all o f al-Qaeda’s 
victims and survivors including us Africans (Nairobi Bomb Survivor “G” August 
2002).
In this respect, it is worth giving some careful consideration to the next statements that
were provided by two survivors and chairmen o f the Nairobi Bomb Blast Association and
the Nairobi Visual Bomb Blast Group who acknowledged that although the U.S.
government had spent more than $40 million in the form o f humanitarian aid to assist
Kenyan victims and survivors to deal with their plight and assisted in renovating the
damaged buildings, these survivors, however, felt that the U.S. officials were more
interested in rebuilding damaged businesses and infrastructure than in assisting the
survivors rebuild their lives. These survivors also indicated that they continue lobbying
the U.S. government to provide them and thousands o f others with long-term medical and
educational assistance, counseling and rehabilitation services, and monetary awards.
Kenyan victims cannot understand why some al-Qaeda victims were compensated 
while others were n o t.. ..It seemed the US cared more about buildings than people 
. . .T h e  US must realize that they can’t just walk away from these problem s.. ..It 
seems to us that the US government is more interested in renovating buildings 
that were damaged than assisting the survivors in their struggle to recover and 
heal (Nairobi Bomb Survivor, “H ”, August 2002).
The U.S. government should make some compensation to the Kenyan bomb 
survivors for their injuries and long-term recovery needs because they were
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victims o f circumstances (Nairobi Bomb Survivor, August, “I” , 2002).
In sum, the testimonies presented above show that the Nairobi bomb survivors were 
angry that they were discriminated against and denied compensation when the twelve 
Americans who died in the U.S. embassy in Nairobi and 3000 victims who died in the 
World Trade Center on September 11 were generously rewarded with millions o f dollars. 
They also resented the fact that the United States courts not only dismissed their class 
action suit demanding damages, but also that the U.S. government refused to make 
available bin Laden’s and al-Qaeda’s frozen assets and funds to be used to benefit them.
It is important to note, however, that had the twelve American citizens who were 
killed in the American embassy attack in Nairobi and had the 3000 victims o f September 
11 attacks from more than sixty countries not been compensated in the millions o f 
dollars, the Kenyan victims and survivors would not, perhaps, have raised the 
compensation issue, nor would discrimination or racism have been invoked as the 
rationale for denying them direct individual payments. Otherwise, the Kenyan bomb 
survivors would have appreciated the little government assistance they received and 
continued to rely on their families, charities, and religious beliefs as coping mechanisms.
Survivors’ Coping Mechanisms 
The American embassy bomb attack in downtown Nairobi killed more than two 
hundred and injured five thousand. The cries and groans from those who were wounded 
and the stench o f those burnt beyond recognition have never faded from the ears and eyes 
o f Kenyans. The site o f the five-storey American embassy, the spectacular 25-storey 
bell-bottom-shaped Cooperative House, and the five-storey Ufundi building that housed
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small private businesses and a secretarial college remain an eerie and somewhat ghostly 
place. The location o f the American embassy and the Ufundi House is now a memorial 
park and monument in honor o f the 219 dead and thousands wounded and left with 
indelible scars and bodily deformities (http://web.lexis-nexis.eom/universe/document.f 
Thousands o f those affected have struggled and continue to struggle. While many 
received some direct individual compensation, it is still not enough for those unable to 
work to support their families (Macharia et al. v. United States). In every memorial 
service that victim s’ families and survivors attend, they continue to request more 
financial assistance and demand some compensation from the U.S. government 
(http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document.)
When asked how it feels to have survived the attack, how they cope with their injuries
and suffering, and what they think o f the August 7, 1998, attack, this is how one Nairobi
bomb survivors put it:
It is unthinkable and unexplainable. The bomb happened so fast that you cannot 
remember anything exeept the pain and injuries and daily struggles and 
nightmares that you go through and endure. A bomb that lasted a few seconds 
changed our lives and our country forever. But as a survivor, I thank God for 
being alive. Although I lost an eye and I am still in great pain from the head 
injuries and wounds, I thank God for sparing my life because some o f my fellow 
Kenyans were not lucky enough to have survived the bomb. I feel blessed. At the 
rehabilitation and counseling centers, the psychiatrists and counselors tell us to 
speak out about our ordeal and share it with our fellow bomb survivors about our 
nightmare. They also tell us that by speaking out and sharing with other people o f 
our experience will help us cope and heal. They also strongly suggest that we join 
survivors’ support groups to share our stories and experiences. Otherwise, you 
deal with it the best you know how. For me, I tend to treat this tragedy just like 
any other tragedy and move on with m y life. I wake up every day and thank God 
for sparing my life knowing that there are some families who lost their beloved 
ones in the attack. Since the attack, however, I have been experiencing daily 
nightmares and suffer panic attacks. In fact, even the sound o f a bursting balloon 
or a tire o f a motorcar terribly scares me to death. Otherwise, I try to make every 
moment count and make the best o f the worst situation. Kwa sababu hayo ndio 
maisha. Tufanyeje? (Because that is life, what can we do?) (Nairobi Bomb
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Survivor “A ”, June 2000).
While the testimony shows that the survivor still experiences fear and nightmares
whenever he hears a loud noise, he indicated that he treats the attack as any other tragedy
and tries to move on with his life knowing full well that there were other Kenyans who
did not survive the attack. He expressed gratitude that God spared his life. He also
pointed out that he prays that such a tragedy does not happen again, not in Kenya or
anywhere in the world:
I count m yself blessed. I really thank God for sparing my life. I ’m alive today 
because o f G od’s mercy and grace. I also pray and ask God that this tragedy 
should never happen again, not only here in Kenya, but anywhere in the world 
because terrorism is devastating and destructive. In fact, we Kenyans are peaceful 
people and therefore terrorists should leave us alone (Nairobi Bomb Survivor “B ”, 
June, 2000).
The next statement was presented along these same lines, but differs slightly because
the survivor was partially blinded and worried that her work production was low and
therefore considered herself a failure.
I live to deal with it. I know that my life will never be the same again, and so 1 try 
to do the very best I can with what I have got left. It is really a problem, especially 
working without my two eyes and ears. I have a problem seeing and hearing and 
that affects my overall work assignments. Sometimes my work production is low 
and I feel like I ’m a total failure. But thanks to the help o f the rehabilitation 
centers, counseling centers. I ’m able to handle my anger, pain, and suffering 
better (Nairobi Bomb Survivor “C ”, June, 2000).
The next three testimonies show that survivors took counseling services and joined a
survivors’ group to share their experiences and ordeals with other victims and survivors,
but nothing is as com forting and healing as the pow er o f  prayer:
I cope through prayers and by asking the Lord to give me and my family strength 
and courage to move on with our lives. At the rehabilitation centers, our 
counselors and psychiatrists suggest that we express and share our experiences, 
anger, pain, suffering, stresses, and other trials and tribulations with fellow 
survivors and other people as a way o f coping with our situation. Moreover, with
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me as with the rest o f  the other bomb survivors, we count ourselves blessed to be 
alive. We are aware that the realities and memories o f August 7, 1998, will never 
go away, but we try so hard to take care o f everything one step at a time. We try 
as much as possible; however, no matter how painful and discouraging the ordeal 
is to look at the bright side o f things and push ourselves without surrender to live 
our lives without fear (Nairobi Bomb Survivor “C”, June, 2000).
I believe in the strength o f  the L ord .. .prayers and empathizing with others is very 
important to our survival. Through togetherness and being strong and united as a 
family o f survivors, we can move on with our lives. That is simply how 1 cope 
with my loss and suffering. I have accepted the fact that I ’m totally blind, and 
there is nothing I can do to change that. But those who planned and executed the 
attacks that robbed us our sight and health will have to answer to God come 
Judgment Day. For now, all I can do, and I hope other survivors do the same, is 
move on with our lives, because life does not stop just because one is blind or 
disabled (Nairobi Bomb Survivor, “M”, August, 2002).
I had to accept my fate because there is nothing I can do to change things. I know 
that I will never be able to see again. I decided to move on with my life and to do 
the very best to raise my children. I count m yself blessed and lucky to be a 
survivor because I know many o f my fellow workers and other Kenyans died in 
the attack (Nairobi Bomb Survivor “I” August 2002).
In sum, the evidence and testimonies presented here show that the Nairobi bomb 
survivors have not only accepted their fate as disabled and blind people, but have also 
decided to move on with their lives as there is nothing they can do to reverse the 
situation. They are grateful that God spared their lives and therefore feel blessed.
Conclusion
To conclude, most o f the Nairobi bomb survivors that I interviewed were at their 
places o f work when they were injured. They told me that when they heard something 
that sounded like a big bang coming from the direction o f the U.S. embassy, they rushed 
to their windows to see what was happening. A few seconds later, they were hit and 
injured from flying glass and broken windows. In addition, survivors that I spoke with 
were either partially or totally blinded from the blast. They told me that after being
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injured, they were lying on the floor in their offices or in the streets crying and begging 
for help.
The survivors remember vividly the events o f that Friday morning o f August 7, 1998, 
and especially the excruciating pain they experienced. Most o f them, however, do not 
have a clear knowledge o f how they got to the hospitals, who the good Samaritans who 
drove them to hospitals were, or who assisted them into the matatus (minibuses) to get to 
hospitals for treatment. They also indicated that the governments o f Kenya and America 
were helpful in assisting them to receive free medical treatment, surgeries, medication, 
and other assistance to help them deal with their ordeal. In regard to their coping 
mechanisms, they indicated that they are blessed to be alive and thus have accepted their 
fate, injuries, and ways o f life as blinded or disabled people. Again, they pointed out that 
joining a survivors’ group and attending meetings and sharing their stories and 
experiences with other survivors assured them that they are not alone in their trauma. 
Others indicated that they attend church much more regularly now to thank God for 
sparing their lives. They pointed out that with God on their side, no loss, pain, or 
suffering is difficult to overcome. The survivors, however, indicated that they still 
continue their long quest for compensation from the U.S. government for their injuries 
and long-term recovery needs as they can no longer hold jobs because o f their injuries. 
They were particularly disappointed that the U.S. government decided to give monetary 
compensation to twelve o f its citizens who died during the U.S. embassy attack in 
Nairobi, as well as provided compensation to all three thousand victims o f September 11 
(American and non-American alike), while they were denied similar compensation. 
Furthermore, when they filed a class action suit against the U.S. government asking for
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damages, their suits and claims were dismissed in the U.S. District Court, the U.S. Court 
o f  Appeals, and the Supreme Court for failing to prove that the U.S. government was 
negligent in failing to warn Kenyans o f the attacks or preventing the attacks from 
happening (refer to Macharia et al., vs. United States of America in the Appendix II).
In one respect, the attacks o f the U.S. embassies in Africa and those o f September 11 
brought Africans and Americans together. According to the Assistant Secretary for 
African Affairs, W alter Kansteiner (https://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document') 
the attacks against the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania not only renewed 
their shared commitment to peace and freedom, but also strengthened their ties further in 
regard to the war on global terrorism. Furthermore, Kenya and Tanzania are among the 
key U.S. allies and partners in the Horn o f Africa in the war against international 
terrorism (Lyman and Morrison 2004). Moreover, the former U.S. Ambassador to 
Kenya, Prudence Bushnell (also a survivor o f the attack), noted that the victims o f 
African and American terrorist attacks have a common bond and kinship because they 
were the first ones to experience the horrors and devastation of al-Qaeda terrorist 
operations (Shipman, https://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document.)
For his part, Douglas Sidialo, a survivor o f the U.S. embassy attack and a leader o f the 
Kenyan bomb survivors also pointed out when he heard o f the September 11 attacks, he 
was angry and grieved. He said that, “I felt an instant sense of solidarity with 
America...I knew Americans were our brothers...1 wished that I could travel to America 
to console the victims and survivors....Because Americans traveled to Kenya to assist 
and console us during our tragedy” (https://news.bbc.co.Uk/l//hi/world/africa.) Sidialo 
also noted that Kenyans and Americans have been “brought together by these events”
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(http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/docunient.) He maintained that “the survivors 
and grieving relatives o f the Oklahoma City bombing, U.S. embassies bombings in 
Kenya and Tanzania, and the September 11 attacks in New York City and Washington 
D C., must come “together as a family” to console and comfort other survivors in their 
quest to cope with their tragedy and in their struggle to find emotional and psychological 
healing (https://web.lexis-nexis.com.universe/document.) Sidialo indicated that 
sharing stories, experiences, or ordeals with other terrorism survivors is key in assuring 
them that they are not alone in their loss and suffering (https://web.lexis- 
nexis.com/universe/document.)
In regard to the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, the U.S. 
Congress approved a new embassy bomb law that provided compensation to the twelve 
American citizens who were killed in the explosion. Congress overwhelmingly voted 
391 to 18 to provide compensation for deaths and injuries suffered by its citizens. More 
than $10 million was designated for payment to the families o f the Americans who 
perished (Kelley 2002). Although there were more than two hundred Kenyans and 
twelve Tanzanians who died in the bomb attacks. Congress made it very clear that 
Africans (i.e., Kenyans and Tanzanians) could not be compensated because they were not 
U.S. citizens (Kelley 2002).
Among the Congressional dissenters from the legislation was California 
Congresswoman Barbara Lee who disagreed with the majority o f her fellow 
Congressmen in the way the compensation plan was designed. She questioned that if 
Congress established a compensation system that allowed all victims and survivors of 
September 11 to be compensated irrespective o f their nationalities, why were the victims
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of the 1998 American embassies bombings, o f which majority were African, denied 
compensation? (Kelley 2002). She maintained that if  Congress’s new law stipulated that 
citizens o f other countries were entitled to receive equal compensation as those o f U.S. 
nationals due to the attacks o f September 11, why were the African victims o f the 1998 
American embassies bombings denied the same compensation coverage? (Kelley 2002). 
Congresswoman Lee, therefore, indicated that she would introduce a bill to provide relief 
and compensation to the Kenyan and Tanzanian survivors. She pointed out that it was 
morally wrong for Congress to deny African victims o f terrorism compensation solely 
because they were not American citizens whilst it was morally correct to offer 
compensation to all victims o f  the September 11 attack regardless o f their nationality or 
country o f citizenship. She reminded her fellow Congressmen that, “More that 4,000 
Kenyan and Tanzanian nationals were also injured in the bombings....They were a 
productive part o f their countries’ labor force” (Kelley 2002). Congresswoman L ee’s 
efforts to persuade Congressional members to make payments to the Kenyan and 
Tanzanian victims and survivors were unfruitful.
Personal Observations 
Initially, when I approached the authorities in Nairobi and made my intentions known 
to them that I wanted to interview survivors o f the bomb blast, especially those who had 
resumed their duties in the aftermath o f  the bomb, I was taken aback when I heard that 
those who were injured were not liked by some o f their fellow workers because they 
received a lot o f exposure from the rehabilitation centers, counseling, and the agencies 
that were assisting them cope with their tragedy, and, o f course, researchers.
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For example, when I inquired to interview four o f the survivors who were present on 
that particular day, this is what one o f the workers who was instructed to introduce me to 
the survivors had to say: Wewe bwana Njoroge, kuna watu wenu hapa wanataka 
kuongea na wewe kuhusu mambo ya bomu (You, Mr, Njoroge, there are your people here 
who want to talk to you about the bomb attack). I sensed a feeling o f uneasiness between 
those who were injured during the attack and those who were not, because it seemed to 
me that the non-victims thought that the survivors were being treated as heroes or 
heroines or were using their injuries to gain advantage— to receive sympathy and 
government favors— free medical treatment, drugs, school fees, and job  training.
For example, when I inquired from the Kenya Railways Corporation if  I could have
the names o f  those who were injured in the U.S. embassy attack so that I could talk to
them about their experiences as survivors, I received the following from the coordinating
officer in charge o f the survivors:
So you are from an American university doing a study on the responses o f the 
victims and survivors o f the bomb blast? In order for you to see or talk to those 
who were injured in our Corporation, first you have to make an appointment with 
our General M anager....W e want to know those who have been interviewed and 
what they are saying....W hether those who have been interviewed will receive 
further financial assistance....Again, you people (researchers) come here to talk to 
these survivors when they are working...you know, it takes time from their work 
and duties and this becomes a conflict o f interest.. .they use government working 
hours for private gain...maybe you should come back during lunch hour, and I 
will see what I can do to help you (personal conversation with “J”, June, 2002).
I asked to talk directly to the General Manager to introduce m yself and make my case. 
He replied: ""Wewe nenda urudi saa saba tutaongea" (You go and come back at 1:00.
We will talk) (Ondieki, 1997). I recognized that the officer that I was dealing with did 
not want me to identify and interview survivors because I was not willing to do as he 
wanted— “to talk well” (i.e., to offer lunch or a couple o f drinks) (Ondieki, 1997). At
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first, I thought that his actions were inappropriate because he wanted to be bribed before 
allowing me to speak to survivors. So I left and came back at 1:00 p.m. as he had 
instructed. I found the officer still waiting for me. I offered to buy him a couple o f beers 
and a roasted leg o f goat meat to let me contact and speak to the survivors. He agreed. 
The following day, he personally assisted me in contacting the bomb survivors and even 
instructed them it was all right for me to interview them in their offices during working 
hours.
I also encountered similar obstacles at the Kenya School for the Blind (KSB). When I 
walked into the office o f the officer in charge o f KSB and requested to interview bomb 
survivors blinded from the American embassy attack, he told me to provide a letter from 
my university showing that I was a doctoral student conducting fieldwork. After 
providing him with said letter(s), he agreed to allow me to contact and speak to survivors. 
But he stated that, “I would like to know more about your research and your life in the 
U.S.” (Officer “J”, June 2002). I knew exactly what he meant. He expected me to 
reciprocate by giving him kitu kidogo ‘something sm all’ or inviting him for chai ‘a cup o f 
tea’ for allowing me to speak to survivors. Having encountered a similar problem at the 
Railway Headquarters, I offered to take him for drinks. He allowed me talk to survivors. 
Ethnographers often encounter many obstacles and problems that include finding reliable 
gatekeepers, contacting respondents, canceling appointments, unwillingness and 
uneasiness responding to questions, acting suspiciously, and failing to gain rapport 
(Spradley 1980). Researchers and ethnographers who know how to solve these problems, 
especially those that deal with persons o f authority, find it much easier to conduct their 
research. Usually, buying a few beers, cigarettes, or food for officials and respondents is
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important to building rapport. I did the same thing during my fieldwork (Ondieki 1997).
1 also found out that there were some individuals who were claiming to be the 
coordinators or chairmen o f the bomb survivors or victim s’ families who lobby 
government officials and U.S. officials to compensate those who were affected by the 
attacks. In reality, some o f these so-called “coordinators” were only self-anointed 
prophets. Their claims that they lost one o f their relatives or were themselves injured 
could not be proven. Some claimed to speak on behalf o f the victims and survivors, but 
in reality had ulterior motives, to line their own pockets and receive government favors, 
that is, to get money from the Njojo Commission and school fees for their children. 
Others were expecting that if  and when the victims and survivors would finally receive 
monetary compensation for their loss, injuries, and suffering, they would also benefit.
Given the African custom o f the extended family, denying compensation to victims or 
survivors o f terrorism who used to be the breadwinners and are now unable to work to 
provide for their families, extended families, and relatives is akin to sentencing hundreds 
and thousands o f  dependent family members to lives o f poverty and even early death 
(Rutahindurwa 2003). For example, it has been reported that more than 5,000 Kenyans 
who were wounded during the U.S. embassy bomb attack incurred permanent injuries 
which prevent them from holding jobs (http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l//hi/world/ainericas.)
Moreover, it has been reported that about 80 percent o f those who were injured were 
male breadwinners. According to the Chairman o f the Nairobi Bomb Survivors 
Association, the attacks left thousands of families w ithout breadwinners, therefore 
forcing them to become beggars Nairobi Bomb Survivor, August 2002).
The Responses o f the September 11 Victims
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The victims and survivors o f the American embassy bombing in Nairobi can be 
compared to those o f the September 11 attacks in New York in relation to the following 
themes: (1) The initial reactions to the attacks— how they remembered; (2) undelivered 
government promises; (3) compensation issues; and (4) the coping mechanisms. The 
victims and survivors o f September 11 remembered vividly seeing the first plane 
slamming into the South Tower o f the World Trade Center and thought it was an 
accident. A few minutes later, they saw another plane crashing into the North Tower and 
suspected that the United States was possibly under terrorist attack. A few hours later the 
Twin Towers collapsed, killing more than three thousand civilians and injuring thousands 
others. The initial reactions from survivors and millions o f others who witnessed the 
attacks o f September o f 11 were horror, shock, anger, and fear.
The situation in downtown Manhattan was akin to a war zone. Those who witnessed 
the scenes o f horror and devastation caused by the attacks lacked the words to express the 
horror o f that “Black Tuesday” . Witnessing people jum ping out o f the top floors o f the 
World Trade Center to their deaths, seeing terrified victims trapped in the burning towers 
begging to be rescued, witnessing the overwhelming black cloud o f debris that enveloped 
lower Manhattan and blinded thousands when the towers fell, and experiencing the sheer 
terror o f the attacks seemed surreal and incomprehensible to those within the vicinity o f 
the towers (Fink and Mathias 2002; Time September 11, 2001). President Bush called the 
attacks “a national tragedy and an apparent act o f terrorism against our country.” Others 
pointed out that September 11 was the most devastating terrorist onslaught waged against 
the United States since Pearl Harbor. September 11 was simply referred to as another 
“day that will live in infamy” {Time September 11, 2001; America Under Siege, 2001).
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Unlike the attacks o f the U.S. embassy in Nairobi that claimed more than two hundred 
civilians and injured five thousand, those o f the World Trade Center and the Pentagon 
claimed more than three thousand people and injured thousands others. Unlike Kenya 
where few people watched the actual attacks unfold, attacks against the United States 
were watched by millions o f Americans on their television sets. Compared to Kenyans, 
Americans were dramatically affected because thousands o f survivors and millions of 
people witnessed the attacks and clearly remember exactly where they were during the 
“day of infamy” that changed their lives. In an article appearing in Time on September 
11, 2001, Lance Morrow wrote that the September! 1 attacks were different from all 
previous ones that al-Qaeda had planned and executed because o f the following:
This was terrorism brought to near perfection as a dramatic form. Never has the evil 
business had such production values. Normally, the audience sees only the smoking 
aftermath— the blown-up embassy, the ruined barracks, the ship with a blackened hole at 
the waterline. This time the first plane striking the first tower acted as a shill. It alerted 
the media, brought cameras to the scene so that they might be set up to record the vivid 
surreal bloom o f the second strike ( ‘Am I seeing this?’) and then— could they be such 
engineering geniuses, so deft at demolition?— the catastrophic collapse o f the two towers, 
one after the other, and a sequence o f panic in the streets that might have been shot for a 
remake o f The War or the Worlds or for Independence Day. Evil possesses an instinct for 
theater, which is why, in an era o f gaudy and gifted media, evil may vastly magnify its 
damage by the power o f horrific images.”
In the days and months after the attacks, there was an overwhelming sense o f  unified 
American fury that demanded revenge and military retaliation against the perpetrators
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and the states that sponsored them. In October o f 2001, President Bush ordered the 
invasion o f Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden’s and al-Qaeda’s safe haven and site o f their 
training camps. W ithin months, the Taliban was on the run. The Bush administration 
also promised to assist in the rebuilding o f Ground Zero, bail out affected businesses and 
airlines, and assist the victim s’ families financially. Some victim s’ families were and are 
still are unsatisfied with the promises that the government made to them and have not to 
date been met.
Undelivered Promises
Compared to the Kenyan government, the United States followed through with many 
o f the initial promises it had made to the victim s’ families in regards to setting aside a 
section at Ground Zero as sacred ground to memorialize those who were killed in the 
World Trade Center and to compensate families o f the victims. The Kenyan government, 
with the assistance o f the United States, constructed a monument where the U.S. embassy 
used to be located to honor those who were killed in the bomb attack. The United States 
government, on other hand, has not yet built a memorial to honor those who perished in 
the September 11 attacks. It is not that the U.S. does not intend to build a memorial, but 
due to controversies swirling around the most appropriate way to do so have hindered any 
meaningful progress. Because the U.S. government has as yet failed to deliver on its 
promise, this has angered many families o f the victims.
Unlike Kenya which failed to establish a national inquiry to find out why the attacks 
happened, the families o f the September 11 lobbied Congress to create The 9/11 
Commission to investigate the attacks (p. xvii). The Commission investigated why and
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how the attacks o f September 11 occurred and provided recommendations to the U.S. 
Congress to ensure that such attacks do not occur again in the United States. Some of the 
recommendations made included: Restructuring o f the intelligence community to ensure 
that the FBI and CIA shared information and worked together with less bureaucratic 
infighting, creating a National Intelligence Director to oversee the overall task of 
national intelligence programs, and empowering the Department o f Flomeland Security to 
oversee homeland defense and other security issues at airports, ports o f entry, and 
preparedness strategies to ensure national security {The 9/11 Commission Report 
2004:361-428).
Today, the families o f the September 11 are still a powerful force lobbying Congress 
and American officials to deliver all o f the promises made to them in the days and 
months after the attack. They also demand that all o f the recommendations made by The 
9/11 Commission Report are enacted to ensure that another attack does not occur on U.S. 
soil. Families o f the Nairobi attack, on the other hand, lack the means and the 
wherewithal to form a lobbying group to voice their concerns and demands. In addition, 
because o f the Nairobi bomb victim s’ and survivors’ suit for more compensation was 
dismissed in the U.S. courts and because government medical assistance and social 
programs were terminated, they were left without recourse but to pay for their own 
medical and rehabilitation costs. In Kenya as in America, families o f victims and 
survivors have lost trust with their governments because many promises were either 
inadequately delivered or have not been delivered at all.
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Compensation Issues
In both Kenya and the United States, commissions were established to disperse 
compensation to the victim s’ families. The Kenyan government created the Njojo 
Commission to oversee the task o f dispersing money acquired from charities and the 
United States Assistance for International Development (USAID) to the victims and 
survivors. In America, Congress established a Federal Commission Fund to compensate 
millions o f dollars to victim s’ families for their loss, pain, and suffering. In the U.S. 
more than 90 percent o f the victim s’ families o f the September 11 attacks accepted 
compensation and agreed not to bring lawsuits against U.S. insurance companies, 
commercial airlines, airports, and the W orld Trade Center. Other families, however, 
decided to seek damages through the courts.
Unlike Kenya, where the bomb victims and survivors received compensation ranging 
from a few hundred to a few thousands o f dollars, the September 11 victims received 
compensation in terms o f millions o f dollars. The United States denial to compensate the 
Kenyan victims and survivors with individual direct payments for their loss and suffering 
necessitated a class action suit against the United States government (see Macharia et al. 
vs. United States of America in Appendix II). The suit, however, was dismissed in the 
U.S. Civil Court, the U.S. Court o f Appeals, and the Supreme Court.
Coping Strategies
In both Kenya and the United States, the coping mechanisms that the victim s’ families 
and survivors employed to deal with their loss, pain, and suffering were the same. They 
included joining survivors’ support groups where they shared their experiences and
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ordeals with others who were similarly affected by the tragedy; others relied on family 
members and their religious faith to provide comfort and solace, thus accepting the bitter 
reality that they will never see their loved ones again and accepting the fact that they are 
unable to reverse the outcome o f the attacks. With the exception o f  those victims and 
survivors who are still bitter and angry about the attacks that robbed them of their loved 
ones or were severely injured, the majority o f the victim s’ families and survivors have 
decided to get on with their lives.
But as long as government officials fail to deliver on all the promises they made to the 
victims’ families and survivors, as long as officials fail to enact all recommendations 
made by The 9/11 Commission, and as long as officials fail to bring the principal 
masterminds and perpetrators o f the Nairobi embassy bombing and the World Trade 
Center attack to justice, including Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, the victims, 
survivors, and the public will continue to lose faith in their governments.
In comparing the attacks o f the September 11 and those o f the embassy bombing of 
August 7 and in talking with the bomb survivors in Kenya, I find some common patterns 
regarding the compensation issue and payment plans. Some o f these common concerns 
can be phrased in terms o f three general questions: (i) Why not us? (ii) Is that all? (ii) 
Why should we settle for less? These simple questions can be developed further. First, if 
the victims o f the September 11 attacks were compensated in the millions o f dollars, why 
were the victims o f the first W orld Trade Center attacks in 1993 denied the same 
compensation; or the victims o f the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995; or the victims of 
the U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, or victims o f the anthrax 
attacks in 2001? Why has a consistent plan not emerged?
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Second, why were the September 11 victims paid in millions o f dollars while those in 
the African embassy attacks were paid in a couple o f hundred or a few thousand of 
dollars? Third, why did the U.S. government treat the suffering o f African bomb victims 
and survivors with indifference while the families o f twelve American citizens have now 
been paid $1 million each?
Fourth, why is it that the U.S. court systems are awarding significant sums o f money 
to plaintiffs and victims o f  terrorism in default judgm ents against terrorist-sponsoring 
countries such as Iraq, Iran, Libya, and Saudi Arabia, but not the victims o f the U.S. 
embassies attacks in Kenya and Tanzania?
Fifth, why did the U.S. Congress decide to compensate a few terrorist victims and 
survivors with seized assets from countries known to be terrorist sponsors and not all 
victims o f terrorism? Sixth, why should the 1998 African bomb victims settle for 
payments ranging from $500 to $11,000 when the victims o f September 11 cannot even 
settle for $1 million for the loss o f a loved one? Seventh, if  it is true that the U.S. has 
successfully seized more than $200 million o f bin Laden and al-Qaeda assets, why is it 
refusing to make those assets available to the victims and survivors to be used to benefit 
them regardless whether they are American or African? These are the sorts o f questions 
that trouble the survivors and many other Africans, including myself.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
RETHINKING TERRORISM: A SHIFT OF PARADIGM
“Liberty is a food that is good to taste but hard to digest: it sets well only in a 
good strong stomach.”
—Jean-Jacques Rousseau, [1835]
“W ar is a like a delicious piece o f cake that everybody wants a piece of: 
Politicians, criminals and speculators, profiteers and murderers, sadists and 
masochists, the faithful and the charitable, historians and philosophers, and 
journalists.”
—Dubravka Ugresic, 1995
In this study, I developed a holistic theory o f the culture o f terrorism as a protracted 
step-child o f economic injustices, political oppression, the legacies o f imperialism and 
neo-colonialism, socio-cultural imperatives, and ideological and religious zealotry (Azar 
1989; Chua 2003; Riches 1986; Taheri 1987; Hoffman 1995). Non-governmental 
terrorist operations directed towards nation-states can be viewed as responses to the 
clashes o f civilizations and globalization and government officials’ policies and actions 
(Huntington 1996; Chua 2003, Chomsky 2003).
Deliberate and choreographed terrorist operations are an attempt to create a theater—  
symbolically designed not only to inculcate fear and instill insecurity and influence a 
larger audience, but also to undermine government authorities in their attempts to protect 
their citizens (Crenshaw 1995; Hoffman 1999; Harvey 1998; Stem 1999; Jenkins 1990). 
For example, Livingston (1978: 20) wrote that, “the significance o f international 
terrorism does not lie in the number o f lives taken or in the amount o f destruction 
inflicted; it lies in the number o f lives threatened and in the amount o f fear the terror 
generates.”
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In modem times, terrorist organizations, particularly Islamic fundamentalist
organizations such as al-Qaeda target the West in general and the United States in
particular because these societies generally enjoy unmatched economic and military
superiority. The al-Qaeda network continues to exploit new technologies and
vulnerabilities and seeks sophisticated and lethal weapons to inflict mass casualties.
M odem societies are especially susceptible to weapons o f mass destruction. For
example, the attacks against the U.S. on September 11 were stem  reminders that a few
non-state terrorist individuals armed with primitive weapons (i.e., wielding knives and
box-cutters) could hijack A merica’s own commercial aircraft and crash them into
financial and military buildings causing thousands o f deaths and unprecedented
destruction to the w orld’s sole superpower, the United States (Talbott and Chanda 2001 ;
Alexander and Alexander 2002). The 9/11 Commission Report (2004; xvi) articulated it
best when it reported that on September 11,
We leamed about an enemy who is sophisticated, patient, disciplined, and lethal. 
The enemy rallies broad support in the Arab and Muslim world by demanding 
redress o f political grievances, but its hostility towards us and our values is 
limitless. Its purpose is to rid the world o f religious and political pluralism, the 
plebiscite, and equal rights for women. It makes no distinction between military 
and civilian targets. Collateral damage is not in its lexicon.
Deliberate and catastrophic attacks against defenseless civilians usually provoke 
government officials to employ rhetoric o f war on terrorism to resuscitate patriotism and 
galvanize national and intemational support and cooperation for the necessity o f 
preemptive military force to fight intemational terrorism (Scheuer 2004; Clarke 2004; 
Woodward 2004). Govemm ent officials impose counter-terrorism measures that often 
infringe upon protected constitutional freedoms and liberties. For instance, some o f the 
provisions o f the US PATRIOT ACT threaten democratic practices and suppress citizens’
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civil and personal rights— the freedoms o f expression, association, and protection from 
arbitrary and capricious laws and practices (Booth and Dunne 2003; M ahajan 2002; 
Chomsky 2003).
In addition, as the U.S. govemment relentlessly continues to pressure world leaders to 
pass new and tougher counter-terrorism measures, and as the Bush administration 
threatens to use the power o f the “stick” (military force and economic sanctions) against 
countries that fail to cooperate and support the U.S. in the war on terror, the warm 
relations and support that the United States enjoyed prior to September 11 continue to 
weaken. Furthermore, the overwhelming cooperation and support that the United States 
received from the intemational community during and immediately after the attacks o f 
September 11 have continued to wane. President Bush’s political mantra; “You are 
either with us, or you are with the terrorists” (quoted in Clarke 2004:244), and his 
preemptive invasion o f Iraq are partly responsible for the lukewarm support the U.S. has 
received from other world leaders and nations.
To summarize the theory, terrorism consists o f socio-cultural practices, ideologies, 
methods, tactics, organizational stmctures, and resources that groups use to address their 
grievances to advance tactical and strategic objectives. Terrorism can be viewed as a 
desperate response by weak and powerless groups (i.e., those in terms o f  numbers, size, 
capabilities, technology, and weapons) waging war against strong and powerful state 
entities. But terrorism can not only be seen as a weapon of the weak, but also a method 
o f struggle that any person, group, and state or non-state entity can employ to achieve 
desired goals such as economic, political, religious, social, or ideological remuneration.
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Because terrorism is another form o f foreign policy, govemment responses against it 
must not only take into consideration the challenges and impact that terrorist operations 
pose, but also discem  the overall calculus o f terrorism. To discern the phenomenon of 
terrorism, an ancient and complex problem, it is important to take into account that the 
nature o f terrorism, its characteristics, causes, courses, consequences, and mitigating 
mechanisms shift in time and space. In this case, we can speak o f a distinction between 
the “old terrorists” and “new terrorists” .
The Changing Face o f Terrorism 
Some scholars and analysts have argued that the “traditional” or secular terrorists were 
largely left-wing ideologues employing violence to achieve political objectives, were 
nationalistic and separatist in scope, relied on guns, bombs, and dynamite as weapons o f 
choice, and kidnapped govemment and business officials and used them as bargaining 
chips (Fraser and Fulton 1987; Laqueur 1987 White 1999; The 9/11 Commission Report 
2004). The “m odem ” terrorists, on the other hand, comprised mostly o f right-wing 
ideologues, lack political agendas except religion. They employ a vast array o f weapons 
(bombs, explosives, suicide-missions, or weapons o f mass destruction) to kill and 
inculcate fear and inseeurity in a larger audience beyond their targets (White 1999; Fraser 
and Fulton 1987; Laqueur 1987; The 9/11 Commission Report 2004; Hoffman 2004).
Whereas traditional terrorists largely conducted attacks against govemment 
institutions and societies within their territorial boundaries, flied specific flags, wore 
specific uniforms, and demanded seats at the negotiation tables, the new terrorists, on the 
other hand, conduct attacks within and outside their territories, fly no specific flags, wear
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no specific uniforms, and demand no seats at negotiating tables (Hoffman 1999; 
Henderson 2002; Keane 2001). Comparing traditional and modem terrorism. White 
(1999:76) noted that they have to been viewed as “a manifestation o f violence in a 
particular time period.”
Historian W alter Laqueur (2001) also pointed out that yesterday’s theories and 
explanations might be inadequate to examine today’s and tomorrow’s terrorists. This is 
for the following reasons: First, prior to the 1990s, traditional or secular terrorist groups 
such as the Palestinian Liberation Organization (FLO), the Irish Republican Army (IRA), 
and the Basque Freedom Front (ETA) not only subscribed to the left-wing ideologies of 
Lenin-Marxist doctrine, but also were motivated by a specific political agenda— to 
acquire independence. Conversely, the modem terrorist groups o f the post-Cold W ar era 
subscribe to right-wing ideologies and lack specific political agendas except that they are 
motivated by extremist religious zealotry that advocates total destmction o f  the enemy. 
For example, some scholars contend that al-Qaeda’s main intention in attacking the 
United States had nothing to do with acquiring independence but to eliminate U.S 
influence from the G ulf regions and M iddle East to make it possible to create Islamic 
states that follow stringent Sharia laws and doctrines (Hoffman 1999; Laqueur 2001 and 
2004; Jenkins 2001, Combs 2003; Ruthven 2002; Armstrong 2000; Stem 2003).
Second, traditional terrorist organizations targeted significant persons and 
institutions— politicians, ambassadors, businessmen, academicians, or embassies. After 
kidnapping an ambassador or taking an embassy hostage, the traditional terrorists used 
them as bargaining chips to get concessions and reach their goals. Brian Jenkins (1985) 
judged that traditional terrorists killed fewer significant persons to scare a larger
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audience. M odem terrorists, on the other hand, target both “hard targets” such as military 
barracks, the Pentagon, embassies, or financial sites such as the W orld Trade Center and 
“soft targets” such as hotels, resorts, residential complexes, or com muter train and bus 
systems where civilians congregate. Modem terrorists’ goal is to kill as many people as 
possible and force millions and perhaps billions o f people around the world to watch and 
listen via the media (Weinberg and Eubank 2000; Stem 1999; Scheuer 2004; The 9/11 
Commission Report 2004; Alexander and Alexander 2002).
Third, a majority o f the followers that joined traditional terrorist groups and 
participated in terrorist operations came from poor, illiterate, and marginalized 
backgrounds. Others came from dysfunctional families. The followers o f Palestinian 
Liberation Organization, Hamas, Hezbollah, Euskadi ta Askatasuna, and Tamil Tigers are 
examples (Post et al. 2002; Laqueur 2001). Conversely, a majority o f  members and 
followers o f modem terrorist groups come from stable, middle, and upper class families, 
and are well-educated and well-traveled. Al-Qaeda’s leaders, Osama bin Laden, Ayman 
al-Zawahiri, Sheik Mohammed, Mohammed Atef, Ramzi Yossef, and the September 11 
attackers, Mohammed Atta and his co-hijackers, are examples (Zakaria 2003; Gunaratna 
2002; Bergen 2002; Reeve 1999; Strasser and W hitney 2004; Clarke 2004).
Fourth, whereas the traditional terrorist organizations employed primarily the 
techniques o f kidnapping, bombing, and hostage-taking within territorial boundaries, the 
modem terrorists employ various fighting techniques and methods to wage jihad.
Modem terrorists bring jihad to the enemy’s shores. Their techniques include sleeper 
agents, freelancers, and suicide-bombers who infiltrate the targeted society, collect 
information, conduct surveillance, and live quietly within the targeted society to evade
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detection until they are activated to carry out attacks. Modem terrorists also employ both
sophisticated and primitive methods to wage war. For example, the nineteen suicide-
bombers who attacked America on September 11 used box-cutters and pocket-knives
(primitive weapons) and American commercial aircraft as guided missiles (sophisticated
weapons) to attack the World Trade Center and the Pentagon (Alexander and Alexander
2002; The 9/11 Commission Report 2004). In short, because the al-Qaeda network relies
on sleeper agents living quietly in the countries they plan to attack and blends in with the
community as the perpetrators o f September 11 did, they are far more lethal than their
previous terrorist counterparts. Reed L. Wadley (2003:339) stated:
A l-Q aeda’ reliance on so-ealled sleeper agents suggests the potential for some 
sort o f  treacherous attacks, especially against (culturally similar) civilian targets. 
Added to this is the apparent shift o f terrorist organizations, from hierarchical cell 
structures to loosely connected, linear networks, which may allow for more 
independence in ‘potentially far more lethal’ tactical decisions, as well as 
increased anonymity. It should also not be forgotten that guerilla/terrorist 
organizations, o f whatever stripe, are never culturally neutral. Some, such as the 
Taliban and A1 Qaeda, come from regions with a well-established ethic o f honor 
and blood vengeance, where treachery may be an acceptable means o f ‘payback’. 
Indeed, given the tribal pattern o f  small groups using treachery against other small 
groups, the possibility exists that A1 Qaeda operatives or their sympathizers might 
employ treacherous ambushes against small units of, for example, U.S. Special 
Forces, allied forces deployed in Afghanistan.
Because terrorist attacks are now conducted by religiously- and ethnically-inspired
individuals or groups and because terrorist operations are now privately funded and
choreographed to kill many people and destroy unprecedented amounts o f property far
more than in the previous decades, the face o f terrorism is changing markedly. Michael
A. Diamond (2002:36) pointed out that:
Today, terrorism is associated with public acts o f violence and mass destruction, 
dramatic public performances intended to shock bystanders and symbolize a war 
between good and evil. The timeliness and relevance o f understanding the
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psychology o f large ethnic, religious, nationalist and cultural large-group conflict 
is unmistakable.
A brief summary o f motivational theories and counter-terrorism responses could serve 
as a backdrop to this discussion. There are several explanations why some individuals 
and groups use terrorist operations to advance their agendas, some o f which provide 
useful insights into the phenomenon o f terrorism and terrorist events, but none o f which 
can sufficiently explain why some organizations such as al-Qaeda resort to terrorist 
attacks during peacetime. Chapters one and three o f this study examined the theories and 
organizational structure o f al-Qaeda in detail. In this section, I briefly examine key 
motivational explanations grouped into three categories: (1) cultural, (2) psychological, 
and (3) pragmatic.
For a cultural viewpoint, violence or terrorism is viewed as something that is 
embedded in the cultural practices of some people or societies so that when conflicts 
occur, the propensity to employ violence comes almost naturally to the parties concerned. 
Anthropologist Napoleon Chagnon’s analysis o f the fierce people, the Yanomamo (1968), 
is an example. Second, culture becomes an explanatory variable when individuals or 
groups draw inspiration from earlier violent movements or heroes. Harry H. Tumey- 
High’s study on the Primitive War: Its Practices and Concepts (1991) is an example. 
Some people, therefore, talk about a “Zulu warrior tradition” that the Inkatha Freedom 
Party is said to symbolize or an “Islamic jihadist” tradition against the infidel that is said 
to have inspired Arab and Muslim fundamentalist organizations such as al-Qaeda. In 
other words, culture helps to explain why some groups or societies employ violence to 
get what they want. Oftentimes, societies reach into the past to retrieve long-forgotten 
heroes, narratives o f great battles, and myths that portray bravery, courage, honor, pride.
262
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
and power (Post et al. 2002). Islamic religious extremists, such as al-Qaeda, eulogize
t h
Saladin (a 12 century Arab warrior) who fought and defeated the Christian Crusaders. 
Al-Qaeda’s senior leaders, bin Laden and al-Zawahari, are attempting to follow in the 
foot-steps o f  Saladin by waging holy war against the infidel United States and Israel 
(Armstrong 2000; Ruthven 2002; The 9/11 Commission Report 2004; Emerson 2003; 
Gunaratna 2003; Bergen 2003; Herbst 2003).
The psychological explanations revolve around individuals or group behavior under 
conditions o f  competition, rapid change, modernization, and globalization. The basic 
argument is that a large number o f people in the world do not benefit from development. 
Many people simply find it difficult to satisfy their ambitions when confronted by the 
pressures o f modernity and globalization. The result is relative deprivation, which 
generates feelings o f frustration and a desire to express them in aggressive and violent 
ways. The proponents who apply this theory to terrorist organizations tend to assume 
that members and followers o f such organizations come from poor and impoverished 
backgrounds and marginalized and dysfunctional families who carry their frustrations 
into terrorist movements (Post et al. 2002; Jenkins 2001). Although it can be argued that 
poverty, marginalization, alienation, and hopelessness breed frustration and frustration 
breeds violence because disadvantaged individuals with a propensity to violence get 
pulled into terrorist groups, the theory does not explain why some individuals from good, 
rich, educated backgrounds such as many in al-Qaeda’s infrastructure join terrorist 
movements or participate in suicide-bombings (Silke 2003; Atran 2004). For example, 
the perpetrators o f  the September 11 attacks, with their education and technological 
skills, could have had secure livelihoods and worked in good jobs, but chose to sacrifice
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their lives for religious reasons. In this case, I argue that deprivation, poverty, 
marginalization, alienation, and hopelessness do not always push their victims towards 
terrorism, for if  that were the case, the poorest countries and the most oppressed peoples 
in third world countries, including those in sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, the 
Caribbean, and Asia, would have resorted to terrorism (Zakaria 2004; Bergen 2002;
Atran 2004; Jenkins 2001).
The pragmatic factor focuses on the rational calculation imperative. From a rational 
standpoint, terrorism does not have any intrinsic propensity or meaning. Like any other 
political movement, terrorism can be viewed as an instrument that rational individuals or 
actors employ to advance their agendas— cultural, economic, political, social, religious, 
or ideological. Thus, rational choice explanations are important in the study o f terrorism. 
One can hardly find groups o f individuals who glorify terrorism as an end in itself. Many 
organizations tend to abide by the Clausewitzian dictum of terrorism as a continuation o f 
politics by other means (Peters 2002). Put otherwise, most terrorist groups, including 
those driven by religious fervor and zealotry claim that their terrorism has a political 
logic. For example, even though al-Qaeda is a religious terrorist movement, it claims to 
have a political motivation for conducting terrorist operations. Al-Qaeda routinely 
reminds Arab and Muslim people that the reason for waging war against the W est and the 
United States is because o f their foreign policies and actions toward the Arab and Muslim 
world (Scheuer 2004). I argue that bin Laden and al-Qaeda only use U.S. foreign policy 
actions and the Arab-Israeli conflict when it fits their needs— to recruit new members and 
followers to their organization and to acquire support from the Arab and Muslim world. 
Otherwise, bin Laden and al-Zawahiri are not particularly interested in the Palestinians
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and their problems (Keane 2001; Friedman 2002).
Jenkins (2001) and others discussed the issue o f the paradigm shift regarding terrorism 
in the following areas: First, from a motivational standpoint, there have been 
fundamental changes in terrorist objectives. For example, during the 1960s and through 
the 1980s, terrorists were driven largely by either ideological imperatives (communism or 
socialism) or narrow nationalistic factors (liberation) that spawned separatist violence.
But toward the end o f the twentieth-century, religious beliefs and imperatives provided 
the context for violence and terrorism. This shift is important because those who believe 
that they have the mandate o f God or Allah to kill their enemies have fewer moral qualms 
about mass murder and care less about the conventional rule o f war (Diamond 2002; 
Hoffman 1999; Jenkins 2001).
Furthermore, because religiously inspired terrorists rarely have a political agenda to 
promote, they usually do not care if  their terrorist campaigns and operations yield actual 
socio-political or economic reforms. This is because terrorist zealots usually believe that 
martyrdom for G od’s cause brings reward in the afterlife (Keane 2001). In this case, 
suicide terrorism and mass murder go hand in hand. Scholars and analysts who predicted 
that religiously-driven terrorists would be capable o f planning and executing the worst 
destruction and cause casualties o f epic proportions were vindicated by al-Q aeda’s daring 
and meticulously coordinated attacks against the United States on September 11 
(Alexander and Alexander 2002; Clarke 2004; Jenkins 2001).
Second, from the technological viewpoint, Jenkins (2001) argued that the secret 
weapon o f the modem terrorist, as the al-Qaeda attackers of September 11 demonstrated, 
did not necessarily require sophisticated technology, but rather human resolve. He
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maintained that coordinated terrorist operations succeed only when those executing them 
are willing to sacrifice their own lives. The hijackers and perpetrators o f the September 
11 attacks did exactly that and thus, “wiped out several assumptions about suicide 
attacks” (p.7). For example, some scholars and analysts who previously viewed suicide 
attacks as not exportable were taken aback when al-Qaeda operatives and suicide- 
bombers traveled, trained, planned, and executed the worst attacks on American soil 
since Pearl Harbor (Talbott and Chanda 2001; Hoge and Rose 2001).
Third, the profiles o f terrorist individuals including those o f the September 11 
perpetrators also differ from the profiles o f the typical suicide-bombers seen in the 
Middle East, Southeast Asia, North Africa, and Latin America, who for the most part 
came from poor and impoverished backgrounds, were generally illiterate and from 
dysfunctional backgrounds, or were psychologically deranged and damaged young men 
in their early 20s (Post et al. 2002). Some scholars and analysts believed that with greater 
maturity, social status, education, and economic opportunity, the proclivity to suicide 
would dwindle (Silke 2004). Jenkins (2001) noted that even though economic 
opportunities usually discourage young men from joining terrorist groups to participate in 
suicide operations, the September 11 perpetrators, on the other hand, had it all. They 
were older and thus more mature (in their late 20s and early 30s), were highly educated, 
(with bachelor’s and m aster’s degrees), were well-traveled and knowledgeable (had lived 
in Europe and America and spoke multiple languages), came from well-to-do families, 
and were much more sophisticated than their predecessors because they understood the 
cost-benefit ratio o f participating in a suicide mission (Zakaria 2003; Gunaratna 2002; 
Bergen 2002). For these reasons, Jenkins (2001) argued that the profile o f the suicide
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attacker requires revision.
Part o f the explanation for the radical difference o f the September 11 perpetrators 
resides in the nature o f  bin Laden’s network, which tapped into a much larger human 
reservoir than any previous terrorist organization. For example, traditional terrorist 
groups usually were small in size with an active membership o f a few hundred.
However, the Soviet-Afghanistan war o f the 1980s brought thousands o f Arab and 
Muslim fighters from different continents, countries, classes, and Islamic sects into 
Afghanistan (Cooley 2000; Mamdani 2004; Scheuer 2004). After fighting and defeating 
the Soviets, they became al-Qaedans and drew on multiple resources and logistics in 
planning and executing operations against the W est and the United States. Some analysts 
think that al-Qaeda has several thousand members, a size that is much larger than any of 
the larger traditional terrorist organizations. A large number o f active members within al- 
Qaeda is important because it allows individuals to specialize in areas such as 
recruitment, military training, logistics, techniques, information gathering, aviation, or 
suicide bombing (Williams 2002; Gunaratna 2002; Jenkins 2001).
Additionally, it is equally important to take the cultural context into account. For 
example, all cultures (primitive and civilized) produced their share o f  martyrs and heroes 
who readily sacrificed their lives for causes in which they believed (Post et al 2002). For 
example, the fanatical obedience o f the Arab assassins who nine centuries ago struck 
terror in the minds o f their enemies is a classic example (Herbst 2003). Other revered 
heroes run the gamut from historic conquerors such as Saladin who fought and defeated 
the Christian Crusaders; Alexander the Great who conquered the then known world; 
Ghengis Khan who conquered Mongolia and much o f Asia and into parts o f Europe, and
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Shaka Zulu who fought and defeated the Boers in South Africa to contemporary heroes 
such as Steve Biko o f South Africa, Tom Mboya o f Kenya, and Patrice Lumumba of 
Ghana. Jenkins (2001:9) pointed out that, “In recent years, suicide terrorism has become 
the benchmark o f religious devotion and political commitment among ‘true believers’ in 
the Middle East.”
Political scientist Martha Crenshaw (1995:2) also noted that modem terrorists “are 
seeking nothing less than to transform the world. Motivated by religious imperatives, 
they are feared by many observers and bystanders to lack an earthly constituency and 
thus feel accountable to only a deity or some transcendental or mystical ideas. Many 
terrorists today are more inclined to use highly lethal methods in order to destroy an 
impure world and bring about the apocalypse— unlimited ends lead to unlimited means.”
The report from the United States National Commission on Terrorism noted that 
terrorist threats are changing in ways and styles that make it much more difficult to 
combat and defeat than ever before. The commission also reported that intemational 
terrorism once threatened America and its interests abroad, but today, intemational 
terrorists target and attack American citizens and interests at home (cited in Chomsky 
2002). The first W orld Trade Center terrorist bombing in 1993 masterminded by Ramzi 
Yousef clearly demonstrated that point. Therefore, contemporary societies are now faced 
with new kinds o f terrorists and threats that require new kinds o f responses and strategies 
from counter-terrorism experts and engaged govemmental officials to combat it.
Officials in the Bush administration have repeatedly claimed that the U.S.-led 
coalition forces in Afghanistan and Iraq have made significant strides and tremendous 
progress in the w ar on global terrorism. These officials and those in govemment and the
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military contend that since the war on terror began, al-Qaeda’s infrastructure has been 
dismantled, many o f its members and supporters killed or captured, and its top leaders 
forced to hide (Hoffman 2003; Seger 2004). For example. Vice President Dick Cheney, 
senior intelligence officials, senior military leaders, and other policymakers have claimed 
that the al-Qaeda infrastructure has not only received serious blows and is in its “ last 
throes” , but also that the days are numbered for Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, 
and Taliban leader Mullah Muhammed Omar (Hoffman 2004; Gunaratna 2004). 
Furthermore, American officials and authorities routinely cite the capture o f senior al- 
Qaeda officials and lieutenants such as Khalid Sheik Mohammed, Ramzi Binalshibh,
Abu Zubaida, Nurjaman Ridiuan Isamuddin (alias Hambali) and the killing o f 
Mohammed A tef and al-Zawahiri’s only son among other terrorists as proof that al- 
Qaeda’s infrastructure is nearly destroyed (Hoffman 2003; Gunaratna 2004).
Despite the raids on al-Qaeda operatives and the military strikes against al-Qaeda’s 
senior leadership, it remains a potent force and a highly capable and extremely lethal 
network. Al-Qaeda is not only the w orld’s number-one terrorist threat, it is also an 
organization that has shown that it is adaptive, mutating, and resilient (Atran 2004; 
Hoffman 2004; Gunaratna 2004). In other words, it remains to be seen what al-Qaeda’s 
next attacks will entail. Although there have been significant attempts by govemment 
authorities to dismantle the network, its officials and cell members have been successful 
in planning and executing several deadly attacks against civilian populations in many 
countries around the world.
For example, since the commencement o f the war on global terror, al-Qaeda affiliates 
and operatives have successfully executed attacks against tourist resorts in Bali,
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Indonesia, and Mombasa, Kenya (2002); a commuter train in Madrid, Spain (2003); 
residential complexes and business enterprises in Saudi Arabia (2004); and govemment 
institutions and non-govemmental organizations in Kabul, Afghanistan, and Baghdad,
Iraq (2003-2005) all resulting in mass murder and unprecedented destmction o f property 
and dismption o f commerce. For these reasons, Fouda and Fielding (2003:180) wrote: 
Whether al-Qaeda continues to exist as an organization or not, its methods have 
demonstrated to the world that a tiny organization with limited resources can humiliate 
the greatest power on earth. That lesson has not been missed by thousands o f Islamist 
militants around the world. The destmction o f al-Qaeda’s bases and infrastmcture in 
Afghanistan may only have served to spread the organisation’s techniques. Without a 
fundamental reassessment o f American foreign policy and its uncritical support for Israeli 
actions in the Occupied Territories, the war against terror will continue for many years to 
come.
Under these conditions, therefore, it would be a grave mistake for political and public 
officials to claim victory. Al-Qaeda is still a global menace and threat. Bmce Hoffman 
(2003) also w am ed that an effective assessment o f al-Qaeda should take into 
consideration that as long as bin Laden and al-Zawahiri are alive and direct their 
followers to continue their relentless attacks against the infidel W est and America, it 
would be premature for the political leaders, the intelligence community, and the military 
apparatus to declare victory and ultimately “write al-Qaeda’s obituary” (Hoffman 2003: 
430). Other scholars and analysts also noted that it is not only dangerous to downplay al- 
Q aeda’s ability to mutate into new, autonomous, and lethal cell networks which may be 
extremely difficult to identify, fight, and defeat, but also because they are scattered in
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many countries around the world. Therefore, whether bin Laden and al-Zawahiri are 
killed, it would be premature to think that the network can be totally be dismantled 
because there are so many followers waiting to replace bin Laden and al-Zawahiri (Silke 
2004; Raufer 2003; Gunaratna 2004).
There have been significant developments in the war on terror. For example, Al- 
Qaeda now lacks safe havens and training camps that were readily provided by the 
Taliban regime in Afghanistan and several o f al-Qaeda key members have been killed or 
captured. Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri have been forced to become fugitives. However, 
we should be careful not to underestimate al-Qaeda’s capabilities to plan and execute 
devastating attacks. We are still far from winning the war on terror, just as we have been 
unable to win the war on poverty or drugs.
Furthermore, terrorists continue to attack soft targets around the world killing innocent 
civilians; inculcating fear in the public; destroying property and impacting people’s 
lifestyles; coercing and intimidating govemment officials; and influencing policymakers 
and decision-making processes. Peace, stability, and self-preservation in the twenty-first 
century may not be attainable and the world might not after all be any different from the 
one British philosopher Thomas Hobbes envisioned in the year 1651. Hobbes wrote in 
his book the Leviathan that in a world that is afflicted and infested with hatred, anarchy, 
chaos, war, fear, and danger, the “life o f man is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” 
(p. 186). W orse still, if terrorists were to succeed in acquiring weapons o f mass 
destruction, we should expect that the lives o f millions and perhaps billions would 
certainly be even more solitary, poorer, nastier, more brutish, and shorter.
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The traditional way o f studying and understanding terrorism and terrorists based on 
organizational definition, psychological profiles, and personality traits and attributes may 
no longer be relevant because oftentimes yesterday’s profiles, theories, and assumptions 
about terrorism may not necessarily be applicable to today’s and tom orrow’s terrorists 
(Hoffman 2003; Raufer 2003; Laqueur 2001; Kushner 2004), For example, in an 
environment where al-Qaeda terrorists are the primary target o f govem ment officials’ 
wrath and military force, al-Qaedans have managed, however, to mutate and cope with 
the environment and the political landscape they now face. Moreover, al-Qaeda has 
managed to change adaptively from what was once viewed as a monolithic organization 
with a centralized organizational command and control stmcture and pyramidal and 
hierarchical leadership stmctures into more dynamic, diverse, and decentralized 
organizational stmctures which are comprised o f loosely-connected cell networks and 
entities that act independently o f each other by planning and executing attacks without 
approval from a central command and leadership stmcture (Gunaratna 2004; Hoffman 
2004; Jenkins 2001).
Consequently, post-September 11 and the subsequent invasions and preemptive strikes 
against Afghanistan and Iraq, the w orld’s attention has tumed to the question o f how to 
best deal with and respond to global terrorism. In the contemporary world, the threat of 
terrorism not only dominates the political discourse and politics o f world leaders and the 
intemational community, but also commands great public attention and debate. But as 
world leaders and nation-states employ both unilateral and multilateral approaches and 
institute new and tough counter-measures necessary to combat terrorism and terrorists, 
one thing seems to be obvious: there is still no such thing as a “magic bullet” or any easy
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answers and solutions to the problem of intemational terrorism, as one m an’s terrorist 
will always be another m an’s liberator (Taheri 1989; Silke 2004; Alexander and 
Alexander 2001 ; Chomsky 2002).
However, efforts from the interdisciplinary studies on the phenomenon o f terrorism 
have helped a great deal to identify some o f the most essential components and issues 
that political leaders, intelligence personnel, policy-makers, and the general public must 
take into account in their quest to understand terrorism (Silke 2004).
Although military responses and preemptive strikes against terrorists and terrorist- 
sponsoring states may be considered as useful and effective mechanisms, they have, thus 
far, proven to be counter-productive. Other counter-measures must also be applied.
They include; cutting the economic arteries that supply terrorists with cash, that is, 
cutting off the flow o f money, the lifeblood o f the terrorist infrastmcture; impeding 
terrorist fund-raising capabilities and money-laundering means that support terrorist 
operations; freezing or confiscating terrorists’ assets and investments; instituting tough 
laws and punishing terrorists and suspected terrorists to discourage them from planning 
attacks; encouraging multilateral approaches and working in partnerships with other 
countries around the world to fight terrorism; and finding solutions to the w orld’s social 
malaise, poverty, illiteracy, and hopelessness. The latter would play a pivotal role in 
discouraging young people from joining terrorist organizations.
Therefore, an effective counter-terrorism strategy that is supported by other world 
governments and blessed by multilateral cooperation and the United Nations would most 
likely send a strong message to terrorist individuals and organizations that their actions or 
behavior would not be tolerated. For example, the attacks o f September 11 against
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America were not only condemned worldwide, but also made millions and perhaps 
billions o f people around the world to treat the attacks as if they were their own. W riting 
about the impact o f  the attacks, a French columnist from the newspaper Le M onde wrote, 
“we are all Americans.” This statement was echoed by the members o f the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) who unanimously repealed Article 5 o f its founding treaty, 
which declared that “the attack on America to be an attack on the alliance as a whole, and 
enables America to call on its allies for military support” {The Economist 9/22/01:13).
Furthermore, when the United States requested from the intemational community and 
the United Nations cooperation, support, and a mandate to use military force to remove 
the Taliban regime and dismantle bin Laden’s and al-Qaeda’s terrorist training camps in 
Afghanistan, many world leaders, intemational organizations, and nation-states 
responded promptly and positively. Therefore, a few months after preemptive strikes 
began, the Taliban regime was toppled and al-Qaeda’s training camps were dismantled. 
Seger (2004) noted that even though from the standpoint of al-Qaeda, the September 11 
attack was an operational success, it resulted in a massive backlash against al-Q aeda’s 
infrastmcture. He maintained that U.S.-led coalition forces overthrew the dictatorial 
leadership o f the Taliban regime; killed and captured hundreds or thousands o f al-Qaeda 
operatives; dismantled bin Laden’s and al-Qaeda’s headquarters and training camps in 
Afghanistan; and forced Mullah Omar, bin Laden, al-Zawahiri, and other surviving 
remnants o f the Taliban and al-Qaeda into caves.
Other analysts also warn that it is important to take into consideration that al-Qaeda is 
not only the most well-known terrorist organization in the world, but also is the most 
difficult to detect and fight because it is now spread over eighty countries around the
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world (Napoleoni 2003; Strasser and Whitney 2004; Clarke 2004). It is also important to 
take into account that religious terrorism is a phenomenon capable o f  morphing to 
accomplish its intended objectives (Jenkins 2001). The same can be said o f al-Qaeda.
It is equally significant to remember that al-Qaeda is a network o f individuals and 
terrorist organizations. Some o f these organizations are highly structured while others 
operate as loosely-knit cells. Usually, the behavior o f a highly-structured group is 
predictable. Conversely, the behavior and actions o f networks and loose cells are 
difficult to predict as they usually lack a strong leadership structure or command and 
control apparatus.
In her concluding remarks, M aria A. Ressa (2003:220-221) stated that:
A l-Qaeda’s ideology unites disparate Muslim groups, crossing national and ethnic 
lines. The West has not done enough to fight ideology with ideology. Law 
enforcement and military action are not enough. If pursued excessively, they are 
bound to fail. The United States and its Western allies have become their worst 
enemies by acting in ways that reinforce and perpetuate the stereotypes 
propagated by al-Qaeda. There is only one way to win the global war on 
terrorism— by supporting the moderate Muslims around the world, and by asking 
for their help. The operative word is “ask”; Americans cannot dictate or demand. 
Until and unless the W est realizes this and begins to act accordingly, al-Qaeda 
will find supporters for its radical ideology. Yes, law enforcement is crucial, and 
military maneuvers against al-Qaeda camps must continue. But the linchpin o f  the 
war is the Muslim moderates in every Islamic community around the world, who 
must once again tell the world exactly what Islam truly stands for. They face a 
difficult task o f  trying to cage an amorphous enemy that uses their language and 
traditions to inspire a primal response.
To summarize, five points regarding the changing face of terrorism need to be 
reemphasized. One, in its long history, terrorism has appeared in many shapes and 
guises. In modem  times, communities face many kinds o f terrorism that have far- 
reaching and negative impacts to their social fabric. This is because the calculus of 
terrorism has changed in its motivations and approaches because the terrorists’ targets.
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techniques, and tactics are continually changing. For instance, since the 1990s, terrorists’ 
motives have changed in significant ways. Laqueur (1996:25) noted that, “ ...the 
anarchists and the left-wing terrorist organizations that succeeded them, down from the 
Red Armies that operated in Germany, Italy, and Japan in the 1970s, have vanished; if 
anything, the initiative has passed to the extreme right.” In contemporary times, most 
terrorists are mostly inspired by ethnic and religious fervor. The latter motivation applied 
and still applies to al-Qaeda fundamentalists.
Second, the face o f terrorism has changed in regard to its modus operandi.
According to Laqueur (2004:25), “terrorism is by no means militants’ only strategy.”
This is because today’s terrorist groups such as Hamas, Hezbollah, Palestinian Liberation 
Organization (FLO), Islamic Jihad, the Basque Homeland Front (ETA), the Irish 
Republican Army (IRA), and al-Qaeda combine both the political and terrorism wings in 
their struggles. In reference to these groups, Laqueur (2004:25) wrote that, “The political 
arm provides social services and education, runs businesses, and contests elections, while 
the ‘military w ing’ engages in ambushes and assassinations. Such division of labor has 
advantages: the political leadership can publicly disassociate itself when terrorists 
commit a particularly outrageous act or something goes wrong.”
Third, terrorist operations have also changed because today’s terrorists employ various 
approaches and techniques to wage war against their enemies. These techniques involve 
suicide-bombings, kidnappings, hostage-takings, and beheadings. Additionally, terrorists 
groups attack both hard and soft targets to cause mass casualties. Because terrorists 
groups are motivated by ethnic, religious, and apocalyptic millenarianism, they may not 
hesitate to use weapons o f mass destruction.
276
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Fourth, because state-sponsored terrorism is slowly diminishing, terrorist groups 
heavily rely on individuals to sponsor their activities. Al-Qaeda and many o f its core 
religious groups relied in the past and still rely on Osama bin Laden for sponsorship. In 
other words, as countries disassociate themselves from terrorist groups, terrorism has 
increasingly become a private enterprise funded and conducted by individuals.
Fifth, to combat contemporary terrorism, new definitions and terms need to be 
developed for the new realities regarding terrorism. The intelligence community, policy­
makers, and political actors, in particular, must take into consideration that there are 
significant differences among terrorists’ motivations, approaches, and objectives. They 
must understand that they dealing with a different kind o f terrorist who would stop at 
nothing to cause mayhem. Therefore, when designing counter-measures to fight 
terrorism and terrorists, policy-makers must consider the changing face or terrorism. 
Conversely, in the absence o f these considerations and realities, current counter-measures 
may deter yesterday’s terrorist, but not necessarily tom orrow’s terrorist.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
CONCLUSIONS
May the culture o f life and love render vain the logic o f death...m ay Christians, 
Muslims, and Jews seek greater unity with each other.. .may hope conquer the 
‘inhuman’ phenomenon o f terrorism.
—Pope John Paul II, Easter Mass, March 11, 2004.
Terrorism is an ancient phenomenon. Scholars, analysts, and terrorism experts have 
attempted to define what terrorism entails but have been unsuccessful in providing a 
universal explanation that is acceptable to all. Terrorism eludes precision because it 
means different things to different people. The general consensus, however, is that it is 
an intentional act o f force to induce fear, advance desired goals, and influence policy 
decisions. In chapter one, I provided an operational definition o f terrorism and indicated 
that it is a deliberate, calculated, premeditated, and unlawful use o f violence or the threat 
o f violence to inculcate or create an atmosphere o f fear with the intention o f coercing or 
intimidating state authorities for the purposes o f advancing economic, political, social, 
religious, or ideological objectives. I also indicated that individuals or groups who 
employ terror intend not only to undermine a governm ent’s ability to protect its citizens, 
but also intend to produce fear and insecurity far beyond its immediate victims or 
physical targets to influence the behaviors o f larger and broader audiences and to sway 
govemment officials’ decision-making processes.
In chapter one, I also examined major theories o f terrorism capable o f explaining the 
phenomenon o f terrorism. They included the following: “Clash o f civilizations” , “clash 
o f globalization”, “root-causes theory”, Marxist theory, and revitalization theory. After 
discussing these theories in detail, I argued that even though they provided significant
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insights into the problem o f terrorism, they lacked a holistic cultural approach. In my 
study, I provided a holistic theory o f the culture of terrorism and stated that terrorism is a 
socio-cultural response to the legacies o f colonialism and neocolonialism. These legacies 
include underdevelopment, political oppression and repression, economic and social 
injustice, and globalization. In certain places, on-going colonial conflicts are catalyzed 
by the clashes o f civilizations and communities whose differences are aggravated by 
ancient cultural animosities or traditional practices that evoke tribal and religious fervor. 
The conflicts are also motivated by virulent historical hatred between developed and 
developing countries and societies. For example, the practices and policies o f the United 
States provoke some individuals or groups in Arab and Muslim countries to employ 
violence and terrorism to inculcate fear and instill insecurity in the American psyche and 
to undermine govemment authorities to influence policy-making decisions. Catastrophic 
terrorist attacks, on the other hand, provoke govemment officials to use the rhetoric of 
war on terror not only to resuscitate patriotic slogans and divert the public’s attention 
from domestic problems and agendas, but also to employ the rhetoric o f the threat o f 
terrorism to galvanize national and intemational support and cooperation for the necessity 
o f military intervention and to fight intemational terrorism. G ovem m ent responses 
against terrorism oftentimes impose excessive counter-measures that may infringe upon 
peoples’ protected constitutional freedoms and liberties. For instance, in the U.S. and 
several European countries, the introduction o f draconian anti-terrorism legislation in the 
guise o f the war on terror threatens democratic practices and values and suppresses 
citizens’ civil and personal rights, such as the freedoms o f expression and association and 
protection from arbitrary and capricious laws (i.e., detentions without trials, rights to
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legal counseling, and the suppression o f due process procedures). This evokes emotional 
reactions, public fury, and political dissent and results in internal conflict and instability. 
Furthermore, rash responses to terrorism negatively affect not only the peoples’ personal 
and national security and sense o f community, but also undermine democratic systems. 
From an intemational viewpoint, the war on terror has not only forced world leaders to 
pass new legislation to combat terrorism, but also has provided an opportunity for some 
leaders in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East to use the rhetoric o f war on terror to crack 
down on political opponents, opposition groups, human rights advocates and to 
criminalize political dissent and protests. For example, as the U.S. continues to pressure 
the intemational community and world leaders to enact more and tougher anti-terrorism 
measures, and as President Bush continues to threaten countries that fail to cooperate and 
support the U.S. in the war on terror with the power o f “the stick”, i.e., the use o f military 
force or the imposition o f economic sanctions such as terminating foreign aid and loans, 
restricting foreign trade and investment, freezing financial assets, or embargoing 
weapons, the general support that the U.S. enjoyed prior to the events of September 11 
continues to weaken. Moreover, the intemational support and cooperation that the United 
States received in the days and months immediately after the attacks o f September 11 
continue to wane.
Therefore, terrorism consists of a set o f socio-cultural practices, ideologies, methods, 
techniques, organizational stmctures, and tools that individuals or groups find useful to 
redress their grievances and advance their desired goals. Terrorism can be a desperate 
response by weak and powerless groups (i.e., in regard to size and capabilities) 
challenging strong and powerful entities (i.e., in regard to states with established
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militaries). But terrorism is not only a weapon o f the weak, it is also an instrument of 
struggle that any person or group can use to accomplish some type o f economic, political, 
social, religious, or ideological objective. In this case, we can conclude that both state 
authorities and non-state groups can use terrorism to advance their desired agendas.
In chapter two, 1 described how 1 gathered data to examine the phenomenon and the 
impact o f terrorism. I indicated that my primary source o f information was library 
materials that included recent books, journals, magazines, and newspaper articles, the 
Internet, and other media outlets. In addition, I indicated that I supplemented my 
information by conducting fieldwork in Kenya where I interviewed the U.S. embassy 
bomb survivors in Nairobi to understand how the attack affected them and how 
government authorities assisted them. I employed an informal method using semi­
structured questionnaires. I presented my findings in an ethnographic narrative. 1 also 
highlighted some o f the problems and obstacles 1 encountered in the field and explained 
how 1 dealt with them, thus enabling me to contact and interview survivors.
In chapter three, I examined al-Qaeda as victimizer. Because the attacks against the 
U.S. embassy in Nairobi and the World Trade Center in New York were the hallmarks o f 
al-Qaeda, 1 discussed in detail its origins, organizational structure, recruitment methods, 
and modus operandi. I indicated that the 1998 attacks against the U.S. embassies in 
Kenya and Tanzania were a dress rehearsal for the attacks o f 2001 against America.
1 indicated that prior to attacks o f September 11, al-Qaeda was centrally and 
hierarchically structured with an elaborate rank and file. I also demonstrated that it was 
structured in a pyramidal style where command and control ran from the top to the 
bottom within the organization. Top leaders o f al-Qaeda included Osama bin Laden and
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Ayman al-Zawahiri and their closest loyalists. There was also an existence o f a well- 
organized chain o f officials that was comprised o f loyalists who headed various 
committees to supervise recruitment, training, financing, and operations.
I indicated that al-Qaeda functioned as a family entity where duties, assignments, 
positions o f power, and promotions were conferred based on family and marriage ties, 
kinship, and loyalty to bin Laden and the ideology o f jihad. In addition, I indicated that 
after September 11 and as U.S.-coalition forces invaded Afghanistan, al-Qaeda lost its 
sanctuary and training camps and was forced to operate from the underground. In other 
words, post-September 11, al-Qaeda decentralized into loose cells and affiliates that 
independently conducted terrorist operations to advance the organization’s objectives.
I indicated because al-Qaeda operatives are now scattered in several countries around 
the world and because these cells operate independently, it is difficult for intelligence and 
law enforcement agencies to disrupt them. This is because they are like a bunch o f 
grapes such that when one is plucked, the rest continue to flourish.
Additionally, I showed that al-Qaeda is the only non-governmental organization that 
has been successful in conducting attacks on land, sea, and air (e.g. the American 
embassy car bomb attacks in East Africa in 1998, the U.S.S. Cole attack in 2000, and the 
U.S. World Trade Center and Pentagon in 2001), but also is the only group that has been 
capable of conducting series o f terrorist attacks world-wide even when being hunted 
down by U.S.-coalition forces. The chronology o f attacks perpetrated by al-Qaeda and 
presented in chapter one affirms my assertion than fewer countries now claim to be 
immune from al-Qaeda’s attacks.
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Finally, 1 indicated that al-Qaeda’s modus operandi not only changes with the current 
environment they now face, but also includes constant innovation in their techniques. Al- 
Q aeda’s tactics are like that o f chameleon that camouflages itself during a crisis to ensure 
its survival.
In chapter four, I discussed some o f the problems and issues that preoccupy social 
scholars and political actors in political discourses and public debates and speeches 
regarding terrorism. Some o f these issues include whether terrorist organizations are 
liberators or oppressors. I argued that terrorists and state officials use these phrases to 
demonize and weaken the spirit o f their enemies in order to acquire alliance and support 
for their objectives. 1 pointed out that the words liberators and terrorists use usually 
change in time and space. Today, one can be labeled a terrorist and tomorrow be called a 
liberator. For example. Nelson Mandela, Jomo Kenyatta, and Yasser Arafat were at one 
time labeled terrorists and later were called liberators and even statesmen.
1 also discussed the issue whether or not individuals join terrorist groups or commit 
acts of violence because they are poor, deranged, deprived, or cowardly. I pointed out 
that to the contrary, al-Qaeda senior leaders including bin Laden, al-Zawahiri, and the 
perpetrators o f September 11 were not from poor and deprived families nor were they 
deranged cowards. They came from privileged, stable families, but yet were willing to 
fight and die for their ideologies and religious faith. In other words, the attacks that we 
have witnessed thus far have been conducted by al-Qaeda members who came from the 
upper and middle classes.
Additionally, I discussed whether or not U.S. foreign policy is a source o f resentment, 
anger, hatred, and violence against the United States. I indicated that as much as
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American policies and practices directly or indirectly affect many people and countries 
around the world and particularly provoke individuals and groups in Arab and Muslim 
countries to harbor sufficient hatred to attack America, the majority o f people and 
societies the world over who are affected by these policies and practices do not resort to 
violence to express their resentment and grievances.
Finally, I discussed whether solving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict can reduce the 
“Muslim rage” and end hatred and violence against Americans and Israelis and their 
allies. 1 indicated that as much as finding a solution to the Palestinian-Israeli problem is a 
positive step towards peace in the Arab and Muslim world, some terrorist groups will 
continue to capitalize on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict not only to justify their violent 
actions, but also to acquire support and increase their pool o f followers. Bin Laden and 
al-Qaeda operatives now embrace the Palestinian problem as their own to justify their 
actions against the United States. Furthermore, even with the withdrawal o f Israelis from 
some Palestinian territories, violence and suicide-terrorism directed at Israeli citizens and 
interests have not reeeded.
In chapter five, I discussed in detail the measures governments put in place to respond 
to terrorism and fight terrorist organizations. I indicated that the war on terror has taken 
multi-faceted approaches such as diplomatic, financial, legislative, political and 
rhetorical, military, and socio-cultural to fight international terrorism and dismantle al- 
Q aeda’s infrastructure (Reynolds 2002; Gunaratna 2002; Hoffman 2004).
The diplomatic approach involved requesting the world community to cooperate with 
the United States and those countries affected by terrorism to fight against terrorism. For 
example, when bin Laden was implicated in the embassies bombings in East Africa and
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the September 11 attack, the United States government requested the Taliban leadership 
to surrender him and other senior al-Qaeda members to stand trial for planning and 
masterminding those attacks. When the Taliban officials refused, preemptive military 
retaliation was authorized which led to the demise o f the Taliban government and the 
dismantling o f the al-Qaeda safe haven in Afghanistan.
The financial approach dealt with freezing assets o f bin Laden and al-Qaeda members 
to prevent them from financing future attacks. The United States and other countries 
have passed legislation authorizing their respective officials and agencies to identify 
terrorist organizations and freeze their assets.
The creation o f the Homeland Security Department dealt with domestic threats to 
ensure that future attacks do not occur within the United States. Security enhancements 
at U.S. airports, border entries, symbolic monuments/buildings, and embassies were 
instituted as counter-terrorist measures.
The political rhetoric dealt with the war on terrorism and campaigning for support for 
preemptive military retaliation against hostile groups and countries. In his speeches, 
President Bush declared that the September 11 attacks constituted the “first war in the 
2U ‘ century.” Thus, he wanted Osama in Laden “dead or alive” and promised the 
Americans and the world that he would “smoke all o f al-Qaeda terrorists out o f their 
caves” . He referred to al-Qaeda members as “evil-doers.” Other officials in the Bush 
administration also indicated that their task was to “drain the swamps o f terrorists” to 
make the world safe and free o f terrorism. President Bush’s doctrine became: “You are 
either with us or you are with the terrorists” and “If you do business with the terrorists, 
you cannot do business with the United States.” Additionally, in his State o f Union
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address, President Bush called Iraq, Iran, and North Korea the “axis o f evil” because they 
sponsored international terrorism. In short. Bush declared war on terrorism and put the 
world on alert that those countries that failed to cooperate and support the war on terror 
would be considered hostile to the United States and would face military retaliation.
Other measures in the war on terror included the passage of the United States Patriot 
Act which provided enhanced powers to intelligence and law enforcement agencies to 
identify, thwart, and prevent terrorist attacks. Critics o f this Act claim that the power to 
hold suspected terrorists incommunicado is not only a draconian act but is also 
unconstitutional as it violates individual liberties and due process procedures.
In regard to the socio-cultural responses, the U.S. government declared a period o f 
mourning to remember and honor those who died during the attacks. The government 
also promised to provide financial compensation to the victims o f September 11, 2001.
In chapter six, I dealt with the reactions, claims, and coping mechanisms o f the 
victims o f  terrorism. 1 conducted fieldwork in Nairobi and interviewed survivors. These 
were the findings; First, survivors vividly remembered where they were when the attack 
happened but did not know who took them to hospital. They also said that they were in 
great pain and begged doctors and nurses to give them medication to reduce their pain.
Second, even though survivors blamed al-Qaeda for the attacks, they pointed out that 
government authorities were also to blame because they failed to do everything within 
their power to prevent the attacks. They also indicated that the U.S. government was to 
blame because it knew that its embassy was vulnerable and yet failed to provide 
sufficient security. They pointed out that the even when the U.S. ambassador to Kenya, 
Prudence Bushnell, alerted American officials that the embassy was vulnerable, nothing
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was done to enhance security around the embassy. Ambassador Bushnell testified before 
the U.S. Congress and requested funds to provide more security for the embassy, but her 
efforts and requests were unsuccessful. Survivors therefore claimed that the actions and 
inactions o f the United States created circumstances that permitted the attacks that 
subsequently cost lives and injuries. Because U.S. officials failed and neglected to secure 
the embassy in Nairobi, survivors filed lawsuit against the United States government 
demanding damages (refer to Macharia et ai., vs. United States in appendix II).
Third, survivors indicated that although the governments o f Kenya and America 
assisted them with free medical treatment and financed their surgeries, medications, and 
rehabilitation efforts, they were bitter that assistance was prematurely terminated leaving 
them without alternative means to cover medical costs. They said that the money that the 
United States gave the Kenyan government after the attacks was used to rebuild damaged 
buildings rather than help victims and survivors rebuild their lives. They claimed that 
America was more interested buildings than victims. They pointed out that they were 
bitter because the United States government decided to directly compensate the families 
o f the twelve Americans who died in the attacks, but failed to do the same for the families 
o f the Kenyan victims. They said that they were angry because families o f Americans 
who died in the blast received one million dollars each while families o f Kenyans who 
perished in the same attacks received less than ten thousand dollars. They said that the 
United States failed to compensate them because o f racial discrimination, because they 
were African and Kenyan. In addition, they pointed out that when they heard that the 
families o f the September 11 attacks were compensated in the millions o f dollars, they 
were furious. They indicated that compensation would not have become an issue if all
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victims had been treated fairly. Again, they said that when they learned that their civil 
suit was dismissed in U.S. District Court, the Court o f Appeals, and the U.S. Supreme 
Court, they were even more angry.
Fourth, survivors said that they relied on their families to deal with their pain and loss. 
They also joined survivor groups to share their experiences with others. Others pointed 
out that they turned to God and prayer to ease their pain. Some said that they attended 
church regularly not only to thank God for sparing their lives, but also to pray for those 
who planned and carried out the attacks. Some even said that they had forgiven Osama 
bin Laden and his al-Qaeda operatives, because as Christians forgiving enemies is the 
right thing to do. Survivors also pointed out that they accepted their fate as blind and 
disabled persons because there was nothing they could do to reverse the situation. They 
said that they find comfort and solace in church and prayer because with God on their 
side, pain, loss, and suffering can be endured and conquered.
In chapter seven, I discussed the changing face o f terrorism and indicated that 
yesterday’s terrorists were different from today’s terrorists. I argued that traditional 
terrorists generally limited their attacks within their own countries while modem 
terrorists lack territorial boundaries. I also pointed out that traditional terrorist groups 
generally relied on states for sponsorship while contemporary terrorists rely on 
individuals. In other words, terrorism has become a private enterprise as the al-Qaeda 
network demonstrated. Al-Qaeda operatives brought jihad to their American shores as 
the attacks o f  September 11, 2001, showed. Contemporary terrorist groups, particularly 
al-Qaeda, not only rely on free-lancers and sleeper-agents, but also tap into native
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terrorist cells to plan and execute operations. The attacks in Mombasa, Bali, Madrid, and 
London were examples.
I also pointed out that the methods and techniques that traditional terrorist groups used 
were different from those o f contemporary terrorists. The latter employ innovative 
techniques such as attacking soft targets and civilians to weaken the spirit o f their 
enemies and to demonstrate that no one including Americans are immune. Moreover, 
modem terrorists primarily employ suicide-bombings, hijackings, kidnappings, and 
beheadings to attack their enemies. For example, Islamic fundamentalists and al-Qaeda’s 
leaders encourage their followers to use lethal methods and martyrdom as weapons to 
fight the enemies o f Islam. Again, unlike traditional terrorists, modem terrorists and al- 
Qaeda are increasingly using females as martyrs in the jihad stmggle.
Additionally, I argued that the motivation for terrorism has shifted. I pointed out that 
whereas traditional terrorist groups were generally motivated by political factors, such as 
national liberation, contemporary terrorists are motivated by religious factors, such as 
zealotry and fanaticism. Moreover, I argued that the language and ideology o f counter­
terrorism has changed. In public speeches and political discourse, social scholars, policy 
analysts, media personalities, and political leaders including the Bush administration are 
backing away from the phrase “war on terror” in favor o f “prolonged stmggle against 
violent extremism.” The reason for this shift seems to be that calling terrorism a war 
diverts attention from the ideological stmggle. Because bin Laden and his al-Qaeda 
operatives call their endeavor jihad  ‘stm ggle’, it would seem that the language o f the 
Bush administration is coming to resemble that o f the terrorists.
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APPENDIX I 
EXCERPTS: THE NAIROBI BOMB SURVIORS 
The following is a transcription o f interviews with the Nairobi bomb survivors during 
my fieldwork in 2000. The survivors included two men and two women from four 
different Kenyan tribes. They were: Mr “A” (a Kikuyu); Mr. “B” (a Luo); Ms. “C” (a 
Luhya); and Ms. Kilonzo “D” (a Kamba). These survivors were-and still are employees 
o f the Kenya Railways Corporation. At the time o f the bomb attack, they were in their 
offices working. W hen I approached them and requested to speak to them what it meant 
to be a bomb survivor, they had all just resumed work after a period o f undergoing 
medical treatment. My interview with these survivors took place at their workplace and 
during office hours and with the permission o f their supervisors.
1 introduced m yself to the survivors as a doctoral candidate in anthropology and 
ethnic studies in the United States; informed them that I was interested in their story and 
wanted their reactions to the attack and how they coped with it. After gaining their 
approval, 1 proceeded with informal interviews. Specifically, I used the grand-tour 
questions to elicit general responses from survivors (i.e., to get the big picture). 1 also 
used the min-tour questions as follow-ups to elicit detailed and more specific answers.
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T able 1, Questions asked in semi-structured interviews in English.
I: Grand-tour Questions
1. Can you tell me where you were and what happened to you when the United States
embassy was attacked on the morning o f August 7, 1998?
2. Can you tell me how you were rescued, what injuries you incurred, and what medical
treatment you received?
3. W here else, outside the Kenyan hospitals, were you taken for further treatment and what
treatment did you receive?
4. Can you tell me how you came to know that the bomb attacks were planned and conducted
by Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda organization?
5. Can you tell me what kind o f government or non-governmental assistance you received or
continue to receive to help you cope with your ordeal?
6. Since the attack, have you received financial compensation from the Njonjo Commission
(a government-appointed commission to oversee the task of assisting victims and 
survivors o f  the bomb attack) and how were you selected for this compensation?
7. Do you think the financial assistance you received was enough to offset your medical
payments and other personal expenses?
8. Tell me why you decided to join other bomb survivors in a civil lawsuit against the U.S.
government for more compensation for the pain and suffering you incurred?
9. When you learned that you had lost your civil suit in an American court, what were your
thoughts, and do you think that justice was done?
10. What do you think your government should do to ensure that such attacks do not happen 
again and that the safety o f the citizens o f  this country is top priority?
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T able 1, (continued)
II: Mini-tour Questions
11. You indicated that you traveled to Germany for further medical treatment. What were the 
reasons and how were you selected to travel abroad for treatment?
12. Please tell me more why you were selected to travel to Germany and what kind of 
medical treatment you received?
13. You have indicated that the governments o f Kenya and the United States provided you 
with free medieal treatment, continual medical check-ups, drugs, and school fees for your 
children. For how long will you receive this assistance and what will you do when the 
assistance is no longer available?
14. You stated that the Kenyan and American government promised to assist you in educating 
your children up to secondary school or university. Do you think that the two 
governments have delivered what they promised?
15. You indicated that the reward that you received from the Njonjo Commission was peanuts 
compared to what the American citizens received. Why do you say that?
16. You have particularly stated that the reason you think the U.S. government refused to 
compensate you for the damages that you incurred as it did with the twelve Americans 
who died from the bomb was “because you were Africans”. What do you actually mean 
by that statement?
17. In your own opinion, how much money were you expecting to be compensated for your 
pain and suffering?
18. Explain further how you actually cope on a day-to-day basis from the injuries you
incurred? In other words, describe some o f the typical things you do to deal with your 
pain and suffering?
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Table 1, Questions asked in semi-structured interview in Swahili
Moja: Maswali kwa Jumla
1. Utaweza kuniambia ulikua wapi na nini kilichotendekea tarehe saba mwezi wa nane
mwaka wa eltu moja mia tisa na tisini na nane wakati bomu ilikolipuka?
2. Nieleze ni majeraha ya aina gani ulioyapata kutokana na mashambulizi hayo, ni usaidishi
gani au matibabu gani uliyoyapokea?
3. Niambie ulipelekwa hospitali gani hapa Kenya au ngambo kwa matibabu na ni matibabu
gani uliyoyapokea?
4. Nieleze ulijuaje kwamba mashambulize ya bomu kwa ubalozi wa Amerika yalitendwa na
bwana Osama bin Laden na kundi lake la al-Qaida?
5. Utaweza kuniambia tangu ujeruhiwe, serikali ya Kenya au Amerika imekusaidi kwa njia
gani?
6. Ni kiasi cha pesa ngapi ulichopokea kwa majeraha yako kutoka kwa serikali ya Kenya au
kutoka kwa Komisoni ya Njonjo?
7. Unafikiria kwamba fedha ulizozipata zilikua za kutosha kugaramia matibabu na mahitachi
yako mengine?
8. Nieleze ni kwa sababu gani ukaungana na wajeruhi wenzako kuichukua serilikali ya 
Amerika kotini kwa malipo zaidi?
9. Wakati mlipoelezwa kwamba mlipoteza kesi yenu kule mahakamani mwa Amerika ni
mawazo gani yaliyokujia na unafikiri mlitendewa haki?
10. Kwa maoni yako, ungetaka serikali ya Kenya kuchukua hatua gani ill kuilinda nchi hii 
kutokana na uadui wa bin Laden na kundi lake la al-Qaida?
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T able 1, (continued)
Mbili: Maswali kwa Maelezo Zaidi
11. Umesema kwamba ulipelekwa kwa hospitali ya Kenyatta na baadaye kule inchi ya 
Ujerumani kwa matibabu zaidi. Ni kwa sababu gani ukachaguliwa kwenda ngambo kwa 
matibabu Zaidi?
12. Tafadhali nieleze kwa urefu ni majeraha gani uliyoyapata ili kuchaguliwa kwenda 
ngambo kwa matibabu zaidi?
13. Umesema kwamba serikali ya Kenya na Amerika zilikusaidia kwa matibabu, madawa, 
pesa shule kwa matoto wako au malipo ya bure kwa mafunzo zaidi kwa kituo cha vipofu 
humu nchini Kenya. Ni kwa muda gani utakapopokea usaidishi huo na utafanya nini 
usaidishi huyo utakaposimamishwa?
14. Umesema kwamba serikali ya Kenya na Amerika zilikuhaidi kukusomeshea watoto wake 
hadi malize sekondari au chuo kikuu. Je serikali hizo zimethemitisha haadi hiyo?
15. Umesema kwa fedha mlizopokua kwa kujeruhiwa yenu hazikuwa za kutosha 
ukizilinganisha na zile wananchi wa Amerika walizozipata kutokana na bomu. Nieleze 
zaidi ni kwa nini unafikiria hivyo?
16. Tafadhali nieleze kwa urefu unamaanisha nini ukisema kwamba serikali ya Amerika 
ilikataa kuwalipa pesa za kutosha kwa majeraha yenu kwa sababu “yenye ni watu wa 
Afrika” . Unamaanisha nini ukisema hivyo?
17. Kwa maoni yako, ulitarachia kiasi cha malipo ya pesa ngapi kutoka kwa serikali ya 
Amerika kwa majeraha uliyoyapata kutokana na uvamizi wa bomu?
18. Nieleze zaidi vile unavyiokumba majeraha yako. Kwa njia nyingine, eleza haswa vitu 
unavyiofanya kila siku kukumbana na mshipa wako.
Mr. “A ”, June 19, 2000, Nairobi, Kenya 
The following is a transcription o f an interview  with a Nairobi bomb survivor “A”, a 
Kikuyu by tribe, a male in his 50s, and an employee o f the Kenya Railways Corporation. 
At the time o f the attack, he was a general service officer. When 1 interviewed him, he 
had resumed work at the Kenya Railways and was holding the same job position.
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Kennedy: Tell me where you were and what happened to you on August 7, 1998?
A: I was here in my office working for the Kenya Railway Corporation when suddenly I 
heard a very big bang. At first I thought that it was a Kenya Bus Services (KBS) tire that 
had busted or some kind o f accident involving two buses. So, I proceeded to the window 
to see what was happening. As I was standing at the window looking out at the then U.S. 
embassy at Haile Selassie Avenue, I saw many people running away. I thought that 
whatever the bang, it was really big as many Kenyans were running from every direction. 
Minutes later, nilisikia tena mlio mwengine mkubwa mno (1 heard another very loud 
bang). After that, I thought we were invaded because the noise from the bang sounded 
like those o f guns and bombs. I thought we [Kenyans] were at war. A few seconds later, I 
was full o f blood and bleeding as I lay down in my office. I was in great pain. From that 
time on, 1 did not remember what happened or where I was.
K: So, when you woke up or regained your consciousness, where were you?
A: When 1 woke up, 1 found m yself at Kenyatta National Hospital. 1 was in deep pain 
and 1 was crying. I thought I was going to die. 1 begged the nurses who were running up 
and down in the hospital to tell me what had happened to me. ‘W hy 1 am here?’ I cried. 
‘Why is blood coming out o f eyes, ears, and head?’ I asked crying. I begged for pain­
killers, but nobody would attend to me. I was told to calm down and stay quiet and try to 
sleep as I had been severely wounded.
K: Did you finally find out what had happened to you and did you receive treatment?
A: Yes. But it was not until 5:00 p.m. when finally the doctors told me that I had 
incurred severe injuries on my left eye, arm, ear, and head from a bomb blast that had 
exploded that morning at the U.S. embassy. I was told that there were many people who 
were badly injured. So 1 did not get any treatment until late that day probably around 
11:00 p.m. But before I was actually treated the doctor and nurses gave me pain-killers 
to help me sleep. I also received some blood transfusion because I had lost a lot o f blood 
from the injuries. The following day, the nurses washed my blood off my wounds and 
took me to the operation theater for an eye and head operations. I was hospitalized at 
Kenyatta hospital for two months and received a total o f  two major operations and other 
minor operations to my arm, ear, and jaw. Soon afterward 1 was flown to Germany for 
further treatment.
K: In Germ any, w hat kinds o f  treatment did you receive and have you now  fully  
recovered from those injuries?
A: In Germany, I received further head and eye operations and received an artificial eye. 
I stayed in a Germany hospital for two weeks and then flew back to Kenya where 1 now 
see doctors at Kenyatta hospital on monthly basis for further medical check-ups. I am 
slowly recovering from the wounds and as you can tell I am at least better enough to be
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back at work.
K: Immediately after the attack, did you know who was responsible for the bomb that 
resulted into your injuries?
A: No.
K: How about now, do you know who was responsible for the attack?
A: Serikali inasema kwamba ilikuwa kazi ya waraabu na huyo mjamaa anayeitwa 
Osama na kundi lake (the government says that it was the work o f the Arabs and that 
person called Osama and his group).
K: Do you then blame the Arabs for the bombing that led to your injuries and loss o f 
your eye?
A: Yes and No. Yes, I blame those Arabs that were directly involved in the killing and 
wounding o f many o f  us. Ninamlaumu huyo jam aa mwaarabu adui anayeitwa Osama bin 
Laden (I blame that Arab person they call Osama bin Laden). And no, I do not blame all 
the Arabs for the bomb and for what happen to me and the rest o f us. 1 only blame those 
who were responsible for the attacks that killed and injured so many o f us Kenyans 
including the some Americans.
K; What is your perception o f the terrorists (what you do think about terrorists)?
A; They are bad people. They came to our country invaded us and killed and maimed us.
I can only thank God for those o f us who were so luck enough to survive. The only thing 
I can say is that terrorists are very bad people and should never be allowed to kill or harm 
other people anywhere in the world.
K: Do you have any thoughts why you think al-Qaeda targeted the American embassy
in Nairobi that resulted in the death and injuries o f many civilians?
A; 1 don’t know why terrorists chose Kenya or why they targeted the U.S. embassy here 
in Kenya that killed and injured many o f us innocent people. I heard that the terrorists 
were targeting Americans and wanted to get back at the Americans for reasons that 1 do 
not know. 1 think that if  those Arab terrorists wanted Americans they knew where to find 
them not here in Kenya. Terrorists chose the wrong country and wrong place to get back 
at the Americans. But now that they [terrorists] have killed and wounded us, all that is 
left is to pray to God that something like this does not happen again.
K; Have governments o f  Kenya and U.S. assisted you to cope with this tragedy?
A: Both governments have helped us [survivors] in many ways to cope with this 
tragedy. The Kenyans government helped us with free medical treatment in Kenyatta 
National Hospital. It also paid our traveling and living expenses to Germany while we
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receiving further treatments. Again over the years our government has been subsiding or 
paying for our monthly and annual medical check-ups here in Kenyans hospitals.
Together with the U.S. relief aid, our government pays for our retraining at the Kenya 
Society for the Blind and at other rehabilitation and counseling centers. In addition, our 
government paid three month o f our computer training skills. As for the American 
government, through its United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 
and American Medical Relief Emergency Fund (AMREF) and other related agencies, 
they have assisted us with further medical treatments here in Kenya and Germany and for 
the continuous medical check-ups, drugs, and counseling services.
K: Besides the free medical treatment and drugs, what else have you received from 
either the Kenyan or American governments to deal with your suffering?
A: Our government [Kenya] under the Njonjo Commission and the funds that were 
generously donated by the U.S. government, the Red Cross, and other private 
organizations and well-wishers were given to some o f us [survivors and victim s’ 
families] for our pain and suffering. In fact some people were awarded financial 
assistance in hard cash and/or in terms o f school fees. Those who were awarded school 
fees were told that the fees will last for two to four years. Again, some o f us were told 
that the money or training we received was supposed to be a compensation for our pain 
and suffering from the bomb attack.
K: How much have you personally received from the Njonjo Commission?
A: 1 was awarded Kenyan Shillings 150,000 ($1,500) the highest amount o f  money 
awarded to survivors with major injuries such as mine. I understand that some o f my 
fellow bomb survivors were awarded even less for their injuries.
K: Why do you think that was the case?
A; 1 really don’t know. We were told that it depended on the severity o f the injuries that 
a person suffered. And in my case, 1 had the most.
K: Do you know what other criterion that the Njonjo Commission used to determine the 
extent o f a survivor’s injuries before awarding them money?
A: No. But 1 understand that it depended on the severity o f injuries, which had to be first 
determined by the doctors. That is why I think some survivors were awarded very little 
money. In fact, some o f my fellow survivors told me that they given between Kenya 
shillings 30,000 to 50,000 ($400 to 600). Officials from the Njonjo Commission simply 
told that it depended on the injuries one received?
K: In your knowledge, do you know whether all other bomb survivors or victims 
families have thus far been compensated for their pain and suffering or for losing their 
beloved ones or breadwinner?
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A: No. I have heard that some survivors have been complaining for not being given 
money or school fees to help them cope with their loss and suffering. Furthermore, even 
some o f us who have been luck enough to receive some money, the financial assistance is 
not enough. It is peanuts compared to the injuries and the pain we experience on daily 
basis. Some o f us who incurred severe injuries cannot afford to purchase medication or 
go to hospital for further treatment and other routine check-ups from the bomb injuries. I 
think that all bomb victims and survivors should be better compensated to help them cope 
with their loss and suffering. It is only fair that the government treats all victims and 
survivors o f the bomb blast equally and fairly. We did not bring these pain and suffering 
to ourselves. We were at the wrong place at the wrong time. We need more financial 
assistance to help us especially acquire further medical treatments in our road to 
recovery.
K: Can you think o f any other non-governmental agencies that helped you or continue to 
help you to deal with you tragedy?
A: Yes indeed. They include, the Red Cross, the American Relief Emergency Fund 
(AMREF) among others, which I don’t know by name. All I know is that these 
organizations have been very generous to us for providing us with food, clothing, and 
funds for medical treatment, rehabilitation, and counseling. And in conjunction with the 
Kenyan government, these agencies have assisted us with monies to be able to attend 
seminars at the Kenya School o f the Blind and other rehabilitation centers and other 
necessary treatments for the purposes o f healing.
K; Mr. “A” What does it feel like to have survived the bomb attack?
A: It is unthinkable. The bomb happened so fast that you can’t remember anything 
except the pain and injuries and the daily struggles and nightmares that you go thorough 
and endure. A bomb that lasted for a few seconds changed our lives and our country 
forever. But as a survivor, I thank God everyday for being alive. Although I lost an eye 
and I am still in great pain from the head injuries and other wounds, 1 thank God for 
sparing my life because some o f my fellow Kenyans were not luck enough to have 
survived the bomb. 1 feel blessed.
K; How do you deal with yours injuries on the daily basis as you try to make sense of 
what happened to you and thousands o f Kenyans after the bomb attacks?
A: At the rehabilitation and counseling centers, the psychiatrists and counselors tell us 
to speak out about our ordeals and share it with our fellow survivors about our 
nightmares. They also tell us that by speaking out and sharing with other people o f our 
experience will help us cope and heal. They also strongly suggest that we jo in  survivors 
support groups to share stories and experience. Otherwise, you deal with it the best way 
you know how. For me, 1 tend to treat this tragedy just like any other tragedy and move 
on with my life. I wake up everyday and thank God for sparing my life knowing that 
there are some families who lost their beloved ones from the attack. Since the attack, 
however, 1 have been experiencing daily nightmares and suffer from panic attacks. In
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fact, even the sound o f  a busting balloon or automobile tire terribly scares me to death. 
Otherwise, I try to make every moment count and make best o f the worst situation. Kwa 
sababu hayo ndio maisha. Tufanyejel (Because that is life. W hat can we do?).
K: As a survivor, w hat would you like the Kenyan government and its related agencies 
put in place to ensure that another terrorist attacks does not occur here?
A: 1 think that our government should be tough on terrorists. It should be extremely 
careful and alert at all times because if  a terrorist bomb can happen once it can again.
And, if  a bomb can happen here in Kenya it can happen anywhere. Our government must 
thoroughly screen visitors, refugees, and anyone coming into our country because we no 
longer know who the bad guys are. Our government should tighten the security at all o f 
our borders in order to make sure that terrorist attack does not ever happen again. Again, 
all political refugees and other foreign citizens in our country should be watched and their 
purpose for being in our country be known. Finally, our government should enforce 
tough Immigration laws and ensure that our Airports and Ports are tightly secured. This 
means that all necessary precautions should be taken to ensure that our government is 
prepared to fight and prevent terrorism.
K: What can you say about the rescue team, medical personnel, NGOs, and other groups 
that were responsible in the rescue and recovery mission and assisting survivors cope 
from this horrendous bomb attacks?
A: They were simply great and helpful. The rescue mission from American and Israel 
working with fellow Kenyans helped rescue and save many survivors. The medical staff 
both here in Kenya and Germany was good and treated us well to save our lives. The 
NGOs and others related agencies have all been generous and helpful and for providing 
us with financial assistance, medical treatment, counseling, rehabilitation, school fees, 
and other financial and training assistance to help us cope with our tragedy. We are so 
grateful to all those organizations and peoples who were involved in the rescue mission, 
emergency relief, counseling, rehabilitation, medical treatment, and other generous 
financial assistance we received from these organizations and well-wishers from all over 
the world.
K: Thank you for your time and insights. 1 wish you well.
“Mr. B”, June 19, 2000, Nairobi, Kenya 
The following is the response o f bomb survivor “B”, a Luo by tribe, and a male in his 
40s. At the time o f the attack, he was a personnel officer at the Kenya Railways.
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Kennedy: Tell me where you were and what happened to you on August 7, 1998?
B: It was around 10:30 a.m. 1 was at my place o f work at the Kenyan Railways 
Corporation, on the second, floor room 205 in the Personnel Section working. We heard 
something that sounded like guns and busted tire. So some o f us rushed into the windows 
to find out what was happening. A few minutes later there was fire and smoke coming 
into our offices. There were also flying glasses coming towards our office. 1 was hit with 
a flying glass on the face. 1 fell down. 1 was bleeding very badly from my head and eyes.
1 was taken by a Samaritan to Kenyatta Hospital. Many hours later 1 was operated on my 
eye. Days later, 1 was flown to Germany and received more eye operation. 1 stayed in a 
Germany hospital for one month. After that I flew back to Kenya and for some time, 1 
have been going to Kenyatta Hospital for more treatment. In the months o f November 
and December o f 1999 ,1 flew to Germany again for another operation. After the 
operation, I came back to Kenya and since then, I have been seeing Dr. Gondi, an eye 
specialist at the Kenyatta Hospital. He checks up on me and others with similar situations 
to make sure that there are no further complications from the operations. In fact, today I 
went to see Dr. Gondi because my eye has developed some complications from the 
operations I received here in Kenya and Germany.
K: In Germany, what kinds o f treatment or operation did you receive?
B: Head and eye injuries. They operated my eye and gave me an artificial eye.
K: Can you now see clearly?
B: Not at all because everything is blurry and oftentimes painful when Tm outside in the 
sun.
K: Who do you blame for the attack that caused you these injuries?
B: They say that it was the work o f Muslims and this guy they call Osama.
K: When you say “they” what do you mean?
B: Oh! 1 mean the Kenyan and American officials and the media say that those who were 
behind the attack were Arabs and M uslims and al-Qaeda.
K: Continue please...
B: Kulingana na maafisa was selikali yetu and Amerika wanasema kwamba ni waarabu 
waliyeusika na haswa huyo mjamaa Osama na kundi lake. Isitoshe, magazeti, radio, 
televisoni, zote zinamlaumu Osama (According to our officials and those in America say 
that those who were behind the attack were Arabs and especially Osama and his group. 
Furthermore, the newspapers, radio, and television all blame Osama).
K: Do you therefore blame Arabs and Muslims for the bombing?
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B: No. I only blame those who were involved in planning and attacking us. But because 
those who attacked us happened to be Arabs and Muslims, we can blame them for the 
deaths, injuries, and destruction o f  our people and country.
K: How have the governments o f  Kenya and America helped you cope?
B; Both governments have helped us [survivors] with free medical treatments here in 
Kenya and Germany. The two governments have also assisted us to pay for our traveling 
and living expenses in Germany and assisted us in terms of schools fees for our children. 
And under the Njonjo Commission which was established with funds generously donated 
by the U.S. through USAID, Red Cross, and other non-governmental organizations, some 
o f us [survivors] have been awarded some money as compensation for our injuries.
K: How much have you received so far for your pain and suffering?
B: Thus far, I have received cash shillings 120,000 ($1200). However, the money I and 
others received is not enough to offset our medical expenses. We really need more 
financial assistance from our government because we can’t afford to see our doctors for 
medical check-ups. Since the government does not pay or subsidize our drugs and 
medicines, were are forced to foot the bill ourselves. Some o f us are not in position to do 
so and therefore we are suffering.
K; What do you think about terrorists?
B: They are really bad people. They are animals and cowards.
K: Are you angry that these so-called animals caused you these injuries? And how do 
you cope with your pain and suffering on a daily basis?
B: Yes, 1 am angered and bitter. Why did those terrorists cowards had to bomb us? Why 
did they target us? W hat did we do wrong to them to kill and injure us? If  these bad 
people [terrorists] were angry and hated Americans, why didn’t they go to America and 
attack them there? Why here in Kenyan? To cope with my loss and suffering, 1 have to 
look at this tragedy as if it were an unfortunate situation (say a road accident) and deal 
with as one can deal with an aceident. You see, once you convince yourself that this 
bomb was just one o f those accidents, then, you can try the best you can to move on with 
your life.
K: What advice can you offer the Kenyan government and its officials as to how they 
could be better prepared to deal with and prevent future acts o f terrorism?
B: Our government must be extremely on the look out for bad people. Our officials 
cannot afford to allow anybody to enter our country without thorough screening or 
making sure that those who come to Kenya are here legally. M ost important, our 
government must tighten security at all airports, borders, and all other places o f entry. 
Again, all those who are here in Kenya illegally must be deported back to their own
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countries. Furthermore, those who are arrested for planning and executing terrorism must 
be punished severely in order to send a message to could-be terrorists that Kenya will not 
seat on the side-lines when it comes to terrorism, domestic or transnational. Our country 
must also cooperate with countries in fighting terrorism and learn from the western 
countries how to respond terrorism. Our country must provide better training tools and 
facilities to the rescue and emergency relief teams, medical personnel, and other related 
agencies in order to save lives in-case another terrorist attack occurs.
K: How does it feel like to be a bomb survivor?
B: 1 count m yself blessed. I really thank God for sparing my life. I ’m alive today because 
o f G od’s mercy and grace. I also pray and ask God that this tragedy should never happen 
again not only here in Kenya but anywhere in the world because the terrorism is 
devastating and destructive. In fact, we Kenyans are relatively peaceful people and 
therefore terrorists should leave us alone.
K: Do you ever experience a sense o f guilt that you survived and hundred o f other 
Kenyans died from the attack?
B: Yes. Those who died from the bomb blast on that Friday morning would be anybody. 
In fact, many o f those who died were innocent people and bystanders. Some were coming 
to town that morning in buses, mini-buses, and private cars to work. Some were standing 
on queue waiting to enter into the U.S. embassy for student and traveling visas. Some 
were walking-by the embassy heading to their different destinations. Some were waiting 
for their loved ones in and around the U.S. embassy. Some were attending classes at a 
secretarial college at near the U.S. embassy. And some were basically at their usual place 
o f work when they were killed or injured. Yes, I feel guilty because those who were 
killed had their lives cut short without any apparent reason. Those who perished in that 
horrible act will never get to see their children grow, marry, and have children o f their 
own. Those who were queuing for student visas will never get a chance to pursue an 
American education. Those who were attending the Kenyan secretarial college will never 
get an opportunity to receive their diplomas. Those who were waiting for their loved ones 
will never get a chance to say hello or goodbye. Those who were killed while working in 
their offices will never get a chance say goodbye to their beloved ones, friends or work­
mates. And those who came to town that Friday morning never went back home alive. 
That is why I think that I’m lucky and blessed because 1 can go home to my children and 
family whereas those who killed will not. Besides, in the aftermath o f the bomb attack. 
I ’m back working to make ends meet and to provide for my family whereas those who 
died w ill not. I ’m still a live and here today even though I ’m severely  injured at great 
pain. But many o f my fellow Kenyans were doomed on that day. It makes me angry and 
sad that those who died or injured were in the wrong place at the wrong time. I have 
asked m yself many times why I survived while they died, but I don’t have answers. Yote 
tunamwachia mungu (We leave all to God).
K; Thank you for sharing your story. Best wishes.
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Ms. “C”, June 19, 2000, Nairobi, Kenya 
The following is an interview with Nairobi survivor “C”, a Luhya by tribe, a female in 
her 30s, and an employee o f the Kenya Railways Corporation. At the time o f the attack 
she was an office assistant.
K: Tell me where you were and what happened to you on August 7, 1998.
C: 1 was here on second flood working and at around 10:15 am, 1 heard a loud noise. 1 
went to the window to check out what was happening because the noise was so loud that 
it shook the whole building. Just as 1 reached the window to look out towards Haile 
Selassie Avenue and Moi Avenue, I had another very loud noise and saw the window 
glasses flying into our office. I was hit on the face and I fall down under the table. I did 
not know what had happened to me except that I was hurting in my eye, head and ear. I 
crawled outside bleeding from my face and other parts o f my body. The people were 
telling that I had been hit very badly with what they thought was a bomb. 1 would not see 
or hear well sinee I had been injured so badly. There was a lot o f blood coming from my 
eye and I was crying for help. Some people rushed me to Kenyatta Hospital. At the 
hospital, 1 heard a lot o f people crying because they had been injured from a bomb attack.
K: At the hospital what kind o f medical treatment did you receive?
C: I did not get medical treatment immediately. But hours later, I was taken to the 
operation theater where my left eye was operated on. I hospitalized for some time. W eeks 
later, I was discharged. Then sometime in 1999 I flew to Germany for a second eye 
operation. I receive an artificial eye. Before, coming back to Kenya, the Germany 
doctors told me that I needed to go back again for another eye operation. Months after 
arriving to Kenya, I visited Dr. Gondi at the Kenyatta Hospital, who with other doctors 
told me that beside my eye, one o f my ears was also severely damaged. They told that I ’d 
to be operated on because at first they did not did not know whether it was all that 
serious. After my operation, I can now hear a little bit.
K: Who do you blame for the attacks that caused you these injuries?
C: I really do not know who to blame. I don’t know the people who were responsible.
At first w e all thought it was a fatal road accident or bus collision. But hours and days 
later, our government and that o f America said that the bomb attack was the work o f the 
Arab terrorists and that Saudi Arabia citizen, Osama.
K: Now that you know who was behind it, what do you think o f terrorists?
C: I think that they are very bad people because they killed and injured many innocent
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people for no reason. They are cowards. Hao waarabu nikaa tu wanyama (those Arabs 
are like animals).
K: Are you angry that terrorists targeted Kenyans even though their alleged intentions 
were the United States and its citizens?
C; Yes. Because, all these scares that you see in my body is the work o f those terrorists. I 
will never be able to see and hear again with both o f my eyes and ears because o f the 
injuries 1 suffered from those terrorist animals. But even if I’m angry and bitter there is 
nothing I can do now to change the situation. I have cried enough and suffered enough. I 
know that being angry or bitter w on’t help me turn things around as they were before the 
attack. And I don’t believe in a moment that those terrorists did not intend to target our 
people. If they did not intend to kill us, why did they pick Friday morning (one o f the 
busiest days in the week) to bomb the U.S. embassy? And if they wanted to kill 
Americans and not us, why didn’t they go to America to bomb them there?
K: So how do you cope with your tragedy on the daily basis?
C: I live to deal with it. I know that my life will never be the same again, and so, I try to 
do the very best 1 can with what 1 have got left. It is really a problem especially working 
without my two eyes and ears. I have a problem seeing and hearing and that affects my 
overall work assignments. Sometimes my work production is low and I feel like I’m a 
total failure. But thanks to the help o f the rehabilitation centers, counseling services. I ’m 
able to handle my anger, pain, and suffering better. Also with the assistance o f donations 
from the USAID and NGOs, some o f us [survivors] were able to enroll in secretarial 
colleges or computers to acquire new skills. I find computer skills very helpful at work.
K: You mentioned that you attended computer classes. Who paid for it and how long did 
it last?
C: Our government assisted some o f us and with the money generously donated by 
different organizations, agencies, and well-wishers in paying for the computer training at 
the local private colleges for three months.
K: Is there any other assistance that you have received thus far to help you cope with 
your loss and suffering?
C: Yes. Besides the free medical treatments and medicine our government, some o f us 
were lucky enough to travel to W est Germany for further medical treatment. Our 
governm ent paid for our airfare and other expenses. Also, our government under the 
Njojo Commission compensated some o f us some money. I was awarded Ksh. 150,000 
($1,500). We were told that the money some o f use received were from the Kenyan 
government treasury and the assistance from the American government and other 
generously donated money from the world organizations that made it possible to establish 
the Njonjo Commission. In addition, I have been making use o f the Kenya Society for the 
Blind for rehabilitation, counseling, and other services to deal with my disability
304
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
problems. All these services have been made possible by both our government and that of 
the American.
K: How about school fees for your children?
C: No. I did not get assistance in terms o f school fees because my children are still too 
little. Those who received school fees were families o f the victims and other survivors 
whose children were old enough to attend primary school and secondary schools. 
Basically, for many survivors, the fees assistance was supposed to last for two to three 
years whereas for those who lost a family member, school-fees will lasts up to secondary 
school. But 1 was promised some little money in order to start a small business which 1 
have not received to-date. As for the future medical treatments from my complicated 
operations, it remains uncertain whether our country or that o f American will continue to 
assist to us pay for our medical bills and routine check-ups. I really hope that they 
continue to assist us financially or medically until we are in a position to financing our 
medical treatment. W ithout the government assistance, some o f us who received artificial 
eyes in Germany will not be able to maintain them as many o f us did not have insurances 
at the time o f the attacks to cover for these complicated surgeries.
K: Thanks for your time and story. I wish you well.
Ms. “D”, June 19, 2000, Nairobi, Kenya 
The following is an interview with the Nairobi bomb survivor “D”, a Kamba by tribe, 
a mother o f four, and an employee o f the Kenya Railways Corporation. At the time o f 
the attack, she was assigned to duties in the payroll office. When 1 interviewed her, she 
was still holding the same job position.
K: Tell me where you were and what happened to you on August 7, 1998?
D: I was here on the first floor on the payroll section working. At about or around 10:00 
a.m., 1 was standing near the file cabinets and then all o f a sudden, I heard something that 
sounded like guns-shots. 1 thought that it might have been a gas tank that blew off. But 
then I saw smoke and fire. 1 then proceed further to the window to see where the shots or 
sm oke were com ing from. I remember the whole building was shaking and the next thing 
1 knew, I was down after being hit by flying window glasses. 1 did not know what was 
happening and why I was hit or why 1 was bleeding. I heard many people running out o f 
the office building but 1 would not find my way out because I could not see. Blood was 
coming out o f eyes, head, and face. Sometime later, my brother called my office but I 
could not answer as I could not see or find the phone. But one o f my co-workers did 
answer the phone and told my brother that 1 had been seriously injured from what many
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believed to be a bomb attack. So, my brother rushed to my office, got hold o f me, washed 
blood from my eyes and face and then carried me to into a matatu (minibus) and took me 
to Kenyatta National Hospital.
K: At Kenyatta National Hospital what kind o f treatment did you receive?
D: After I arrived at the hospital, I did not receive treatment as there were many more 
bomb casualties with even severe complications who were in need for urgent medical 
care including surgeries. The doctors, however, gave me painkillers and non- infection 
medication while they attended to those with much seriously injuries. I was told to wait to 
be operated on because the theaters were full o f people who were undergoing operations. 
Later that day, I was transferred to Nairobi Hospital where I was operated. Both o f my 
eyes were operated on and the retinas were reattached. Months later, I was flown to West 
Germany under the USAID grant for further treatment. I stayed in West Germany for two 
weeks and then returned to Kenya. Since then, I have been seeing Dr. Gondi, an eye 
specialist once a month for check-ups.
K: Who paid for your medical treatments in Kenyan and Germany hospitals?
D: Our government paid the bill for my operation at Nairobi Hospital. And with the 
assistance o f the U.S funds, I was able receive traveling expenses to attend more 
operation treatments in West Germany. Furthermore, our country allows me to see my 
doctors free o f charge for further medical check-ups, at least for now.
K: Besides the free medical assistance, what else have you received thus far to help you 
cope with pain and suffering?
D: Our government paid school fees for four o f my children for a duration o f two years; 
paid my expenses at a computer college for three months; and still pays for my monthly 
rehabilitation expenses at the Kenya Society for the Blind.
K: Have you received direct compensation for your pain and suffering?
D: Yes. The Njonjo Commission awarded me Shillings 60,000 ($ 800).We were told that 
most o f the money came from the USAID, the NGOs, and donations from charities 
around the world to assist us deal with our injuries.
K: Do you think that the financial assistance you received and those that your fellow 
survivors received was enough to help you cope with your suffering?
D: Not really. Because our government indicated that they would provide us with free 
medical assistance and yet that assistance did not include subscription drugs. Since drugs 
are so expensive, the little money that I was awarded as compensation for my suffering, I 
used it to purchase drugs. Now that the award money is gone, I am without medication. I 
don’t have the enough money or the means to pay for my medical bills and at the same 
time provide for my four children. I think that our government should do a lot more to
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help us get well because what happened to us was not our own-making.
K: What are your thoughts about the terrorists whose actions changed your life?
D: They [the terrorists] are simply cowards. I f  those terrorists were angry with the 
Americans, they should have gone to Washington D.C., and bomb the Americans there 
not here in Kenya.
K: If you had the opportunity to face the terrorists caused your injuries, what would you 
say to them?
D: I would ask them the following questions: Why here? Why us? W hat did we do 
wrong to you to deserve this? W hat did you aecomplish by killing and injuring us and in 
the process destroying thousands o f people’s lives? Most important, I would tell that I 
forgive them and ask them never again to repeat the same senseless murder against us or 
against other innocent people around the world. I would also tell them that I forgive them 
as human beings and hope that God would also forgive their vicious actions. But, 1 would 
also like them to be punished severely so that they ean reap what they planted.
K: Why would you forgive people whose actions changed your life fore-ever?
D: Beeause I ’m a bom again Christian. And the Bible tells us to forgive all those who 
tress-pass against us including of-course our enemies the terrorists. I believe that God 
spared my life for a reason and that is why I feel blessed. I know that my life will never 
be the same again. I also know that I will never be able to see again with both o f my eyes. 
But forgiving my enemies is the beginning o f my getting well and moving on with my 
life. Forgiving the terrorists who attacks us on August 7, 1998, is in a way showing them 
human compassion and showing them that their criminal acts against innocent people 
(Kenyans, Tanzanians, and Americans) is not the right way to achieve ones grievances 
because there are many more peaceful avenues to solve problems without necessarily 
resorting to terrorism. Using terrorism as an instrument to bring about change only 
manages to kill innocent people, G od’s people.
K: How else do you cope with your loss, pain, and suffering on a daily basis?
D: Through prayers and by asking Lord to give me and my family strength and courage 
to move on with our lives. At the rehabilitation centers, our counselors and psychiatrists 
suggest that we express and share our experiences, anger, pain, suffering, stress, and 
other trials and tribulation with fellow survivors and other people as a way o f coping with 
our situation. M oreover, with me as with the rest o f other bomb survivors count ourselves 
blessed to be alive. We are aware that the realities and memories o f that August 7, 1998 
will never go away, but we try so hard to take everything one step at a time. We try as 
much as possible, however, painful and discouraging the ordeal is to look at the bright 
side of things and push ourselves without surrender to live our lives without fear.
K: Do you experience nightmares and if  so how often?
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D: Yes. I experience bad dreams almost every night. In my nightmares, I hear cries for 
help. I hear the injured groaning in agony. I hear cries from their loved ones. I hear their 
cries for pain-killers to help them and me to sleep even if  only for a moment. And then, I 
wake up crying and sweating and experiencing fear and helplessness. It is like being 
terrorized over and over again every night. This is what I have to go through on a daily 
basis. I dread going to sleep at night. I now suffer from what the doctors call 
hypertension. This is a disease I did not have before the bomb attack.
K: What are your thoughts to the allegation that the U.S. embassy security personnel 
refused to let Kenyan rescue teams to enter through their embassy to rescue survivors 
who were trapped in the rubbles in the five-story building, Ufundi House who would 
have been rescued had the American security allowed the rescuers and volunteers through 
the embassy entrance?
D: I think that Americans were also concern in rescuing those who were trapped inside 
the U.S. embassy. They had to rescue and save their personnel and people first before 
helping Kenyan victims and survivors. I can understand why they had to guard their 
embassy. For instance, if you came home from work and you found your apartment on 
fire, what do you do? Do you try to save your house or your neighbors? O f course, your 
first human instinct and priority is to try to rescue and save your house and try to salvage 
whatever belongings you can in your house before going to help your neighbor. So, the 
same can be said about the Americans. The Americans embassy military personnel were 
doing what comes natural to all human beings. The truth of the matter is the Americans 
were trying to rescue their own people and help secure or guard their belongings before 
helping the Kenyans. Personally, I don’t know why the U.S. embassy security denied 
permission to our Kenyans rescue and volunteers from using their main entrance to 
rescue many o f  our people who were buried alive in rubbles at the Ufundi building. But 
again. I’m not in a position to answer why the Americans denied such permission. That is 
a question that American security personnel can answer.
K: Thank you for story, experience, and insights. Best wishes.
Interviews with Nairobi Bomb Survivors on the Compensation Issue 
The following interviews were conducted in 2002 during the fourth anniversary o f  the 
Nairobi bomb attack. The survivors were interviewed at the site o f  the attack (now a 
memorial site). The interviews focused on the survivors’ reactions and claims that 
government authorities and officials promised them free medical treatment, drugs, routine 
medical check-ups, school fees, and other social services but were inadequately 
delivered. Another promises involved assisting the victims and survivors through legal
308
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
procedure to collect damages or compensation for their loss and suffering.
Mr. “E”, August 7, 2002, Nairobi, Kenya
Mr. “ E” is a Kikuyu by tribe and a male aged 65 years. At the time o f the bomb 
attack, he was in a Kenya Bus headed to work. When he was injured, the bus that he was 
riding in had just stopped at a traffic light near the U.S. embassy.
K: Mr. “E”, tell me where you were and what happened to you four years ago today?
E: I was in a Kenya Bus headed to work on the morning o f August 7, 1998, four years 
today. I remember that bus had stopped at traffic lights at a round about or intersection o f 
Moi and Haile Selassie Avenues, next to where the American embassy used to be. Some 
seconds later, a bomb went o ff killing many passengers and pedestrians. I, like many 
others were blinded from flying objects and broken glasses and windows.
K: How has the government assisted you to cope with your tragedy?
E: For four years now, our government has been assisting us [the survivors] in terms o f 
free medical treatments, drugs, rehabilitation and other services to help us cope with our 
loss, pain, and suffering. Now that we are told the government would no longer provide 
us with free medical services, we don’t know what is going to happen to us. I have ten 
children who are jobless. I’m also jobless because I ’m blind and the injuries I incurred 
from the bomb cannot allow me to hold a job.
K: Were you among the 5,000 Kenyan survivors who sued the U.S. government for 
damages under the class action suit o f MERANIA MURINGU M A C H A R IA , ET AL., v. 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA?
E; Yes.
K: Why did you join in that civil suit?
E: Because we were told that the U.S. officials knew about the terrorist attacks against 
their embassy but did not do more to secure it from the attack. We were also told that the 
American officials failed to warn us or our government o f those terrorist attacks.
K: So, what happened to your suit?
E: Nothing. We were told that the judges in the United Stated threw it out because our
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lawyers did not prove that the United States was responsible for our deaths and injuries. 
The U.S. courts, however, suggested that we should seek damages from the terrorist 
individuals or organizations themselves, specifically Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda 
network.
K: Have you received any money from bin Laden or al-Qaeda’s frozen assets?
E: No.
K: Why is that?
E; Again the United States has refused to allow Osama and al-Qaeda’s seized assets and 
funds to be used to compensate us for our loss, pain, and suffering. We don’t understand 
why the U.S. refuses to give us Osama and al-Q aeda’s frozen money to help us deal our 
loss.
K: How did you know that some o f Osama and al-Qaeda’s assets seized?
E; We learned from our officials and the media that after the terrorist attacks against the 
United States on September 11, millions o f Osama and al-Qaeda’s funds were seized.
K; Has your government assisted you in any way to receive restitution from al-Qaeda’s 
frozen assets and funds?
E: Not really. Nobody is telling us anything. Nobody is doing anything. Our states 
offieials keep promising us that they will do more to assist us but nothing is happening. 
Even the American Ambassador keeps telling us every anniversary that America will 
never forget us, and yet it refuses to allow Osama and al-Qaeda’s seized assets to be used 
to compensate us. We do not understand why the U.S. is doing this to us and denying our 
claims. Our lawyers have appealed and so we are waiting for a decision.
K: When you learned that the September 11 victims and survivors were individually 
compensated for at least $1.5 million for their loss and suffering, what were your 
thoughts?
E; It showed us that America has the money to compensate terrorist victims and 
survivors but does not want to compensate those who were killed or injured in their 
embassy attack here in Kenya.
K: W hy do you say that?
E: Because the American government compensated twelve o f its citizens who were 
killed and several others who were injured from the bomb attack. The twelve American 
who were killed received during the U.S. embassy attack received at least $1 million each 
for while we received peanuts or nothing. Also the American government awarded the 
September 11 victims and survivors (both U.S. citizens and non-citizens) with millions o f
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dollars while the rest o f us [Kenyans] have not. Worse still, we have tried the legal 
procedure to acquire money damages for our loss, pains, and suffering, but the U.S. 
courts keeps dismissing our complaints. We think that American government has refused 
to compensate us Kenyans bomb victims and survivors because o f  racial discrimination. 
If  the U.S. government compensated all those who were killed or injured on September 
11, we are also entitled for compensation beeause terrorist victims or survivors in New 
York are just as human as those in Nairobi.
K: Thanks for your insights. I wish you well.
Mr. “F”, August 7, 2002, Nairobi, Kenya 
Mr. “F” is a Kikuyu by tribe and a male in his 40s. He is the ehairman o f  the Nairobi 
Bomb Blast Survivors. He is among the 5, 000 bomb survivors who sued the United 
States government for damages.
K; Why did you decide to attend today’s anniversary? What were your thoughts when 
you learned that the U.S. government decided to make payments to victims o f September 
11 and not the Kenyan victims?
F: I ’m the Chairman o f the Nairobi Bomb Blast Survivors Group. Every year we attend 
this anniversary, we hear the same story that the governments o f Kenya and Ameriea will 
do more to help the victims and survivors in terms of medical and financial assistance. 
We are frustrated because the government promises are never delivered. We filed a class 
action suit against the United States in the Distriet Court of Columbia, but we were told 
that U.S. Judge dismissed our complaint because our lawyers did not prove that the U.S. 
was negligence and responsible for our deaths and injuries. Our lawyers have filed an 
appeal but we don’t know the outcome. We have never been told what happened. So 
despite being the number one democratic nation in the world, we suspect it [the United 
States] has no respect for the jud ic iary .. ..Kenyan victims cannot understand why some 
al-Qaeda victims and survivors were compensated while others were not. It seems to us 
that the U.S. cares more about renovating damaged buildings than providing relief and 
financial assistance to the victims. Furthermore, we were shocked and bitter to learn that 
the U.S. officials passed legislations that offered compensation to the victims of 
September 11 (both Americans and non-Americans) and the families o f the twelve 
Americans who died in the Nairobi attaek but not the Kenyan and Tanzanian victim ’ 
families or survivors.
K; Thanks for your insights.
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Ms. “G”, August 7, 2002, Nairobi, Kenya 
Ms. “G” is a Kikuyu by tribe, a female aged 33, and a mother o f two children.
At the time o f the attack, she was in the second floor o f the Cooperative House working. 
The force from the bomb threw her out o f the window injuring her.
K; Ms. “G” where were you four years ago today and what do you think about the 
compensation issue?
G: 1 was in the second floor o f the Cooperative Bank House, working. The force from 
the bomb threw me out o f the building. 1 was severely injured. My chest was crushed. I 
also received other bodily injuries. I was forced to retire because I would not work 
anymore. I received $4,000 from the bank. I used the money to cover for medical costs. 
That money is gone. I still require medications and monthly medical check-up, but I can’t 
afford the costs. I also have two children in school. Without a job, I don’t know how I 
will pay for their fees. W e were promised financial compensations but we have not 
received anything yet. W e were told that the families o f the twelve Americans who died 
in the Nairobi attacks were awarded one million dollars each. We sued the U.S. 
government for damages but Americans refused to compensate us. We know that 
America has the money to compensate us. If they will not give us compensation, we have 
to ask why. Is it because we are Kenyans?
K: Thank you for your time and insights.
Mr. “H”, August 7, 2002, Nairobi, Kenya 
Mr. “H” is a Kikuyu by tribe and a male aged 45. At the time o f  the attack, he was 
walking past the U.S. embassy. He was seriously injured and his arm was severed.
K; Tell me where you were four years ago today and what think about compensating o f 
the victims and survivors of terrorism?
H; Four year ago, today, I was walking past the U.S. embassy when the bomb went off. 
I received severe bodily injuries. My hand was severed. I can’t work. 1 can’t provide for 
my wife and seven children. We were told that we can apply for a U.S.-sponsorship 
business loan o f about $250 to start a small shop (kiosk). I was turned down because I
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would not come up with two guarantors. I hear that the American government is giving 
millions o f dollars to the September 11 victims and survivors, but I can’t get even 250 
dollars to assist me take care o f my family. I ’m bitter because before the attack, I was at 
least capable o f taking care o f my family. I used to farm in my little land and raise a few 
cows. I used to sell my vegetables and milk in Nairobi. But now, all I can do is beg.
K: Thank you for sharing your story. I wish you well.
Ms. “I”, August 7, 2002, Nairobi, Kenya 
Ms. “I” is a female aged 28 years. At the time o f the bomb, she was seven months 
pregnant. She still works as a telephone operator in the Cooperative House, a job she 
held when the attack took place. She was totally blinded.
K; Tell me where you were four year ago today, what happened to you and what you 
think about the U.S. decision not to compensate you for loss and suffering?
th
I: Four year ago today, I was in the 13 floor o f  the Cooperative Bank building working 
as a telephone operator at the switch-board. I heard a very loud bang coming from the 
American embassy which is next door to my office, the Cooperative Bank. I rushed to the 
window that faced the American embassy to see what was happening. Shortly thereafter, 
something powerful exploded. I was knocked down from flying objects and glasses from 
broken widows. I was bleeding from my eyes and ears and all over my body. I would not 
see anything. I thought I was going to die. I was also seven month pregnant.
K; How did you get out o f the building?
I: I don’t know who assisted me out but I think it would have been my colleagues or the 
rescue people.
K; Where were you taken?
I: Kenyatta National Hospital.
K: What were your injuries?
I: Severe body injuries and total blindness.
K: Why w eren’t you taken abroad for treatment as were some o f your fellow survivors?
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I: Because the doctors told me that there is nothing that would be done to save me as I 
was totally blinded from the bomb attack. Instead o f going abroad for further treatment, 
our government paid my expenses to attend the Kenya School for the Blind to learn to 
function as a blind person.
K; What is life like as a blind person?
I: Every hard. You see before the bomb attack, I was able-bodied and independent 
person and productive at work. Now I have to use a cane to find my way around. On 
many occasions, I have to request other people or strangers to assist me to cross a road, 
board a bus, get into an elevator, or find food in the market. For me, the worst part being 
blind is that I never saw how my baby looks like because she was bom two months after I 
had been blinded fi'om the blast. For me being a parent and blind has been really difficult 
because if my children are in any problem or danger, I cannot help them because I can’t 
see. That really hurts me more than anything else.
K: So how did you cope with your loss and suffering?
I: I had to accept my fate because there is nothing I can do to change things. I know that 
I will never be able to see again. I decided to move on with my life and do the very best 
to raise my children. I count m yself blessed and luck to be a survivor because I know 
many o f my fellow workmates or Kenyans died from the attack
K: How has the government assisted you to cope with your tragedy?
I: Other than the free medical treatment, medication, or rehabilitation services that our 
government has been able to assist us with, I also received some money from the Njonjo 
Commission.
K: How much did you personally receive?
I: Around Kenya Shillings 150,000 ($2,000). Our government also promised us [victims 
and survivors] more assistance or damages for our loss and suffering.
K: Is the government still assisting you with free medical treatment, drugs, and other 
services that it promised?
I: Yes and No. Yes because for almost four years we have been assisted with free 
medical treatment at the Kenyatta National Hospitals, medical check-ups and medication 
and other services such as rehabilitation and counseling. But now our government has 
said that the money which the United States gave through the humanitarian aid to assist 
us is finished. We were told that all free medical treatments and other services have been 
terminated. Now we are supposed to pay for our medical costs. W orse still, many us 
[survivors] did not have insurance coverage and cannot afford to pay for our medical 
costs.
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K: So how are you going to pay for your medical services?
I: I went back to work as a telephone operator at the Cooperative House. The old job, I 
use to do. I now earn at lest more than $1 dollar a day. Since being blinded, I have not 
been as productive as I would have like to be. Before the attack, I was hoping for a 
promotion but now that hope is slim. Again, before the attack, I used to work overtime 
and was attending a secretarial college to become secretary, but now, it is hard to do that.
K: What about the compensation and damages from the class action suit that you filed 
against the U.S. government?
1; We were told that the American judged dismissed our claim. But our lawyers have 
appealed again.
K: After hearing that the U.S. government refused to award you damages, what were 
your thoughts?
I: ‘It’s not fair. It’s really hurting. Like me, my life has really changed. I think that they 
should compensate us so that w e...w e can organize ourselves and to able to live a good 
life’. America should give us money because it gave other terrorist victims and survivors 
who were killed and injured on September 11. W e are not any different from those were 
killed or injured in New York and W ashington D.C. We are all human beings. A terrorist 
attack affects all o f us the same way no matter which country one comes from. If 
American government doesn’t want to pay from their own pockets, it should at least 
make available Osama and al-Qaeda’s seized assets and funds to be used to compensate 
us. Because, Osama and his al-Qaeda group were the ones who attacked us, their 
financial assets, which the American government seized should be used to compensate all 
o f al-Qaeda’s victims and survivors including us Africans.
K: Thank you for your story and insights. I wish you well.
Mr. “J”, August 7, 2002, Nairobi, Kenya 
Mr. “J” is Kikuyu by tribe and a male aged 50. At the time o f the bomb attack, he was 
at his place o f work at Pioneer House, a building near the American embassy. He was 
injured from flying debris or broken window glasses.
K: Mr. “J” how were you injured and why did you attend this year’s anniversary?
J: I was working in Pioneer House, which is next to the American embassy. When the
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book went off, I was knocked-down and buried under debris. My chest was crushed. 
When I was rushed to the hospital, I was told that my lungs were bleeding. Since then, I 
have had many complications with my lungs because they are weak. The doctors told me 
that I have to have medication to help function. For over three years, our government 
gave us medication for free, but now the government has stopped doing that. We were 
told that from now on we must pay for our own medical care and health services. Me, 
like thousands o f other my other Kenyan survivors cannot afford to pay for our medical 
treatment or medication. T ’m not working anymore and so I can’t afford to pay for my 
drugs’. This is why I come here today to remind our state officials and those o f the 
United States that we [victims and survivors o f  bomb] did not ask for what happened to 
us on August 7, 1998. We were innocent civilians who were attacked, killed, and injured. 
So our officials and those o f America should do more to help us and not to abandon and 
neglect us simply because we are disabled.
K: Thanks for your time and story. Good luck.
Bwana “M”
K: Tafadhali nielize ni nami unayemlaumu kwa udui was bomu uliowapata?
M; Si ni hawa waarabu tu. Kwani kuna nani mwengine isopokua tu huyo mwaarabu 
atwaye Usuma mwenye pesa nyingi.
K: Asante sana.
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Kibigo, All Plaintiffs, [^* 2 ] PLAINTIFFS: Philip Michael M usolino, Musolino & D essel, M ark S te v en  Zaid, 
W ashing ton , DC USA.
For United S ta te s  of Am erica, FEDERAL DEFENDANT: M eredith  M anning, Robin M E arn e st, US A tto rn ey 's  
Office, W ashing ton , DC USA.
JUDGES: Colleen Kollar-Kotelly, U nited S ta te s  D istrict Judge .
OPINIONBV: Colleen Kollar-Kotelly 
O PINIO N: [*17] MEMORANDUM O PIN IO N
( J u l y  2 9 ,  2 0 0 2 )
P resen tly  pending before  th e  C o u rt is D e fen d an t U nited  S ta te s ' Motion to  D ism iss P laintiffs' A m ended  
C om plain t for lack o f su b jec t m a t te r  ju risd ic tion  p u rs u a n t  to  Federal Rule of Civil P ro c e d u re  1 2 (b )(1 ) , an d  fo r 
failure to  s ta te  a  claim  upon  w hich relief can  be  g ra n te d , p u rsu a n t to  Federal Rule of Civil P ro c e d u re  1 2 (b )(6 ). 
Plaintiffs, rep re se n tin g  a p ro sp ec tiv e  c lass  o f o v e r five th o u sa n d  K enyan citizens a n d  b u s in e s se s ,  b ring  th is  
action in connection  with th e  A ugust 7, 1998, te r ro r is t  bom bing  of th e  United S ta te s  E m b assy  in N airobi, 
Kenya ( th e  "Em bassy"). Plaintiffs a llege  th a t  D e fe n d a n t 's  n eg lig en ce  re la ted  to  th e  se c u rity  of th e  E m b assy
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com p o u n d ed  Plaintiffs' in ju ries and  lo sses suffered  as a resu lt of th e  bom bing. Upon rev iew  of D e fen d an t's  
m otion to  d ism iss, m em o ran d u m  of law and  a tta ch e d  exhibits. Plaintiffs' o p position  [* * 3 ] th e re to , 
D e fen d an t's  reply, and th e  re lev an t law, th e  C ourt shall g ran t D efen d an t's  m o tion  to  d ism iss.
[ * 1 8 1  I . BACKGROUND
On A ugust 7, 1998, a, te rro ris t bom b exploded a t the  re a r  e n tra n ce  to th e  A m erican  E m bassy  in Nairobi, 
Kenya, killing over two h u n d red  peop le , injuring th o u san d s  m ore, and d am ag in g  K enyan  b u s in e s se s  located  
n e a r  th e  E m bassy . Plaintiffs' A m ended  C om plaint ("Cplt.") a t 68. The bom bing  in ju red  th o se  inside  th e  
E m bassy  com pound , and led to th e  co llapse  of th e  a d ja c e n t Ufundi Building, [ d .  P 71 . A dditional in juries 
o ccurred  w hen g lass  w indow s sh a t te re d  a t the  n earb y  C o-op Bank Building. I d .  It is be liev ed  th a t  th e  
bom bing w as carried  o u t by th e  a l  Q a e d a  te rro r is t o rgan ization , led by O sam a bin L aden . I d .  P 69.
Plaintiffs com plain th a t th e  "actions an d  inactions by th e  United S ta te s  of A m erica, principally  th ro u g h  th e  
D e p a rtm en t of S ta te , c re a te d  c ircu m stan ces  which p e rm itted  th e  Bom bing a n d  su b se q u e n tly  c au sed  and  
e x a c e rb a te d  th e  loss and  injury su s ta in ed  by K enyan victim s." I d .  a t  58 . Specifically , Plaintiffs a lleg e  in C ount 
O ne th a t th e  E m bassy  w as inheren tly  d a n g ero u s  and  th a t em p lo y ees of th e  D e p a rtm e n t of S ta te  ("DOS") 
knew  or should  hav e  [* * 4 ] know n th a t  a te rro ris t a tta ck  ag a in s t th e  E m bassy  w as likely. Cplt. PP 8 2 -9 4 . 
D esp ite  th is  know ledge. Plaintiffs a rg u e , DOS em p lo y ees failed to  a le r t th e ir  su p e rio rs , th e  E m bassy , and  
K enyan c itizens th a t  such d a n g e rs  w ere  im m inent. I d .  PP 57, 91 A dditionally, Plaintiffs a s s e r t  th a t  DOS 
em p lo y ees failed to  provide sufficiently  tra ined  secu rity  perso n n el to  th e  E m b assy  a n d  failed to  tak e  
n e ce ssa ry  secu rity  p recau tio n s  to  p rev en t such  an  a ttack . I d .  PP 8 8 -8 9 . Plaintiffs a lleg e  fu r th e r  th a t  th e  
United S ta te s  "m ad e  secu rity  and  re scu e  re la ted  decisions b a se d  on race  a n d  n a tio n a l origin." Cplt. P 92 . 
Plaintiffs a lso  a llege  th a t th e  U nited S ta te s  is re sp onsib le , b a sed  on th e  d o c trin e  of r e s p o n d e a t  s u p e r i o r ,  foi 
th e  neg ligence  of th e  in d ep e n d en t co n tra c to r providing secu rity  se rv ices a t th e  E m b assy . I d .  PP 52, 75, 88 .
As a re su lt of th is a lleged  failure to  provide ap p ro p ria te  secu rity . Plaintiffs claim  in C oun t Two th a t  th e  
E m bassy  w as a public an d  p rivate  nu isan ce  th a t  "deprived  ne ig h b o rs of th e  u se  an d  e n jo y m e n t of th e ir 
ad jo in ing  p ro p erty ."  I d .  PP 95 -9 8 . In C ount T hree, Plaintiffs m ain tain  th a t  th e  U nited S ta te s  v io la ted  
in te rn a tio n a l c u s to m a ry  law , th e  K enyan C onstitu tion , [**5] and  th e  In te rn a tio n a l C o v en an t on  Civil and  
Political R ights ("ICCPR") by its a lleged  security  fa ilures. I d .  PP 9 9 -1 0 5 . Plaintiffs, in C oun t Four, re q u e s t re lief 
in th e  form  of a co n stru c tiv e  tru s t, to hold any a s s e ts  o r  funds se ized  by th e  U nited S ta te s  from  O sam a bin 
Laden an d  a l  Q a e d a  for th e  "use, benefit, and  en jo y m e n t of th e  plaintiffs and  p ro sp ec tiv e  c lass  m e m b e rs ." 
Cplt. P 109. Plaintiffs a llege th a t  th is C ourt p o sse sse s  ju risd ic tion  o v e r th e  p re s e n t  ac tio n  p u rsu a n t to  th e  
Federal Tort C laim s Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671 e t  s e q . ,  which o p e ra te s  a s  a lim ited  w a iv er of th e  United 
S ta te s ' so v ere ig n  im m unity . Cplt. a t  68 .
D efendan t m o v es to d ism iss Plaintiffs' C om plain t on th e  g ro u n d s th a t  it is no t a m e n a b le  to  su it in this C c u ,. 
ba sed  on th e  foreign  cou n try  ex cep tio n , 28 U.S.C § 2 6 8 0 (k ), and  d isc re tio n ary  function  ex cep tio n , 28 U.3.C .
§ 2 6 8 0 (a ), to  th e  FTCA's w a iver of sovere ig n  im m unity . D e fen d an t's  M em orandum  of Law ( "Def. M em .") a t  
14, 17. D e fen d an t c o n te n d s  first th a t  Plaintiffs h av e  failed to  d e m o n s tra te  th a t  any  o f th e  a lleg ed  n eg lig en t 
conduct com pla ined  of o ccurred  w ithin th e  U nited [**5] S ta te s . I d .  a t  14-17 . S eco n d , D e fen d an t a rg u e s  th a t 
any ac tio n s th a t  m ay  hav e  tak en  place within th e  U nited S ta te s  clearly  fall w ithin th e  d isc re tio n a ry  ex cep tion  
to  th e  FTCA. I d .  a t  17-30 . Finally, D efen d an t a s se r ts  th a t  Plaintiffs fail to  s ta te  a claim  p re d ic a te d  on 
in te rn atio n al and  K enyan law and  fail to  s ta te  a [*19] claim  for a c o n stru c tiv e  tru s t .  I d .  a t  2, 3 7 -3 8 .
II . D ISC U SSIO N
A. L e g a l  S t a n d a r d
In review ing a m otion  to d ism iss for failure to  s ta te  a  claim  upon w hich re lief m ay  b e  g ra n te d  p u rsu a n t to 
Federal Rule o f Civil P rocedure  1 2 (b )(6 ), a court will no t g ra n t th e  m otion "unless it a p p e a rs  bey o n d  d o u b t 
th a t  th e  plaintiff can  p rove no s e t  of fac ts  in su p p o rt of his claim  which would en title  him  to  relief." C o n le y  v . 
G ib s o n ,  355 U.S. 4 1 , 4 5 -4 6 , 2 L. Ed. 2d 80, 78 S. Ct. 99 (1 9 5 7 ). Accordingly, a t  th is  e arly  s ta g e  in th e  
p ro ceed in g s , th e  C ourt a s su m e s  th e  v erac ity  of all factual a lleg a tio n s se t  fo rth  in P laintiff's C om plain t. S e e  
D o e  V. U n i t e d  S t a t e s  D e p ' t  o f  J u s t ic e ,  243  U.S. A p p .  D C . 354 , 753 F.2d 1092 , 1102 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
M oreover, " th e  com pla in t m u st be 'liberally co n stru ed  in favor of th e  plain tiff,' w ho m u s t  b e  [* * 7 ] g ra n te d  
th e  benefit of all in fe ren ces  th a t can  be  derived from  th e  fac ts  a lleged ." S c h u le r  v. U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  199 U.S. 
App. D C. 23, 617  F.2d 605 , 608  (D C. Cir. 1979). N o n e th e less , th e  C ourt is no t b ound  to  a c c e p t th e  legal 
conclusions of th e  non-m oving  p a rty . S e e  T a y lo r  v . F D IC ,  328  U.S. App. D.C. 52, 132 F.3d 753, 762 (D.C.
Cir. 1997).
Before a fed era l co u rt m ay h e a r  a case , it m u st a sc e rta in  w h e th e r  it h a s  ju risd ic tion  o v e r  th e  u nderly ing
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su b jec t m a tte r  of th e  action . B e n d e r  v . W i l l i a m s p o r t  A r e a  S c h o o l  D is t . ,  475  U.S. 534, 541 , 89 L. Ed. 2d 501, 
106 S. Ct, 1326 ( 1986) ("Federal co u rts  a re  no t co urts of g en era l ju risd ic tion ; th ey  have  only th e  pow er th a t  
is au tho rized  by Article HI of th e  C onstitu tion  and the  s ta tu te s  e n ac te d  by C ongress p u rsu a n t th e re to ." ) .  
Motions to  d ism iss for lack of jurisd iction  over the  su b jec t m a tte r  of th e  action a re  p ro p e r u n d e r  Federal Rule 
of Civil P rocedure  1 2 (b )(1 ). In  th e  Rule 12(b)(1) con tex t, th e  plaintiff b e a rs  th e  b u rden  of proving 
jurisd iction . M c N u t t  v. G e n e r a l  M o to r s  A c c e p ta n c e  C o rp . ,  298 U.S. 178, 1 82-183 , 80  L. Ed. 1135, 56 S. Ct. 
7 8 0  (1 9 3 6 ); L a n d  v . D o l la r ,  330  U.S. 731, 735, 91 L. Ed. 1209, 67  S. Ct. 1009 (1 9 4 7 ). [**8] W hen a 
d e fen d an t b rings a ch allenge  to  th e  ac tual com plaint itself, w ithou t relying on m a tte rs  o u ts id e  th e  p lead ings, 
th e  m otion to  d ism iss is a "facial challenge" to a com plain t, b e ca u se  a d istric t court is no t a sk e d  to  review  
d o cu m en ts  o u ts id e  th e  p lead ings. S e e  H o h r l  v . U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  251 U.S. App. D.C. 145, 782 F.2d 2 27 , 241 
(D.C. Cir. 1986), v a c a t e d  o n  o t h e r  g r o u n d s ,  482 U.S. 64 , 96  L. Ed. 2d 51, 107 S. Ct. 2 2 4 6  (1 9 8 7 ) (m a te ria ls  
a l iu n d e  p lead in g s can  be considered  on Rule 12(b)(1) m otion ); 2 Ja m e s  Wm. Moore e t a l., M o o r e 's  F e d e r a l  
P r a c t ic e ,  § 1 2 .3 0 (4 ], a t 39  (3 rd  ed. 2002) ("A facial a tta c k  q u e stio n s  th e  sufficiency of th e  p lead in g ."). On a 
m otion to  d ism iss a  c ase  th a t  p re se n ts  such a "facial challenge ,"  a  co u rt m u st acc ep t all o f th e  co m p la in t 's  
w ell-p leaded  factual a lleg a tio n s a s  tru e  and draw  all re a so n a b le  in feren ces from  th o se  a lleg a tio n s  in th e  
plaintiff's favor. U n i t e d  T r a n s .  U n io n  v . G a te w a y  W e s te r n  R . C o . ,  78 F .3d 1208 (7 th  Cir. 1996) ( c i t i n g  R u e th  
V.  E P A , 13 F.3d 227 , 229 (7 th  Cir. 1993)).
Flowever, in so m e  in s tan ces , a court is required  to  look beyond  th e  p lead in g s and  to  inquire  in to  fac ts  th a t  
a re  p e rtin en t to  th e  d e te rm in a tio n  [**9] of w h e th er it h a s  su b je c t m a tte r  ju risd ic tion . L a n d ,  3 3 0  U .S. a t 735 
n .4 . Such a "factual challenge" a tta ck s  th e  ex is tence  of su b jec t m a tte r  ju risd ic tion  by looking b ey o n d  th e  
p leadings an d  p laces th e  b u rd en  on th e  plaintiff to  prove th a t  fac ts  ex is t th a t  e stab lish  a  c o u rt's  ju risd ic tion . 
S e e  F e d e r a l  E le c t io n  C o m .  v . N a t i o n a l  R i f le  A s s o c . ,  553 F. Supp . 1331 , 1343 (D.D.C. 1983) ("A factual 
a tta c k , ' how ever, challen g es th e  ex is ten ce  of su b jec t m a tte r  ju risd ic tion  in fact, irresp ec tiv e  o f th e  p lead in g s, 
and m a tte rs  o u tsid q  th e  p lead ings, [* 2 0 ] such a s  tes tim o n y  and  affidav its, a re  co n sid ered . M oreover, a  
factual a tta c k ' u n d e r  Rule 1 2 (b )(1 ) m ay  occur a t any s ta g e  of th e  p ro ceed ings, and  plaintiff b e a rs  th e  b u rd en  
of proof th a t  ju risd ic tion  d o e s  in fact ex ist.") (in ternal c ita tio n s o m itted ).
In th is  in stan ce  D efen d an t b rings a factual challenge to th e  ex is te n ce  of su b jec t m a tte r  ju risd ic tion  an d  th u s . 
Plaintiff b ea rs  th e  b u rd en  of p re sen tin g  proof th a t ju risd ic tion  p roperly  lies with th is C ourt.
0. T h e  F e d e r a l  T o r t  C la im s  A c t
A bsent an e x p re ss  w aiver of sovere ig n  im m unity, a plaintiff m ay  not su e  th e  United S ta te s  in federal co u rt 
S ee  F D !C  v . M e y e r ,  510 U.S. 471 , 474 , 127 L. Ed. 2d 308 , 114 S. Ct. 9 9 6  (1 9 9 4 ); [* * 1 0 ] s e e  a ls o  U n i t e o  
S t a t e s  V. M it c h e l l ,  463  U.S. 206 , 212, 77 L. Ed. 2d 580, 103 S. Ct. 2961 (1 9 8 3 ) ("It is ax iom atic  th a t th e  
United S ta te s  m ay  no t be  su ed  w ithout its co nsen t and th a t  th e  ex is te n ce  of co n sen t is a p re re q u is ite  for 
ju risd ic tion ."). The Federal T ort Claim s Act ("FTCA"), 28 U .S.C. §§ 1 3 4 6 (h ), 2 6 7 1 -8 0 , c re a te s  an  e x p re ss  
lim ited w aiver of th e  U nited S ta te s ' sovereign  im m unity, re n d erin g  th e  fed era l g o v e rn m e n t an d  its ag en c i^ . 
liable for certa in  " to rt claim s, in th e  sa m e  m an n er and  to  th e  s a m e  e x te n t  a s  a p riv a te  individual u n d e r  like 
c ircu m stan ces ."  28  U.S.C. § 2 6 7 4 (a ). W hile th e  FTCA c re a te s  th e  ju risd ic tional b asis for to rt c la im s b ro u rh r  
a g a in s t the  U nited S ta te s , th e  underly ing claims a re  d e te rm in ed  acco rd ing  to  local law.
In enacting  th e  FTCA, C o n g ress explicitly p reserved  th e  federa l g o v e rn m e n t's  im m unity  from  su it for claim s 
"based  upon an  a c t o r om ission  of an  em ployee  of the  G o v ern m en t, exerc is ing  d u e  care , in th e  e x ec u tio ', a
s ta tu te  or reg u la tio n , w h e th e r  or not such  s ta tu te  o r regu la tion  be  valid, o r based  upon th e  ex erc ise  or 
perfo rm ance  o r th e  failure to exerc ise  o r perform  a d iscre tio n ary  function  [* * 1 1 ] o r du ty  on  th e  pa rt o f a 
federal agency  or an  em p lo y ee  of th e  G overnm ent, w h e th e r o r  no t th e  d iscretion  involved be a b u se d ."  28 
U.S.C. § 2 6 8 0 (a ) ("d isc re tio n ary  function exception"). A plaintiff m u s t fu rth e r d e m o n s tra te  th a t  th e  
com plained of a c t o r om ission  by th e  United S ta te s  does n o t a rise  in a  fo reign  country . S e e  28  U.S.C. § 268 0  
(k) ( "foreign cou n try  ex cep tion"). If a  claim  falls within o n e  of th e s e  FTCA excep tio n s, th e  C ourt d o es  no t 
p o ssess  su b jec t m a tte r  ju risd ic tion  and m u st dism iss th e  action .
C. D e f e n d a n t 's  m o t i o n  t o  d is m is s  f o r  la c k  o f  s u b j e c t - m a t t e r  j u r i s d i c t i o n  F e d .  R . C iv .  P . 1 2 ( b ) ( l ) .
D efendant m o v es to  d ism iss C ounts O ne and Two of Plaintiffs' C om plain t p u rsu a n t to  Federal Rule of Civil 
P ro c e d u re  1 2 ( b ) ( 1 )  b a s e d  on  t h e  discretionary  function and  th e  fo reign  co u n try  excep tio n s to th e  FTCA. At 
th e  o u tse t, th e  C ourt m u st a d d re ss  Plaintiffs' e rro n eo u s a sse rtio n  th a t  D e fen d an t's  m otion  to  d ism iss 
Plaintiffs' com pla in t p u rsu a n t to  Federal Rule of Procedure 1 2 (b )(1 ) m u s t h e  tre a te d  a s  a m otion  to  d ism iss 
p u rsu a n t to Federal Rule of Civil P rocedure  1 2 (b )(6 ). Plaintiffs' O pposition  to  D efen d an t's  Motion to  D ism iss 
Com plaint [* * 1 2 ] ("PI. O pp 'n") a t 4 -6 . Plaintiffs con tend  th a t  a tta c k s  a s  to  ju risd ic tion  p u rsu a n t to Rule 12 
(h )(1 ) "should b e  lim ited  to  com pla in ts which estab lish  failure to  e x h a u s t ad m in istra tiv e  rem e d ie s , or w hich
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estab lish  th a t  th e  to rt upon which the  com plain t is based  falls within one of th e  explicit e x cep tio n s  se t  ou t in 
28 U.S.C. § 2 6 8 0 (h )."  n l  PI. O pp’n a t 4. Plaintiffs a rg u e  th a t w here, as h e re , a d e fe n d a n t [* 2 1 ] m o v es to 
dism iss a claim  based  upon th e  d iscretionary  function exception  or th e  foreign  co u n try  ex cep tio n  to  th e  FTCA, 
co u rts  should  apply th e  "heigh tened  req u irem en ts  of Rule 12(b)(6)" and t re a t  all fac tu a l a lle g a tio n s  - 
including th o se  re la ted  to jurisdiction - in th e  com plain t a s  true. Id .
--------------------------------- Footnotes -----------------------------------
n l  28 U.S.C. § 2 6 8 0 (h ) c re a te s  an  exception  to th e  w aiver of im m unity for "any  claim  arising o u t o f  a ssau lt, 
b a tte ry , fa lse  im prisonm en t, false a rre s t, m alicious p rosecu tion , ab u se  of p ro cess , libel, s lan d er, 
m is rep re se n ta tio n , dece it, or in te rference  with co n trac t rights."
----------------------------End F o o tn o tes ------------------------------------[**13]
Plaintiffs' a sse rtio n  h as  little m erit. As d iscussed  above, w hen a court is req u ired  to  look beyond  th e  p lead ings 
to estab lish  its jurisd ic tion , a plaintiff m ust th rough  testim ony  and affidavits, d e m o n s tra te  th a t  a  c a s e  is 
properly  b efo re  th e  court. S ee  L a n d ,  330 U.S. a t  735. This C ourt m ust review  th e  a lleg a tio n s  in P laintiffs' 
C om plain t, and  m ay review  facts ou tside  of th e  p lead ings, in o rder to d e te rm in e  w h e th e r  ju risd ic tio n  ex is ts .
In this in s tan ce , th a t m ea n s  exam in ing  fac ts  re la ted  to  w here  th e  alleged n eg lig en t ac tio n s took  p lace , a t 
h o m e o r a b ro ad , and  w h e th er D efendan t's  actions w ere  in fact d iscretionary  in n a tu re . Flowever, "w e do  so 
only to d e te rm in e  w h e th er th e  d istric t court has jurisd iction  over th o se  ac tio n s, no t to  p re ju d g e  th e  m erits  of 
th e  case. If the«district cou rt has jurisd iction  over th e  suit, th e  plaintiff m u st still p ro v e  th a t  th e  g o v e rn m e n t's  
ac tions w ere  neg ligen t in o rd e r . . .  to prevail." C o p e  v . S c o t t ,  310 U.S. App. D.C. 144 , 45 F.3d 4 4 5 , 448  
(D C. Cir. 1995).
The c a se s  c ited  by Plaintiffs do not indicate o therw ise . Plaintiffs primarily rely on R ic h a r d s o n  v . U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  
338  U.S. App. D.C. 265 , 193 F.3d 545 (D.C. Cir. 1999), [**14] for th e  co n ten tio n  th a t  a  m otion  to  d ism iss 
b a sed  on th e  d iscretionary  function m ust sa tisfy  th e  h e ig h ten ed  re q u irem en ts  of Rule 1 2 (b )(6 ). To th e  
co n tra ry , th a t ca se  directly  found th a t "no one d o u b ts  th a t  [th e  plaintiff's] original com p la in t w ould p roperly  
be d ism issed  for lack of su b je c t m a tte r  jurisdiction, b e ca u se  of th e  d iscre tionary  function  ex cep tio n ."  
R ic h a r d s o n ,  193 F.3d a t 547 . The issue in R ic h a r d s o n  d ea lt with w hether th e  d istric t cou rt had e rre d  in 
d enying  a p r o  s e  plaintiff a ch ance  to  am en d  his com plain t in o rder to s ta te  a cogn izab le  claim . N ow here, 
d o es  th e  R ic h a r d s o n  court indicate th a t, in applying th e  d iscretionary  function ex cep tio n , a co u rt is u n ab le  to 
dism iss a  claim  p u rsu a n t to  Rule 1 2 (b )(1 ) and  in fact, recognized th a t such d ism issa l w as a p p ro p ria te  a s  to 
th e  plaintiff's original com plain t. I d .
Further, Plaintiffs con tend  a t th e  o u tse t th a t this C ourt should not dism iss th e  action  p u rsu a n t to  Rule 12(b) 
(1 ) b e ca u se  Plaintiffs have no t had  th e  opportun ity  to  conduct sufficient ju risd ic tional d iscovery  in th is case .
PI. O pp'n a t  8. Plaintiffs a rg u e  th a t D efendant h as  failed to  p roduce certa in  re q u e s te d  d o c u m e n ts  th a t  
perta in  [* * 1 5 ] to  how th e  DOS identifies te rro ris t th re a ts  and how th e  DOS m ak e s  d ecisio n s reg ard in g  who 
to  notify reg ard in g  such  th re a ts . I d .  W ithout this inform ation , Plaintiffs a rg u e , "D efen d an t . . .  is p rec lu d ed  
from  m aking a factual a ttack  on th e  th rea t reac tion  cla im s in this case ." I d .  a t  8.
Plaintiffs a rg u m e n t is m erely  an  a tte m p t to re -litiga te  m a tte rs  a lready  reso lved  by th is C ourt and  th e  
M ag istrate  Ju d g e  in th is case . Plaintiffs w ere afforded th re e  m o n th s of d iscovery  on th e  ju risd ic tiona l 
qu estio n , during  which tim e th ey  had th e  opportun ity  to subm it in te rro g a to ries , d e p o se  w itn esse s , and  
re q u e s t d o c u m e n ts  from  th e  D efendant. S e e  D ecem ber 17, 2001 , O rder; Civ. No. 9 9 -3 2 7 4  (CKK) a t  3, 
Plaintiffs w ere  p e rm itte d  to tak e  Federal Rule of Civil P rocedure  3 0 (b )(6 ) dep o sitio n s of U nited S ta te s  
pe rsonnel n2 reg ard in g  [*22] "how and w here th e  D ep artm en t m ade decisions concern ing  secu rity , local 
g u ard s, tra in ing , an d  m an a g em e n t of th re a t inform ation ." S e e  O ctober 3, 20 0 1 , O rder Civ. No. 9 9 -3 2 7 4  (AK) 
a t  6. M ag istrate  Ju d g e  Alan Kay denied  Plaintiffs' re q u e s ts  for additional d iscovery  and  reso lv ed  all of 
Plaintiffs' challen g es concern ing  th e  sufficiency of D e fen d an t's  com pliance with [* * 1 6 ] d iscovery  re q u e s ts .
S e e  I d .  M ag istra te  Ju d g e  Kay subseq u en tly  clarified his O rder of O ctober 3; exp lain ing  th a t  D e fen d an t w as 
no t r e q u i r e d  to  " p r o d u c e  r e s p o n s e s  which ad d ress  b o th  Jur isd ic t iona l  and factual issu es ."  O ctober 30, 2001, 
O rder Civ. No. 9 9 -3 2 7 4  (AK) a t 2. C onsequently , th is  C ourt concludes th a t Plaintiffs h a v e  had  a m p le  
o p p o rtu n ity  to  ob tain  inform ation from D efendants concern ing  th e  jurisd ictional issu e  a n d  re ite ra te s  th a t 
"Plaintiffs a re  n o t en titled  to fu rther jurisdictional d iscovery ." Dec. 17, 2001, O rd er a t 3.
Footnotes
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n2 The C ourt n o tes th a t Plaintiffs also had an opportun ity  to tak e  five Rule 3 0 (b )(5 )  d ep o sitio n s on the 
ju risd ic tional question  in a re la te d  action before this C ourt, d ism issed  on March 30, 2002 , B ic h a r g e  v. U n it e d  
S t a t e s ,  Civ. Action No. 0 0 -1 6 3 6  (D.D.C. March 30, 2002).
----------------------------- End F o o tn o te s--------------------------------
1. D iscretionary Function Exception
T he Court will begin its analy sis  with the  discretionary  function excep tion . All of Plaintiffs' claim s co n ta in ed  in 
C ounts O ne and Two, sa v e  one , re la ted  to th e  negligence [* * 1 7 ] of th e  in d ep e n d en t co n trac to r, an d  can  be 
resolved p u rsu an t to  th is  excep tion . n3
--------------------------------- F o o tn o tes-----------------------------------
n3 Plaintiffs, in recognition  of th e  foreign country excep tion , h av e  a tte m p te d  to  d e m o n s tra te  th a t th e  in juries 
an d  property  d am ag e  su ffe red  in Kenya w ere th e  resu lt of n eg lig en t acts o r om issio n s co m m itted  w ithin th e  
United S ta te s . S e e  Cplt. PP 4 0 -6 2 . This type of claim is know n a s  a "h ead q u a rte rs"  claim . S e e  B e a t t ie  v. 
U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  244 U.S. App. D.C. 70, 756 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1984). H ow ever, h e a d q u a r te rs  c la im s a re  
"recognized  hy this C ircuit . . .  in such limited c ircu m stan ces th a t  in g en era l, 'u n le s s  su b je c t m a tte r  
jurisd iction  can  be  se p a ra te ly  estab lished  for th o se  claim s tru ly  arising in a  fo reign  co u n try  . . .  it is se ldom  
w orth  [plain tiffs '] while to  try  to  m ake a  case live o r die on th e  basis  of h e a d q u a r te rs  c la im s."’ M a c C a s k i l l  v . 
U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  834 F. Supp . 14, 17 (D.D.C. 1993), a f f ' d  w i t h o u t  o p in io n  24 F.3d 1464 (D.C. Cir. 1994) 
(quoting  B e a t t ie ,  756 F.2d a t  9 7 ). The Court for the  p u rp o se s  of its d iscussion  of th e  d isc re tio n ary  function  
analysis will a ssu m e  th a t Plaintiffs have properly alleged a h e a d q u a rte rs  claim .
----------------------------End F o o tn o te s----------------------------------- [* * 1 8 ]
P ursu an t to  th e  d isc retionary  function exception, th e  United S ta te s  re ta in s  sovere ig n  im m unity  for any a c ts  
tak en  hy a federal em p lo y ee  th a t a re  "based upon the  ex erc ise  o r pe rfo rm an ce  or th e  failure to ex erc ise  or 
perform  a d iscre tio n ary  function  or duty ." 28 U.S.C. § 2 6 8 0 (a ). This excep tion  app lies to g o v e rn m en ta l a c ts  
th a t  "involve an  e lem en t of ju d g m e n t o r choice." U n i t e d  S t a t e s  v . G a u b e r t ,  4 9 9  U.S. 315 , 323 , 113 L. Ed. 2d 
3 3 5 , 111 S. Ct. 1267 (1 9 9 1 ) (quoting  B e r k o v i t z  v . U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  4 8 6  U.S. 531 , 100 L. Ed. 2d 531 , 108 S. Ct. 
1954 (1 9 8 8 )). The p u rp o se  of th e  exception "is to  p rev en t judicial 'se c o n d -g u ess in g ' o f leg isla tive  an d  
ad m in istra tiv e  decisions g ro u n d e d  in social, econom ic, an d  political policy th ro u g h  th e  m edium  of a n  action  in 
to rt,"  G a u b e r t ,  499  U.S. a t  323 (in ternal citations o m itted ). In de te rm in in g  th e  applicability  of th e  
d isc retionary  function ex cep tio n , th e  Court u n d e rtak es a tw o p a r t te s t .  First, th e  C ourt m u st d e te rm in e  
w h e th e r a  federa l s ta tu te , regu la tion , or policy specifically p re sc rib e s  a g o v e rn m e n t a c to r 's  co u rse  o f action . 
I d .  a t 322 . In such  a ca se , no discretion  [**19] is em ployed  an d  th e  only rem ain ing  inquiry for th e  C ourt is 
w h e th er th e  em ployee  did, o r did not, do w hat w as p rescrib ed  by th e  app licab le  s ta tu te ,  regu la tion  o r policy. 
S e e  C o p e  v. S c o t t ,  310 U.S. App. D.C. 144, 45 F.3d 445 , 4 4 8  (D.C. Cir. 1995). S econd , if no specific action  is 
p rescribed , th e  act is d isc re tio n ary , and th e  court m u st nex t d e te rm in e  w h e th e r th e  action  w as of th e  ty p e  
g rounded  in [*23] social, econom ic, or political policy. S lo a n  v . U .S .  D e p ' t  o f  H o u s in g  &  U r b a n  D e v . ,  344 
U.S. App. D.C. 389, 236  F.3d 756, 761 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citing G a u b e r t ,  499  U.S. a t  323). If an "e stab lish ed  
g o v ern m en ta l policy, a s  e x p re sse d  or implied by s ta tu te , reg u la tio n  o r agency  gu idelines, allows a 
G o v ern m en t a g e n t to  ex erc ise  d iscretion , it m ust be p re su m ed  th a t  th e  a g e n ts ' a c ts  a re  g ro u n d ed  in policy 
w hen  exercising  th a t d iscre tion ."  G a u b e r t ,  499 U.S. a t 3 2 4 -3 2 5 . O nce it is e stab lish ed  th a t th e  g o v e rn m e n t 
actions in qu estio n  a re  d isc re tio n ary  in n a tu re  and grounded  in an  ap p ro p ria te  policy, a  court lacks su b je c t 
m a tte r  ju risd ic tion  o v er c laim s pred icated  upon th a t d iscre tio n ary  action (o r inaction).
Plaintiffs con tend  th a t officials in th e  United S ta te s  com m itted  tw en ty -o n e  [* * 2 0 ] n eg ligen t ac ts  th a t  w ere  
e ith e r non-d isc re tio n ary  or no t sub jec t to "policy ju d g m en t."  PI. O pp 'n  a t 29 -3 0 . All o f th e s e  alleged ly  
neg ligen t a c t s  c a n  b e  c a t e g o r i z e d  a s  c i th e r :  1) a fai lure  to  p ro v id e  g u id a n c e  and  a d v ic e  on im proving secu rity  
a t  th e  E m bassy , 2) a failure to  provide security eq u ip m en t to  th e  E m bassy , 3) a failure to tra in  a d eq u a te ly  
Em bassy p e rsonnel an d  c o n tra c to rs  to deal with various secu rity  th re a ts , 4) a  failure to  w arn a d eq u a te ly  
Em bassy p e rsonnel, an d  o th e rs , of potential terro ris t th re a ts , 5) an  im proper classification  of th e  level of 
secu rity  risk a t  th e  E m bassy , o r 6) falsely leading E m bassy p e rso n n el to  believe th a t secu rity  a n a ly se s  had  
b een  con d u cted  o r would be  conducted . I d .  The C ourt concludes th a t  each of th e se  a lleged  actions fall within 
th e  d iscretionary  function excep tio n  to th e  FTCA.
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a . M a n d a to ry  v s .  D isc r e tio n a r y  C onduct
None of th e  actio n s ab o u t which Plaintiffs com plain involve a failure to ab id e  by th e  d ic ta te s  of a s ta tu te ,  
guideline o r  regu la tion . A lthough Plaintiffs rep ea ted ly  a s se r t  th a t DOS officials failed to  fulfill "non- 
d iscre tio n ary " d u tie s , PI, O pp'n 15, 22, Plaintiffs fail to identify any re lev an t s ta tu te ,  gu ideline, o r [**21) 
reg u la tio n  th a t  p rescribed  DOS em ployees ' course  of action  re la ted  to th e  secu rity  a t th e  E m bassy . Plaintiffs 
cite  d o c u m e n ts  th a t  e ith e r a re  no t guidelines p rescrib ing  a specific course  of action , o r  a re  g u id elin es th a t  do 
no t apply to  Plaintiffs' specific claim s. Plaintiffs' failure to  identify a re lev an t gu ideline  o r  reg u la tio n  is no t 
su rp rising  a s  d e te rm in a tio n s  a b o u t w hat security  p recau tio n s to  ad o p t a t  A m erican  e m b a ss ie s , an d  w hat 
secu rity  in fo rm ation  to p a ss  on, and  to  whom  th is inform ation  should  be g iven , do no t involve th e  m echan ical 
app lication  o f s e t  ru les, hu t ra th e r  th e  co n stan t exerc ise  of ju d g m e n t an d  d isc re tio n .
For in s tan ce , th e  United S ta te s  D ep artm en t of S ta te  Foreign Affairs M anual, D iplom atic Security  ("FAM"), Def. 
Mem; Exhibit 2, in stru c ts , in th e  "Physical Security  S ta n d ard s"  sec tion , th a t  "p ro jec t m a n a g e rs  an d  regional 
secu rity  o fficers (R SO 's) should  follow all s ta n d a rd s  t o  t h e  m a x im u m  e x t e n t  p o s s i b le . ” Def. M em; Exhibit 2,
12 FAM 3 1 4 .1  (e m p h a sis  a d d ed ). n4 This Manual fu r th e r  in stru c ts  th a t w hen full im p lem en ta tio n  of outlined  
s ta n d a rd s  is "im possib le or in ap p ropria te ,"  foreign serv ice  officers should  e n g a g e  in a  p ro cess  of "risk 
m a n a g e m e n t."  [* * 2 2 ] I d ,  12 FAM 6 H 511.4 . This risk m an a g em e n t "p ro cess  b eg in s with an  a s s e s s m e n t  of 
th e  [*24] v a lu e  of th e  a s se ts , th e  d eg ree  of a specific ty p e  o f th re a t,  and  th e  e x te n t  o f th e  v u lnerab ilities. . . 
. A decision  is th e n  m ad e  a s  to  w h a t level of risk can  be  a ccep ted  and  w hich c o u n te rm e a su re s  sho u ld  be 
applied . Su ch  a  decision  involves a  cost-benefit analysis, giving decision m a k e rs  th e  ability to  w eigh vary ing  
secu rity  risk  leve ls ag a in s t th e  co st of specific c o u n te rm e a su re s ."  I d .  Thus, a s  th is  d o c u m e n t c learly  
illu s tra te s , th e  p ro cess  of secu ring  an em bassy  involves su b jec tiv e  ana ly sis , decisions, and  a  balancing  of 
b en efits ; it d o ^s  no t involve th e  m echanical application of gu idelines o r ru les.
------------------------  F o o tn o te s --------------------------
n4 In C o p e ,  th e  plaintiff cited a Park Service m anual th a t e stab lish ed  road sa fe ty  s ta n d a rd s  "applicable  only 
'to  th e  e x te n t  p rac ticab le .'"  45  F.3d a t 450. In re sp o n se , th e  C ourt of A ppeals for th e  D istrict of Colum bia 
C ircuit o b se rv e d  th a t  "this c av e a t m ean s th a t th e  s ta n d a rd s  a re  applicable only w hen  no co m p etin g  priorities 
ex is t. S u c h  f l e x i b i l i t y  is  t h e  e s s e n c e  o f  d is c r e t io n . "  45  F.3d a t 4 5 0  (e m p h a sis  a d d ed ).
------------------------------End F o o tn o tes ---------------------------------- [* * 2 3 ]
In add ition . Plaintiffs a tte m p t to  d e m o n s tra te  th a t certa in  DOS re p o rts  e s tab lish  th a t  th e  secu rity  m e a su re s  
tak e n  prior to  th e  1998 a ttack  w ere  " inadequate ," and  co n ta in ed  "identified defic iencies." PI. O pp 'n  20 -21 . 
H ow ever, P laintiffs a rg u m e n ts  a s  to  th e  inadequacy o r deficiency of th e  level of secu rity  th a t  in h in dsigh t 
would h a v e  b e e n  d esirab le  on th e  day of th e  bom bing is m ere ly  an  a tte m p t to  a rg u e  th e  m erits  o f th e  case , 
ra th e r  th a n  e v id en ce  th a t D efendan t failed to  com ply with c e rta in  m an d a to ry  gu idelines and  reg u la tio n s . n5 
In sum , n o n e  of th e  actions o r in s tan ces  of inaction th a t  form  th e  basis of Plaintiffs' C om plain t involve a 
failure to  pe rfo rm  no n d isc retio n ary  du ties. T herefore, th is C ourt tu rn s  to  th e  n ex t s te p  in th e  G a u b e r t  analysis 
an d  m u st d e te rm in e  w h e th er DOS em ployees' alleged ac tio n s and  inactions im plicated  social, political, or 
econom ic policy co n sid era tio n s. C o p e ,  45 F.3d a t 4 4 8 -4 9 .
     - Foo tno tes - - ...................- - ...............
n5  The C ourt m u st a lso no te  th a t  Plaintiffs frequently  cite  to  inapplicable or irre lev an t gu idelines in o rd e r to 
a tte m p t to  d e m o n s tra te  th a t m an d a to ry  du ties ex ist. For in s tan ce . Plaintiffs m ak e  a w eak  a tte m p t to  su g g e s t 
th e  e x is ten ce  of "certification req u irem en ts , " for bom b d e tec tio n  eq u ip m en t. PI. O pp'n a t 20. Yet th e  
d o cu m en t c ited  re la te s  to  th e  sa fe ty  of X-ray devices u sed  by e m b a ssy  p e rso n n el. B. 6085 . Sim ilarly, 
Plaintiffs a t te m p t  to  su g g e s t th a t th e  building's w indows did no t m e e t DOS secu rity  s ta n d a rd s . PI. O pp 'n  a t 
21. Yet th e  s ta n d a rd s  cited by Plaintiffs pertain  only to  newly acqu ired  o r ren o v a ted  em b a ssy  buildings. B. 
7691 , 9 1 9 5 . T he E m b a s s y  in Nairobi w as not such a building. B. 3500.
....................... End F o o tn o tes---------------  [* * 2 4 ]
b. P o lit ica l, S o c ia l,  a n d  E co n o m ic  P olicy  C o n sid e ra tio n s
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U nder th e  FTCA d iscretionary  function excep tion , no t all d iscre tionary  conduct is e x em p ted ; only co n d u ct that 
is "suscep tib le  to  policy ju d g m e n t and involve[s] an  exercise  of political, social o r econom ic  ju d g m e n t"  is 
exem p t. C o p e  v. S c o t t ,  310 U.S. App. D.C. 144, 45 F.3d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (in te rn a l c ita tions o m itted ). 
D ecision-m aking b ased  on policy considerations h a s  been  c o n tra s ted  with "d e te rm in a tio n s  Involving th e  
'application  of ob jective  scientific s tan d ard s ;" ' th e  la tte r  a re  not p ro tec ted  by so v e re ig n  im m unity  e v en  when 
th ey  involve th e  exercise  of discretion . S lo a n ,  236 F.3d at 765. Flowever, w hen "balancing  facto rs" is an 
in tegral p a r t of the  decision-m aking  process, and  particularly  w hen th is involves co n sid e ra tio n s  su ch  a s  how 
to  "allocate funds am ong significant p ro ject d em an d s ,"  and how to  weigh inconven ience  ag a in s t " th e  risk of 
sa fe ty  h aza rd s ,"  decisions a re  suscep tib le  to policy ju d g m e n t. C o p e ,  45 F.3d a t  4 5 1 ; s e e  a ls o  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  v .  
S . A .  E m p r e s a  d e  V ia c a o  A e r e a  R io  G r a n d e n s e  ( " V a r ig  A id in e s " ) ,  467  U.S. 797, 8 2 0 , 81 L. Ed. 2d  6 6 0 , 104 5. 
Ct. 2755 (1 9 8 4 ) [* * 2 5 ] (finding th a t  decisions th a t  requ ire  th e  g o v e rn m en t to "estab lish  prio rities fo r th e  
acco m p lish m en ts  of its policy ob jectives by balancing th e  o b jec tiv es so u g h t . . . a g a in s t such  practica l 
c o n sid e ra tio n s  as staffing and  funding," im plicate th e  d iscretionary  function ex cep tio n ).
M oreover, "it is th e  n a tu re  of th e  conduct, ra th e r  th an  the  s ta tu s  of th e  acto r,"  th a t  g o v e rn s  w h e th e r  th e  
co nduct is b a sed  on policy considera tions. V a r ig  [ * 2 5 ]  A i r l in e s ,  467  U.S. a t  8 1 3 . Thus, th e  fact th a t  secu rity  
re la ted  d ecisio n s m ay  not hav e  b een  taken by high level g o v e rn m en t officials is irre lev an t to  th e  q u estio n  of 
w h e th er th o se  decisions im plicate econom ic, social o r political policies. Even "d ay -to -d ay  o p e ra tio n a l ' 
decisions" of a federal agency  often  im plicate policy co n sid era tio n s. G a u b e r t ,  4 9 9  U.S. a t 332 ; s e e  a lso  S lo a n  
V. D e p ' t  o f  H o u s in g  a n d  U r b a n  D e v e lo p m e n t ,  344 U.S. App. D.C. 3 8 9 , 236 F.3d 756 , 762 (D.C. Cir. 20 0 1 ) 
(" th e  d iscre tio n ary  function excep tion  . . . does no t apply 'exclusively  to policym aking or p lann ing  fu n c tio n s,' 
b u t ra th e r e x te n d s  a s  well to  decisions m ade a t th e  o p erationa l level.").
The conduct a t  iA u e  in th is c ase  and  the  decisions regard ing  w h a t [** 2 6 ] action to  ta k e  re la ted  to  secu rity  
clearly  a re  "suscep tib le  to  policy analysis” and th u s  th e  d iscre tionary  function ex cep tio n  is app licab le .
Plaintiffs a tte m p t to  a rg u e  th a t  decisions regard ing  w h e th e r o r no t to  w arn E m bassy  e m p lo y ees  a n d  K enyan 
c itizens a b o u t a  possib le te rro ris t th rea t and decisions regard ing  "how b est to s e c u re  th e  E m b assy 's  
p rem ises"  did no t Im plicate political, social o r econom ic  policy co nsidera tions. PI. O pp 'n  a t 3 7 -4 1 . Plaintiffs 
a rg u e  th a t D e fen d an t's  actions re la ted  to th e  a lleged  secu rity  fa ilu res a t th e  E m b assy  "could no t e v o k e  'social 
w isdom  . . . political practicality  . . .  or econom ic exped iency  . . . R a ther, th a t co n d u ct im p lica tes 'n eg lig en ce  . 
. . due  care  . . . and  re aso n a b len e ss , and fall well o u tsid e  th e  confines of d isc re tio n ary  func tions." PI O pp 'n  a t 
4 0 , (quoting  D eclaration  of J. Je rom e Bullock ) (o m issio n s in orig inal). However, Plaintiffs fail to  c o u n te r  
D efen d an t's  specific  a rg u m e n ts  th a t the  decisions m ad e  by DOS and its em p lo y ees in re la tio n  to how  b e s t to  
sec u re  th e  Nairobi E m bassy im plicated specific policy concerns.
D ecisions reg ard in g  how m uch sa fe ty  equ ipm ent sh o u ld  be p rovided to  a p a rticu lar e m b a ssy , how  m uch  
train ing shou ld  b e  [* * 2 7 ] g iven to  guards and e m b a ssy  em p lo y ees, and  th e  a m o u n t of se c u rity -re la te d  
g u idance th a t  shou ld  be  provided necessarily  en ta ils  ba lancing com peting  d e m a n d s  fo r fu n d s and  re so u rce s . 
Each individual e m b a ssy 's  n eed  for security  m u st be  b a lanced  ag a in s t th e  need  pe rce iv ed  a t  o th e r  e m b a ss ie s , 
an d  th e  n eed  fo r secu rity  m u st be  balanced a g a in s t th e  n eed  for a lte rn a tiv e  p ro jec ts  th a t  could c o n su m e  
sca rce  re so u rces . M oreover, each  of D efendant's d ecisio n s regard ing  secu rity  involved balancing  p o ten tia l 
inconvenience to  S ta te  D ep artm en t em ployees a g a in s t th e  perce ived  secu rity  g a in s th a t  would re su lt from  a 
sa fe ty  m easu re .
Decisions reg ard in g  w hen  and  how to  warn people  of p o ten tia l te rro r is t th re a ts  sim ilarly involve a balancing  
of policy co n sid era tio n s. DOS em ployees m ust ba lan ce  th e  cost an d  inconvenience th a t  a fa lse  w arn ing  m ight 
c au se  ag a in s t th e  risk th a t any  given th rea t will m ate ria lize . W here su ch  a w arning m ig h t in fluence th e  
actions of officials of foreign g o v ern m en ts  — as  a  w arning a b o u t th re a ts  to a  U nited S ta te s  e m b a ssy  likely 
w ould—A m erican officials m u st a lso  consider th e  effec t th a t  a w arning, or th e  failure to  give o ne , m ig h t hav e  
on th a t  foreign g o v e rn m e n t and  Am erican [**28] re la tio n s with it. C lassification of th e  level of risk  facing  an  
em b assy  involves choices ab o u t w h a t types of th re a ts  th e  United S ta te s  considers m o s t w o rrisom e. It a lso  
involves d e te rm in in g  how m uch risk, and w hat ty p es  of risk, should  b e  requ ired  b e fo re  an  e m b a ssy  is eligible 
for certa in  secu rity  m ea su re s . As risk classification m ak e s  a s ta te m e n t abou t co n d itions in th e  co u n try  w h ere  
th e  em b assy  is lo ca ted , it could a lso influence U nited S ta te s  re la tio n s with th a t c o u n try , and th e re fo re  be 
influenced by th e  footing on which th e  United s ta te s  se e k s  to  m ain ta in  th o se  re la tio n s .
[*26] It is exac tly  b ecau se  such  political, econom ic and  social policy con sid era tio n s m u st be b a lan ced  th a t 
C ongress g ra n te d  th e  d iscretionary  authority  to  th e  S e c re ta ry  of S ta te  to  "develop an d  im p lem en t . . . 
policies and p ro g ram s, including funding levels and s ta n d a rd s , to  prov ide for th e  secu rity  of th e  U nited S ta te s  
G overnm en t o p e ra tio n s  of a  diplom atic na ture  and  foreign g o v e rn m e n t o p e ra tio n s o f th e  dip lom atic n a tu re  in 
th e  United S ta te s ."  22 U.S.C. § 4801  (1990) (O m nibus D iplom atic S ecurity  and A n tite rro rism  Act). As th e  Act
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allows th e  S e c re ta ry  to  exerc ise  d iscretion  "it m ust be p re su m ed  [**29] th a t  th e  [S e c re ta ry 's ]  a c ts  a re  
g rounded  in policy w hen exercising  th a t  discretion." G a u b e r t ,  499  U.S. a t 3 2 4 -3 2 5 . T he d ecisio n s m ad e  by 
D efendant reg ard in g  th e  secu rity  of th e  Em bassy and w arn ings of possib le  th re a ts  a re  c learly  d isc re tio n ary  in 
n a tu re  and g ro u n d ed  in policy an d  th ere fo re , do not fall within th e  FTCA's w aiver of so v e re ig n  im m unity .
2. Foreign C oun try  Exception
The FTCA also  p roh ib its Suits a g a in s t th e  United S ta te s  for ac ts  or om issions aris ing  in a te rr ito ry  su b je c t to  
th e  sovereign ty  of a n o th e r  na tion . 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k ); U n i t e d  S t a t e s  v. S p e la r ,  338 U.S. 217 , 2 1 9 , 94 L. Ed.
3, 70 S. Ct. 10 (1 9 4 9 ). C o n g ress ex em p ted  actions arising in foreign co u n trie s  from  th e  FTCA b e c a u se  "it w as 
unwilling to  su b je c t th e  U nited S ta te s  to liabilities depend ing  upon th e  law s of a  fo reign  pow er." S p e la r ,  338 
U.S. a t 221. As n o ted  ab o v e, while jurisdiction is d e te rm in ed  by th e  FTCA, th e  underly ing  to r t  c la im s a re  
decided b a se d  on th e  local law w h ere  th e  act o r om ission occurred .
The United S ta te s  a rg u es  th a t  th e  a c ts  Plaintiffs com plain of o ccurred , for all p ractical p u rp o se s , in Kenya, 
and a re  th e re fo re  [* * 3 0 ] no t actio n ab le  — even  if neg ligen t -- d u e  to th e  fo reign  c o u n try  ex ce p tio n  to  th e  
FTCA's w aiver of im m unity. Def. Mem. a t  14-15. With one  ex cep tion , which th e  C ourt a d d re s s e s  below , th is 
C ourt need  n o t a d d re ss  th e  q u estio n  of w h e th er Plaintiffs a re  com plaining of a c ts  th a t  to o k  place in Kenya, or 
ac ts  th a t took  p lace  in th e  U nited S ta te s  because , a s  d iscussed  in Part I I .C .l  ab o v e, th e  d isc re tio n ary  
function e x em p tio n  re n d e rs  th e  U nited S ta te s  im m une from  liability for su c h  a lleged  a c ts  o r o m issions. 
Flowever, th e  C ourt d iscu sse s  below  Plaintiffs' a llegations reg ard in g  D e fen d an t's  liability for th e  a c ts  and 
training of local g u a rd s  a s  su ch  c laim s are  not resolved by application  of th e  d isc re tio n ary  function  excep tion .
Plaintiffs a lleg e  th a t  th e  U nited S ta te s  is responsib le  u n d e r th e  do c trin e  of r e s p o n d e a t  s u p e r i o r  for th e  
negligence o f local g u a rd s  em ployed  by a  private  co n trac to r. U nited In te rn a l In v e stig a tiv e  S e rv ice s ("U llS"), 
re ta in ed  to  p rov ide  E m bassy secu rity . Cplt. PP 52, 75 , 88 . Plaintiffs co n ten d  th a t  th e  local g u a rd s  w e re  no t 
properly tra in ed  to  re sp o n d  to  th e  s ituation  th a t  a ro se  on  A ugust 8, 1998, an d  th a t  D e fen d an t is re sp o n sib le  
for th is failure to  tra in  a n d  th e  [* * 3 1 ] negligent ac ts  of th e  local g u a rd s . I d .  UIIS c o n tra c te d  with th e  
E m bassy in Nairobi ag ree in g  to  prov ide local guard  serv ices for th e  E m bassy . Def. Mem a t  12, Exhibit 3 (UIIS 
C ontract). U IIS ' responsib ilities u n d e r  th e  co n trac t included providing "basic tra in ing , n6  f irea rm s 
qualifications, an d  an n u al recertifica tion  training" for th e  local g u a rd s . Def. Mem, Exhibit 3 a t  74 9 8 . UIIS also 
hired m an a g e rs  respo n sib le  for secu rity  force training and  provided secu rity  tra in in g  for E m bassy  em p lo y ees 
and the  local g u a rd s . I d .  a t  75 5 1 . UIIS provided this train ing , [*27] and  su p e rv ise d  th e  local g u a rd s  in 
Nairobi, Kenya.
---------------------------------F o o tn o te s ------------------------------------
n6  Basic train ing  included train ing  in te rro rism  and crim inality, train ing  in m ission  e m e rg en c y  p lans, and 
training in a c c e s s  contro l. Def. M em ., Exhibit 3 a t 7498-99 .
----------------------------- End F o o tn o te s---------------------------------
The C ourt is p rec lu d ed  from  en te rta in in g  Plaintiffs' claim s b ased  on th e  ac tio n s of UIIS an d  th e  local g u a rd s  it 
superv ised  for tw o re aso n s . First, th e  United S ta te s  is im m une from  such  c la im s of n eg lig en ce  p u rsu a n t to  
th e  foreign co u n try  [* * 3 2 ] excep tion . It is c lear th a t "torts occurring  on A m erican  e m b a ss ie s  . . . w hich a re  
located  in fo reign  co u n tries  a re  b a rred  by th e  foreign coun try  excep tion ."  B e a t t ie  756  F .2d a t  97 . T hus, 
actions tak en  by local g u a rd s  on th e  day  of th e  te rro ris t bom bing clearly  a ro se  in a  fo reign  na tion  an d  can n o t 
be  th e  su b je c t of a claim  b ro u g h t u n d e r  th e  FTCA. Second, th e  tra in ing , o r lack th e reo f, th a t  Plaintiffs 
com plain of, a lso  took  place in K enya, and  not in th e  U nited S ta te s . Plaintiffs fail to  d e m o n s tra te  activ ities 
occurring within th e  U nited S ta te s  th a t  a c t as a basis for claim s b a se d  on th e  failure to  p rov ide  p ro p e r 
training to  th e  local g u ard s.
M oreover, th e  FTCA w aiver of im m unity  does no t cover to rtio u s a c ts  or om issions c o m m itted  by in d ep e n d en t 
con tracto rs o r th e ir  em p lo y ees. S e e  28  U.S.C. § 1346 (sovereign  im m unity  is w aived only a s  to  a c t s  a n d  
om issions of fed era l e m p lo y ees; in d ep e n d en t c o n trac to rs  a re  no t federa l e m p lo y e es); U n i t e d  S t a t e s  v . 
O r le a n s ,  425  U.S. 807 , 8 13 , 4 8  L. Ed. 2d 390, 96  S. Ct. 1971 (1 9 7 6 ). T he FTCA w aives so v e re ig n  im m unity  
for to rtious ac tio n s u n d e rta k en  by "officers o r em ployees of any federa l ag en cy  [* * 3 3 ] . . . and  p e rso n s  
acting on behalf of a  federa l ag en cy  in an  official capacity ." 28 U.S.C. § 26 7 1 . A fed era l ag en c y  is defined  a s  
"the execu tive  d e p a r tm e n ts  . . . in d ep e n d en t e s tab lish m en ts  of th e  United S ta te s , an d  co rp o ra tio n s  prim arily 
acting a s  in s tru m en ta litie s  o r a g en c ie s  of th e  United S ta te s  b u t  d o e s  n o t  in c lu d e  a n y  c o n t r a c t o r  w i t h  t h e
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U n i t e d  S t a t e s . "  I d .  (em p h asis  ad d ed ).
Plaintiffs c o n te n d  th a t th e  United S ta te s  su p erv ised  th e  day  to day  o p e ra tio n s  o f UIIS, an d  th u s , u n d e r  th e  
"control o f physical conduct" te s t, UIIS w as n o t a c o n tra c to r  with th e  United S ta te s ,  b u t ra th e r  an  em p lo y ee . 
PI. O pp'n a t  24 . The crucial facto r in d istingu ish ing  b e tw een  a federa l em p lo y ee  a n d  an  in d e p e n d e n t 
c o n tra c to r is w h e th e r th e  Federal G o v ern m en t h a s  th e  pow er to  "control th e  d e ta ile d  physical p e rfo rm a n ce  of 
th e  c o n trac to r."  O r le a n s ,  425 U.S. a t  8 1 4 -8 1 5  (quoting  L o g u e  v. U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  4 1 2  U .S. 521 , 37 L. Ed. 2d 
121 , 93 S. Ct. 2215  (1 9 7 3 )). Broad su p erv iso ry  contro l, e v en  on a  daily  b asis, d o e s  no t suffice to  
d e m o n s tra te  contro l o v er th e  physical p e rfo rm an ce  of th e  co n tra c to r. O r le a n s ,  4 2 5  U .S. a t  8 1 7  (finding 
th a t  [** 3 4 ] th e  fact th a t an  in d ep e n d en t com m unity  ag en c y  w as req u ired  to  com ply  w ith ex te n s iv e  
g o v e rn m e n t reg u la tio n s did no t c re a te  an  em p lo y m en t re la tio n sh ip ); s e e  a ls o  G ib s o n  v . U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  567 
F .2d  1237 (3d  Cir. 1977), c e r t  d e n ie d ,  4 3 6  U.S. 925 , 56 L. Ed. 2d 768 , 98  S. Ct. 2 8 1 9  (1 9 7 8 )  ("The fac t of 
b ro ad , su p e rv iso ry  control, or ev en  th e  p o ten tia l to  ex erc ise  d e ta iled  con tro l, c a n n o t c o n v e rt a  c o n tra c to r  in to  
an  ag en t, n o r can  it be  th e  basis for im posing  v icarious liability on  th e  United S ta te s ." ) .  The U nited  S ta te s  
S u p re m e  C o u rt exp la ined  in L o g u e  v . U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  412  U.S. 5 21 , 37 L. Ed. 2d 121 , 9 3  S. C t. 22 1 5  (1 9 7 3 ), 
t h a t  g u id an ce  from  th e  g o v e rn m en t o r re q u ire m e n ts  th a t  a  c o n tra c to r  com ply w ith g o v e rn m e n t reg u la tio n s , 
d o e s  not e s tab lish  th e  type of contro l n e ce ssa ry  to  form  an  em p lo y ee  - em p lo y er re la tio n sh ip  u n d e r  th e  FTCA. 
T he C ourt found  th a t  an em ployee  - em p lo y er re la tio n sh ip  did no t e x is t b e tw een  th e  U nited  S ta te s  and  a local 
c o u n ty  jail a lth o u g h  th e  jail w as req u ired  to  com ply with B ureau  of Prisons' ru les  a n d  re g u la tio n s  p rescrib ing  
s ta n d a rd s  o f t re a tm e n t,  and a lthough  th e  [*28] U nited S ta te s  re se rv e d  th e  rig h t to  in sp e c t th e  jail. [* * 3 5 ] 
L o g u e ,  4 1 2  U.S. 521 , 37 L. Ed. 2d 121, 93  S. Ct. 2215. S im ilarly , th e  O r le a n s  C o u rt co n clu d ed  th a t  a lth o u g h  
th e  co m m unity  action  ag encies a t issu e  in th a t  c ase  w ere  req u ired  to  "com ply w ith e x te n s iv e  reg u la tio n s , 
w hich include em p lo y m en t policies and  p ro ced u res , lobbying lim ita tions, acco u n tin g  a n d  in sp ec tio n  
p ro c ed u re s , ex p en d itu re  lim ita tions and  p ro g ram m atic  lim ita tio n s a n d  ap p lica tio n s p ro c e d u re s ,"  th e  a g en c ie s  
w e re  not "em ployees" un d er th e  FTCA. O r le a n s  425  U.S. a t  8 1 7 -1 8 . T he O r le a n s  C o u rt n o ted  th a t  to  find 
o th e rw ise  w ould "d isto rt well e stab lish ed  co n cep ts  o f m a s te r  a n d  s e rv a n t re la tio n sh ip s  a n d  e x te n d  th e  
m ean ing  of th e  Federal Tort C laim s Act beyond  th e  in te n t o f C o n g re ss."  I d .  a t  8 1 9 .
In th is in s ta n c e , it is c lear th a t th e  U nited S ta te s , while re ta in in g  b ro ad  su p e rv iso ry  co n tro l o v e r  th e  local 
g u a rd s  p u rsu a n t to  th e  co n trac t with UIIS, did no t m ain ta in  con tro l o v e r th e  d e ta ile d  physical p e rfo rm a n ce  of 
th e  c o n trac t. DOS regu la tions clearly  s ta te  th a t  "day to  d ay  a c tiv itie s  a re  to b e  m a n a g e d  by a n d  su p e rv ise d  
by th e  c o n tra c to r."  Def. Reply Mem. a t  18, Exhibit 9, 12 FAM 3 2 4 .2 (a ) . Plaintiffs a s s e r t  th a t  [* * 3 6 ]
D efen d an t con tro lled  th e  activ ities of th e  c o n trac to r in th a t  th e  c o n tra c t req u ired  th e  c o n tra c to r  to  su b m it th e  
n a m e s  a n d  in form ation  for each  em ployee  h ired in o rd e r for th e  U nited S ta te s  to  u n d e r ta k e  a  se c u rity  ctreck 
of th e  po ten tia l em ployee. PI. O pp 'n  a t  2 4 -2 5 ; Def. Mem, Exh. 3 a t  7494 . A dditionally , th e  g o v e rn m e n t 
c o n trac t s e t  fo rth  certa in  s ta n d a rd s  of co n d u ct th a t  th e  UIIS w as req u ired  to  com ply  w ith , including requ iring  
UIIS to  "m ain ta in  sa tis fac to ry  s ta n d a rd s  of em p lo y ee  c o m p e ten cy "  and  to  req u ire  c e r ta in  u n ifo rm s a p p ro v ed  
by th e  U nited S ta te s . I d .  Further, UIIS n e ed e d  to  e n su re  th a t  local g u a rd s  m e t th e  U nited S ta te s ' 
re q u ire m e n ts  for ed u ca tio n , lan g u ag e  proficiency and h e a lth . I d .  The c o n tra c t a lso  req u ired  UIIS to  se n d  th e  
local g u a rd s  it h ired  to o rien tation , and  to  provide certa in  specific  tra in ing , including tra in in g  in w hich th e  
E m bassy  R egional Security  Officer ("RSO ") took p a rt. I d .  a t  7 4 9 8 . Review of th e  UIIS c o n tra c t,  Def. Mem,
Exh. 3, m a k e s  c lea r th a t  Plaintiffs h av e  n o t d e m o n s tra ted  th a t  D e fen d an t re ta in e d  co n tro l o v e r  th e  d e ta iled  
physical p e rfo rm a n ce  of th e  co n trac to r, b u t  ra th e r, th a t th e  c o n tra c t se t  forth  d e ta ile d  g u id e lin es an d  
reg u la tio n s th a t  [* * 3 7 ] th e  c o n tra c to r w as requ ired  to  confo rm  with a s  it im p lem en ted  its h iring , superv isio ri 
an d  tra in ing  of E m bassy  local g u a rd s . As in O r le a n s ,  th is ty p e  of g en era l su p e rv iso ry  con tro l th a t  re q u ire s  th e  
c o n tra c to r to  com ply  with reg u la tio n s an d  gu idelines issu ed  by th e  g o v e rn m e n t, d o e s  n o t c re a te  th e  ty p e  of 
em p lo y ee  — e m p lo y e r re la tionsh ip  env isioned  u n d e r th e  FTCA. The g o v e rn m e n t m ay  "fix specific  a n d  p rec ise  
conditions to  im p lem en t federal o b jec tiv es" within a  c o n tra c t w ith an  in d e p e n d e n t c o n tra c to r . O r le a n s ,  4 2 5  
U.S. a t  8 1 5 -1 6  (finding th a t w hile th e  c o n tra c to r w as "re sp o n s ib le  to  th e  U nited S ta te s  for co m p lian ce  with 
th e  specifica tions o f th e  co n trac t, o r by g r a n t . . .  [it w as] la rg e ly  free  to  se lec t th e  m e a n s  of its 
im p lem en ta tio n ." ) . Accordingly, th e  C ourt finds th a t  Plaintiffs h a v e  no t d e m o n s tra te d  th a t  D e fen d a n t is liable 
fo r th e  a c ts  o f UIIS and  th e  local g u a rd s  u n d e r UIIS' con tro l.
C on seq u en tly , th e  C ourt lacks ju risd ic tion  to  e n te rta in  P laintiffs' c la im s co n ta in ed  in C oun t O ne a n d  Two of 
Plaintiffs' C om plain t and  D efen d an t's  m otion  to d ism iss a s  to  th e s e  co u n ts  m u s t b e  g ra n te d .
D. D e f e n d a n t 's  M o t io n  t o  D is m is s  P la in t i f f s  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  L a w  C la im s  [* * 3 8 ] f o r  F a i lu r e  t o  S t a t e  a  C la im  a n d  
f o r  L a c k  o f  S u b je c t  M a t t e r  J u r is d ic t io n .
C ount III o f Plaintiffs' C om plaint a tte m p ts  to  s ta te  a  claim  a g a in s t  th e  United [* 2 9 ] S ta te s  fo r v io la tions of 
"princip les o f in te rn a tio n al law . . . [and] C h a p te r  V of th e  C o n stitu tio n  of Kenya . . ." Cplt. P 100 . Plaintiffs 
a s s e r t  th a t  th e  U nited S ta te s ' action  and  inaction  re la ted  to  th e  1998  bom bing  v io la te  b o th  c u s to m a ry
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In ternational law n7 and th e  In te rna tional C ovenant on Civil and  Political R ights, XXX, 1967 6  I.L.M. 368  
( e n t e r e d  i n t o  f o r c e  Mar. 23 1976, e n t e r e d  in t o  f o r c e  f o r  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  S ep t. 8, 1992). Cplt. P 105. 
D efendan t m oves to dism iss C ount Three for failure to s ta te  a  claim  and  for lack of su b je c t  m a t te r  
ju risd ic tion . Def. Mem. a t 18.
---------------------------------F o o tn o te s ------------------------------------
n7  C ustom ary  in ternational law is defined a s  "custom s and u sa g e s  am o n g  na tio n s of th e  w orld" a n d  it is p a rt 
of the  law of th e  United S ta te s .
----------------------------- End F o o tn o tes--------------------------------
1. Kenyan Law and  th e  K enyan C onstitu tion
Plaintiffs a s s e r t  th a t  th e  United S ta te s  ac tio n s " in terfered  with th e  P ro tection  [* * 3 9 ] o f F u n d a m e n ta l R ights 
a n d  F reedom s of th e  Individual, a s  se t forth  in C h ap te r V of th e  C onstitu tion  o f K enya, a t  s e c tio n s  70 , 72, 74, 
76, 80, 81 an d  8 2 (2 )."  Cplt P 100. As d iscussed  a t leng th  ab o v e , th e  U nited S ta te s  is im m u n e  from  su it in th e  
federal c o u rts  a b se n t an e x p re ss  w aiver of sov ere ig n  im m unity . In th is in s tan c e . Plaintiffs fail to  iden tify  any 
ex p ress  w a iver of im m unity th a t  would perm it such  a su it a g a in s t th e  United S ta te s  b a se d  on th e  law s of 
Kenya. In d e ed , th is is no t surprising , a s  any  w aiver of im m unity  with re sp e c t to  su its  b ro u g h t u n d e r  foreign  
law would b e  in co nsis ten t with th e  policy sc h e m e  em b e d d ed  in th e  FTCA; th e  foreign  co u n try  ex ce p tio n  w as 
ad ded  to th e  FTCjJt specifically to  p rev en t plaintiffs from  su b jec tin g  th e  U nited S ta te s  to  su its  b ro u g h t 
p u rsu an t to  foreign  laws. S e e  S p e la r ,  338 U.S. a t  221 (no ting  th a t  C o n g ress  e x e m p te d  a c tio n s  a ris in g  in 
foreign c o u n trie s  from  th e  FTCA b ecau se  "it w as unwilling to  su b je c t th e  U nited S ta te s  to  liab ilities d ep en d in g  
upon  th e  law s of a  foreign pow er."). The U nited S ta te s  has n o t w aived its im m unity  w ith re s p e c t  to  su its  
b rough t u n d e r  foreign  law, th u s , this C ourt lacks su b jec t m a tte r  ju risd ic tion  o v e r  [* * 4 0 ] P lain tiffs' c laim s 
b rough t u n d e r  th e  Kenyan C onstitu tion  or o th e r  law s of Kenya.
2. The In tern a tio n a l C ovenan t on  Civil and Political R ights
Plaintiffs a s s e r t  th a t  th e  United S ta te s ' ac tio n s befo re  and a f te r  th e  bom bing  o f th e  U.S. E m b assy  In Nairobi 
violated artic les  3, 6, 7, 9 , 10, 17, and 26 of th e  In te rn a tio n a l C o v en an t on  Civil and  Political R ights 
("ICCPR"). Cplt. P105. As n o ted  above, in o rd e r fo r th e  U nited S ta te s  to  be  su b je c t to  Suit, th e re  m u s t  b e  an  
ex p ress w aiver of sovereign  im m unity. T here  is no such  w aiver re la te d  to  c la im s b ro u g h t p u rs u a n t  to  the  
ICCPR. W hen th e  S e n a te  ratified  th e  ICCPR it did so  with a d ec la ra tio n  th a t  a rtic le s  1 to  27 w e re  n o t se lf­
execu ting . 138 Cong. Rec. S 4 7 8 4  (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992). A t re a ty  th a t is no t se lf e x ec u tin g  re q u ire s  fu r th e r  
action  by C ongress to  in co rp o ra te  it into do m estic  law and w ith o u t such  action  c o u rts  m ay  n o t e n fo rc e  su c h  a 
trea ty . S e e  B u e l l  v . M i t c h e l l ,  274 F.3d 337, 372 (6 th  Cir. 2 0 0 1 ) (q u o tin g  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW § 111 (1 9 8 7 )) ("C ourts in th e  U nited S ta te s  a re  bound  to  give e ffec t to  in te rn a tio n a l law an d  
to  in te rnational a g re e m e n ts , e x cep t th a t a 'n o n -se lf-ex ecu tin g ' a g re e m e n t [* * 4 1 ] will n o t b e  g iven  e ffec t a s  
law in th e  a b se n c e  of n ece ssa ry  au th o rity  "). C ourts h av e  uniform ly held  th a t  th e  ICCPR is no t se lf-ex ecu tin g  
and  th a t, th e re fo re , it d o es no t give rise to a  p rivate  righ t of ac tion . S e e ,  e . g . ,  I g a r t u a  D e  L a  R o s a  v . U n i t e d  
S t a t e s ,  32 F.3d 8, 10 n . l  (1 s t Cir. 1994) c e r t ,  d e n ie d ,  514 U.S. 1049, [* 3 0 ] 131 L. Ed. 2d 3 0 8 , 115 S. Ct. 
1426 (1 9 9 5 ) ("Articles 1 th ro u g h  27 of th e  C o v en an t w ere  n o t se lf-ex ecu tin g , an d  could n o t th e re fo re  give 
rise  to  p rivately  en fo rceab le  righ ts u n d e r United S ta te s  law ".); R a lk  v. L in c o ln  C o u n t y ,  81 F. S u p p . 2d 1372, 
1380 (S.D. Ga. 20 0 0 ) (n e ith e r legislative nor ex ecu tiv e  b ran ch  in ten d ed  ICCPR to  be  se lf-ex e cu tin g  an d  no 
private  rig h t of action  w as c re a te d );  W h ite  v .  P a u ls e n ,  997  F. S u p p . 1380, 1387  (E D. W ash . 1 9 9 8 ) (ICCPR 
no t se lf-execu ting  tre a ty  th a t  g ives rise to p riv a te  c a u se  of a c tio n ); R e a v e s  v .  W a r d e n ,  2 0 0 2  U .S. D ist. LEXIS 
62 8 0  (M.D. Pa. March 22, 2 0 0 2 ) (sa m e ); W eaver v. T orres, 2 0 0 0  U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1 9 5 2 9  (D. Md. N o v em b er 
15, 2000) (d ism issing  th e  p la in tiffs  claim u n d e r  th e  ICCPR b e c a u se  it d o e s  n o t c re a te  a  p r iv a te  r ig h t of 
action). [* * 4 2 ] Accordingly, Plaintiffs claim b a se d  on th e  ICCPR m u s t be  d ism issed  fo r fa ilu re  to  s ta te  a 
claim  and for lack of jurisd iction .
i 3. Alleged V iolations of C ustom ary  In terna tional Law
i
Plaintiffs a s s e r t  th a t  "the  United S ta te s  is requ ired  to  e n su re  th e  following rig h ts  w hich h a v e  a ch iev ed  s ta tu s  
as  cu sto m ary  in te rn atio n al law: avo idance  of cruel, inhum an  o r d e g rad in g  tr e a tm e n t  o r p u n ish m en t, 
avoidance o f pro longed  a rb itra ry  de ten tion , and  av o id an ce  of sy s te m a tic  racial d isc rim in a tio n ."  C plt. P 103. 
The R e sta te m e n t (Third) of Foreign Relations Law d efin es cu sto m ary  in te rn a tio n a l la w 'a s  th e  "general and 
c o n sis ten t p ractice  of s ta te s  followed by th em  from  a s e n se  of legal ob liga tion ." 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document? m =91643aeeb475bfaf6739c50a952627bc& ... 6/2/2005
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
L exisN ex is(T M ) A cadem ic - D ocum ent P age 11 o f  12
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102(2). C ertain cu stom ary  in te rnational law s rise  to th e  level of "jus co gens" 
m eaning  th ey  a re  norm s th a t "are  recognized  by th e  in te rn atio n al com m unity  of s t a te s  a s  p e re m p to ry  
(n o rm s), pe rm ittin g  no d e ro g atio n ."  I d .  a t  § 102. The Court of A ppeals for th e  D istrict of C olum bia C ircuit h a s  
n o ted  th a t  no t ev ery  violation of in te rnational law, even  if co m m itted  by th e  U nited S ta te s ,  is a c tio n ab le  in a 
United S ta te s  co u rt. C o m m it t e e  o f  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  [**43] C i t iz e n s  L iv in g  in  N ic a r a g u a  v. R e a g a n ,  2 7 3  U.S. 
App. D.C. 266 , 859  F.2d 929 , 936  (D.C. Cir. 1988). The C i t iz e n s  L iv in g  in  N ic a r a g u a  c o u rt m a k e s  c le a r  th a t  
v iolations o f th o se  portions of custo m ary  in te rnational law th a t  have  not ach iev ed  j u s  c o g e n s  s ta tu s  a re  
clearly no t ac tio n ab le . Id .
Plaintiffs h a v e  no t sufficiently alleged a c au se  of action  u n d e r  cu sto m ary  in te rn a tio n a l law . F o rem o st,
Plaintiffs h a v e  failed to  ind ica te  w hat conduct by th e  United S ta te s  v io la ted  in te rn a tio n a l law. It a p p e a r s  from  
th e  C om plaint th a t  Plaintiffs' first a llegation  regard ing  "cruel, in h um an , or d e g rad in g  tr e a tm e n t  o r 
p u n ish m en t,"  Cplt. P 103, re fe rs  to  th e  U nited S ta te s ' failure to  w arn  K enyans of a th re a t  w hose  valid ity  was 
in doub t, exclusion  of K enyans from  a re a s  a round  th e  bom bing w here  re scu e  a n d  c le a n u p  e ffo rts  w e re  
ongoing, a n d  a failure to  p rov ide  th e  sa m e  a ss is ta n ce  to K enyans as th e  U nited S ta te s  p rov ided  to  its own 
nationals . T he su g g estio n  th a t  such  actions rise to  a violation of in te rn a tio n al n o rm s a g a in s t cruel, in h u m an , 
o r d eg rad in g  p u n ish m en t lacks m erit.
Plaintiffs a lso  a llege  th a t th e  U nited S ta te s  vio lated  a cu sto m ary  in te rn a tio n a l law  n o rm  a g a in s t "p ro lo n g ed  
a rb itra ry  d e te n tio n . [**44] " I d .  This accu sa tio n  clearly  re fe rs  to  th e  fact th a t  a f te r  th e  bom bing , "K enyans 
w ere  den ied  access"  to  certa in  a rea s , "and th e ir m o v em en ts  an d  actions w ere  re s tr ic te d  by th e  U nited  
S ta te s ."  Cplt. P 77. A ssum ing a rg u en d o  th a t such action would qualify a s  "d e te n tio n ,"  Plaintiffs h a v e  still 
failed to  a lleg e  th a t  th e  action  w as "prolonged," o r "arb itrary ." Finally, p laintiffs a lleg e  th a t  th e  U nited  S ta te s  
violated c u s to m a ry  in te rn atio n al law n orm s a g a in s t "sy stem atic  racial d iscrim ination" in its h and ling  of e v e n ts  
in Kenya [* 3 1 ]  before an d  a f te r  th e  bom bing. I d .  P 103. H ow ever, Plaintiffs fail to  a lleg e  fac ts  th a t  would 
d e m o n s tra te  th a t  th e  United S ta te s ' decisions regard ing  th e  provision of m edical a s s is ta n c e  to  A m erican  
n a tionals b u t n o t to  K enyans, ro se  to  th e  level of sy s tem atic  d iscrim ination .
In sum . Plaintiffs fail to  a llege ev en  th e  basic e le m en ts  of a violation of th e  ab o v em en tio n ed  in te rn a tio n a l 
cu sto m s. Accordingly, th e  C ourt will dism iss Plaintiff's c u sto m ary  in te rn atio n al law c la im s p u rsu a n t to  Federal 
Rule of Civil P rocedure  12 (b )(6 ).
E. C o n s t r u c t iv e  T r u s t / P e r m a n e n t  I n ju n c t i o n
C ount Four o f Plaintiffs' C om plaint re q u e s ts  th a t  th is  C ourt req u ire  th e  U nited S ta te s  [* * 4 5 ] to  hold an y  
se ized  a s s e ts  an d  funds of O sam a bin Laden and  a l  Q a e d a  in a  co n stru c tiv e  t ru s t  for th e  "u se , b en efit, and  
en jo y m en t o f th e  plaintiffs an d  prospective  c lass  m em b ers ."  Cplt. P 109. "A co n s tru c tiv e  t ru s t  is a  rem ed y  
th a t  a  co u rt d e v ise s  a fte r  litigation ," U n i t e d  S t a t e s  v . B C C I  H o ld in g s ,  310 U .S. App. D.C. 268 , 46 F .3d 1185 , 
1190 (D.C. Cir. 1995), "to re d re ss  th e  in justice  th a t  would o th e rw ise  occur w hen  o n e  p e rso n  h as  frau d u len tly  
o r w rongfully ob ta in ed  th e  p ro p e rty  of a n o th e r,"  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  v . T a y lo r ,  276 U .S. App. D.C. 84 , 8 6 7  F.2d 
700 , 703 (D .C. Cir. 1989). As th is C ourt d iscu ssed  in M w a n i  v . U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  Civ. A ction No. 9 9 -1 2 5  (Nov.
19, 1999), a  co n stru ctiv e  tru s t  is no t an  in d ep e n d en t cau se  of action . As th is C ourt finds th a t  d ism issa l of 
C ounts O ne, Two and  T hree  a re  ap p ro p ria te , th e re  is no b asis on which to aw ard  in junc tive  re lief o r  a 
co n stru ctiv e  tru s t.
P o l i t ic a l  Q u e s t i o n  D o c t r in e
This C ourt, hav ing  concluded th a t  it lacks su b je c t m a tte r  ju risd ic tion  o v er Plaintiffs' c la im s n eed  n o t re ac h  th e  
issu e  of w h e th e r  th e  Political Q uestion  doc trin e  b a rs  this C o u rt's  review  of th e  c laim s.
I I I .  CONCLUSION
B ased on [* * 4 6 ] th e  foregoing, th e  C ourt finds th a t Plaintiffs have  failed to  e s tab lish  th a t  th is  C o u rt h a s  
su b jec t m a t te r  ju risd ic tion  o v e r th e  claim s a g a in s t th e  United S ta te s  a lleged in C o u n ts  o n e  an d  tw o of th e ir  
com plain t. Having failed to  do  so , th e  C ourt concludes th a t th e s e  C ounts shall b e  d ism issed  w ith re s p e c t  to  
D efendan t U nited  S ta te s  for lack of su b jec t m a tte r  ju risd ic tion  p u rsu a n t to Federal Rule o f Civil P ro c e d u re  12 
(b )(1 ). The C ourt also  finds th a t  Plaintiffs h av e  failed to  s ta te  a  cognizab le  claim  u n d e r  in te rn a tio n a l law. 
T herefo re , P laintiffs' C ount T h ree  shall be  d ism issed  with re sp e c t to  D efen d an t U nited  S ta te s  p u rsu a n t to  
Federal Rule o f Civil P rocedure  1 2 (b )(6 ). Finally, th is C ourt finds th a t th e  b e c a u se  a re q u e s t  fo r a  c o n stru c tiv e  
t ru s t  is n o t a n  in d ep en d en t c au se  o f action . C ount Four m u st a lso  be d ism issed . A ccordingly, D e fen d a n t's  
m otion to d ism iss  is g ra n te d . An ap p ro p ria te  O rd er acco m p an ies th is M em orandum  O pinion.
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D ated ; July 2 9 ,  2 0 0 2  
Colleen Kollar-Kotelly 
U nited S ta te s  D istrict Judge  
ORDER
For ttie  re a so n s  se t  forth  in th e  accom panying  M em orandum  Opinion, it is, th is 2 9  of July, 2 0 0 2 ,  h e reb y
ORDERED th a t  D efen d an t th e  United S ta te s  of A m erica 's [* * 4 7 ] m otion  to  d ism iss [#  6 4 ] is GRANTED; and 
it is fu rth e r
[ * 3 2 ]  ORDERED th a t  th is c a se  is DISMISSED 
SO ORDERED.
COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY 
U nited S ta te s  D istrict Ju d g e
<<p re v io u ; D o c u m e n t  3 1  o f  3 2 . n e x t»  
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MERANIA MURINGU MACHARIA, ET AL., APPELLANTS v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, APPELLEE
No. 02-5252
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
357 U.S. App. D C. 223; 334 F.3d 61; 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 13899
May 13, 2003, Argued 
July 11, 2003, Decided
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: US Supreme Court certiorari denied by M acharia v. United S ta tes, 157 L. Ed. 2d 
1042, 124 S. Ct. 1146, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 681 (U.S., Jan. 20, 2004)
PRIOR HISTORY: [ * * 1 ]  Appeal from the United S tates District Court for the District of Columbia. (No. 
9 9 C V 0 3 2 7 4 ) .  Macharia v. United S tates, 2 3 8  F. Supp. 2d 1 3 ,  2 0 0 2  U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1 4 3 9 8  (D.D.C., 2 0 0 2 )
DISPOSITION: Affirmed.
COUNSEL: Philip M. Musolino argued the cause and Filed the  briefs for appellants.
Michael J. Ryan, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Roscoe C. 
Howard, Jr., U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney. Robin M. Earnest, Assistant U.S. 
Attorney, entered an appearance.
JUDGES: Before; GINSBURG, Chief Judge, and ROGERS and TAFEL, Circuit Judges. Opinion for the Court 
filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.
OPINIONBY:TATEL
OPINION: (*63) TATEL, C ir c u it  Judg e '. Appellants, a prospective class of m ore than  5,000 Kenyan citizens 
and businesses injured in the  1998 bombing of the United S ta te s  Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, sued the  United 
S tates under the  Federal Tort Claims Act alleging that the governm ent negligently failed to secure the 
Embassy and to warn of a potential terrorist attack. Following limited jurisdictional discovery, the district 
court dism issed the complaint, finding that the discretionary function, foreign country, and independent 
contractor exceptions to the  Federal Tort Claims Act's waiver of sovereign imm unity bar appellants' claims.
We affirm [**2] in all respects.
1 .
At approximately 10;30 on the morning of August 7, 1998, an explosives-laden truck dispatched by the al 
Qaeda terrorist network approached the entrance to the rear parking lot of the United S ta tes Embassy in 
Nairobi, Kenya. An em bassy guard, a Kenyan employed by UIIS, a security com pany working under contract 
with the S ta te  Departm ent, refused to open the Embassy ga te . Blocked from entering the compound, one of 
the two terrorists began shooting while the o ther threw a flash grenade  a t ano ther guard. Unarmed and 
unable to notify the Embassy's detachm ent of United S ta tes Marines e ither by telephone or radio, the  guards 
ran for cover. Although apparently still off-premises, the terrorists d e tonated  their explosives, causing
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massive internal dam age to the Embassy, killing 44 Embassy employees and approxim ately 200 Kenyan 
citizens, injuring som e 4,000 individuals, and causing the collapse of an adjacent building. Approximately 
nine m inutes later, another al Qaeda terrorist detonated an explosives-laden truck som e thirty-five feet from 
the outer wall of the United States Embassy in Oar Es Salaam, Tanzania. That attack killed twelve people and 
injured eighty-Tive, [♦♦3J
Appellants, all Kenyan Citizens and businesses injured in the Nairobi bombing, filed suit against the  United 
S ta tes in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia alleging that governm ent actions and inactions 
led to the  bombing and exacerbated appellants' injuries. Brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA),
28 U.S.C. § 2671 e t Sep., counts I and II of the complaint allege that the United S ta tes Embassy was 
inherently dangerous; th a t S ta te  Departm ent employees knew or should have known about a likely attack  on 
th e  Embassy and that despite this knowledge they failed to warn their superiors, the  Embassy, and Kenyan 
citizens; that the S ta te  D epartm ent failed to provide properly trained security personnel to th e  Embassy and 
to take necessary  security precautions to prevent an attack; and that as a result of these  shortcom ings, the 
Embassy had becom e a private and public nuisance. Counts I and II also seek  to hold the United S ta tes  liable 
for the negligence of the UIIS guards. Count III alleges that the governm ent's security failures violated 
custom ary international law, the Kenyan Constitution, and the International [*64] Covenant on Civil and 
Political [**4] Rights (ICCPR). Count IV seeks formation of a constructive tru st to hold any a sse ts  or funds 
seized by the  United S ta tes from Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda for the benefit of plaintiffs and prospective 
class m em bers.
Invoking the discretionary function and foreign country exceptions to the FTCA's limited w aiver of sovereign 
immunity, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a), (k), the government moved to dismiss. Before ruling on the  governm ent's 
motion, th e  district court allowed plaintiffs three  months of jurisdictional discovery. See M acharia v. United 
S ta tes, No. 99-3574 (D.D.C. March 26, 2001). During discovery, the governm ent objected to plaintiffs' effoits 
to obtain information from any agency other than the S tate D epartm ent. The governm ent also objected to 
any discovery on the  m erits. A m agistrate judge sustained both objections, and the  district court denied 
plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration. See Macharia v. United S tates, No. 99-3274 (D.D.C. Dec. 17, 2001).
Following completion of jurisdictional discovery, the district court dism issed th e  complaint. M a c h a r ia  v.
U nited  S ta tes , 238 F. Supp. 2d 13 (D.D.C. 2002). Rather than "apply the  heightened [**5] requirem ents of 
[Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 12(b)(6) and treat all factual allegations -- including those related to 
jurisdiction -  in the complaint as true," id. at 21 (internal quotation m arks om itted), the court trea ted  the 
governm ent's jurisdictional argum ents as a "factual challenge," id . at 20, under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(1), and required plaintiffs to "demonstrate" "through testim ony and affidavits" th a t the "CcijC 
is properly before the court," id . a t 21. Observing that plaintiffs "were afforded th ree  m onths of discovery on 
the jurisdictional question, " id ., the court rejected plaintiffs' contention th a t it "should not dism iss the  action 
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) because [they] have not had the opportunity to conduct sufficient jurisdictional 
discovery in this case," id . With respect to m ost allegations contained in counts I and II, the court found thai 
"the decisions m ade by [the United States] regarding the security of the Embassy and warnings of possible 
th rea ts a re  clearly discretionary in nature and grounded in policy and therefore[] do not fall within the  FTCA'= 
waiver of sovereign [**6] immunity." Id . at 26. The district court dism issed all claims based on th e  alleged 
negligence of the UIIS guards under the foreign country and independent contractor exceptions to  the  FTCA. 
Id . at 26-28. As to count III, the court held th a t sovereign immunity bars plaintiffs' Kenyan Constitution and 
ICCPR claims, and that plaintiffs had failed to allege a claim under custom ary international law. Id . a t 2 8 -3 ’ . 
Having dism issed plaintiffs' substantive claims, the district court dismissed count IV, explaining th a t "a 
constructive trust is not an independent cause of action." Id  a t 31.
Plaintiffs now challenge the district court's discovery rulings and its dismissal of their complaint. Our review of 
the district court's dismissal of the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b) 
(6) is de novo, see  Stokes v. Cross, 356 U.S. App. D C. 73, 327 F.3d 1210, 1214 (D C. Cir. 2003); we review 
the district court's discovery rulings for abuse of discretion, see  Goodm an Hold ings  v. Rafidain B ank, 307 U.S. 
App. D C. 79, 26 F.3d 1143, 1147 (D C. Cir. 1994).
II.
The FTCA authorizes district [**7] courts to hear suits for money dam ages against the  United S ta tes "for 
injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or om ission of 
any employee of the Governm ent ... if [*65] a private person ... would be liable to the claimant in 
accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). The Act's 
waiver of sovereign immunity has various exceptions, however. We agree with the district court th a t three  of 
those exceptions -- discretionary function, foreign country, and independent contractor -- bar appellants'
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claims under counts I and H.
D is c r e t io n a r y  F u n c t io n  E x c e p t io n
The FTCA's discretionary function exception bars claims "based upon the exercise or perform ance or the 
failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee 
of the Government, w hether or not the discretion involved be abused." 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). In U n ite d  S ta te s  
V. G a u b e r t,  499 U.S. 315, 322-23, 113 L. Ed. 2d 335, 111 S. Ct. 1267 (1991), the Supreme Court 
established a tw o-part te s t for determining whether [**8] the  discretionary function exception applies in a 
particular case. First, because "the exception covers only acts th a t are discretionary in nature, acts that 
involve an e lem ent of judgm ent or choice," id .  a t 322 (internal quotation m arks om itted), G a u b e r t 's  first step 
requires that we determ ine w hether any "federal sta tu te , regulation, or poiicy specifically prescribes a course 
of action for an em ployee to  follow," id .  If one does, "the em ployee has no rightful option but to adhere to 
the directive." B e r k o v i t z  v. U n ite d  S ta te s ,  486 U.S. 531, 536, 100 L. Ed. 2d 531, 108 S. Ct. 1954 (1988). 
Under G a u b e r t 's  second step , which applies when there  is no "federal statu te, regulation, or policy" and when 
th e  "challenged conduct involves an elem ent of judgment," id . ,  the court m ust decide "whether the  judgment 
is of the kind th a t the discretionary function exception was designed to shield," id .  "Because the purpose of 
the  exception is to p revent judicial 'second-guessing' of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in 
social, economic, and political policy through the medium of an action in tort," the Supreme Court explained, 
"when [**9] properly construed, the exception protects only governm ental actions and decisions based on 
considerations of public policy." G a u b e r t,  499 U.S. at 323 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
In this case, even after several m onths of discovery, appellants failed to establish, as G a u b e r fs  first step 
requires, the existence of a "federal statu te, regulation, o r policy" th a t applies to any of the governm ent's 
allegedly negligent coViduct, including the governm ent's alleged failure to secure the Embassy and to warn of 
a potential attack. This failure is hardly surprising, for as the district court explained, "determ inations about 
what security precautions to adopt a t American em bassies, and w hat security information to pass on, and to 
whom this information should be given, do not involve th e  mechanical application of se t rules, but ra ther the 
constant exercise of judgm en t and discretion." M a c h a r ia ,  238 F. Supp. 2d at 23. Indeed, the Secretary of 
S ta te  has authority to "develop and implement ... policies and program s, including funding levels and 
standards, to provide for the  security of United States Governm ent operations of a diplomatic [*♦ 10] 
nature," 22 U.S.C. § 4 8 02(a)(1 ), and the "Physical Security S tandards ' section of the S tate Departm ent's 
Foreign Affairs Manual instructs "project m anagers and regional security officers ... [to] follow all standards to 
the maximum ex ten t possible," UNITED STATES DEP'T OF STATE FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, 12 FAN 314.1. 
The manual also directs foreign service officers to engage in a process of
risk m anagem ent ... beginning with an assessm ent of the  value of the assets, [*66] the degree 
of a specific type of th rea t, and the extent of the vulnerabilities... A decision is then m ade as to 
what level of risk can be accepted and which counterm easures should be applied. Such a 
decision involves a cost-benefit analysis, giving decision m akers the  ability to weigh varying 
security risk levels against the cost of specific counterm easures.
I d . ,  12 FAH-6 H-511.4. In short, embassy security is vested In the discretion of State Departm ent employees, 
from the Secretary to the  foreign service officers at various em bassies. S e e  M a c h a r ia ,  238 F. Supp. 2d r t  
23-24.
Conceding that they "did not rely on any documents" to dem onstra te  th a t [**11] a "federal sta tu te , 
regulation, or policy" applied to the governm ent's conduct. Appellants' Reply Br. at 6, appellants contend that 
the discretionary function exception is nevertheless inapplicable because the government failed to follow an 
u n w r i t t e n  federal policy. According to appellants, the Office of Diplomatic Security (DS), the office within the 
State D epartm ent responsible for em bassy security, failed to file "trip reports" with the Embassy's Regional 
Security Officer following visits to the Embassy in March and June 1998, even though " [a] team  trip report 
would have been a norm al practice.' " Appellants' Reply Br. a t 6 (citing Williams Dep. a t 125:19-20). OS's 
failure to file a trip report, appellants maintain, left the Embassy with inadequate guidance about how to 
improve security and to p revent al Qaeda's attack.
Even assuming an unw ritten practice can satisfy the s ta tu te 's  requirem ent, appellants have failed to establish 
that DS had a m a n d a t o r y  obligation to file a trip report. To the  contrary, although the record estahlisties that
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filing trip reports was OS's "procedure," one witness testified that "reality som etim es intercedes, and you do 
not have sufficient [**12] time to do something as formal as ... a trip report." Flowers Dep. at 51:15-17.
The sam e w itness explained that filing a trip report "would be ideal, but it could have been that the people 
that were team  leaders ... were immediately sent on o ther trips or to handle other pressing business... If [the 
diplomatic security agent] was called away before he had a chance to write a trip report, it might be 
som etim e before he ge ts to it or it could be never if this flood of work doesn 't give him the  opportunity to do 
it." I d .  a t 49 :7 -21 . The record thus establishes only th a t filing trip reports was preferred, not that it was 
required, i . e . ,  not that it am ounted to a mandatory policy.
Having failed to identify a relevant "federal statu te, regulation, or policy" under G a u b e r f s  first step, 
appellants contend that the-discretionary function exem ption is inapplicable under the second step because 
th e  governm ent's conduct was the product of simple negligence ra ther than social, political, or economic 
considerations. Specifically, appellants cite twenty-one instances of alleged governm ent negligence, from its 
failure to fix a pin in the drop bar a t the Embassy's rear [**13] parking lot to its failure to timely design a 
training program  for vehicle bomb recognition and prevention that led to appellants' injuries. S e e  Appellants' 
Br. a t 25-26. The district court helpfully distilled these  allegations into six categories:
1) a failure to provide guidance and advice on improving security a t the Embassy, 2) a failure to 
provide security equipm ent to the Embassy, 3) a failure to train adequately Embassy personnel 
and contractors to deal with various security th rea ts , 4) a failure to warn adequately Embassy 
personnel, and others, of potential terrorist th rea ts , 5) an improper classification of the level of 
securit/^  [*67] risk a t the Embassy, or 6) falsely leading Embassy personnel to believe that 
security  analyses had been conducted or would be  conducted.
M a c h a r ia ,  238 F. Supp. 2d a t 22. The district court concluded that all six categories w ere barred by the 
second step  of the  discretionary function test. I d .  As the  district court explained, "decisions regarding how 
much safety equipm ent should be provided to a particular em bassy, how much training should be given to 
guards and em bassy em ployees, and the am ount of security-related [**14] guidance th a t should be 
provided necessarily entails balancing competing dem ands for funds and resources." M a c h a r ia ,  238 F. Suop. 
2d at 25. "Each individual em bassy 's need for security," the  district court noted;
m ust be balanced against the need perceived a t o ther em bassies, and the need for security 
m ust be balanced against the need for alternative projects that could consum e scarce resources. 
M oreover, each of D efendant's decisions regarding security involved balancing potential 
inconvenience to S ta te  D epartm ent em ployees against the perceived security gains th a t woul ! 
result from a safety m easure.
I d .  We have little to add to the district court's fine analysis, except to note that, as the governm ent points 
out in its brief, "decisions about foreign em bassies, especially their location and structure, require agency 
officials to account for policy objectives, and consult and negotiate with the  host country-actions that, by 
their very nature , affect foreign relations." Appellee's Br. a t 27.
Appellants insist that "nothing in the record supports the notion that anyone at DS decided' to: make 
inaccurate s ta tem en ts , fail to keep a promise, fail [**15] to send a report, fail to send a report on tim e, 
overlook a broken pin or outdated  dropbar, or fail to correct m isapprehensions." Appellants' Br. at 30. Put 
another way, appellants m aintain that G a u b e r fs  second step  requires evidence that decision m akers actually 
considered social, economic, or policy considerations. But we rejected ju st this argum ent in C o p e  v. Scoff, 
310 U.S. App. D.C. 144, 45 F.3d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citation om itted): "What m atters Is not what the 
decisionm aker was thinking, but whether the type of decision being chalienged is grounded  in social, 
economic, or political policy. Evidence of the actual decision may be helpful in understanding whether the 
'nature ' of the decision implicated policy judgm ents, but the applicability of the exemption does not turn on 
w hether the  challenged decision involved such judgm ents."
Appellants' challenges to the district court's discovery orders require little discussion. They argue that the
http://web.lexis-nexis.com/uni verse/document?_m=d6b5f2756847ddd62f969bd45ffee4e2... 5/12/2005
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
LexisNexis(TM ) Academic - Document Page 5 o f  6
district court improperly applied a factual attack standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), 
which requires plaintiffs to dem onstrate through affidavits and other testim ony that the court has jurisdiction, 
[**16] instead  of a facial attack standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), where the court 
accepts the  plaintiffs' allegations as true. S e e  G o u ld  E le c s ., In c .  v. U n ite d  S ta te s ,  220 F.3d 169, 178 (3d Cir. 
2000). According to appellants, the district court's choice of a factual attack standard  was error, since the 
court allowed discovery only regarding physical security and denied appellants a chance to conduct discovery 
on "threat response." Appellants' Br. a t 18. In support of this allegation, appellants point out that the 
deponents offered by the governm ent declined to answer any questions on the th rea t issue, but appellants 
ignore the  fact that those deponents were not asked to testify on that issue. Moreover, as the government 
observes, "appellants refute their [*68] own argum ent by citing docum ents on th reat information that 
appellee produced in discovery, to support their claim of failure to dissem inate th rea t information." Appeilee's 
Br. at 42. The district court thus properly employed a factual attack  standard under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(1).
Nor do we de tect any abuse of discretion in the district court's other discovery orders. The S tate [**17] 
D epartm ent's statutory responsibility for em bassy security obviated the need for discovery in o ther 
departm ents and agencies. S e e  22 U.S.C. § 4802. Likewise, discovery on the  m erits would have been entirely 
Irrelevant to th e  jurisdictional issue raised by the governm ent's motion to dismiss. See I g n a t ie v  v . U n ite d  
S ta te s ,  345 U.S. App. D.C. 85, 238 F.3d 464, 467 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (rem anding dismissal of FTCA claim for 
jurisdictional discovery).
F o r e ig n  C o u n t r y  a n d  In d e p e n d e n t  C o n t r a c t o r  E x c e p t io n s
Our conclusion regarding the discretionary function exception leaves only appellants' allegations of negligence 
by Embassy guards. According to appellants, the Kenyans UIIS hired as Embassy guards lacked adequate 
training and equipm ent, and negligently failed to identify and stop the terrorists from detonating the bomb. 
We agree with the district court that the independent contractor and foreign country exceptions bar these 
claims.
The FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity applies only to tortious acts undertaken by "officers or employees 
of any federal agency ... and persons acting on behalf of a federal agency in an official capacity." 28 U.S.C 6 
2671. [**18] The Act defines "federal agency" as "the executive departm ents[,] ... independent 
establishm ents of the United S ta tes, and corporations primarily acting as instrum entalities or agencies of the 
United S ta tes, but does not include any contractor with the United S tates. " I d .  The Suprem e Court has 
interpreted this language, referred to  as the  "independent contractor exception," to m ean that a contractor's 
negligence may only be imputed to the  United S ta tes if the contractor's “day-to-day operations are 
supervised by th e  Federal Government. " U n ite d  S ta te s  v. O r le a n s ,  425 U.S. 807, 815, 48 L. Ed. 2d 390, 96 S. 
Ct. 1971 (1976). "A critical elem ent in distinguishing an agency from a contractor," the Court explained, "is 
th e  power of th e  Federal Governm ent 'to  control the detailed physical perform ance of the contractor.' I d  a I 
814 (quoting L o g u e  v. U n ite d  S ta te s ,  412 U.S. 521, 528, 37 L. Ed. 2d 121, 93 S. Ct. 2215 (1973)).
Appellants contend that DS designed the Embassy's contracts for employing local guards, handled all 
paym ents to UIIS, and regularly provided advice regarding the contracts. See Appellants' Br. at 33 They 
also [**19] contend that the contract required UIIS to provide the S tate Departm ent with the nam es of the 
local guards it employed, to subm it the  nam es of all personnel to the Departm ent for approval, to ens a e that 
guards w ear uniforms approved by the  D epartm ent, and to conduct inventories as directed by the 
D epartm ent. I d .  Far from dem onstrating day-to-day S tate Departm ent supervision of the contractor, 
however, these allegations establish only th a t "the contract set forth detailed guidelines and regulations ti; jt 
the  contractor was required to conform with as it implemented its hiring, supervision and training of Embassy 
local guards." M a c h a r ia ,  238 F. Supp. 2d a t 28. As the  Suprem e Court held in O rle a n s ,  the governm ent maj 
"fix specific and precise conditions toam plem ent fédérai objectives" without becoming liable for an 
independent [*69] contractor's negligence. O rle a n s , 425 U.S. a t 816.
To be sure, appellants presented evidence th a t supervision of the UIIS contract am ounted to a "full time job 
for one [A ssistant Regional Security Officer]." Appellants' Br. at 34. Although this may well constitute the sort 
of day-to-day supervision falling outside the [**20] independent contractor exception, Assistant Regional 
Security Officers are located overseas -- in this case, in Nairobi -- and the FTCA's sovereign immunity waiver 
does not extend to acts or omissions arising in territory subject to the sovereign authority of ano ther nation. 
See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k); see a ls o  U n ite d  S ta te s  v. S p e la r ,  338 U.S. 217, 221, 94 L. Ed. 3, 70 S. Ct. 10 
(1949) (purpose of foreign country exception is to avoid having another country's law define the scope of the 
federal governm ent's tort liability). Moreover, to the extent that appellants allege negligent supervision of 
local guards by S tate Departm ent em ployees located in the United S tates, those allegations are, for the
httpV/web.lexis-nexis.com/uni verse/document?_m=d6b5f2756847ddd62f969bd45ffec4e2... 5/12/2005
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reasons given above, barred by the discretionary function exception. See s u p r a  pp. 6-10.
III.
Having considered appellants' remaining arguments and finding no basis for questioning the  district court's 
disposition, we affirm in all respects.
S o  o r d e r e d .
Hprevious D ocum ent 4  o f 4.
Terms & Conditions Privacy Copyright,© 2005 LexisNexis, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All Rights Reservt
http://web.lcxis-nexis.com/uni verse/document?_m=d6b5f2756847ddd62f969bd45ffee4e2... 5/12/2005
Reprotjucetj with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproctuction prohibitect without permission.
APPENDIX III
UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA LAS VEGAS 
DOCUMENTATIONS
Pp. 335-338
335
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
UNTV
DATE; May 16,2001
TO: Ondieki Kennedy
Anthropology 
M/S 5003
FROM: lft> Dr. Fred Preston,
UNLV Social/Behavioral Sciences Institutional Review Board
RE: Status of Human Subject Protocol Entitled:
“Socio-Cultural & Political Responses to Terrorism in the 1998 US Embassy 
Bombings in Kenya & Tanzania”
(Reviewed by Dr. Michael Stitt, UNLV Social/Behavioral Sciences IRB) 
OPRS# lOlsOSOl-033
This memorandum is official notification that the protocol for the project referenced above has 
been reviewed by the Office for the Protection of Research Subjects and has been determined as 
have having met the criteria for exemption from full review by the UNLV Social/Behavioral 
Sciences Institutional Review Board. In compliance with this determination of exemption from 
full review, this protocol is approved for a period of one year from the date of this notification 
and work on the project may proceed.
Should the use of human subjects described in this protocol continue beyond a year from the date 
of this notification, it will be necessary to request an extension. Should you require any 
change(s) to the protocol, it will be necessary to request such change through the Office for the 
Protection of Research Subjects in writing.
If you have any questions or require assistance, please contact the Office for the Protection of 
Research Subjects at 895-2794.
cc: OPRS File
Office for the Protection of R esearch Subjects 
4505 Maryland Parkway • Box 451046 • Las Vegas. Nevada 89154-1046 
(702) 895-2794 •  FAX (702) 895-4242
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UNTV
May 16,2002
To Whom It May Concern:
This is to request permission to conduct field research and particularly interview willing 
Kenyan victims/survivors and government officials on the social effects of transnational non­
governmental terrorism in regards to the US embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 
August 7" 1998. This study is intended to meet my doctoral dissertation requirement in the 
department o f Anthropology and Ethnic Studies in the University of Nevada Las Vegas. The 
purpose of this study is to understand how the victims/survivors cope with the tragedy in the 
afiermath of the bomb and how the two affected cotmtries—Kenya and Tanzania respond to 
transnational terrorism to prevent future terror attacks %ainst innocent civilians.
Your cooperation and assistance in this study is highly appreciated.
Yours Sincerely
K b i^ ^ G . Ondieki 
4423 El Canqjana Way 
Las Vega, Nevada 89121 
(702) 898-9637
D epartm ent of Antfiropology 
Ethnic Studies
4505 Maryland Parkway •  Box 455003 • Las Vegas, Nevada 89154-5003 
(702) 895-3590 •  FAX (702) 895-4823
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Description of Study
1. In this study, I intend to use a snowballing and participant observation approach to 
ascertain that both male and female bomb survivors are equally selected to participate in this 
investigation. 1 do not intend to pay participants because I am financing the bulk of the costs for 
this research.
2. The aim of this study is to understand how African bomb survivors think about terrorism 
and how they are coping with the tragedy in the aftermath of the US embassy bombings. I believe 
that the most useful method that will help me understand the survivors’ responses is ethnography. 
This is because the ethnographic method allows me an informal strategy to interview and record 
the survivors’ reactions without sounding as if I am interrogating tkm . Again, this method will 
allow survivors an opportunity to tell me in their own words what is important about the bomb 
tragedy. 1 intend to pose general statements that 1 believe will be significant in understanding 
terrorism from the perspective of the survivors. For instance, 1 will ask survivors to tell me what 
happened on August 7'*' 1998 in regards to the US embassy bombing and how they are coping 
with the tragedy.
3. Since this study intends to use the ethnographic method, 1 will pose informal questions that 
will not put respondents at risk. 1 will let the survivors share with me freely what they think is 
important in dealing with the tragedy.
4. The results from this study may be used to make recommendations to the government 
agencies that directly deal with terrorism prevention and disaster relief. 1 believe that if the 
survivors’ responses are incorporated into an overall prevention of terrorism program, the 
government agencies will be better prepared to deal with future terrorist activities and be in a 
better position to assist bomb survivors to cope with the tragedy.
5. Since this study deals primarily with the often neglected sector of human cruelty-the 
survivors, I believe that through this study, the research will give bomb survivors a voice to 
express their trials and tribulations in coping with terrorism.
6. 1 will interview those bomb survivors who will be willing to participate and have no 
expectation of being rewarded with cash monies except on occasion a cup of tea or nyama chôma 
(roasted goat meat) as sign of courtesy. Therefore, during my study, 1 do not intend to incur any 
ex tra  c o s ts  b e y o n d  th o se  req u ired  by common sense and courtesy.
7. From time to time, I will remind the participants (survivors) that if they want to remain 
anonymous their wishes will be honored. 1 will also remind them that the information 1 obtain 
from them will be stored at an undisclosed location preferably in the United States for at least 
three years after the completion of my research.
Departm ent of Anthropology 
Ethnic Studies
4505 Maryland Parkway •  Box 455003 • Las Vegas, Nevada 89154-5003 
(702) 895-3590 •  FAX (702) 895-4823
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Informed Consent
I am Kennedy G. Ondieki, a doctoral student at the University o f Nevada Las Vegas in the 
Department o f Anthropology and Ethnic Studies. I am conducting an ethnographic study on the 
social consequences o f terrorism in regards to the US embassy bombings in East Africa in 1998. I 
am interested in understanding what you think about terrorism and how you are coping with the 
tragedy in the aftermath o f the bomb.
If you wish to participate you are highly welcome. But it is important to understand that you 
will not be paid for time or information that you will be providing. This is because I am a student 
collecting data towards the writing and completion o f  my doctoral degree. This interview is 
informal and thus 1 will be asking you very general questions in regard to what you think about 
the bombing, how you are coping with the tragedy, and what you think should be done to prevent 
future terrorist activities in this country.
Your responses to these questions depends what you wish to share with me on this subject. It 
is also important to know that the information that you will provide will not be used against you 
in any way, shape, or form to put you or yoiu family members in danger. I remind you that 
participation in this study is voluntary and so you are free to withdraw from this study at any time 
without penalty or ill-feeling. 1 assure you that your confidentiality and anonymity and other 
wishes that you may have including not being taped will be honored. 1 also assure that all the 
information obtained from you will be stored in a safe place and more specifically it will be 
archived in the department o f Anthropology and Ethnic Studies in the University o f Nevada Las 
Vegas for at least three years after the completion o f this research.
For further questions about this research, please feel free to contact:
1. University o f  Nevada Las Vegas Office for the Protection o f  Research Subjects, 702-895-2794
2. Dr. Tony Miranda—Chair o f Anthropology and Ethnic Studies, 702-895-3590
3. Dr. Gary Palmer—Dissertation Chair, Anthropology and Ethnic Studies, 702-895-3307
Yours Sincerely,
K eru T ed y  G . O n d ie k i  
4423 El Campana Way 
Las Vegas NV 89121 
702-898-9637
D e p a r tm e n t of A n th ro p o lo g y  
E thnic S tu d ie s
4 5 0 5  M aryland P arkw ay  •  B ox 4 5 5 0 0 3  •  L as V eg as , N evada  8 9 1 5 4 -5 0 0 3  
(702) 8 9 5 -3 5 9 0  •  FAX (702) 8 9 5 -4 8 2 3
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